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Thesis Abstract 
The world is still groping under the yoke of seeking lasting solutions to some stubborn 
international conflicts that have resisted myriad resolution attempt with no solutions 
still in sight. This is despite the imposing presence of the UN and the growing 
sophistication in the art and science of conflict resolution. The compelling fact 
necessitating this research is that the world has classified such age-long conflicts as 
“intractable” giving the impression of fait-accompli. Excitingly, the 1994/95 collapse 
of the 48years Apartheid conflict, which was hitherto regarded as one of the world’s 
worst intractable conflict, was a contradiction of this idea of intractability. Hence 
South Africa Blaise the trail that these so-called intractable conflicts are tractable after 
all. 
This research aims at identifying the totality of instruments employed by South Africa 
to achieve this success. While operating within a multidisciplinary purview of the 
intersection between, Politics, International Relations, Philosophy as well as language 
and Communication. The methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and 
Giorgio Agamben’s “Exclusive Inclusive Philosophy of the Homo Sacer”, were 
applied in the analysis and interpretation of the emerging narratives from the TRC 
report. The purpose is to discover the underlying theories and principles that animate 
the mediation process in order to understand this South African recipe for intractable 
conflict. 
Emerging from the above processes is the discovery that the South African success 
story rests on a home-grown intervention process. That which involves negotiations 
that ultimately led to the emergence of a new constitution and the Institution of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which is vested with the responsibility of 
dealing with the atrocities of the past, in a manner that creates no winner or loser. 
The findings further reveal, that underlying these negotiations and operation of the 
TRC is the fundamental principle of “deconstruction of absolute ideas”. Emanating 
from this were a set of seven paradoxical couplets upon which the South African 
success story was brewed. These Seven paradoxes constitute a significant contribution 
to knowledge. They include Peace without Reconciliation, Unification without 
Harmony, Healing without Forgetting, Confession without Remorse, Amnesty without 
Forgiveness, Tolerance without Friendship, and Truth without Justice.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction to Thesis. 
1.0 Goals of the Study 
 
The fundamental problem necessitating this research is the observation that between 
1994 and 1995, a conflict that had fiercely ravaged South African society for almost 
five decades was ‘resolved’. This was a dramatic turn of events for a conflict hitherto 
labelled as ‘intractable’ (Jones 2015) for the singular fact that it had stubbornly refused 
resolution and mediation for nearly 48 years.  With such a revolutionary turn-around - 
following many failed interventions - the need to fully understand the factors that 
underlay South Africa’s transition appear compelling. The driving impulse behind this 
research has been to identify the theoretical principles that underlay the ‘when, why 
and how’ of this conflict de-escalation. The thesis examines the mediation processes 
and nation-building mechanisms deployed to identify and isolate the fundamental 
elements and underlying theoretical principles (both explicit and implicit) employed 
in the construction of a new democratic South Africa. It is hoped that identifying the 
instruments and properties at the base of the South African success story can help in 
understanding the fragile dynamics under which peace was attained.  
The South African peace process was actualised via the establishment of an 
unprecedented and quite remarkable ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ whose 
operation can be justifiably credited with preventing South Africa spiralling into civil 
war. It seems a reasonable proposition to suggest that what happened in South Africa 
was as a result of a novel approach, method and strategy of conflict resolution (i.e. 
TRC). This dissertation seeks to explore this proposition and identify the constituent 
elements that made peace possible. It argues that underlying the physical process of 
negotiation and reconciliation initiated by the TRC are rigorous theoretical principles 
that can be credited with its success and stability. However, the dominant themes at 
play here are complex, contradictory and need of deconstruction. This thesis argues 
the way forward to understanding is found through a discourse analysis of TRC 
evidence twinned with a theoretical framework that utilises Agamben’s philosophy of 
the Homo Sacer. It is Agamben’s positioning of “exclusive inclusion” that help point 
towards themes of ‘complimentary contradiction’ at the heart of this project.   
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The need to investigate the elements that accounted for South Africa’s success seem 
important for at least three main reasons: first, because there may be lessons to learn 
that can be useful in the mediation of other conflicts; second, a clearer understanding 
of the underlying philosophical principles and mechanisms upon which the peace 
process was built can aid the future management and sustainability of post-apartheid 
South Africa; and three, because understanding the reasons behind South Africa’s 
story should help articulate and identify the generic principles upon which age-long 
conflicts can be successfully de-escalated. This, in turn, could also open up room for 
further research towards potent instruments for de-escalating other similar global 
conflicts. The research objectives of this thesis are hence: 
1. To subject to interrogation the narratives within the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission reports. Which dominant underlying themes and principles 
underlie the instruments of negotiations and institution of the TRC that 
informed moves from apartheid to democracy? 
2. To demonstrate how Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) can help unpack the 
understanding of the South African transition from apartheid to majority rule. 
To what extent can CDA provide a coherent framework for understanding 
conflict analysis in post-apartheid South Africa? 
3. To show how Agamben’s theory of exclusive inclusion of the Homo Sacer can 
be usefully applied to the rhetoric and narratives that ultimately resolved the 
apartheid conflict. How can Agamben’s theory of exclusive inclusion provide a 
coherent explanation for the complementary and contradictory narratives that 
together account for the transition from warring to a peaceful society? 
1.1 Rationale and Structure 
This research was originally provoked by the recognition that there are some conflicts 
in the world believed to be irresolvable. We tend to label such conflicts as ‘intractable’ 
largely because myriad efforts have been made at resolving them but to no avail.  Some 
such conflicts are identified in the table below: 
 
 
3 
 
 
A cross-section of a diagram showing examples of intractable conflicts 
By Dan Jones (2015:148-149) 
Bercovitch (2003) argues that intractable conflicts are amongst the most dangerous 
conflicts in the world because they threaten not only their immediate locality but the 
entire globe (e.g. ‘spill-over’ terrorism). According to researchers such as Bremer 
(1992), Goertz and Diehl (1992), these conflicts accounted for about 45% of all 
militarised disputes between the years 1816-1986 and half the wars since 1816. 
Parakrama (2001) argues that despite the end of the Cold War there are approximately 
900 million people (one-sixth of the world’s population) belonging to disadvantaged 
communal groups in or on the verge of conflict. In a similar vein, Isseroff (2003) 
concludes that seemingly intractable conflicts often end with a series of failed accords 
and resolutions as evidenced by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The original driver of 
this thesis was thus on the one hand, to identify the causes of ‘intractability’ in societal 
conflicts in general; and on the other, to identify how such intractable conflicts could 
become tractable. After an investigative literature review, however, it was decided that 
the best way forward (i.e. it was more do-able) be to identify one intractable conflict 
and use it as a case study. Studying the case of South Africa revealed two major 
features to this researcher. First, South Africa had embarked on a series of genuine 
negotiations that were entirely homegrown without external mediation; second, the 
institution of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, founded upon both implicit 
and explicit principles, appeared by nature ‘paradoxical’ in order to compute the 
complexities of apartheid atrocities, human right violations and injustices of the past.  
By ‘paradoxical’ it is argued that the TRC was vested with the responsibility of 
granting amnesty to perpetrators who publicly confessed all atrocities. This truth 
commission seemed quite novel compared to ‘traditional’ War Crime Tribunals such 
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as Nuremberg ( Philips: 2008). Also, this originality led this researcher to wonder what 
elements in the negotiation and mediation processes may help explain this. It was 
speculated there must be some fundamental constructs and theoretical bias upon which 
both the spirit and letter of the negotiations and the institution of the TRC was based 
right from its conception, constitution and implementation. Moreover, it was 
determined that these could only be comprehended if there were a careful study and 
rigorous analysis of the elements and processes involved in order to identify the 
underlying theoretical principles at play. 
This thesis identifies the methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the 
instrument that can be most effectively used to prosecute the intended research agenda 
(see Chapter Two for a detailed discussion). Critical Discourse Analysis is used 
precisely because it is capable of supporting a rigorous analysis of text and language 
that goes beyond explication and implication in order to give rise to interpretation and 
meaning. Some of the main themes that CDA addresses include: social problems; 
power relations as discourse; discourse constitutes society and culture; discourse as 
ideology; discourse as history; the link between text and society is mediated; discourse 
analysis is interpretative and explanatory,  discourse is a form of social action 
(Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 271-80).  A number of alternative mixed method 
quantitative and qualitative approaches have been previously deployed by researchers 
(Guelke, 2005, Asmal, Louise  and Roberts.1997, Gounden and Solomon,2001, Huyse, 
2001, Lansing and King,1998, Mamdani, 2002, Minow, 1998 etc) in the analysis of 
the problem of Apartheid.  The most useful of these scholars is probably Moon (2006) 
who believed understanding could not be founded on anyone else, but Foucault. 
According to Moon, “Foucault’s work facilitates an account of reconciliation as an 
intrinsically political project that is constitutive of power, truth, and subjectivity. 
Reconciliation discourse, by constituting its objects, subjects, concepts, and strategies, 
governs the production of knowledge and statements of ‘fact’ and ‘value’ and maps 
out the relations of power between those subjected to and constituted by, its 
disciplinary force” (Moon, 2006:265). What Moon provoked through this observation 
is the recognition that this research should embark on a rigorous examination of TRC 
documents, using the methodology of critical discourse analysis, to dissect the 
documents with a view of identifying the main themes and dominant narratives that 
animates the mediation process in South Africa. In her analysis, Moon argues that the 
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TRC negotiated the relationship between the real violent conflict and the imaginary 
future reconciliation by narrating a causal and linear relationship between them. She 
further maintained that its narrative was roughly organized around the following 
landmarks namely: a past conditioned by violent conflict, a present characterised by 
the confessional, as well as testimonial, and a future of reconciliation. She then 
undertook a cursory look into three main sections of the TRC’s Report where it 
emphasised that South African history is overwhelmingly conditioned by violence and 
the law the relationship between them. It seems reasonable to argue, therefore, among 
the factors that made the South African conflict last for so long, was the use of the 
wrong form of conflict management technique in seeking resolution. This suitably 
underscores the fact that using the appropriate methodology is key to achieving results. 
Indeed  Bercovitch and Derouen (2004: 1) are of the view that age long conflicts such 
as those of Apartheid South Africa could only have persisted for so long because of 
the use of wrong approaches which explains why they argue that “internationalized 
ethnic conflicts are generally acknowledged as the most difficult and complex conflicts 
to manage. These conflicts too can be de-escalated, or be made less violent, especially 
if the right form of conflict management is chosen” (2004:1). Lederach (1997) and 
James et al. (2001) similarly argued that ‘In recent years, researchers investigating 
conflict resolution processes have developed various problem-solving workshops…as 
a result of the belief that conventional methods of third-party intervention in 
international disputes were not very successful. They argue that in order to make 
progress, there is a need to move from "pre theories" to “theories of conflict and its 
resolution” which is precisely what this thesis attempts with CDA. This is important 
because of successful isolation and identification of the combination of the complex 
elements that changed the South African course of history open up room for further 
research into finding means of de-escalating other similar conflicts on the globe. 
Similarly, successfully identifying the secret behind the de-escalation of the South 
African apartheid conflict (after about 48 years of fierce struggle)  throws light on why 
the elements had remained resistant to interventions for such a long period. This 
inevitably creates room for a further understanding of not just the consequential history 
of such intractable conflict but also the colouration of contemporary socio-political 
problems of the society that emanated from such long history of violence as well as 
possible futuristic problems that could arise from the rubble of such unfinished 
business. To clarify: this thesis is not seeking solutions to intractable conflicts per se. 
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Rather, it acknowledges the fact that South Africa effectively found a solution to its 
intractable conflict and so seeks to understand how and why this was so using CDA. 
CDA is quite appropriate for this agenda in that it analyses the underlying theoretical 
foundations of conventional approaches; it moves beyond traditional diplomacy with 
top-level leaders and short-term objectives to holistic and integrated approaches. It 
also emphasises multiple levels of actors, long-term objectives, and the healing of 
relationships and people through integrated frameworks for sustained peace-building 
and reconciliation. The use of CDA as a methodology for investigating, analysing, and 
interpreting the dynamics at work in the transition of South Africa from a deeply 
divided society to a peaceful democratic state where powers reverted from the white 
minority to the black majority is an original contribution to knowledge. 
1.2 Applying Agamben’s Homo Sacer  
This thesis argues that the theory to best explain the harmonisation of the underlying 
contradictory elements at the base of the South African negotiations, as well as those 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, is Giorgio Agamben’s philosophy of 
exclusive inclusion of the Homo Sacer. It is a theory that situates ‘couplets of 
contradictions’ in an ‘inconsistently consistent’ manner. It finds harmony in 
disharmony, unity in disunity, and negates absolute ideas in favour of relative ones. 
Agamben describes these relationships in terms such as “zoe” and “bios”,  “exclusive 
inclusion”,  “Homo Sacer”, “ bare-life”, “state of exception” “indistinction”, and a host 
of others. These ideas are considered in detail in chapter two. The interpretation, 
application and adaptation of Agamben’s philosophy to South Africa, is an original 
contribution to knowledge. It helps to explain certain policies and actions as well as 
the justification of such in the mediation process.  
Using Critical Discourse Analysis, the themes that animate the mediation and nation-
building process in South Africa are identified and subjected to “Agamben-esque” 
interpretation in order to identify the rhetoric at the base of the peace process. The 
thesis determines that underlying the success of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission is a number theme that, fused in couplets of compliments and 
contradictions, that are paradoxical. It also reveals that the revolutionary change in the 
fortune of South Africa, from a deeply divided autocratic society to a democratic 
society can be logically explained within the interplay of these paradoxes. The thesis 
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argues that there are seven paradoxes at the base of the peace process in South Africa 
that emerge and fuse in couplets, of some sorts to ultimately de-escalate the South 
African conflict.  The narratives reveal that not only were the narratives docile, but the 
emerging ideas also were actually in flight, in transition, and to use the Aristotelian or 
metaphysical term, they are in “the state of becoming”. These couplets are identified 
in the diagrammatic form below: 
Theoretical Model Underlying the TRC’s Report of South Africa 
    (Zoe + bios)           (Deconstruction level)         (Zoe only) 
• Peace based on Reconciliation                                     Peace without Reconciliation   
 
• Healing as a result of forgetting                                       Healing without forgetting 
 
• Tolerance resulting from friendship                                Tolerance without friendship 
 
• Unification founded on Harmony                                    Unification without Harmony 
 
• Confession did with Remorse                                 Confession without Remorse 
 
• Amnesty flowing from forgiveness                               Amnesty without forgiveness 
 
• The truth that leads to justice                                              Truth without justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
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The above translates into four distinct chapters. Chapter 4 deals with the paradoxical 
couplets of “Peace without Reconciliation and Unification without Harmony”. In 
chapter 5, we have another set of two couplets; Healing without Forgetting and 
Confession without Remorse. Chapter 6, has “Amnesty without Forgiveness and 
Tolerance without Friendship and the last of the couplets in Chapter 7, is “ truth 
without Justice” while Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter. 
At this point in the Introduction, it may prove helpful to refresh the memory of the 
South African context. Historically, South Africa is a multi-ethnic society with about 
53 million people with a variety of culture, languages and religion. It is this pluralism 
that made the country’s constitution recognise eleven official languages. Eighty per 
cent of this multi-ethnic society is black. The remaining twenty per cent spreads among 
whites, Asians, and other fair-skinned people of other ethnic backgrounds usually 
referred to as “coloured” (Giliomee and Mbenga 2007). The country runs a 
parliamentary system of government that recognises nine provinces. Even though it is 
one of the few countries in Africa that has never had a military coup d’état it remained 
largely undemocratic for nearly half a century. The society was ruled mainly by the 
white minority ethnic group known as the “Boers”. Mixed-race elections were taboo 
in South Africa until 1994. Racism dominated and dictated the socio-political and 
economic life of the people. The constant racial, social and political strife between the 
white minority rulers and the black majority ruled was the central contradiction that 
activated forces of antagonism. A new development of the South African conflict was 
instituted in 1948 when the white minority ruling National Party instituted apartheid, 
which is a system that officially institutionalised racial segregation and discrimination. 
The term ‘apartheid’ is thus often used to designate practices of governance and 
control originating 300 years ago as well as referring, more usually, to the laws and 
policies inaugurated by the National Party from 1948. The effect of this dual usage, as 
similarly argued by Aletta Norval (1996: 1) is primarily to make the history of 
apartheid ‘coincide’ with that of South Africa.  
Apartheid succeeded in producing anti-apartheid activism as personified by the black 
majority party, the African National Congress (ANC) led by Dr Nelson Mandela. This 
activism sent Mandela and the ANC leaders into incarceration and majority of anti-
apartheid voices brought unprecedented pressure on the apartheid regime from all 
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around the world. In turn, the mechanism of apartheid began to unravel when 
discriminatory laws became repealed or abolished in 1990. The continuous and 
constant clashes between these two oppositions led gradually to the collapse of 
apartheid. 1994 ushered in a new constitution and the first democratic election in South 
Africa and the release of Mandela after 27years of incarceration to become the first 
black majority president of democratic South Africa. Under the new arrangement, it 
becomes necessary for South Africa to deal with its “dark history” in order to establish 
a future of peace and stability. To achieve this, South Africa was confronted with two 
choices: either criminal tribunals or a truth commission. They chose the latter for 
expedient reasons that will be articulated throughout this research. Whereas the TRC 
recognised that the inauguration of the National Party in 1948 represented an 
intensification and formalisation of apartheid, this was not a significant departure from 
previous practices of governance. The implication of this is to suggest that the success 
of the NP in 1948 did not constitute a ‘rupture’ to a previously different political order, 
rather, it represented the continuation of a long history of violent oppression in which 
the NP was only recent protagonists. This narrative is again intended to downplay the 
villainy of the perpetrators in order to make reconciliation possible’ (Moon, 2006:265). 
The details of how this manifested itself in South Africa is what the rest of this thesis 
is all about.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework on Agamben’s Exclusive Inclusive 
Philosophy of the Homo Sacer 
2.0 Introduction to the Theoretical framework 
This chapter will begin with: i) a clear and well-structured explication of Agamben’s 
discussion of exclusive inclusion in his seminar work, Homo Sacer. (Agamben, 
1995)  ; ii) clear articulation of how the arguments deployed by Agamben can, in 
principle, be extended to an analysis of concepts or extended beyond the figure of 
homo sacer to an analysis of a series of concepts derived from the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission, via Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).  
Agamben’s philosophy is by no means straightforward even though, the nature of the 
argument as presented by Agamben appeared too simplistic and repetitive because of 
the overlapping nature of the arguments with one factor linking to the other and 
involving the same geometry of arguments recurring at intervals. The only part of  
Agamben’s philosophy that seem relevant to this thesis is his “exclusive, inclusive” 
philosophy of the Homo Sacer.  This “exclusive, inclusive” philosophy featured 
prominently in one of his works: namely, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life 
(1995,1998). 
The Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1995,1998), is a 127 pages book 
divided into three parts. The first part dealt with what he calls the logic of Sovereignty, 
the second part dealt with the Homo Sacer, and the third part dealt with what he calls 
The camp as a biopolitical paradigm of the modern. Our interest is in the second part, 
which runs between pages 47 and 73. Here Agamben discusses the entire life of the 
Homo Sacer taking note of the significant landmarks and characteristics of the Homo 
sacer viz-a-viz his sojourn from the society to exile.  
However, details of this Agamben’s theory will be dealt with under the different 
sections set out above. It is sufficient at this stage, to state in a simplified form what 
this Agamben’s philosophy entails. 
Agamben’s philosophy of the homo Sacer is a transitional philosophy that starts with 
one element or entity that is composed of two distinct opposing units. In the 
transformation process, one of the two units necessarily has to be removed because it 
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was inimical to the success of the entire entity. However, after it was removed, or 
dropped, the remaining unit which is no longer complete, still had relics of elements 
of that which was removed or dropped. This is what is excluded yet inclusive but in 
some limited forms. The other features and characteristics of this entity have 
paradoxical and seemingly contradictory postures until viewed critically. In this thesis, 
we found that ideas at the base of the collapse of apartheid shares similar features with 
that of the Homo Sacer.  
In concrete terms, Agamben presented an archaic image of the Roman law in which as 
a consequence of a serious crime, an individual citizen is stripped of his citizenship 
and exiled. This action of the Sovereign turns the individual from being a citizen to a 
Homo Sacer. When he was a citizen, the individual human being has within him two 
elements whose separatability is subject to philosophical debate. However, 
theoretically, Agamben tries to separate them at least theoretically. These two elements 
are nature and nurture or what Agamben calls Zoe and bios or the animalistic or 
biological nature of a man, and his social or political nature. One was acquired at birth 
as a consequence of being born just like any other animal,  while the other was acquired 
as a result of training, political participation and societal orientation.  
However, for Agamben, when a citizen commits a serious crime, the Sovereign 
protection he enjoys as a full citizen is withdrawn and sent on exile. This ban removed 
the social nature, through exclusion, leaving just the natural, which is the animalistic 
nature. This is a quite worthless life which accounts for why the Homo Sacer amount 
to nothing and cannot be sacrificed to any deity or else, the shrine will be profaned. 
However, in a strict sense, The social cannot be removed entirely from the natural, 
having merged at birth. There will always be relicts of the social left in the animal as 
the pure animal is now unachievable. 
Interestingly, it is this defective animal-dominant nature that Agamben calls, “sacred”.  
His sacredness lies within two contradictions. One of such contradictions is that he has 
lost the protection of the state and as such exposed to the danger of sudden death by 
an attacker who is rightly permitted to do so. On the other hand, his sacredness entails 
its worthlessness and as such unfit for ritualistic sacrifice. 
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Interestingly, the complete and so to say “perfect” nature of the citizen under the 
sovereign, was incapable of societal peace. What could guarantee peace is surprising, 
this imperfection called sacred. We found equivalent ideas that brought about societal 
peace in Apartheid South Africa in this relationship between the so to say “perfect” 
idea and the “imperfect” one. 
 Although we know that there may be no perfect ideas in the real sense of the word, it 
only exists in relative terms. Within Agamben’s philosophy, the so-called “perfect”, 
gave way to the “imperfect” and it should be further reemphasised here, that it was this 
“imperfection” “ sacred Idea” that was instrumental to the smooth transition in  
Apartheid South Africa. The Homo Sacer or Sacred man is the impurity that is left 
after the “complete”, and pure citizen has been excluded. 
 Agamben developed new interpretations of traditional concepts whose modern 
meaning, were not initially obscure or ambiguous. For instance, the term “sacred man” 
or “homo Sacer” is used by Agamben to denote that which can be killed by anyone 
without committing homicide but cannot be sacrificed in a religious ceremony.  
This and many more seemingly contradictory or opposing terms that more often than 
not appear in couplets, help to unfold the ideas that will be espoused in due course in 
this chapter. Nevertheless, there are salient facts that seen consistent all through the 
interpretations of this thesis. For instance, the very idea that there is a complication in 
Agamben’s ideas was reinforced. The ideas appear in couplets of contradictions, as a 
matter of fact, they seem at first glance contradictory until subjected to further critical 
analysis.  
Nevertheless, it is imperative for clarity and authenticity to lay out a full explication 
or description of Agamben’s overall project in HOMO SACER: Sovereign Power and 
Bare Life, with the additional justification of the arguments from contemporary 
Agamben scholars. This though, will not take precedence over the original text, yet we 
may begin with a cursory look at Micheal Peter’s analysis in order to give us a general 
overview of the entire treatise of Agamben. After this, we shall move on straight to the 
original text itself under the section, “what is Homo Sacer” where we shall engage 
with Agamben extensively from his is HOMO SACER: Sovereign Power and Bare 
Life, to justify first-hand the analysis as they unfold. 
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However, one of Agamben’s scholars Michael Peter (2014) attempted at a panoramic 
and chronological study of the Agamben’s Homo Sacer project where he drew the 
following conclusion. He maintains that ‘ The structure of Agamben’s project of Homo 
Sacer which began in 1995/98 and ran through a series of other works, apart from The 
Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998,1995). The others include State of 
Exception (2003); The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of 
Economy and Government (2007); The Sacrament of Language: An Archaeology of 
the Oath (2008); Opus Dei. Archeologia dell’ufﬁcio (2013/2012); Remnants of 
Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (2002); The Highest Poverty (2013, 2011). 
( Peters, 2014:329) Nevertheless, for this research, the scope of our interest will be 
mainly limited to the first one which is directly relevant to this research. 
It is in the Homo Sacer (1998) that Agamben first examines the logic in the idea of 
sovereignty, and that of Homo Sacer and famously maintained that the concentration 
camps are biopolitical paradigms of the modern states which he nevertheless got to 
round to analyse. He identifies this as a kind of missing link which could only be filled 
by turning to Hannah Arendt’s studies of totalitarian regimes as a form of total 
domination but quickly maintained that neither of them showed any link with either 
the camps or its relationship with bare-life. 
It is for this reason that Michael  Peter (2014:330) rightly argues that Agamben, 
traces bare life as the new political subject as implicit in the 1679 writ 
of habeas corpus and highlights the new centrality of the ‘body’ in the 
politico-juridical model: in Descartes and Newton, and in Hobbs’ 
Leviathan but also in the ‘thanatopolitics’ and eugenics of the Nazis 
death camp that places it outside ‘the normal juridical order’ (p. 97) 
and linked to the concept of state of exception. He concludes with 
three theses: (1) The original political relation is the ban (the state of 
exception as zone of indistinction between outside and inside, 
exclusion and inclusion). (2) The fundamental activity of sovereign 
power is the production of bare life as originary political element and 
as threshold of articulation between nature and culture, zoe ¯  and bios. 
(3) Today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental 
biopolitical paradigm of the West (p. 102). (Peter, 2014:330) 
 
Hence, the principles and narratives that translate into bringing back peace to apartheid 
South Africa resonate within the first two above. The precise analysis for the first item 
above, which is the fact that (1) The original political relation is the ban (the state of 
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exception as a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exclusion and 
inclusion).Hence the essential thing is that Agamben focused on is an obscure figure 
of archaic Roman law as briefly mentioned above, in which as a consequence of some 
judicial decisions, a citizen, is put under a ban and as such exiled from the society. 
This development transformed the citizen from being a citizen to what he calls the 
Homo Sacer. While within the society, he is a citizen and following the ban that 
expunged him from society and he now exists outside the society as Homo  Sacer. Our 
interest is in the consequences of the travails of this individual and his relationship 
with the state or power that banished him. Agamben used some terms in explicating 
this transition. Some of these terms include state of exception, the zone of indistinction 
between outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion from being a free citizen in the 
polis to being bare life in exile.  
What we have found out in this thesis, is that there seem to be a kind of parallel 
between the ideas underlying the transition of apartheid to democratisation in South 
Africa and what transpired in the life of the homo sacer during his transition from 
being a free citizen in the polis to being a bonded person in exile. This parallel is seen 
in the logic of ideas that were at the base of the resolution of the South African 
apartheid conflict in the course of its transition from a deeply divided conflict-ridden 
society to a peaceful and stable one. Our goal in this thesis is to identify these parallels.  
It is however critical to state ab-initio that there is no substitute for analysing 
Agamben’s original work itself, yet as a starting point, we have found no better 
encyclopaedic description and introduction of both Agamben and his work, 
particularly as relevant to this thesis than the way Michael Peters presented him in the 
Homo Sacer Project. Hence we are compelled to quote him verbatim in order to give 
a more panoramic view, as well as a clear and distinct structural beginning for the 
theoretical analysis of Agamben’s work in this thesis. According to him,  
Giorgio Agamben, an Italian philosopher who extends the ambit of 
Heidegger, Benjamin, Foucault, and Schmitt with a breadth of 
scholarship and reference in metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics and 
politics, is one of the leading political philosophers of his day. He 
carries forth the burden of criticism into the very heart of Western 
law, government and sovereignty. Agamben’s analysis of 
sovereignty became particularly inﬂuential after the events of 11 
September 2001 and his work has seemingly grown in relevance and 
stature since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 with ‘state of 
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emergency’ (which as Benjamin says is not the exception but the 
rule) that indicates how democracy has been tamed and controlled to 
undermine its radical quality. The Homo Sacer project that began 
with his analysis of sovereign power as power over ‘life’ drew 
heavily on Foucault’s concept of biopolitics citing his observation 
‘For millennia man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living 
animal with the additional capacity for political existence; modern 
man is an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being 
into question (Agamben, 1998, p. 10); (Peter,2014:227) 
The timing here refers to Agamben’s principle of exclusion where the exception is 
made to carry on as if it is the rule, especially where the rule would have been 
counterproductive and inimical to the existence and survival of the primary goal. This 
is where peace, stability and tranquillity are threatened, normalcy is suspended for 
emergency rule to operate, and such emergencies operate as if it is the standard rule. 
It is enough at this stage to merely mention that this is precisely one of the operating 
dynamics in the return of peace to apartheid South Africa. For instance, the standard 
procedure for reconciliation would have been “peace with reconciliation”. 
Unfortunately,  that will not fly under emergency rule. Hence, exclusion had to take 
place. Reconciliation was excluded with the result that what emerged was an exception, 
It is “peace without reconciliation”, and this carried on as if it is the rule and it began 
to materialise and actualise itself in the unfolding of the narratives upon which peace 
emerged in the RSA. 
 
Hence our analysis shall be tailored after the following outline: 
1. Exposition and Explication of Agamben’s philosophy of the Homo Sacer 
2. Extension and Application of the theory of the Homo Sacer to the ideas 
Underlying the resolution of apartheid conflict in South Africa. 
3. Critique both of Agamben and the application to South African conflict. 
2.1 Exposition and Explication of Agamben’s Philosophy of the Homo Sacer 
In this work, the central ideas relevant to this thesis is espoused under the following 
significant subheads; 1. Homo Sacer 2. The Sacred Life 3. The ban. (the State of 
Exception as a zone of indistinction)  In this chapter we dealt with what the Agamben’s 
philosophy entails, taking note of some of the critical terms and phenomenon that are 
central to the activation of the narratives that ensued. 
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2.1.1 What is Homo Sacer? 
Giorgio Agamben in the original text; Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare life 
(1995:47-48) gave a vivid and extensive account of the contradictions in the term 
“Homo Sacer” as well as a graphic description of the paradoxical complications and 
complexities involved in the phenomenon. This detail is so important as a foundational 
text to prepare the ground for our analysis; hence we are compelled to quote him 
extensively. According to him,   
 
“Pompeius Festus, in his treatise On the Significance of Words, under 
the heading sacer mons preserved the memory of a figure of archaic 
Roman law in which the character of sacredness is tied for the first time 
to a human life as such. After defining the Sacred Mount that the 
plebeians consecrated to Jove at the time of their secession, Festus 
adds:…The sacred man is the one whom the people have judged on 
account of a crime. It is not permitted to sacrifice this man, yet he who 
kills him will not be condemned for homicide; in the first tribunitian 
law, in fact, it is noted that "if someone kills the one who is sacred 
according to the plebiscite, it will not be considered homicide." This is 
why it is customary for a bad or impure man to be called sacred.The 
meaning of this enigmatic figure has been much discussed, and some 
have wanted to see in it "the oldest punishment of Roman criminal law" 
( Bennett, "Sacer esto", p. 5). Yet every interpretation of homo sacer is 
complicated by virtue of having to concentrate on traits that seem, at 
first glance, to be contradictory. In an essay of 1930, H. Bennett already 
observes that Festus's definition "seems to deny the very thing implicit 
in the term" ( ibid., p. 7 ), since while it confirms the sacredness of a 
person, it authorizes (or, more precisely, renders unpunishable) his 
killing (whatever etymology one accepts for the term parricidium, it 
originally indicated the killing of a free man). The contradiction is even 
more pronounced when one considers that the person whom anyone 
could kill with impunity was nevertheless not to be put to death 
according to ritual practices (neque fas est eum immolari: immolari 
indicates the act of sprinkling the mola salsa on the victim before killing 
him). In what, then, does the sacredness of the sacred man consist? And 
what does the expression sacer esto ("May he be sacred"), which often 
figures in the royal laws and which already appears in the archaic 
inscription on the forum's rectangular cippus, mean, if it implies at once 
the impune occidi ("being killed with impunity") and an exclusion from 
sacrifice? That this expression was also obscure to the Romans is 
proven beyond the shadow of a doubt by a passage in Ambrosius 
Theodosius Macrobius Saturnalia (3.7.38) in which the author,having 
defined sacrum as what is destined to the gods, adds: "At this point it 
does not seem out of place to consider the status of those men whom 
the law declares to be sacred to certain divinities, for I am not unaware 
that it appears strange [mirum videri] to some people that while it is 
forbidden to violate any sacred thing whatsoever, it is permitted to kill 
the sacred man." Whatever the 47 value of the interpretation that 
Macrobius felt obliged to offer at this point, it is certain that sacredness 
appeared problematic enough to him to merit an explanation.” 
(Agamben,1995:47-48) 
 
 
17 
 
 
 
Looking closely, what Agamben calls sacred is a state of imperfection. Ordinarily, 
“sacred” should within that context be relatively a perfect condition. Within 
Agamben’s philosophy, a complete man who lives in the Polis and has both Zoe and 
Bios in him is not sacred. The moment this individual loses one of the elements, which 
is akin to his social nature, he in this incomplete half measure state is considered sacred, 
and that is the situation of the life of the Homo Sacer. Interestingly, the ideas that are 
akin to the life of the Homo Sacer in South Africa similarly came in two forms: One 
has two elements in it, and in the other, one part of the element is lost. It is the partial 
or half measure one that is in the position of the Homo Sacer. As such,  the “sacred 
idea.” which interestingly, formed the basis of the resolution and peace process in the 
RSA is not the complete idea but the defective one. 
 
Similarly, Adam Kotsko (2013a) in Michael Peters (2014:330) identifies the example 
of what “Homo Sacer” is in our contemporary world when he argues that,  
 During the Bush years, however, Agamben’s investigations of 
sovereign authority, the state of emergency (or exception), and the 
concept of ‘bare life’ seemed to speak directly to the most immediate 
and pressing political concerns of the day: the emergency powers 
claimed in the War on Terror, the fate of the ‘detainees’ kept in the 
lawless zone of Guantanamo Bay, and the general reassertion of the 
kind of state sovereignty that globalization was supposed to be 
rendering irrelevant. Despite being coincidentally topical, however, 
there is still much that is puzzling about the political works themselves. 
Homo Sacer, which infamously claims that the paradigm of all 
modern politics is the concentration camp, proceeds by way of an 
investigation of an obscure ﬁgure in Roman law — the homo sacer 
(‘sacred man’) who could be killed with impunity but not sacriﬁced 
Peters, 2014:330) 
The above description is that of a contemporary example of the Homo Sacer in real 
life situation during which as a result of the use of emergency powers in the War on 
Terror, the fate of the ‘detainees’ kept in the lawless zone of Guantanamo Bay 
continues to provoke reactions from all over the world and perpetually hunts the ideals 
of modern democracy. However, breaking this further down, we observed that the 
word “Homo Sacer” is classically a combination of two words; Homo and Sacer. That 
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is, “man” and “sacred”. Starting with “Homo” The Merriam-Webster’s dictionary, 
defines Homo as  “any of a genus (Homo) of hominids and in this category is 
modern humans (Homo sapiens) as well as several extinct related species such 
as Homo erectus and Homo Habilis. 
Similarly, the online English Oxford dictionary equally confirms this assertion, 
by arguing that the genus Homo is believed to have existed for not less than two 
million years, whereas, modern humans (Homo sapiens was first said to have appeared 
in the Upper Palaeolithic whereas, the Latin origin of the word Homo refers to 'man'. 
This affirmation was further corroborated in the Vocabulary.com Dictionary, which 
argues that the genus that includes modern humans is called Homo.  Hence, we can 
argue affirmatively that "Homo sapiens" are modern humans, while our ancestors had 
names such as "Homo neanderthalensis" and "Homo erectus." Generally, they all argue 
that Homo is a Latin word that means man, or human. Whereas, when it is used as a 
prefix, as in "homosexual," it comes from the Greek word homos, meaning the same.   
From the above analysis, it is reasonable to argue that the word “homo” refers to man, 
what then is “Sacer”? Sacer for Agamben means “sacred” although as mentioned 
above, Agamben’s conception of the word sacred is different from what we 
traditionally understand sacred to be. The word sacred for Agamben is a paradoxical 
word with different components that create a whole lot of problematic complexity and 
complications. It is simply an intersection between the political and the spiritual. It 
refers to “that which can be killed politically but cannot be sacrificed religiously as 
this relates to the extensive sovereign powers of the state over its subjects. Precisely 
for Agamben, the word sacred means “one who can be killed and yet not sacrificed”.  
The operationalisation here goes beyond the intersection between the political and 
religious,  the critical point here is not just the intersection between the religious and 
the political so much as in the fact that the Homo Sacer is denied participation in the 
socio-cultural life of the polis. Even in this form, the Homo Sacer does not enter into 
any of the economies of the political. Hence, he can be killed without any cost and has 
not even sufficient value to be sacrificed. 
This worthlessness even in the realm of the spiritual is what Agamben was referring 
to when he further argues that “Sacer”  designates the person or the thing that “one 
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cannot touch without dirtying oneself or without dirtying”; hence, it seems to imply 
the polluted one or the outcast, or the profane one.  The double meaning or paradoxical 
meaning of 'sacred' or 'accursed' is approximately a  guilty person whom one 
consecrates to the gods of the underworld. This is the sense in which Agamben uses 
the word “sacred”. (Agamben, 1995:52) The implication here is that “sacer” refers to 
a state of defectiveness, inappropriateness, or some sort of filthiness. It is everything 
but perfect and complete. 
For Agamben, there is some ambivalence in the understanding of sacred either in the 
religious or political realms. Whereas, according to him, “only an attentive and 
unprejudiced delimitation of the respective fields of the political and the religious will 
make it possible to understand the history of their intersection and complex relations. 
It is important, in any case, that the originary juridico-political dimension that presents 
itself in homo sacer should not be covered over by a scientific mythologeme that not 
only explains nothing but is itself in need of explanation.” (Agamben, 1995:53) The 
point being stressed by Agamben here is the complexity and paradoxicality that 
emerges in the intersection between the political and the religious especially as it 
relates to the Homo Sacer. Elucidating this argument further, Agamben maintains that 
in, 
both the original sources and the consensus of scholars, the structure 
of sacratio arises out of the conjunction of two traits: the 
unpunishability of killing and the exclusion from sacrifice. Above all, 
the impune occidi takes the form of an exception from the ius 
humanum insofar as it suspends the application of the law on 
homicide attributed to Numa Pompilius: Si quis hominem liberum 
dolo sciens morti duit, parricidas esto, "If someone intentionally kills 
a free man, may he be considered a murderer." The very formulation 
given by Festus in some way even constitutes a real exceptio in the 
technical sense, which the killer, invoking the sacredness of the victim, 
could have opposed to the prosecution in the case of a trial. If one 
looks closely, however, one sees that even the nequefas est eum 
immolari ("it is not licit to sacrifice him") takes the form of an 
exception, this time from the ius divine and from every form of ritual 
killing. ( Agamben, 1995:54) 
However, from the above excerpt, Agamben affirmed that to kill a free man, that is, 
one who is not convicted of any crime, who is a law-abiding citizen in the state, and 
who is under the protection of the Sovereign, is criminal. (murder) Nevertheless, if this 
individual is found guilty of a crime and subsequently banished and excluded from the 
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state into exile, that immunity from being killed is automatically lost. Hence, that 
individual is vulnerably exposed to possible sporadic attacks. 
Moreover, he can be killed by anyone freely, without being guilty of murder or 
homicide. The reason for this is simple. He has lost the protection of the Sovereign. 
He is now outside it. At this stage, it appears consistent. The inconsistency comes in 
when it is realised that even though the Homo Sacer has fallen outside Sovereign 
protection, yet he is still subject to and bound by the fact that he is not allowed to be 
sacrificed to any god or deity because he is “sacred”. Where sacred means outcast, 
worthless, dirty, tainted and as such, would profane such shrines if allowed to be 
sacrificed. The law that could no longer protect him because he has fallen outside its 
jurisdiction, still holds him accountable for the kind of death that should or should not 
befall him. This contradiction can only be explained by the fact that it is outside it, yet 
inside it in some partial way. It is excluded yet inclusive. 
Nevertheless, this equivocation is not immediately apparent except when critically 
examined. There is an essential element in the above extract; it is “looking closely” 
because there seem to be some paradoxes or contradiction in the understanding of the 
sacredness of the homo sacer whose sacredness does not preclude him, (Homo Sacer) 
from being politically assassinated or executed, but precluded from being religiously 
martyred or sacrificed. What then was the rationale of saying that it is legitimate and 
perhaps legal to kill him within the jurisdiction of the positive law, but illegal, 
illegitimate or “illicit” to sacrifice him, or kill him within the confines of the divine 
law. Such exclusion in the opinion of Agamben is an exception, not the rule. To 
understand this contradiction or paradox, we must critically examine further,  the two 
concepts; Homo and Sacer- Man and Sacred. That is “The Sacred Man” unravelling 
the implication of his sacredness, is vital to this research. 
The buffer zone of resolution existing between complementary and contradictory 
elements within the philosophy of the Homo Sacer is what Agamben calls the zone of 
in-distinction or that of exception. In achieving this, it appeals to classical 
philosophical traditions and rhetorical discourse that thrives in the ambiguous 
language of antiquity that meanders between Christian theology and modern political 
philosophy.  In advancing his thesis, Agamben appealed first to Aristotle’s conception 
of man as a political animal, Foucault’s fragmentary analysis of the concept of 
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biopolitics, and Carl Schmitt’s idea of the sovereignty and the idea of the sovereign 
exception. 
A careful reading through Agamben and other Agamben scholars reaffirms this. 
Agamben’s arguments more clearly resonate on the fact that the Sovereign decides 
both the exception and the boundaries of legality as it applies to the life and death of 
his subjects. By this it means that he determines which citizen in the polis transforms 
into “homines sacres”, criminals, bandits or outlaws as the case may be. Moreover, 
immediately a citizen becomes such, he is then automatically a Homo Sacer which 
literarily means the outlaw who by that token, is thrown into a state in which he is both 
no longer subject to obedience of the law , nor is he protected any longer by the law 
because he is now outside of its jurisdiction. This push implies that the homo Sacer or 
sacred man can kill and be killed with impunity. Hence, the sovereign and the outlaw 
are both at the boundaries of law and civilisation.  When a person finds himself at this 
point,  he does not have a complete 'life' anymore in the sense that he is neither a citizen 
nor a subject- The Homo Sacer lies in that zone of exception and in-distinction where 
he is now “bare life”.  
Agamben discusses further this idea of the sacredness of the Homo Sacer by 
reaffirming categorically, that “ The sacred man is the one whom the people have 
judged on account of a crime. It is not permitted to sacrifice this man, yet he who kills 
him will not be condemned for homicide; in the first tribunitian law, in fact, it is noted 
that "if someone kills the one who is sacred according to the plebiscite, it will not be 
considered homicide." This is why it is customary for a bad or impure man to be called 
sacred”. (Agamben, 1995:47) 
In his analysis of the situation, Agamben argues that the sacredness of a person, lies 
not only in the fact that it authorises his killing, but also more precisely, renders 
unpunishable such killing, which is why Agamben maintained that  “whatever 
etymology one accepts for the term “parricidium”, it primarily indicated the killing of 
a free man. He went further to assert that the contradiction is even more pronounced 
when one considers the fact that the person whom anyone could kill with impunity was 
nevertheless not to be put to death according to ritual practices  (Agamben, 1995:47)  
Agamben affirms that this issue of sacredness is a puzzle that needs unravelling, and 
that is what he tries to do when he argues extensively that 
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In what, then, does the sacredness of the sacred man consist? And 
what does the expression sacer esto ("May he be sacred"), … mean, if 
it implies at once the impune occidi ("being killed with impunity") 
and an exclusion from sacrifice? That this expression was also obscure 
to the Romans is proven beyond the shadow of a doubt by a passage 
in Ambrosius Theodosius Macrobius Saturnalia (3.7.38) in which the 
author, having defined sacrum as what is destined to the gods, adds: 
"At this point it does not seem out of place to consider the status of 
those men whom the law declares to be sacred to certain divinities, for 
I am not unaware that it appears strange [mirum videri] to some people 
that while it is forbidden to violate any sacred thing whatsoever, it is 
permitted to kill the sacred man." Whatever the value of the 
interpretation that Macrobius felt obliged to offer at this point, it is 
certain that sacredness appeared problematic enough to him to merit 
an explanation. (Agamben, 1995:47-48) 
 There are two important things to note from the above excerpts.  First, they confirm 
the complication of the philosophy of the Homo Sacer and second is that the principles 
derived from this philosophy of the Homo Sacer, would necessarily appear at first 
glance to be contradictory, while a closer look and analysis may reveal that they may 
not necessarily be so after all. This fact will be much more articulated while dealing 
with the section on its application. 
Furthermore, we cannot understand Homo Sacer fully if some of the associated and 
underlying elements or terms are not fully unpacked. Some of the main elements that 
could help in the elucidation of the full import of the homo sacer include bios, zoe, 
bare-life, exclusion, inclusion. However, Agamben observed the emergence of some 
pairings of the phenomenon in our relationship as individuals with the polity. These 
pairings seem to be pairings of opposites, but beyond that, they are paradoxical 
pairings with deeper imports that goes farther than merely opposites. Such pairings 
appear mainly in the Agamben’s homo sacer project.  
The fundamental categorial pair of Western politics is not that of 
friend/ enemy but that of bare life/political existence, zoē l bios, 
exclusion/inclusion. There is politics because man is the living being 
who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life 
and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in 
an inclusive exclusion. ( Agamben, 1995:8) 
For Agamben, these pairings do not necessarily have to be strictly those of opposites 
such as “friends and enemies” instead it is rooted in the interaction and distinction 
between man as a biological entity and man as a social entity. These two categories 
flow into each other such that strict bifurcation becomes difficult. It involves exclusion 
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and inclusion as the case may be at different times. It is this biological or animalistic 
nature of man that he refers to as bare life while the social nature is what he refers to 
as political existence.  The same geometry of analysis goes on with the concept of zoe 
and bios; zoe is the natural or biological nature of man devoid of any training or 
discipline while bios is the socialisation and politicisation that introduces civilisation 
and culture to man. However, zoe is the raw man untamed while bios is the tamed man 
with culture and discipline. Hence at birth, every man has zoe and through training, 
participation and existence in the polity, he acquires bios. Hence a complete man for 
Agamben is both zoe and bios. 
Nevertheless, since a citizen in the polis is composed of both elements, a citizen 
outside the polis is composed of only one element, although with traces of the excluded 
element. After the ban (the State of Exception as a zone of indistinction) when the 
citizen is stripped of his civil rights and send on exile, he becomes the Homo Sacer. 
What this implies is the removal of his bios, while retaining just his zoe which is what 
he acquired at birth, just as any other animal in the jungle. Hence, the Homo Sacer 
does not have bios; he has only zoe, though with traces of bios.  It is an equivalent of 
a worthless life. It is an ordinary, inconsequential life which Agamben calls bare-life. 
One will not be surprised then that such a worthless life cannot be sacrificed to a deity 
without profaning the shrine. The consequence of this exception of the individual from 
the polis, made the individual to find himself in the zone of indistinction, though he is 
excluded from political protection, but immune from religious martyrdom. Hence 
inclusive in some senses. Some of these facts were corroborated by Agamben when he 
says;  
“The protagonist of this book is bare life, that is, the life of homo 
sacer (sacred man), who may be killed and yet not sacrificed, and 
whose essential function in modern politics we intend to assert. An 
obscure figure of archaic Roman law, in which human life is 
included in the juridical order [ordinamento]  solely in the form of 
its exclusion (that is, of its capacity to be killed), has thus offered 
the key by which not only the sacred texts of sovereignty but also 
the very codes of political power will unveil their mysteries. At the 
same time, however, this ancient meaning of the term sacer 
presents us with the enigma of a figure of the sacred that, before or 
beyond the religious, constitutes the first paradigm of the political 
realm of the West”.   ( Agamben, 1995:8)  
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In a further analysis, of this phenomenon of bare life and its transitional journey in 
a modern democratic society, as well as its relationship with both bios and zoe, 
Agamben argues that,  
what characterizes modern politics … the decisive fact is that, 
together with the process by which the exception everywhere 
becomes the rule, the realm of bare life -- which is originally 
situated at the margins of the political order -- gradually begins to 
coincide with the political realm, and exclusion and inclusion, 
outside and inside, bios and zoē, right and fact, enter into a zone 
of irreducible indistinction. At once excluding bare life from and 
capturing it within the political order, the state of exception 
actually constituted, in its very separateness, the hidden 
foundation on which the entire political system rested. When its 
borders begin to be blurred, the bare life that dwelt there frees 
itself in the city and becomes both subject and object of the 
conflicts of the political order, the one place for both the 
organization of State power and emancipation from it. …If 
anything characterizes modern democracy as opposed to classical 
democracy, then, it is that modern democracy presents itself from 
the beginning as a vindication and liberation of zoē, and that it is 
constantly trying to transform its own bare life into a way of life 
and to find, so to speak, the bios of zoē. ( Agamben, 1995:8-9) 
Breaking down what Agamben said here, is vital in the sense that it forms a significant 
strand in its application.  Agamben argues that what characterise modern politics is 
that the exemption becomes the rule; in the polis, the full citizen is a composition of 
both the zoe (natural animalistic nature of man which is given at birth) and bios (the 
cultural, socio-political civilised nature of man which is acquired). Hence the former 
is nature while the latter is nurture. In this state, the citizen has a full life. 
However, following the ban, which is the state of exception as a zone of indistinction, 
he was stripped of his bios and now has just zoe. His life became incomplete, his full 
life became bare life, because a life of zoe without bios or more specifically with traces 
of bios is bare-life. It is a worthless life. It is at this juncture that the citizen became 
Homo Sacer. There is a convergence or fusion of the Homo Sacer whose life is bare-
life with its traits. It comprises only zoe with traces of bios. However, this life is an 
aberration; the ideal one is that of the full citizen within the polis. This fact is an 
exception, not the rule. However, this begins in the words of Agamben to coincide 
with the political realm where this aberration is almost taken as the rule. The 
banishment creates a double contradiction for the |Homo Sacer.  In this case, he is still 
bound by the law which banished him and exposed him to the threat of imminent death. 
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This death still hangs over his head even though he is outside the enclave of the law 
and society where he was banned. He is still bound by the law that prohibits him from 
being sacrificed to any god even outside the polis. This is the zone of indistinction 
between inside and outside the polis. 
 This is an interesting contradiction. The banishment does not allow the Homo Sacer 
any more protection from the law of the polis because he now exists outside of it, yet 
the same law did not let-go his grip of sanction over the life of the Homo Sacer who 
no more circulates within that enclave. He is now incomplete even though the active 
law exists inside the polis but still controls that, which is obtained outside the polis. 
That was why the individual was excluded from the polis but included in the 
expectations of his compliance with the law that banished him, even though he is now 
outside of the polis. The entire life of the Homo Sacer as it is outside the polis is that 
of exception. It is the exception that produced the Homo Sacer. The norm only 
produced full citizens.  
There was another element that seems to underlie this whole image and idea of unity 
and disunity fusing in Agamben’s philosophy; It is what Derrida calls “trace” which 
is the presence of the thing that is absent. (Derrida, 2016) It is this element that makes 
possible for something to be pushed out yet still affected by what is inside. 
Alternatively, it is that which makes it possible for there to be “excluded” and yet 
“inclusive”. Nevertheless, care must be taken to understand this relationship; it is not 
that of degrees where a certain percentage remains.  
Agamben in the above extract argues that “modern democracy presents itself from the 
beginning as a vindication and liberation of zoē, and that it is constantly trying to 
transform its own bare life into a way of life and to find, so to speak, the bios of zoē.”  
This is the zone of the homo sacer and bare life. However, the operation of democracy 
here involves a fierce battle with itself trying to actualise itself within that enclave and 
aspiring to perfection, which means struggling to acquire its bios. In doing this, the 
aberration operates as if it is the norm.   
2.1.2 The Sacred Life   
There is no way we could have discussed Homo Sacer without already discussing the 
“Sacer” part of him, which is the idea of “sacred”. In this section, there is a compelling 
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reason for some sort of repetition to elucidate further, the full import of the sacredness 
of the life of the Homo Sacer.  
According to Agamben,  “The sacred man is the one whom the people have judged on 
account of a crime. It is not permitted to sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will 
not be condemned for homicide; in the first tribunitian law, in fact, it is noted that "if 
someone kills the one who is sacred according to the plebiscite, it will not be 
considered homicide." This is why it is customary for a bad or impure man to be called 
sacred”. ( Agamben, 1995:47) 
The paradox involved in not being permitted to be sacrificed, yet permitted to be killed 
is somehow puzzling. This is synonymous with saying “not permitted to be forgiven 
but permitted to be granted amnesty”. This is a paradox if not an outright 
contradiction”. However, we must understand that this operates in the imperfect 
political realm, which is that of the Homo Sacer outside the polis. This is what gives 
credence to what Agamben calls the “ state of exception” within the context of 
“sacredness” as it relates to the Homo Sacer. It is the phenomenon of the status of the 
Homo Sacer’s death outside the realm of the law as “non-sacrificial and non-
homicidal”. This falls within the zone of indistinction. 
For Agamben, a life caught in the Sovereign ban is what is regarded as sacred. He is 
sacred in that his very exclusion from the community of humans through the ban that 
sends him on exile, automatically excludes him from state protection, and that pushes 
him into the class of vulnerable who can be killed by anyone lawfully without 
committing a crime. However, the emphasis here is on the concept of “exception” and 
this action that created the homo sacer, creates two states of exception from two 
different laws affecting the Homo sacer; first the law on homicide which alludes to the 
“unpunishability” of his killing.; this is an exception from the human law. This must 
be so because he is no more fully human, he is now Homo Sacer and on the other side 
is the exception from the divine law that prohibits him from being sacrificed in any 
ritual killing. 
In a more detailed and extensive argument, Agamben elucidates further, this concept 
of sacredness, and the state of exception, in his analysis, he maintains that the Homo 
Sacer belongs to God and that is why he is “unsacrificeable”, and on the other hand, 
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he belongs to the community which is why he is “killable”. In his words “ Just as the 
law, in the sovereign exception, applies to the exceptional case in no longer applying 
and in withdrawing from it, so Homo Sacer belongs to God in the form of 
“unsacrificeability” and is included in the community in the form of being able to be 
killed. A life that cannot be sacrificed and yet may be killed is sacred life. (Agamben, 
1995:52)  
He, therefore, argues extensively showing the double-barrelled relationship that 
surrounds and defines the life of the Homo Sacer. In his words,  
What defines the status of homo saceris therefore not the originary 
ambivalence of the sacredness that is assumed to belong to him, but 
rather both the particular character of the double exclusion into which 
he is taken and the violence to which he finds himself exposed. This 
violence -- the unsanctionable killing that, in his case, anyone may 
commit -- is classifiable neither as sacrifice nor as homicide, neither 
as the execution of a condemnation to death nor as sacrilege. 
Subtracting itself from the sanctioned forms of both human and divine 
law, this violence opens a sphere of human action that is neither the 
sphere of sacrum facere nor that of profane action. This sphere is 
precisely what we are trying to understand here. We have already 
encountered a limit sphere of human action that is only ever 
maintained in a relation of exception. This sphere is that of the 
sovereign decision, which suspends law in the state of exception and 
thus implicates bare life within it. ( Agamben, 1995:53)         
Arguing further, Agamben wonders if there is a connection between the structure of 
the sovereign and that of the sacred or between both the penal law and sacrifice. In his 
analysis, he argues that the “ Homo Sacer presents the originary figure of life taken 
into the sovereign ban and preserves the memory of the originary exclusion through 
which the political dimension was first constituted. This is a massively important point 
because it is actually this moment of originary violence that founds the political. That 
is in fact at the heart of what we are trying to demonstrate in this thesis. If the originary 
violence necessitating the exclusion did not take place, the subsequent chain of 
complex dynamics that resulted from this exclusion which produced the inclusion 
within the zone of indistinction would have been none existent. Hence its existence. 
The result is that the political sphere of sovereignty was consequently constituted 
through a double exclusion, as an excrescence of the profane in the religious and of 
the religious in the profane. This vice versa relationship takes the form of a zone of 
indistinction between sacrifice and homicide. Explaining this, he says that ‘ the 
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sovereign sphere is the sphere in which it is permitted to kill without committing 
homicide and without celebrating a sacrifice, while a sacred life is, a life that may be 
killed although, not sacrificed. ( Agamben, 1995:53-54) 
This according to Agamben, is the character of the life that has been captured in this 
sphere. Hence, he argues that ‘ What is captured in the sovereign ban is a human victim 
who may be killed but not sacrificed. This is the  Homo Sacer who is synonymous 
with bare life or sacred life; That is the life that constitutes the first content of sovereign 
power, But then what is the origin of this dogma of sacredness of life? It is a life caught 
in the sovereign ban which is originary sacred by which we mean that which may be 
killed but not sacrificed – Hence, the production of bare life is considered the originary 
activity of the sovereign. Agamben summarises this by saying that ‘ The sacredness of 
life, which is invoked today as a fundamental right as against that of sovereign power, 
is, in fact, an original expression in which life is subjected to power over death as well 
as life's irreparable exposure, as far as abandonment is concerned. ( Agamben, 
1995:53-54)        
There is an interesting dimension to this argument which would later form the basis of 
our analysis of the South African situation, and this is the fact of creating a “ zone of 
indistinction between sacrifice and homicide” It is death which is neither sacrifice nor 
homicide but lies somewhere in between. Just as we shall have truth without justice 
lying between a zone that is neither of truth nor of falsehood and again, neither of 
justice nor of injustice. This zone of indistinction would be further unpacked in the 
subsequent sections. 
2.1.3 The ban    
The concept of a ban is significant to this thesis in the sense that the ban, introduces 
some other important concepts that determine the dominant narratives that shaped this 
research, The ban accounts for the paradigm shift from the realm of the convention to 
that of exception. It accounts for the transition from the sphere of normality to that of 
abnormality where the exception now becomes the rule. Interestingly, it is this 
abnormality that is capable of solving societal conflict and not the normality. Agamben 
argues that ;   
Germanic law was founded on the concept of peace (Fried) and the 
corresponding exclusion from the community of the wrongdoer, who 
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therefore became friedlos, without peace, and whom anyone was 
permitted to kill without committing homicide. The medieval ban 
also presents analogous traits: the bandit could be killed (bannire 
idem est quod dicere quilibet possit eum offendere, "'To ban' 
someone is to say that anyone may harm him" [Cavalca, Il bando, p. 
42]) or was even considered to be already dead (exbannitus ad 
mortem de sua civitate debet haberi pro mortuo, "Whoever is banned 
from his city on pain of death must be considered as dead     
(Agamben, 1995:69)     
There is an important moment here that seem to trace the transition of ideas from one 
realm to another. In the excerpt above, Agamben argues that the law banning the Homo 
Sacer was founded on the concept of peace. However, after the ban, it involves a 
transition which leads to what he calls “ corresponding exclusion” which leads to 
another stage he calls “ without peace,” This is the stage that produces the Homo Sacer 
and circumstances he is in. Here the Homo Sacer is under threat and vulnerable or 
amenable to various possibilities and flexibilities. What Agamben did is to exclude 
those elements that would run riot to the main goal or objective leaving only the 
compatible ones.  
However, in the subsequent excerpt, Agamben’s explanation reveals that when the 
Homo Sacer is banned from the society of civilised humans and sent on exile, in which 
case, his bios, is removed, he is left not just with zoe which is the animal nature, but 
also with traces of bios, the social nature. He is incapable of reaching zero level of bios 
as all cannot be totally expunged. What he now has may though be 100% zoe, but with 
traces of bios or what may be called a sort of hybrid that sets him at a point of in-
distinction. This point of indistinction was carefully articulated by Agamben in the 
excerpt below.  In his words,  
the Homo Sacer bears a wolf's head from the day of his expulsion, and 
the English call this wulfesheud". What had to remain in the collective 
unconscious as a monstrous hybrid of human and animal, divided 
between the forest and the city -- the werewolf -- is, therefore, in its 
origin the figure of the man who has been banned from the city. That 
such a man is defined as a wolf-man and not simply as a wolf (the 
expression caput lupinum has the form of a juridical statute) is decisive 
here. The life of the bandit, like that of the sacred man, is not a piece 
of animal nature without any relation to law and the city. It is, rather, 
a threshold of indistinction and of passage between animal and man, 
physis and nomos, exclusion and inclusion: the life of the bandit is the 
life of the loup garou, the werewolf, who is precisely neither man nor 
beast, and who dwells paradoxically within both while belonging to 
neither. ( Agamben, 1995:69)         
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Agamben further compared the life of the homo sacer to that of the Hobbesian State 
of nature where sovereignty resides in the Leviathan. For Agamben, the ban that 
pushed the citizen outside the protection of the Sovereign into a situation where he 
finds himself in a chaotic state similar to what Hobbes calls a state of nature that is 
characterised by “war of all against all”, where there is lawlessness and insecurity of 
life and property and death was imminent. This worthless life is what Agamben calls 
bare life or sacred life. Murder in the state of nature was not illegal until “man” moved 
into the social contract. According to Agamben, the transition from ban to exile leaves 
the Homo Sacer neither in bios nor in zoe but a thin line that combines both elements 
which he calls a state of indistinction. This is further made clearer in Agamben’s words 
where he says that ;   
a zone of indistinction between the human and the animal, a werewolf, 
a man who is transformed into a wolf and a wolf who is transformed 
into a man -- in other words, a bandit, a homo sacer. Far from being a 
prejuridical condition that is indifferent to the law of the city, the 
Hobbesian state of nature is the exception and the threshold that 
constitutes and dwells within it. It is not so much a war of all against 
all as, more precisely, a condition in which everyone is bare life and 
a homo sacer for everyone else, and in which everyone is thus wargus, 
gerit caput lupinum. And this lupization of man and humanization of 
the wolf is at every moment possible in the dissolutio civitatis 
inaugurated by the state of exception. This threshold alone, which is 
neither simple natural life nor social life but rather bare life or sacred 
life, is the always present and always operative presupposition of 
sovereignty.( Agamben, 1995:70)   
However Agamben made his final submission in three theses, the first two are directly 
relevant to this thesis while the third opens up inroads to further research. According 
to Agamben,  
Three theses have emerged as provisional conclusions in the course 
of this inquiry: 1. The original political relation is the ban (the state 
of exception as zone of indistinction between outside and inside, 
exclusion and inclusion). 2. The fundamental activity of sovereign 
power is the production of bare life as originary political element and 
as threshold of articulation between nature and culture, zoē and bios. 
3. Today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental 
biopolitical paradigm of the West. The first of these theses calls into 
question every theory of the contractual origin of state power and, 
along with it, every attempt to ground political communities in 
something like a "belonging," whether it be founded on popular, 
national, religious, or any other identity. The second thesis implies 
that Western politics is a biopolitics from the very beginning, and that 
every attempt to found political liberties in the rights of the citizen is, 
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therefore, in vain. The third thesis, finally, throws a sinister light on 
the models by which social sciences, sociology, urban studies, and 
architecture today are trying to conceive and organize the public 
space of the world's cities without any clear awareness that at their 
very center lies the same bare life (even if it has been transformed 
and rendered apparently more human) that defined the biopolitics of 
the great totalitarian states of the twentieth century. (Agamben, 
1995:117)    
2.2 Extension and Application of the Theory of the Homo Sacer to the Ideas 
Underlying the Resolution of Apartheid Conflict in South Africa. 
Introduction 
Our interest in this thesis is not in Agamben’s Homo Sacer per se. It is in how the 
principles, ideas, concepts and terms that emerged in shaping the relationship between 
the citizen in the polis and his transition to Homo Sacer in Agamben’s philosophy have 
parallels in the ideas and dynamics that emerged in shaping the transition from 
apartheid to democracy in South Africa. For instance, almost all the concepts have 
equivalences in the realm of ideas, and for the purpose conciseness and clarity, some 
concepts had to be created in line with the ones from Agamben in the realm of ideas. 
For instance, The Homo Sacer which is the Sacred man in Agamben became in South 
Africa: “Idea Sacer” which similarly means “Sacred Idea”. However, just as the Homo 
Sacer is that which can be killed but not sacrificed, the “Idea Sacer” can be rejected or 
denounced and contradicted when taken on face value but cannot be “sacrificed”, 
rejected or repudiated when subjected to close critical analysis. Again, just as the 
operating elements in the Homo Sacer appear in couplets of opposites such as 
exclusive inclusion, inside-outside, zoe and bios, the ideas that animate the mediation 
process in South Africa equally appear in couplets of opposites, such as peace without 
reconciliation, truth without justice, amnesty without forgiveness. More also, just as 
the full citizen is stripped of his bios and left only with zoe, though with traces of bios, 
the complete idea in South Africa is stripped of one of its elements. Such as Truth with 
justice is stripped of justice, leaving it with only truth without justice. But then Truth 
without justice is not the same as truth with no justice at all. Traces of qualified forms 
of justice remains within the equation. Again, just as the ban in Agamben leads to the 
zone of indistinction where there was exclusion but still inclusive. In South Africa, for 
instance, though justice had been excluded, yet still inclusive in some defined and 
modulated form such that it is truth without justice but not with injustice as some level 
of justice remained embedded. The same principle of excluding the disturbing 
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elements in the Homo Sacer by not giving it any political voice also applies to the 
South African situation or the peace process, such that the idea that is excluded among 
the couplet is that which stands against the fulfilment of the main objective.  
It is this distinction from the realm of the Homo Sacer that is graphically represented 
in colour format for clarity when seen at a glance. In doing this, we introduced some 
terms that are used here for the first time in order to articulate more clearly the logic 
of transition from Agamben to resolution ideas in South Africa. Some of these terms 
and their parallel in Agamben are, Homo Sacer- Idea Sacer: meaning sacred idea, 
Bare-life- Bare Idea: meaning worthless and inconsequential idea.  
The above analysis features in the application of Agamben’s theory to the Ideas and 
concepts that were at the base of the peace initiative in Apartheid South Africa. It 
shows the transitions and the move from the realm of the human personality to that of 
ideas. 
In this section, there is a need to briefly refresh our memory about the link between 
Apartheid South Africa and the link with Agamben. Before Mandela became President 
in 1994, The South African white minority National Party had been in power for 46 
years.  (Philip, 2008) It held on to power through naked brute force of repression, 
oppression and victimisation of all sorts using state machinery to perpetrate all kinds 
of racial discrimination, segregation and multiple violations on the majority of black 
South Africans. The situation was so fierce that it was on the verge of tearing the nation 
apart. All local and international efforts at brokering peace in South Africa for these 
46 years proved abortive. The consequence was that South African apartheid conflict 
was listed among the world’s worst intractable conflicts. (Jones,2015). However, there 
was a turn around when in 1994, through internally grown negotiation and the 
institution of a new constitution and the emergence of the TRC, South Africa amicably 
resolved its 46 years intractable conflict with a transfer of power from the white 
minority to black majority South Africans. ( Guelke,2005). This research aimed to 
identify what underlying theoretical elements accounted for this successful brokerage 
of peace after such an extended period. Moreover, the method by which we are doing 
this is Critical Discourse Analysis. (CDA). 
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 What CDA did for this study, was that after assembling all the original materials both 
in print and electronic forms and in this case, the primary text was the complete 
volumes of the Truth and Reconciliation Report of South Africa, which came in seven 
volumes. These documents were manually read severally and subjected to critical 
analysis. The result was that through  CDA this study was able to isolate some themes, 
which underlie the mediation processes and the emerging rhetoric and narratives 
appeared in couplets of paradoxical complementary and contradictory forms which 
was a pointer to the hypothesis that there must be some rigorous theories that were 
beneath this success. Further research reveals that it is only within Agamben’s 
philosophy of the Homo Sacer that a plausible explanation for the peaceful transition 
in South Africa finds parallels.  
Agamben’s Homo Sacer is about the individual personality in the polis whose 
relationship with the sovereign, society and law determined his life history from birth 
to death. What we found out is that within the same geometry and logic of analysis, 
Agamben’s principles could also apply to those ideas at the base of South African 
resolution as much as they were with the Homo Sacer. Hence, what we shall be 
demonstrating in this section is to show those parallels. 
Beginning with life in the Polis, in Agamben’s philosophy, it was the ideal. Every 
citizen was under the protection of the sovereign. Citizens were full individuals who 
had both their natural traits of zoe and their acquired social traits bios. It was a “perfect” 
state of harmony governed by both the human law and divine law before things went 
wrong and change came. A similar narrative applies to the resolution ideas in South 
Africa. These ideas also have two somewhat complementary elements. Seven of such 
original ideas emerged, and they are; 1. Peace based on reconciliation, 2. Healing as a 
result of forgetting, 3. Tolerance resulting from friendship, 4. Unification founded on 
harmony, 5. Confession did with Remorse, 6. Amnesty flowing from forgiveness, 7. 
Truth leading to justice. Each of these set of ideas had its zoe and bios. 
There was a transition from this stage, both with the “perfect” and complete citizen in 
the polis and the ideas at the base of the South African peace process. The exclusion 
led to the exile of the citizen and thus changed her from being a citizen to the Homo 
Sacer during which she moved into a state of incompleteness and imperfection. It 
entered into the realm of the unideal. It is the realm where the citizen lost its bios and 
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had just zoe. It is the state of exception and indistinction. In this thesis, we are applying 
the same logical form that was operational in Agamben to the South African situation 
where the analysis centres around ideas. This is the fate that befell these ideas in South 
Africa. 
As a result of conflict, and ban, perfect and excellent ideas such as “peace with 
reconciliation” “became peace without reconciliation” What happened here was that a 
relatively perfect, and the complete idea became deconstructed and pushed to the realm 
of imperfection. The resultant imperfection is what translates to “sacred idea”, and it 
is this sacred idea that we chose in this thesis to call “Idea Sacer”. To say an idea is 
sacred in Agamben’s sense means two opposing things. : that the idea can be rejected 
as an inconsistent contradiction that makes no sense when viewed on a face level. The 
second is that the idea cannot be rejected as such when subjected to critical analysis. 
This is true of all the seven paradoxes derived. At first glance, peace without 
reconciliation does not make sense. Same for truth without justice or amnesty without 
forgiveness. However, a closer look, especially within the narratives that emerged in 
South Africa, confirms that it makes sense after all.  
Nevertheless, just as the citizen lost his bios, to become “Homo Sacer” the “pure ideas” 
lost its bios, leaving them with zoe, an inferior trait, which is called. “Sacred Idea”- 
“Idea Sacer”. As stated above, in the first paradox, reconciliation was lost, and it 
became peace without reconciliation. Forgetting was lost, and it became healing 
without forgetting, friendship was lost and it became, tolerance without friendship, 
harmony was lost, and it became unification without harmony, remorse was lost, and 
it became confession without remorse, forgiveness was lost, and it became Amnesty 
without forgiveness, and finally, justice was lost, and it became truth without justice. 
Peace returned to South Africa on the application of these “sacred ideas” to the 
mediation process. 
This is the realm of the Homo Sacer or that of the “Idea Sacer” The characters in this 
realm, also broadly defines the characters of the ideas at this stage. Agamben defines 
the life of the Homo Sacer as bare-life that is an ordinary life. The same fate affects 
these South African ideas that were no longer perfect and sacrosanct. They were like 
half measure ideas which are “bare-ideas” The term bare idea is a construct we created 
and derived from Agamben’s bare-life. “bare idea” has the same properties as bare life. 
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The difference is that while “bare-life” applies to the inconsequential and 
worthlessness of the life of the Homo Sacer after exclusion, “bare idea” on the other 
hand, applies to the  the inconsequential and worthlessness of the imperfect ideas that 
emerged as the seven paradoxical couplets that were at the base of the South African 
peace process. This was after the ideas have been stripped of their bios and 
completeness. For instance, peace with reconciliation is a “complete and perfect” idea 
to a large extent while “peace without reconciliation” is a “bare idea”. Interestingly, it 
was bare ideas that brought back peace to South Africa. 
Besides, the ban or transition turns the Homo Sapiens to Homo Sacer. The sacred man 
who is nonetheless not permitted to be sacrificed yet can be killed with impunity. This 
seeming contradiction also affects the South African peace ideas as they are vulnerable 
to attacks to the point of destructive criticism because they do not conform to norms 
and conventional expectations.  For instance, how can one talk about peace without 
reconciliation when common sense has it that there can never be peace without 
reconciliation because it is the peace that leads to reconciliation. Though the ideas can 
be attacked and killed for appearing incompatible with common sense at the layman’s 
level, it cannot be jettisoned under rigorous theoretical analysis or intellectually 
ritualised thought system that is philosophically and analytically based. Hence the 
sacredness of the idea means that the ideas cannot be sacrificed, desecrated, or 
repudiated on a platter of a rigorous intellectually ritualised circuit for being illogical, 
irrational or inconsistent without being guilty of intellectual bankruptcy and lack of 
criticality. Whereas on the other hand, the “Idea Sacer” or “Sacred Idea” can be thrown 
out, jettisoned, repudiated and annihilated for being inconsistent with common sense 
expectation and logicality. 
For Agamben, the hardest concept that continues to disturb the stability of the other is 
excluded and pushed outside the realm of bios. Not annihilated, but held out there 
because its absence is still present in the overall scheme of the objective. This bit is 
what Derrida, for instance, refers to as a “trace” It helps to explain the Agamben’s 
exclusive inclusion which is “what a sign differs/defers from. It is the missing part of 
the sign’s presence. In other words, We may now define trace as the sign left by the 
absent thing, after it has passed on the scene of its former presence. “Every present, in 
order to know itself as a present, bears the trace of an absent which defines it” (Derrida, 
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2016:127-131) In Western thought, the main substance, “necessarily contain traces of 
other (absent) signifiers, the signifier can be neither wholly present nor wholly absent”.  
The Derridean Phrase,” wholly present nor wholly absent” implies that nothing is 
absolute, It implies partiality, it connotes, imperfection and aperspectival philosophy. 
All these were indicative of the philosophy on which the South African peace was 
founded. (Derrida, 2016) 
The transition occurred with the appearance of the binary fusion of ideas, such as “truth 
with justice” or “peace with reconciliation”  This was followed by the deconstruction 
in which one of the terms had to be pushed out. However, what in this study is meant 
by “deconstruction”? It is no doubt, a notoriously difficult concept to define or as there 
have been many attempts to explain it in a much more straight-forward way, which 
have been grossly criticized for being too distant from the original texts, and even 
contradictory to the concepts of deconstructionism itself. Some scholars have even 
gone as far as claiming that a “deconstruction” is a dangerous form of nihilism that 
leads to the destruction of ethical and western scientific values. Despite this fact, it is 
still possible to affirm that deconstructionism at least in the Derridean sense, involves 
particular methods of textual criticisms. It is that which includes discovering, 
recognising and understanding the underlying assumptions that may involve both 
implicit and explicit ideas and frameworks that form the basis of beliefs and thoughts 
involving the theory of literary criticism that questions traditional assumptions. These 
assumptions are those concerning such elements as truth, certainty and identity, that 
affirms that words can only refer to other words while attempting to demonstrate how 
statements about texts subvert and undermine their meanings. (Mastin, L. (2009:1)  
The result of that deconstruction is such that a somewhat perfect and complete idea 
became reduced to an incomplete half measure one which is referred to as “sacred”. 
Ordinarily, what should be considered sacred, is that which is perfect not an imperfect 
one? Of course but in deconstruction, it is the reverse, and it is this imperfection which 
we consider an aberration, that operates as though it is the normalcy and it is on this 
basic rhetoric, that societal peace was achieved in the RSA. 
Hence within the purview of deconstruction, the narratives became “truth without 
justice” and “peace without reconciliation”.  It nonetheless remained within the same 
fold. Agamben referred to them when he was talking of excluded inclusion. For 
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Agamben, the disturbing parameter is excluded, though still included outside of the 
bracket which is the position of the Homo Sacer for whom the paradigm of the bare 
life is captured in the sovereign ban which Agamben finds in the figure of Homo Sacer 
of archaic Roman law. Here Agamben argues that the Homo Sacer has been excluded 
from the religious community and all political life and as such, he cannot participate 
in the rites of his gens, nor can he perform any juridically valid act. To that extent, his 
entire existence is reduced to a bare life stripped of every right because anyone can kill 
him without committing homicide. In this state, he can save himself only in perpetual 
flight or in exile to a foreign land after being made vulnerable by being stripped of his 
legal status and expelled from the political community; The Homo Sacer is exposed 
unconditionally to the potentiality of being killed by anyone.  The Homo Sacer ‘is in 
a continuous relationship with the power that banished him precisely insofar as he is 
at every instant exposed to an unconditional threat of death’ which is why it is excluded 
and yet included. (O'Donoghue, 2015, Southerland, 2016: Agamben,1998, ). 
 Furthermore,  the basis of this distinction is addressed by Agamben with recourse to 
the two terms used by the Greeks to distinguish between forms of life: zoē, ‘natural 
reproductive life’ confined to the private sphere, and bios, ‘a qualified form of life’, 
political life. The sovereign reduces those who are banned from the domain of political 
beings to a life defined only regarding zoē which is recognised by the sovereign only 
as biological beings. Whereas, the separation of zoē from bios and the production of 
bare, human life as a product of sovereign power can be said to transform modernity 
as zoē, or the biological life, is repositioned inside the polis, becoming the focus of the 
State’s organisational power. This process, rooted in classical politics and extending 
into the present, indicates, for Agamben, a Western politics that has constituted itself 
from its beginnings as biopolitics. Hence, every idea again has the binary element of 
bios and zoe; but to achieve its objective, they have to be stripped of their bios and left 
with the only zoe which is much more easier to manipulate and recondition. ,  
(O'Donoghue: 2015, Southerland: 2016, Agamben:1998)   
However, in order to understand how all these manifests itself in South Africa, we 
must understand first that the architects of the TRC did not intend to base the de-
escalation of the South African conflict on the binary fusion of opposites, but that of 
compliments, unfortunately, the narratives and rhetoric that emerged could not be 
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manipulated otherwise. Hence, the binary fusion of opposites, which formed the 
bedrock of the de-escalation of the conflict in Apartheid South Africa emerged.  
Nevertheless, what we have done here is to move the Agamben’s idea from the realm 
of the person or personality of the Homo Sacer to those of concepts and this time 
around, they are the concepts that were at the base of the success of the TRC in South 
Africa. 
Hence, there is a logicality of principles here, that determines the dimension of the 
deconstruction. It involves scaling down “perfection” to imperfection and 
“completeness” to incompleteness. The fundamental underlying principle guiding all 
these is a principle in which compromise is upheld at the expense of legality.  This is 
why in the polis, there was a transition from the complete citizen that has two elements 
of zoe and bios into an incomplete personality called Homo Sacer who had only one 
element, which is the zoe. Same for the perfect ideal ideas that were at the base of the 
South African peace process. They were by this principle, reduced from an idea with 
two elements to that which has lost one of the elements such as peace with 
reconciliation becoming peace without reconciliation and the same geometry of 
analysis affects all the elements in the set. 
We have observed that there is a logical principle behind these pairings. It is a situation 
where the ideal gives way to the unideal, and the unideal becomes the standard for 
societal peace and stability. In other words, an “absolute”, “perfect” and “complete” 
idea is repudiated and replaced with a relative and perspectival one. Better still, it is 
replaced by an imperfect, incomplete and defective form while this new aberration is 
rhetorically and narratively projected as usual standard. The overarching underlying 
principle that determines this is that of compromise at the expense of legalism.  
Below is a graphical display of the emerging narratives and paradoxical couplets that 
were at the foundation of the South African peace process. The diagram shows the 
movement of ideas from “perfection” to imperfection. The perfect ideas had both zoe 
and bios while the imperfect had just zoe. Hence showing that peace in South Africa 
was attained through imperfection. 
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A summary of emerging results from the theoretical analysis. 
• The emerging results from this theoretical stage, reveals that  under the 
criminal justice system, “truth” often lead to justice , but in SA, the truth was 
volunteered in anticipation of amnesty which makes it truth without justice 
because  confessing the truth could not lead to punishment or prosecution that 
was already negotiated out because amnesty is no justice. 
•  Also emerging is the confession of gross violation, without remorse, as a 
result, such truths could only elicit state pardon called amnesty, but it is 
amnesty without the victim’s forgiveness.  
• Another emerging result is the fact that confessing to gross violation itself 
helped in healing wounds of the heart, but not without creating permanent 
impressions that remained indelible in their hearts, never to be forgotten. 
• Also emerging is the fact that such un-forgetfulness only Leads to elastic 
tolerance but not friendship.  
• It has equally emerged that such artificiality could only promote societal 
unification to the extent that SA remains one unified political structure but 
lacking sustainable harmony.  
Such is the character of the fragile peace delivered in South Africa on its way 
towards nation building. Perhaps it was a choice of a better evil to accept the 
current injustice in order to be able to lay the foundation of a much more 
solid futuristic societal justice. 
2.3 Critique both of Agamben and the application to South African conflict. 
The critical issue here is that the theoretical principles underlying the peace narratives 
in South Africa were contradictory and seemed conflictual. Only a critical analysis 
founded on the Agamben’s Philosophy of the homo Sacer can rationally justify the 
contradictions.  There is another exciting dimension to the logic of analysis in the 
manner and pattern in which the narratives form themselves together in pairs. We 
observe that within Agamben’s philosophy, in the Polis, the citizen was a whole person 
with both zoe and bios in him. Unfortunately, he lost this completeness and wholeness 
via the sovereign ban that exiled him and changed his status to that of the Homo Sacer. 
The Homo Sacer is an inferior personality, compared to the citizen. He is an 
incomplete entity, an imperfect personality, a second-class entity compared to the 
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holistic nature that he had as a citizen in the polis. He is, in fact, a degeneration and an 
aberration of what used to exist in the polis. In the polis, he had both bios and zoe in 
him, but now as Homo Sacer, he has only zoe. All these traits equally apply to the 
“Pure idea” in South Africa which was the “ideal”, but through the process of 
deconstruction, and reductionism the holistic idea lost its completeness and perfection 
as well as its totality and became the second-best possible. The elements in South 
Africa was all inclusive with such phrase as “with” as in “truth with Justice” but 
degenerated into “without” in which case, it lost one of its vital parts and technically 
became one-legged idea as against the two-legged one in the previous state of affairs. 
We have chosen to describe the above scenario as “a reduction of perfection”  or 
“deconstruction of absolute” in which a “complete” idea, a holistic and all-inclusive 
idea was broken down with the new idea losing parts of its original components. 
Moreover, the ideal was pushed away for the “un-ideal”, and the “un-ideal” became 
the rule.  Interestingly, It is only that which is incomplete or that which has a vacuum 
that can tolerate an addition. Hence it is this none ideal that is flexible enough to 
accommodate complex societal conflicts and its resolution. 
 
Similarly, it is interesting to note that even though Glyn Daly’s focus in the article ; 
“politics and the impossible: Beyond Psychoanalysis and Deconstruction is on  Slavoj 
Žižek and his extensive critique of poststructuralism and deconstruction from a 
Lacanian perspective, There are striking theoretical alignment with that of Agamben 
as applied in this thesis to the South African conflict.  In this article, he  examines what 
he calls “ Žižek" s provocative approach to questions of social reality, ideology and 
nationalism as well as that of reality, whereas, in this thesis, we seek to understand the 
underlying theoretical basis for the success of the South African peace process via 
CDA and Giorgio Agamben’s exclusive, inclusive philosophy of the Homo Sacer. In 
this article, Daly(1999:90-91) argues extensively that, 
It is clear that between the extremes of Universality/Particularity and 
emptiness/fullness there are wider deconstructive possibilities for 
subversive and hegemonic practices. In particular, an alternative 
perspective presents itself which combines the Lacanian insight of a 
constitutive lack with a more positive approach to politics. Such a 
perspective would be one which does not simply ‘tarry with the 
negative’ but actively conjures with negativity as such. This type of 
approach has been crucial to the development of the idea of ‘radical 
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democracy’ as elaborated in the work of Laclau and Mouffe. The 
central insight here has been the identification of two movements 
which are ultimately contradictory but which, at the same time, sustain 
the possibility of democracy through the very impossibility of any 
resolution. On the one hand there exists the attempt by various groups 
in a democratic framework to realize the fullness of society(to fill the 
‘empty place’) through the development of a particular project. On the 
other hand there is a second movement which involved the recognition 
that  such a realization is always impossible and that the happy hour 
of total fulfilment never comes. Radical democracy , therefore, 
subsists in this constitutive interplay: that between the (false) 
extremes of the total possibility/impossibility of the fullness of society 
there exists a plurality of partial and provisional hegemonic projects 
which attempt to perform the filling function. Now this clearly goes 
beyond the Zizekian perspective of attempting a total concealment of 
the constitutive lack. The attempt by a group/individual to bring about 
an effect of concealment can only be seen in purely artificial and 
provisional terms: as a ‘strategic essentialism’ which tries to 
constitute the impossible object. In this way, radical democracy is able 
to build into its ‘vision’ the very sense of its own incompletion and 
incompletability. As a positive feature of its political culture. Thus 
while radical democracy, like all political projects, is a power 
construct which seeks to establish some kind of closure, at the same 
time – and unlike other political projects – it is one which actively 
conjures with its  impossibility and potential for transformation; in 
Derrida’s terms, it remains alive to the promise of a democracy ‘to 
come’.  (Daly, 1999:90-91) 
Just as we can see in the argument of Daly above, it recognises that the discourse is 
that if paradoxes of the extreme opposites. Also, the reference to extremes of 
“universality and particularity” is synonymous with bios and zoe. Bios is the 
universality, which is social while zoe is particularity, which is individualism. The life 
of the Homo Sapien in the polis is characterised by completeness while after the 
exclusion, his life as the Homo Sacer in exile is incomplete-bare-life. Between the 
extreme is the zone of indistinction. Daly says “there are wider deconstructive 
possibilities for subversive and hegemonic practices. In particular, an alternative 
perspective presents itself” this is quite interesting. In Apartheid South Africa, the 
narrative began with a ‘positive’ and perfect narrative such as “ peace with 
reconciliation” however, as a result of the “ban” a deconstruction took place. The 
possibility emerging can be reasonably described as “subversive and hegemonic 
practice”  with the emergence of an incomplete, imperfect, aberration of the ideal that 
was deconstructed. The result can be called “subversive”. It is “peace without 
reconciliation” Daly would probably and rightly too describes this as “a constitutive 
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lack with a more positive approach to politics” It is at the level of “bare-life” so 
“without” portrays the lack, but following rigorous analysis, it is this “lack” and second 
order arrangement that creates a positive approach to politics. It is the mid-way 
position that is dictated by what Desmond Tutu calls “political Prudence” to institute 
“peace that lacks reconciliation” since it is clear that Peace with reconciliation is 
unattainable and an attempt to force it will probably end in disaster. The description of 
this outcome by Daly is remarkably admirable because it is quite succinct. He says 
“The central insight here has been the identification of two movements which are 
ultimately contradictory but which, at the same time, sustain the possibility of 
democracy through the very impossibility of any resolution.” It is incontrovertible that 
“peace without reconciliation” or any of the seven paradoxes involves two movements 
whose contradictions are obvious. However, interestingly, these are the phenomenon 
that helps South Africa to achieve ‘the possibility of democracy through the very 
impossibility of any resolution’.  
Daly describes it as “radical democracy” which he says  “subsists in this constitutive 
interplay: that between the (false) extremes of the total possibility/impossibility of the 
fullness of society there exists a plurality of partial and provisional hegemonic projects 
which attempt to perform the filling function”. This is an apt description of the 
dynamics operating between “peace with reconciliation and peace without 
reconciliation and other paradoxes in the South African situation which brought peace 
back to South Africa after 46 years by performing the “filling function”. Just like we 
have argued elsewhere in this thesis that the particular theories upon which the South 
African peace process was based, may not be known. However, Daly’s analysis here 
as fused with this process, seem to confirm further this assertion that it must have been 
based on a rigorous philosophical basis. What took place in the RSA was an 
“artificiality” not the norm. “peace resulting from reconciliation would have been the 
norm; unfortunately, peace without reconciliation is certainly an aberration. Daly calls 
it ‘strategic essentialism’ and concludes with an incontrovertible submission that aptly 
describes the transitional “closure”, societal peace and stability in the RSA. Also, he 
says In this way, radical democracy is able to build into its ‘vision’ the very sense of 
its own incompletion and “incompletability”. As a positive feature of its political 
culture. Thus while radical democracy, like all political projects, is a powerful 
construct which seeks to establish some kind of closure, at the same time – and unlike 
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other political projects – it is one which actively conjures with its impossibility and 
potential for transformation” as manifested in apartheid, South Africa. (Daly, 1999:90-
91) 
Critical Engagement  
 
 
 
There is a twist to this Agamben’s argument on the question of the possibility of an 
outright dichotomy between zoe and bios. For instance,  can one strictly separate 
perfect ideas from imperfect ones in absolute terms? Just as we are aware that Liberal-
democracy, for example, is ultimately a contradiction and yet it continues to function 
in and through this contradiction (or “imperfection”).  One may then ask if there is a 
clear distinction between sacred and non-sacred ideas? Can one turn into the other and 
if so, how?  Are we able to justifiably posit that  Agamben made a sufficiently strong 
case for separating zoē from bios? Especially when we know that Aristotle already 
identified the human being as a political animal and that singular pronouncement tends 
to contain both dimensions. Derrida also argues that the basic nature of the human 
being (zoē) is to be political (to seek bios) hence,  the specific difference between 
animal and human beings is to be political. Martin Heidegger equally makes a similar 
point: the ontological condition of being is to be ontic).  
 
On a more profound reflection over these questions, starting with Agamben himself, 
whatever his intention, even his philosophy could not sustain that strict bifurcation 
between zoe and bios. Hence, it does not seem to support the fact that in concrete terms, 
bios can be outrightly separated from zoe, except perhaps theoretically. The very idea 
of excluded inclusion seems to suggest this inseparability. The argument of Agamben 
that an attempt at separation was made at the point of the ban was an effort in futility, 
especially when in exile, it is discovered that what was excluded remains in part within 
what remained. Agamben does not seem to be the only one who seems to have 
attempted this form of separation that alludes to the foundation of knowledge. What 
Descartes did with the methodic doubt was similar where he tried to deny and repudiate 
all that he had hitherto known through the senses, including mathematical facts to even 
his own very existence. This seems to be drifting back to the point of tabular rasa but 
could ultimately not reach there when he got to the point of the cogito or self-
realisation. This is not clearly the beginning of the accumulation of social ideas in an 
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empty mind, which would have been the moment of pure animality without rationality. 
Hence Descartes could not reach the point zero or nihilism where a clear demarcation 
can be put between the animal and man when he realised that” I think, therefore am”. 
Again inseparability of the pure animal from the rational animal. Point zero would 
have been the point of tabula rasa, which is pure “animality” while the build up from 
that point will be that of the social man. This point of separation does not seem to be 
practically identifiable. 
Arguing within the same geometry of analysis is Aristotle, who first identified the man 
as a political animal. This affirmation not only fuses the two ideas as one inseparable 
entity, it nonetheless affirms that both elements are constitutive in man whether they 
can be separated or not is a different issue. The fact that man is a composition of both 
natural animal and social animal remains a fact with this Aristotelian assertion. 
Although there is no doubt that the pronouncement that man is a political animal seems 
to be affirming the inseparability of the political from the biological. In actual fact, 
being political seem to exist in the very DNA of man and to that extent, practically 
inseparable. 
Agamben’s idea becomes clearer if we following the argument of Joshua Foa Dienstag 
(2006:148-152) in his review of  Agamben,s work:  The Open: Man and Animal.  Foa 
Dienstag argues extensively on page 149 of this article that, In The Open: Man and 
Animal, Agamben extends this analysis by offering, an alternative conceptual 
foundation for human existence, which is even more so than what he presented in the 
Homo Sacer. According to him,  Agamben's writing here was presented in a more 
sophisticated manner in the discussion of the human-animal relationship which could 
be likened to that of Nietzsche's account of asceticism in the third essay of the 
Genealogy. The depth of discussion here is said to depict the sacred remnant who greet 
the Messiah as half-man, half-animal. Foa Dienstag ‘s analysis reveals that in this work, 
Agamben embarks on a debate about animality between Bataille and Kojeve as well 
as that of the early-twentieth-century zoology. It was after this that he returned to 
medieval theology and finally arrived at what seems to be his main destination, which 
is Heidegger's basis for making a distinction between man and animal as it appeared 
in his lecture series of 1929-1930. 
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Foa Dienstag  maintains that even though the analysis modifies, yet it does not 
fundamentally utter, what was advocated in the Homo Sacer, except that the emphasis, 
is now on the animal as the figure that represents 'bare life,' However, Foa Dienstag  
reiterated the inseparability of man from the animal by affirming that, 
  
“Agamben argues that "the caesura between the human and the animal 
passes first of all within man" (p. 16). That is, every definition of man, 
from Aristotle forward, has defined him by isolating him from the 
animal. But since every human form of life (bios) cannot be separated 
from our animal existence (zoe), the 'animal' of man ends up in the same 
position as the sacred man of Roman law, as something which must be 
excluded, and yet retained in its exclusion, residing in a zone subject to 
sovereign power yet unbound by any law: "the decisive political 
conflict, which governs every other conflict, is that between the 
animality and the humanity of man. That is to say, in its origins Western 
politics is also biopolitics" (p. 80). That the division between human 
and animal may be drawn in many ways, Agamben does not hesitate to 
acknowledge (indeed, his genealogy is meant to demonstrate this). But 
the constant process of defining the human via the (non)exclusion of 
the animal is, to him, the 'anthropological machine' of Western politics 
which always produces the potentially exploitable category of 'bare 
life.' Nor has this machine exhausted itself with the demise of fascism: 
"the only task that still seems to retain some seriousness is the 
assumption of the burden and the 'total management' of biological life, 
that is, of the very animality of man. Genome, global economy, and 
humanitarian ideology are the three united faces of this process" (p. 77) 
Foa Dienstag (2006:149-150) 
 
 
Furthermore, a much more articulate critique of Agamben was undertaken by Derrida 
who though died in 2004 but left behind a vast legacy of material unpublished in the 
form of written lectures. Much of which metamorphosed into what is now The Beast 
and the Sovereign, Volume 1, It was inaugurated by the University of Chicago Press 
and edited by Geoffrey Bennington and Peggy Kamuf, who translated the series into 
English. 
In this volume, Derrida persistently associated bestiality or animality with sovereignty, 
while deconstructing the traditional determinations of the human. Derrida argues that 
the beast and the sovereign are connected because neither animals nor kings are subject 
to the law. Whereas, the sovereign stands above it, while the beast falls outside it from 
below. Derrida then traces this association through a set of scholarly works which 
includes that of La Fontaine’s fable “The Wolf and the Lamb”. Others are Thomas 
Hobbes’s biblical sea monster in Leviathan, D. H. Lawrence’s poem “Snake,” Niccolo  
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Machiavelli’s Prince with its extensive comparison of princes and foxes, a historical 
account of Louis XIV attending an elephant autopsy, and Jean Jacques Rousseau’s 
evocation of werewolves in The Social Contract. Others are Deleuze, Lacan, and 
Agamben ‘s philosophical interpretations of the dichotomy between man and 
animal.(Derida,2009:vol.1) 
In this work, Derrida examines the contradictory involvement of animals in political 
discourse. Sometimes, as he identifies the fact that the political man and the sovereign 
state appear in the form of an animal while at other times, it is presented as superior to 
animals of which he is superior. In session two of this work, Derrida examines the 
‘origin’ of this seemingly contradictory discourse, by referring to animal fables which 
he maintains draw on some sort of unconscious assertions in invoking of images that 
are contradictory in nature as regards to apprehending objective knowledge. In a 
similar vein,  Derrida discourses how Hobbes’s Leviathan and sovereignty itself are 
both constructed and maintained through some strange and mysterious fear of the wolf 
within the human. It is the repression of this wolf, according to Derrida that leads to 
further contradictions in which Thomas Hobbes excluded both beast and God from the 
social contract.  
 
However, Derrida in this work was quite critical of  Giorgio Agamben’s biopolitical 
theory. Derrida’s critique involves issues of conceptualising sovereignty and its 
relationship to the dichotomy between human and animal. It also deals with the 
criticisms of Agamben, which are related to his tendency at laying claim to the 
discovery of the origin of ideas and concepts as well as the conceptual and the textual 
basis for the criticisms, which includes a way of applying history and interpretation of 
Aristotle.  
 
Nevertheless, there is evidence in Derrida’s criticism that the problem of inconsistency 
in Agamben, takes its source from his desire to be first to make certain assertions. For 
instance, Agamben claims both that the ‘‘Production of a biopolitical body is the 
originary activity of sovereign power,” and that the politicisation of bare life in the 
state of exception is in fact, the “Decisive event of modernity ( Agamben,1998: 4, 6).” 
He further claims to be uncovering the essence of sovereignty in the state of exception, 
while also identifying the introduction of bare life into the polis as a distinguishing 
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feature of modernity. Derrida maintains that the confusions and contradictions 
embedded within this are the facts that these Agamben’s assertion is obscured by his 
desire to be first to make such claims. This becomes clearer with his analysis of the 
properties of the zoe /bios distinction in relations to Aristotle’s proclamation of the 
relationship between man and animal. 
 
In his book, The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida argues extensively by pointing out 
several instances when Aristotle appear to use the term zoe in a way that conflicts with  
Agamben own interpretation. One of such is his definition of the human being as 
politikon zoon (‘political animal’). Whereas, the term politikon zoon, for Aristotle 
seems to be a zoe that is political. In fact, Derrida remarks that zoe, or zen which 
implies to live’, is used severally by Aristotle in his work, to describe the human as a 
political animal, and at all times, specifying that the human zoon is political “By nature” 
(physei). Aristotle quoted by Derrida(2009: Vol.1 p. 315). This assertion implies that 
the word ‘political’ refers to how humans beings live naturally, and as such, 
qualification of their animalistic life. Hence,  being political is a natural attribute of 
human life, which makes him specifically different from other animals. The definition 
of the human as politikon zoon, is, therefore, an obvious exception to the zoe/bios 
distinction. Agamben addresses this issue, by claiming that there is no contradiction if 
one interprets the meaning of the qualifier politikon accurately. Derrida pushed this 
argument extensively when he says; 
Let us first of all take into account the textual situation of this 
definition of man as a political animal, or, more literally, of man who 
is by nature (physei) a political animal (politikon zo¯on).10 This 
definition comes up at the very opening, the beginning, the 
commencement of politics, at the commencement of the first book of 
Aristotle’s Politics. The definition of man as a political animal, a 
definition that never fails to specify “by nature” (physei) — and this 
insistent, recurrent, literal reference to physis is not the least obscure 
— this definition of man as a political animal will reappear, in the 
same form, in book 3 (at 1278b) at the moment when Aristotle is 
defining the purpose of the state (polis) and of constitutions. Aristotle 
there says:“kai oti physei men estin anthro¯pos zo¯on politikon” (“and 
man is by nature a political living being”) (1278 b19). It is in this 
passage that, on the basis of a single occurrence of the word bios, in 
the midst of many uses of zoe¯ or zen (to live) — we shall no doubt 
come back to this — Agamben, at the beginning of the book I have 
already mentioned, Homo Sacer, thinks he can find a distinction 
between bios and zoe¯ that will structure his entire problematic. It is 
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in the name of this distinction that Agamben, while situating himself 
in the tracks of Foucault, cites the latter and then proposes, as he puts 
it, to “reconsider” his affirmation: Derrida(2009: Vol.1 p. 315). 
 
It is incontrovertible that Aristotle in his book the Politics, Man is defined as a politikon 
zoon (Aristotle, 1253a, 4). However the understanding is that in attic Greek the verb 
bio nai is basically never used in the present tense, whereas, the word “political” is not 
considered to be basically an attribute of the living being as such, rather, it is a specific 
difference that defines the genus zoon (Derrida, 2009: 2). The basic argument of 
Agamben here is that there is a difference between a living being’s attribute and a 
specific feature that defines that living being. Yet, Derrida’s insistence is that the said 
difference is neither certain nor clear. Hence, the expression,  politikon zoon for him, 
implies  both senses: “The specific difference or the attribute of man’s living, in his life 
as a living being, in his bare life, which implies being political (Derrida:2009: 330).” 
There is no clear difference between the two notions argues Derrida.  They seem to 
flow into each other complementarily. (Derrida:2009: 330). 
 
Hence, Derrida emphasises the fact that Aristotle did not outrightly separate zoe from 
bios as Agamben did. The Aristotelian conception of politikon zoon does not seem to 
carry the connotation of any dichotomy between the two concepts. In other words, 
there was never any form of distinction in Aristotle’s concept of the political, “Man is 
that living being who is taken by politics: he is essentially a politically living being, 
(Derrida:2009: 348).” Thus, Derrida argues that it is ‘obvious’ that Aristotle was 
already “Thinking of biopolitics (Derrida:2009: 349).” This is why Derrida maintains 
that the division in life that apparently structures sovereignty could not have been 
based in his ancient text in the manner that Agamben conceives it.  
Interestingly there is another scholar Amy Swiffen (2012) whose remark on this 
Derrida /Agamben controversy, was quite insightful in his article titled; Derrida Contra 
Agamben: Sovereignty, Biopower, History. According to Swiffen (2012) while 
acknowledging the disagreement between Derrida and Agamben, on the contemporary 
importance of biopower, yet notes the  
“Incredible novelties in bio-power” that must be addressed, but there is 
an issue concerning the “conceptual strategies relied on” to characterize 
these novelties ([1], pp. 330, 326). Derrida’s reading of Aristotle 
demonstrates the zoe/bios distinction, which is “The frontier along 
which Agamben constructs his whole discourse,” does not go deep 
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enough to function as an originary political relation ([1], p. 321). 
Moreover, the insistence on seeing historical and philosophical origins, 
exemplified by the reading of the bios/zoe division in Aristotle is, in 
effect, producing the very sovereign form of exclusion that Agamben 
criticizes in his work. This is not to suggest that Derrida’s position is 
that ancient texts are not relevant to contemporary politics. On the 
contrary, they are ‘indispensable’ for understanding the “Bio-powers or 
zoo-powers of what we call the modernity of ‘our time’ ([1], p. 333).” 
The issue however is how to conceive of the relationship between these 
texts and ‘our time,’ how to think history neither in terms of ‘diachronic 
succession’ nor ‘synchronic simultaneity’ ([1], p. 333). Agamben’s 
approach involves thinking history in terms of “A decisive and 
founding event ([1], p. 333).” Derrida’s criticism intends to compel a 
reconsideration of this way of “Thinking history, of doing history, of 
articulating a logic and a rhetoric onto a thinking of history ([1], p. 332).” 
( Swiffen, 2012:1) 
 
 
Beyond the zoe and bios controversy. is the concept of sovereignty that divides 
Agamben and Derrida. The fundamental difference as spotted by Swiffen (2012) lies 
in their fusion of sovereignty with the conception of history as something that existed 
a long time ago (synchronic) or as an evolving phenomenon from one epoch to the 
other, from ancient to contemporary times (diachronic). According to Swiffen (2012) 
 
The difference in conceiving history corresponds to a difference in the 
two thinkers’ positions on the future of sovereignty. On the one hand, 
Derrida rejects conceptualizing sovereignty in terms of an essential 
relation. The readings in The Beast and the Sovereign suggest instead 
that sovereignty has “More than one ground (…) more than one solid 
and single threshold ([1], p. 334).” This is not to suggest Derrida leaves 
us with an abyssal void or groundless depth underlying the concept; 
rather, it suggests that there are multiple forms of partition, division, 
and condition that broach a sovereignty that is imagined to be 
indivisible. If this is correct then it is not possible to oppose sovereignty 
because sovereignty is not one thing.14 For instance, to unconditionally 
oppose sovereignty would mean opposing classical principles of 
freedom and self-determination. There is no way to conceptualize 
freedom without a certain sovereignty. Thus, it is impossible to reject 
sovereignty without also threatening the value of liberty. The issue is 
therefore not a choice between sovereignty and non-sovereignty but 
among ways of sharing, transferring, translating, and dividing 
sovereignty.15 In contrast, Agamben’s formulation conceives 
sovereignty in terms of an essential relation to bare life. The idea of an 
essential political relation implies that it might be possible to overcome 
sovereign politics, if only the relation were discarded.16 Sovereignty 
could be abandoned and a ‘coming community’ ushered in, in which 
there would be no exception of the fact of living from the form of life 
[20].17 ( Swiffen,2012:1) 
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Conclusion 
 
 
The fundamental question necessitating this critique is the fact that Agamben 
tries to separate zoe from bios distinctly. Scholars taken their source right from 
Aristotle were quite critical of this strict bifurcation. Heidegger based his own 
critique on the metaphysical complications arising from translation and 
interpretation of underlying interlocking concepts such as logos in the 
interpretation of the idea of sovereignty.  Derrida opined strongly that the very 
idea of man being a political animal as pronounced by Aristotle contains and 
fuses man and animal in an inseparable form. Again, that the attempt of 
Agamben at separating them, was in a bid to achieve some sort of first in his 
theoretical claims in the Homo Sacer and Bare life where he tries to push to 
the extreme foundation of ideas. 
 
Whatever the criticism, it does not seem to affect fundamentally, its 
application in this work primarily because at least theoretically, it is 
incontrovertible that man is a composition of both nature and nurtures even if 
a clear cut distinction between his nature and nurture cannot be outrightly 
defined without contradiction. In the same vein, it remains a fact that man is 
both a biological being and a social being all in one. To that extent, we can 
argue that even though Agamben began by trying to separate the two ideas, 
yet the fact remains that Agamben ultimately recognises the practical 
inseparability of the two ideas with his idea of exclusive inclusion which 
seems to affirm that inclusion appears in exclusion which again alludes to the 
Derridean concept of trace. Exclusive inclusion is an affirmation that in a 
practical sense, absolute separation is impossible with zoe and bios. Although 
interestingly, the resultant element that became relevant in the mediation 
process is neither zoe nor bios but the intersection and its inseparable mix, 
which Agamben calls bare life. 
 
In the polis, man is a political animal. At this stage, the problematic bit has 
not appeared in Agamben. It is a stage that has the full mix of the zoe and bios. 
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The artificial separation emerges when, as a result of some juridical decisions, 
a theoretical separation between them was attempted in which the citizen was 
technically stripped of his socio-political nature, which in a way refers to his 
essence. What is supposedly left is his mere existence that is dominantly his 
zoological or animalistic nature. This is the life of the Homo Sacer. In exile. 
However,  though a significant part of his humanity is expectedly stripped, 
what is left is still a hybrid though of dominant animalistic nature that still has 
within it the social. Moreover, it is still this social that is like the umbilical 
cord binding the excluded inclusively — linking the external to the internal.  
 
Our position in this thesis is not to dwell on the fundamental separation 
between Zoë and bios. It is sufficient to acknowledge that both elements exist 
within the human entity and that at least theoretically they can be pointed out 
even if they cannot in concrete terms be physically separated.  
 
However, situating them within the realm of ideas, we may then ask if there 
can be perfect ideas in the absolute sense? The answer to this is straight no. 
Nothing seems absolute in the universe. We may talk of complete or 
incomplete ideas, but within that frame too, its operationalization remains 
relative. Hence when we refer to the deconstruction of “absolute ideas”, to 
give way to relative ones, it is relative absolute. Hence,  even absoluteness 
remains an absoluteness that emerges in relativity. It is just a higher form of 
completeness that is more complete than another but not a reference to 
perfection. 
 
On the whole, what is referred to as a whole, complete and perfect is only in 
degrees relative to a lower form of it. This is why there is an exclusion in 
inclusion and inclusion in exclusion. Hence, in Agamben’s polis, the citizen 
was in a state of relative “completeness” and the exclusion that takes out bios 
further depleted the structure to incompleteness or a less form of completeness. 
The result in which we have a greater proportion of zoe with traces of bios is 
just another level of incompleteness resulting from the depletion of a higher 
form of incompleteness. Hence no idea is absolute, except that one idea has 
richer content than the other within the same geometry.  
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Therefore, operating within Agamben’s philosophy, the resultant idea that 
emerged in the resolution process was a lower order idea where relative 
perfection or completeness was jettisoned for a lower one. 
 
2.3 Summary of Theoretical Framework Chapter  
 
What we have done in this section is a demonstration of how theoretically rigorous the 
work is. It may be useful to reiterate what the original aim of this work is, and why 
this theoretical analysis is essential, as well as how this helped in the understanding of 
the dynamics at play in the resolution of the South African conflict. 
Despite our sustained efforts, some conflicts continue to defy resolution. Indeed, the 
need to understand why this should be the case served as the original motivation for 
this piece of research. The need to understand this became narrowed down to the case 
study of South African apartheid conflict that ravaged the South African society 
unabated for decades, having defied all mediation approaches. Incidentally, this 
research came at a time, when SA had been able to surmount this hitherto intractable 
conflict. This changed the direction of the research from “how to do it” to “how it 
was done” using Critical Discourse Analysis.  
 
Hence, we were able to isolate the dominant themes that animate the mediation 
processes, and further analysis reveals some paradoxes upon which the South African 
conflict resolution lies. In order to understand these seemingly contradictory narratives, 
an appeal to Agamben’s philosophy of the homo sacer became imperative. The 
exciting bit is that not only was the aim of Agamben's philosophy fundamentally 
different from that of this thesis, in the sense that it applies to the relationship between 
the Sovereign and his subjects under dictatorial regimes. Whereas, what we have 
successfully done in this work is to transpose those principles from the realm of the 
individual personality called the homo sacer to those of ideas that were at the base of 
the conflict resolution in SA.  
 
Our findings revealed that the narratives and rhetoric that were at the base of the 
successful resolution of the South African apartheid conflicts, through the institution 
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of the TRC were mostly contradictory paradoxical inconsistencies, which were though 
consistently inconsistent. The seemly incongruence finds perfect and parallel fusion in 
Agamben’s principles of exclusive inclusion, exception, bare life, the zone of 
indistinction, zoe/bios dichotomy, and sacred life of the homo sacer.  
We were able to demonstrate how these terms, manifest first in Agamben’s homo sacer, 
and how they form the basis for the emerging ideas that were at the base of the success 
of the South African conflict resolution.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.0 Introduction to Methodology Chapter  
 
This chapter aims to identify the methods by which the research was carried out. It 
does deal with the justification for the choice of methodology, and the appropriateness 
of the method vis-à-vis the kind of data that is being sought. We shall also discuss the 
origin of the chosen method, its exponents and variations, its merits and demerits, and 
how the chosen method helps to facilitate the primary objective of this research. This 
research is primarily aimed at examining the underlying theoretical principles upon 
which the South African apartheid conflict was successfully de-escalated. Moreover, 
we did this, by examining the content, structure, mediation process and nation- 
building mechanism as well as techniques that were deployed to de-escalate the South 
African apartheid conflict successfully. This is to identify, extrapolate and harness all 
the fundamental elements that were both explicit and implicit in the creation of a new 
democratic South Africa. 
3.1 Choice of Methodology 
 
In discussing our choice of methodology, we need to take into cognisance the kind of 
data that we require for this thesis, and that would largely determine and justify the 
appropriateness of our choice. We want to know particularly if the kind of data we are 
seeking are empirical ones or logical ones?  Following Delanty (1997:29) “ There are 
only two kinds of knowledge; empirical knowledge(knowledge derived from 
experience) and logical knowledge (which is derived from logical analysis)” Delanty 
(1997:29)   And for this research, we shall be adopting an Interpretivist approach. This 
is an approach which is akin to hermeneutics. By this, we mean an approach in which 
truth and nature of reality are often searched for through rational analysis of facts, in 
order to achieve meaningfulness. This is mainly because this research is theoretically 
based. Hence, the kind of data required is indeed not quantitative, and to that extent, 
Survey, for instance, would be grossly inadequate. And because it involves human 
communication and social interaction, the work would be heavily reliant on analysis 
of language, literary forms, linguistic and figurative expressions that together provides 
interpretation and meaning as they feature in documents that reflect attitudes, gestures 
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and procedures that have been preserved in print and talks through various manual and 
electronic devices. The method of research that is preferable is Critical Discourse 
Analysis. (CDA). 
3.2 What is a Critical Discourse Analysis? (CDA) 
CDA as a methodology can be classified broadly, under the general category of 
Qualitative Methodology. This methodology involves a situation where “a researcher 
generally selects a wide range of possible data sources, including transcripts of 
recorded interviews, movie scripts, advertisements, or a company’s internal 
documents.” Willig, (2008). Discourse analysts usually select texts that are as 
complete as possible, and it includes such things as an interview transcript which may 
be written up to include all of the pauses, errors, and corrections. Willig further 
maintained that “discourse analysis is based on the understanding that there is much 
more going on when people communicate than simply the transfer of information from 
one source to another. It is not just an effort at capturing literal meanings; rather, it is 
the investigation of what language does or what individuals or cultures accomplish 
through language. This area of study raises questions such as how meaning is 
constructed, and power functions in society” Willig (2008) In other words, it goes 
beyond descriptive analysis to evaluation and extrapolation of unapparent facts that 
are underlying the phenomenon of investigation and interpretation which is a departure 
from the traditional descriptive approach to conflict resolution. The central tenets of 
CDA include 1. CDA addresses social problems; 2. Power relations are discursive; 3. 
Discourse constitutes society and culture; 4. Discourse does ideological work, 5. 
Discourse is historical, 6. The link between text and society is mediated 7. Discourse 
analysis is interpretative and explanatory, 8. Discourse is a form of social action. 
(Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 271-280)  
Since  CDA does all the above, it would be pertinent to investigate its origin or how it 
began in the first place and for what purposes. Scholars further argued that CDA is 
“concerned with studying and analysing written and spoken texts to reveal the 
discursive sources of power, dominance, inequality and bias. They maintain that it 
examines how these discursive sources are maintained and reproduced within specific 
social, political and historical contexts. Sheyholislami (2001)   van Dijk (1998a).  
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In Fairclough‘s opinion CDA “aims at systematically exploring often opaque 
relationships of causality and the determination between (a) discursive practices, 
events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and processes; 
to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically 
shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity 
of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power 
and hegemony”.  (Fairclough, 1993:135)   
Similarly, scholars argue that  “ CDA aims at making transparent the connections 
between discourse practices, social practices, and social structures, connections that 
might be opaque to the layperson.” Fairclough, (1993:135) It is interesting to note at 
this stage that what we have done with CDA in SA is precisely this, showing the 
unapparent theoretical relationship between the underlying philosophical theories of 
Agamben and the emerging paradoxes as they reflect in the ensuing narrative that was 
at the base of the resolution of the SA apartheid conflict. 
 
Diagram adopted from, Wodak and Meyer 2009:24). Critical discourse analysis: 
History, agenda, theory and methodology. a.  
The above diagram adopted from Wodak and Meyer 2009:24). Clearly outlined the 
four major segments of CDA as follows, starting from (1) the Discourse text, which is 
where the primary text and documents are vigorously studied and dissected. The next 
stage is to subject them to rigorous hermeneutic interpretations and analysis, and from 
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this, It moves to the next stage where it involves the building of theories, concepts, 
principles and paradoxical formations which are taken to the next stage of 
operationalisation where they are concretely applied. In the case of South Africa, the 
Text and videos analysed were the proceedings of the TRC. The discourse produced 
dominant themes that were subjected to interpretations at the 2nd stage. This produced 
some theories or paradoxes in binary forms at the third stage, and the final stage of 
operationalisation is where we examined how in concrete terms these paradoxes 
manifest themselves in the process of returning peace to South Africa.  
3.2.1 The Origin of CDA 
Jaffer Sheyholislami (2001) traced the evolution of CDA to the late 1970s when 
Critical Linguistics was developed by a group of linguists and literary theorists at the 
University of East Anglia (Fowler et al., 1979; Kress & Hodge, 1979). Their approach 
according to Sheyholislami, was based on Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics 
(SFL). CL practitioners such as Trew (1979a, 155) aimed at "isolating ideology in 
discourse" and by so doing, showing "how ideology and ideological processes are 
manifested as systems of linguistic characteristics and processes." This aim was 
pursued by developing CL's analytical tools, argues  Fowler et al., (1979; Fowler, 
( 1991) based on SFL. For  Halliday, these CL practitioners view language in use as 
simultaneously performing three functions: ideational, interpersonal, and textual 
functions. While harnessing the views of Fowler (1991,:71) and Fairclough 
(1995b, :25) argued that 
 whereas the ideational function refers to the experience of the 
speakers of the world and its phenomena, the interpersonal function 
epitomises the insertion of the speakers' attitudes and evaluations 
about the phenomena in question, and establishing a relationship 
between speakers and listeners. These two functions are instrumental 
to the textual function. It is through the textual function of language 
that speakers can produce texts that are understood by listeners. It is 
an enabling function connecting discourse to the co-text and con-text 
in which it occurs. Sheyholislami (2001:1) 
Furthermore, Critical Discourse Analysis, according to van Dijk. (1995: 17) Has 
become a universal name for a unique method for the study of text and talk that came 
into being from critical linguistics, critical semiotics, social and political 
consciousness as well as an oppositional way of researching language, discourse and 
communication. She argues further that delimiting the peculiar principles, practices, 
aims, theories as well as methods of critical discourse analysis is difficult even though 
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an endless list of elements of CDA abound.  (Japanese Discourse Vol.1, 1995, 17-27, 
In other words, it involves typed messages and voice messages that have no one 
distinct character. 
In practical terms, the origin of CDA has been traced to the early 1990s when a group 
of scholars gathered together for a small symposium in Amsterdam in January 1991. 
Here, Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth 
Wodak had two days to harness their ideas, theories and methods, similarities and 
differences of CDA together. (Wodak and Meyer,2009,3) 
Rising from this symposium, these scholars became more reinforced that CDA as a 
school of thought or paradigm has specific general features which include the fact that 
all approaches are problem-oriented and to that extent, inter-disciplinary and eclectic. 
Similarly, it is characterised by a common objective, which is the demystification of 
ideologies and power through a systemic deconstruction process that helps to 
investigate semiotic data which could be spoken written, or visual. Furthermore, CDA 
scholars often re-emphasise their individualistic positions and interests without 
jettisoning their respective scientific methodologies and at the same time, remaining 
self – reflective of their research process. (Wodak and Meyer,2009:3) 
Nonetheless, both Wodak and Meyer,( 2009:3) affirms that the beginning of CDA 
network was marked by the launching of Van Dijk’s journal titled, Discourse and 
Society (1990). They also allude to other books of similar themes within the same 
period, while the Amsterdam meeting became a propeller for what may be referred to 
as the  “institutional approach” which helped in the promotion of exchange 
programmes. (Wodak and Meyer, 2009,4). With this general overview, of the origin 
and scope of CDA, its subject matter became clearer as a method that is basically, 
“inter-disciplinary and eclectic” However, then, that is not all. What unique 
distinguishing character does CDA have?  
3.2.2 The Fundamental Aims, Features and Properties of CDA  
It, therefore, becomes necessary to ask; what the aim of Critical Discourse Analysis 
is? Since it is a method that evolved initially from language analysis, it became natural 
for scholars to begin to use language analysis as a method for studying social changes. 
Nevertheless, because of the newness of this discipline, scholars were yet to develop 
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a form of language analysis that could satisfactorily meet the requirements of theory 
and practice. That explains why Norman Fairclough maintains that his primary 
objective in his work, Discourse and Social Change, was to achieve this dualism.  He, 
therefore, began, by listing the first proponents of CDA to include, Antonio Gramsci, 
Louis Althusser, Michel Foucault, Jürgen Habermas and Anthony Giddens.   
(Fairclough, 1992:1)   
Furthermore, the development of Critical Discourse Analysis has emerged with six 
strands, namely;  the Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer’s version of CDA, which 
emphasises history, agenda, theory and methodology. This version is closely followed 
by the Foucauldian version, which is both Methodological and theoretical in structure. 
The third version is that of Teun A Van Dijk whose focus was on a socio-cognitive 
approach to CDA, whereas Martin Reisigi and Wodak similarly hinged their analysis 
of CDA on a historical approach. For Theo Van Leeuwen, CDA represents a  re-
contextualization of social practice. Finally, for Fairclough, it involves a Dialectical- 
relational approach to social research. (Wodak and Meyer,2009) 
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Pictorial Representation of the Different Strands of CDA
 
Diagram adapted from, Wodak and Meyer,2009:20). Critical discourse analysis: 
History, agenda, theory and methodology.  
In concrete terms, therefore, the subject areas where the use of CDA would most 
probably be useful were highlighted. Moreover, conspicuously, subject areas such as 
physics, chemistry and biology were absent. Instead, CDA is traced fundamentally to 
rhetoric among other allied disciplines in the humanities. (Wodak and Mayer, 2009:1)  
Hence, it is argued that the manifold roots of CDA lie in Rhetoric, text linguistics, 
Anthropology, Philosophy, Socio-Psychology, Cognitive science, Literary studies and 
Sociolinguistics as well as in Applied Linguistics and Pragmatics. (Wodak and 
Meyer,2009:1)   
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In his analysis, Teun Van Dijk, argues that Critical Discourse Studies is an offshoot of 
the 1960s and 1970s with the emergence of new closely related disciplines in 
linguistics generally but dealing mainly with a discourse that has manifested in seven 
dimensions that are common to all these disciplines.  (van Dijk, 2007a; Wodak,2008a 
and wodak and Mayer, 2009:2). 
The seven dimensions include; 
1. a preference for naturally occurring language than an artificially evolved 
abstract language system. 
2. A focus on more holistic, larger units than Isolated words and sentences, 
which gives rise to other basic units of analysis such as texts, discourses, 
conversations, speech acts, or communicative events. 
3. The study of linguistics was stretched beyond abstract sentences and 
grammar to include practical actions as well as interactions. 
4. The concretisation of none verbal gestures as concrete forms of 
communication 
5. Emphasis on socio-cognitive as well as interactional development and 
strategies in the use of language 
6. There is also a focus on the study of the function of language either in its 
socio-cultural, situative or cognitive dimension.   
7. There is also attention on the analysis of a huge variety of concepts in text 
grammar and use of coherent language, topics, macrostructures, speech 
acts, interactions, sign, politeness,  argumentations, rhetoric, mental 
models as well as other aspects of texts and discourse analysis (Wodak and 
Mayer,2009:2). 
In identifying a common ground for the different versions of CDA, These scholars 
tried to make a clear distinction between DS, CDS and CDA,  wodak and Mayer 
(2009:2) In doing this, they argue that the main difference between this phenomenon, 
lies in “constitutive problem-oriented, interdisciplinary approach” of CDA. To that 
extent, “ CDA is not in a way, interested in investigating a linguistic unit, but in 
studying social phenomena which are necessarily complex and thus require a 
multidisciplinary and multi- methodical approach”.  (Wodak and Meyer,2009:2) 
However, from the preceding it is becoming apparent that CDA is not just interested 
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in linguistic exercises for academic purposes only but much more concretely interested 
in solving practical social issues while using linguistics only as a tool. 
This no doubt had in itself created the problem of clarity and homogeneity, which 
further created diversities and proliferation in the understanding of what “text” and 
discourse entails as far as CDA is concerned. This is why Wodak and Meyer were 
unequivocal in maintaining that almost every paper revisits these notions. While citing 
Michel Foucault, Jurgen Habermas, Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau,  Niklas 
Luhmann,   and many others, Wodak and Mayer argue that  discourse means anything 
from a historical monument, a lieu de mémoire, a policy, a political strategy, a 
narrative or a broader sense of the term, text, talk, speech, topic- related conversations, 
to  language per se. (Wodak and Meyer,2009:2-3) 
Some of the themes identified under CDA includes, racist discourse, discourse on 
gender, discourses on un/employment, media discourse, populist discourse, discourse 
of the past, and such unending long list that tend to stretch the meaning of discourse 
from “a genre to a register or style from a building to a political programme 
( Meyer,2009:3)  
 All these explain the confusions, misunderstanding and criticisms of CDA found in 
Blommaert,2005; Wodak, 2008a; Wodak and de Cillia,2006.) This made it imperative 
for every scholar to functionally define their conception of CDA. (Blommaert, 2005)  
3.2.3  The four main  Elements and Themes Common to CDA 
For clearer delineation and delimitation, four main themes evolved for what would 
pass as CDA, and these include Discourse, Critique, Power and Ideology. They have 
been identified as common overlapping grounds for CDA despite their diversities.  
Hence scholars argue that CDA has never laid claim to any single or particular theory, 
nor has it lay claim to any particular methodology; rather, they are multifarious. 
Moreover, derived from different theoretical backgrounds, geared towards different 
data and methodologies. This kind of approach creates a problem of distilling what 
could be CDA. Hence, the need to be more specific on the model of CDA in use at any 
point in time becomes imperative. (Wodak and Meyer,2009:5) 
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a. The Notion of Discourse 
CDA considers language as a social practice. (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997) The 
implication of seeing language as such implies ‘a logical relationship between a 
particular discursive event and the institution(s)  situation(s), and social structure(s), 
which frame it’. Hence discursive events are shaped by social structures, on the one 
hand, and shape social structures on the other hand. Discourse is not only socially 
constituted and conditioned; it equally constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, 
and social identities of people as well as relationships between people and groups. 
Similarly, it helps to reproduce and sustain social structures but also contributing 
towards transforming it. However, since discourse is socially consequential, themes 
that emanate from it include those of power, and can help identify repeatedly unequal 
power relations between opposing social classes and antagonistic groups in society 
such as between  blacks and whites in South Africa, minority versus majority, rulers 
and the ruled, oppressed and oppressors etc. (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 258) 
 Arguing from the point of flexibility in the manner in which CDA scholars conceived 
discourse, the historical discourse approach is often identified and aligned with the 
socio-cognitive theory of Teun van Dijk (1998) where discourse is conceived as 
structured forms of knowledge as distinct from the text which is regarded as concrete 
oral utterances or written work. Reisigi and Wodak, in Wodak and Meyer ( 2009: 97- 
121)   
b. The idea of Critical    
The very idea of criticality in CDA has been traced to the works of some ‘critical 
Linguists’, the Frankfurt school and Jürgen Habermas. The central claims of these 
scholars are that social theory should discountenance the old culture of understanding 
and explanation while embracing the culture of critiquing and challenging society. 
This culture of criticality and challenge is expected to improve understanding of 
society by harnessing all major social sciences, such as political science, sociology, 
psychology, economics, history, and anthropology. (Wodak and Meyer,2009:6-7)  
The emphasis of critique is the view of the analysts themselves, while the word 
“critical” is first traced to an approach called “Critical Linguistics” (Fowler et al., 
1979; Kress and Hodge, 1979).  
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For these criticality scholars, the use of language can lead to some distortion or 
mystification of social issues which systematic analysis could undo. It helps the 
practical connection between social and political activities as well as engagements and 
sociologically informed construction of our societies. To that extent, critique is making 
explicit what is hitherto implicit or obvious what is hidden. (Fairclough, 1995a:747; 
Connerton, 1976:11-39) 
The preceding analysis, seem to affirm that CDA goes beyond description, but 
enlightenment that addresses the very root of some delusions that may act as inhibitors 
to being explicit and transparent in research. (Van Leeuwen, 2006:293) 
c. Ideology  
The very idea of Ideology as a major component of CDA is crucial  because political 
scientists identify four basic features namely;  
- The importance of power over cognition. 
- Guides individual’s  evaluation 
- Provides guidance through action 
- Be logically coherent.   (Mullins, 1972) 
However, as far as  CDA is concerned,  Wodak and Meyer (2000:8) are of the view 
that  “the more hidden and latent type of common beliefs often appear disguised as 
conceptual metaphors and analogies while  Fairclough is more favourably disposed to 
the  Marxist conception of ideology. According to him, “Ideologies are representations 
of aspects of the word which contribute to establishing and maintaining relations of 
power, domination and exploitation” and further argues that Ideological analysis and 
critique can be done through the analysis of the text which is what we have done in 
this thesis. (Fairclough, 2003:218)  
d. Power 
Power is central to CDA and quite relevant to this thesis. It deals with the analysis of 
the language use of those in power who controls the mechanism of inequality and 
suppression or oppression.  It deals with how discourse reproduces social domination 
which entails the abuse of power by one group over the other as evident in Apartheid 
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South Africa as well as how dominated groups such as the black majority, through its 
party ANC resist such oppression. It equally raises the question of how CDA scholars 
conceive power and the kind of moral standards that permits them to make a distinction 
between the use of power and abuse. The dichotomy remained an unresolved dilemma 
even in South Africa. (Billig, 2008) 
However, power has been variously defined both sociologically and psychologically 
without consensus, yet scholars found the following three approaches being recurrent. 
- The power that is borne out of specific resources of different actors- (French 
and Raven, 1959) 
- Power as a function of particular attributes of social exchange in interactions –
(Blau, 1964, Emerson, 1962, 1975) 
- Power as a result of a systemic constitutive element or features of society from 
different perspectives. (Foucault, 1975, Giddens, 1984, Wodak and Mayer, 
2009) 
Delineating the scope of CDA, more clearly, Wodak and Meyer maintain that  “CDA 
can be defined as being fundamentally interested in analysing opaque as well as 
transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power, and control 
as manifested in language. In other words, CDA aims to investigate critically, social 
inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimised, by language use or in 
discourse.“ ( Wodak and Meyer, 2009:10)   
Adopting this scope in our research confirms that Apartheid is a philosophy where the 
opaque relationship between the ruling minority and the ruled majority were brought 
to transparency with the birth of the TRC. It was a commission that cleared the doubt 
that apartheid was a philosophy of dominance, discrimination, power and control of 
the majority by the minority. This fact was manifested in the language of 
discrimination and  its repressive laws, its ruthless actions of incarceration and 
extrajudicial killings to which a number of amnesty seekers confessed  in both text as 
recorded in the TRC report and journals as well as in talks as recorded by the electronic 
media of the internet, TV and recorded motion pictures.  
Furthermore, Norman Fairclough maintains that his objective is to develop an 
approach to discourse analysis, which could be used among other things as a method 
 
 
67 
 
for investigating social changes. (Fairclough, 1992:8). There is no doubt that a 
significant number of social changes affected the South African society with the 
transformation from apartheid to democracy with the release of political prisoners, and 
the conduct of the general election that ushered in black majority rule for the first time.  
However, Fairclough argues that in order for a method of discourse analysis to be 
useful in investigating social change, then it must fulfil some requirements which 
include four main ones  namely; 
- It must be a method for multidimensional analysis. To this extent, Fairclough 
argues that following his previous three-dimensional approach It allows 
relationships between the discursive and social change to be accessed together 
with the properties of text to be related to social properties of discursive events 
as instances of social practice. 
- It must be a method for multifunctional analysis and by this Fairclough argues 
that change in discourse practices, contributes to change in knowledge, beliefs 
and common sense, social relations, as well as social identities. To that extent, 
what is required is a conception of discourse and method of analysis which 
interplays between the elements beginning with a systemic theory of language 
that conceives language as multi-functional and at the same time sees it as 
representing reality, enacting social relations as well as establishing identities. 
The fact here is that there is a correlation between speech and action. (Haliday, 
1978)  Therefore Fairclough (1992:9) maintains that “this theory of language 
can be fruitfully combined with the emphasis upon socially constructive 
properties of discourse in social-theoretical approaches to discourse such as 
Foucault’s.” 
- It must be a method for historical analysis. For Fairclough, this implies that 
discourse analysis should focus on structuring and articulating text 
construction and constitution of the ‘orders of discourse’ which involves 
overall discursive practices and behaviours in some institutions and the society 
at large. Hence Fairclough sees text at this level, as a process involving 
intertextuality. By this, he means “texts are constructed through other texts 
being articulated in particular ways. Ways which depend upon and changes 
with social circumstances. On the level of orders of discourse relationships 
among and boundaries between discourse practices in an institution or the 
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wider society are progressively shifted in ways which accord with directions 
of social change.”( Fairclough,1992:9)  
- Finally, it must be a critical method. By this, Fairclough argues that 
relationships between discursive, social and cultural change usually are not 
transparent, especially as it concerns those involved, neither is 
technologization of discourse transparent. Hence, the concept of criticality 
implies showing a relationship or interconnections that are not apparent. This 
is a significant thing that we did in this research by showing the inapparent 
relationship between the emerging couplet paradoxes and the empirical 
narratives that gives credence to them. It also involves intervention, such as 
making resources available to those that are deprived as a result of the change. 
The empirical evidence of this abounds in the South African situation, which 
is why the confession of heinous crimes was celebrated in the South African 
TRC. Hence, some utterances and gestures of pain, anguish, and helplessness, 
as well as the bitterness that could not be expressed in words at the South 
African TRC, was all part of the mix in arriving at the findings of this research. 
3.4 Analysis of the Fundamental Elements of CDA as applicable to South Africa 
(SA) 
The purpose of this analysis is to set up a framework within which the hidden and in-
apparent facts underlying a subject matter unfolds and leads to the elucidation of 
further given facts, which ultimately accounts for successes or failures of the mediation 
processes. 
Beginning with Wodak and Meyer (2009:45ff) who embarked on the analysis of the 
methods of analysing discourses and disposition maintained that discourse by way of 
definition can be regarded as “ an institutionalised way of talking that regulates and 
reinforces action and thereby exerts power as illustrated by the image of a flow of 
knowledge throughout time “ (Jager,2004; Wodak and Meyer (2009:45). This is 
entirely true of how the narratives were created in the proceedings and hearings of the 
TRC in SA. Tutu and his colleagues, tailored the proceedings towards what is expected, 
and allowable, and those not favoured at the hearings were clearly articulated. 
Also identified among the favoured method of CDA are Linguistic concepts whose 
constituents and components include, figurativeness, vocabulary pronominal structure 
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and argumentation.  This tends to provide a structure for CDA which can be articulated 
through the examination of relevant fundamental concepts such as Special Discourses 
and Inter-discourse. The former refers to those of the sciences while the latter refers to 
those discourses that are non- scientific even though their elements continuously 
overlap.  
However, the flow of discourse that centres on common topics are known as discourse 
strands. Each discourse strand is made up of several subtopics. Although, there is a 
parallel similarity between discourse strands and that of discourses. The dichotomy 
lies in the fact that discourse is abstract and manifests within statements, whereas 
discourse strands are conceived at the level of particular utterances and performances 
found at the surface of texts. (Foucault, 2002; Wodak and Meyer, 2009:46) The latter 
applies in the South African situation. 
Furthermore, discourse strands can be broken into two, namely synchronic and 
diachronic dimensions. The former refers to the analysis of the limited spectrum of 
what is said or say-able at some point and can cut through a discourse strand at various 
points in time, whereas the latter refers to the origin, genesis and a historical setting 
that precedes experience. In the course of this research, both approaches were 
variously applied at different times. 
 This assertion was supported by Wodak and Meyer (2009:46) who argues that ‘ every 
discourse strand has within it, both elements in the sense that every topic has an origin 
as well as a ‘ historical a priori’. Hence when analysing a topic, the researcher must 
maintain focus on the history, in order to identify the knowledge of society on a topic, 
the researcher has to reconstruct the origin of the topic as often done by Foucault while 
discussing everyday life issues or institutions such as hospitals or prisons.  
To this extent, The “Synchronic” would refer to the volatile but compelling 
confessions of human right abuses by the agents of apartheid carrying out the atrocities 
of institutionalised terrorism in South Africa. On the other hand, the “Diachronic” 
refers to the historical antecedents surrounding migration and settlement of the white 
minorities among the black majorities in South Africa and the gradual emergence of 
inequality, segregation and oppressive laws of apartheid. Although it is not limited to 
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this, it could as well refer to the entire cultural assemblage that pre-structures the field 
of possible discourse in South Africa, so it is strictly not limited to just these areas. 
3.4.1 Setting Up A Discourse Analysis Framework For Any Research. 
A set of four primary frameworks for the use of CDA was set up by Wodak and Meyer,  
and this includes Creating a toolbox for Discourse Analysis, Choosing a Subject 
Matter, Choosing discourse Plane and Features as well as Preparation and Accessing 
Materials.   Wodak and Meyer (2009:52) set out a toolbox outline for any research in 
discourse analysis. According to them, “this outline deals with the practical procedure 
for subjecting empirically obtained material to discourse analysis. In an actual project, 
these elements are supplemented with a clarification of the theoretical foundations and 
methodology used “This no doubt helps us to create a framework on which to situate 
our current research in conflict resolution and nation building to fall in line with the 
requirements of CDA. 
Furthermore, Wodak and Meyer (2009:52)  argued that the first step in any research is 
choosing the subject matter and providing its rationale, while at the same time, 
realising that the relationship between a phenomenon of interest and particular 
discourse strand, involves some kind of technicality or complexity. By this, we mean 
that a phenomenon may cut across many discourse strands among which a choice has 
to be made based on an initial conception of the overarching phenomenon which may 
develop further in the course of analysis. This is because theoretical concepts are often 
ambiguous and thus subject to clarification and justification. Hence the researcher can 
focus on the concept that is directly relevant to his research.  Wodak and Meyer 
(2009:52)   
To this extent, our choice and rationale of the South African TRC lie in our search for 
answers to the significant question” of what South Africa did differently in order to 
escape the predicted bloodbath which Desmond Tutu said that was to be the inevitable 
end of South Africa. (TRCR:1998) 
Given that the apartheid conflict was considered intractable, by scholars such as Jones 
(2015:148-149), we hypothesise that this change in fortune of South Africa is not by 
any means an accident of history. It is rather that of conscious, systematic, coherent 
theoretical principles and theories of nation-building and societal conflict resolution 
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that may not only have been skilful, systematically and logically derived but clinically 
executed. Hence, the underlying or unapparent elements that helped in defusing this 
hitherto volatile, age-long intractable South African apartheid conflict was worth 
investigating. (TRCR: 1998) More interesting is the extent of contradictions that were 
thrown up by bitterness that was associated with the carnage that took place in the 
apartheid days in South Africa. This is evident in some of the temper-kindling 
confessions that were emotionlessly volunteered at the TRC hearings which were 
greeted by mass anger and despair of victims who dare to stand against the allowable 
narrative of reconciliation and to the contrary denounces forgiveness in defiance of 
political correctness.  This is why it seems to be like magic that the TRC was able to 
broker peace in South Africa amidst endless pessimism. The contradictions, rhetoric 
and narratives, threw up some themes, principles and theoretical concepts upon which 
the peace process was hinged. Some of the themes include reconciliation, truth-telling 
for amnesty, forgiveness, restorative justice and the question of impunity among others. 
Furthermore, the next stage is that of choosing a discourse plane and its features. 
Within this framework, Scholars argued that it is often better to keep it simple and 
progress gradually and systematically by moving from simple to complex such as 
restricting the research to one plane initially. While the analysis may cover several 
sectors of the analysed plane, yet this choice has to be justified either because it is 
exemplary in modus operandi or that it has never been examined in any research 
project before. Either way, the research should summarise the findings from the 
analysis of other sectors. There are situations where examining several discourse 
planes at the same time, becomes imperative and may be time-consuming and 
complicated, but hinging them on well-justified examples. This may be further 
complicated if entanglement of discourse strands were to be considered. The bottom 
line is that the peculiarity of the research and the document of analysis dictates mostly 
how the research would proceed. Wodak and Meyer (2009:52) In this case, There have 
been myriads works on South Africa and the TRC, but none have approached it from 
the point of CDA , neither has there been anyone that tries to understand the underlying 
theoretical principle that accounted for the peaceful de-escalation of the South African 
conflict, despite logical predictions to the contrary.  
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The last step is that of  Preparing and Accessing Materials, which involves delineating 
the necessary steps for analysis. The particular document in question, the time, period 
or date of the document, and a justification for the document must equally be provided. 
While preparing for the analysis, a general characterisation of the document in 
question must feature. Its political orientation, or philosophy, sources, credibility, its 
level of circulation and accessibility if available within the public domain and coverage 
of a considerably extended period would further enhance the qualitative variety of the 
discourse strands. Wodak and Meyer (2009:53)   
In this case, the document in question is the TRC report of South Africa. It was a 
comprehensive and formidable document containing the entire process of the 
capitulation of apartheid and the transition to the democratic process. It was presented 
to President Thabo Mbeki on the 21st of March 2003. The period of investigation 
covered by the report is from 1960 to 1994, while the Hearing began in 1995. The 
Report came in a total of 7 volumes with five main volumes and two appendixes.  
Besides this is in the public domain as it can be found on the official website:  
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/index.htm#top 
Furthermore, Grange (2014) aptly captures the essence of this mandate by affirming 
that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was founded after the end of Apartheid 
under the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No 34 of 1995. It was 
said to be vested with the responsibility of hearing everyone who believed that they 
had been a victimised by perpetrators of “gross violations of human rights” and that it 
is related to political objectives of the apartheid regime. They were to come forward 
and give testimony and request amnesty from prosecution. The mandate of the 
commission was to record the nature, causes and extent of gross violence, refer cases 
for reparation and rehabilitation and in some cases grant amnesty to the perpetrators 
of crimes related to human rights violations. The TRC had Archbishop Desmond Tutu 
as its chairperson (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998) 
Furthermore, the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was accomplished 
through three committees; (1) Human Rights Violations (HRV) Committee which 
investigated gross human rights abuses that took place between 1960 and 1994. The 
identified victims of abuse were referred to the Reparation and Rehabilitation 
Committee. (TRC Report.2008)  
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(2) Reparation and Rehabilitation (R&R) Committee provided victims support to 
ensure that the TRC process restored dignity and rehabilitation and healing of victims, 
their families and communities. according to the terms prescribed by the Promotion of 
National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No 34 of 1995.” (1995) 
(3) Amnesty Committee (AC) considered applications for amnesty. The perpetrator 
was granted amnesty and free from prosecution for that particular offence provided the 
crimes were politically motivated, and the person seeking amnesty volunteered the 
whole truth. There were 7112 amnesty petitioners, 5392 people were refused amnesty, 
and 849 were granted amnesty. 
Grange (2014) rightly and unequivocally affirms that The TRC was an attempt at 
finding a middle ground between prosecuting the past regime for human rights 
violations and working to hand over power on the condition that no prosecutions would 
take place and a blanket amnesty would be granted to perpetrators of gross violations. 
(Grange, 2014) 
However, On October 28, 1998, the Commission presented its report and findings. In 
the report, it concluded that the private and immoral acts committed by both the 
Apartheid regime, and the liberation strugglers, including the ANC would not have 
been exposed if not for the granting of amnesty. The report, however, condemned both 
sides for committing atrocities without necessarily admitting that it is skewed in one 
direction more than the other. Although theoretical analysis has made it clear that it 
was part of a deliberate narrative for the actualisation of societal peace and stability. 
3.5 What Versions of CDA are We Adopting For This Research and Why? 
There are no watertight ways and rules of doing CDA. Often, CDA users device their 
version of CDA. The important thing is that the basic tenets of CDA cut across most 
practitioners irrespective of whichever version is used. Hence we have an overlapping 
of methodology. Nevertheless, while we may flexibly adopt our own CDA through an 
eclectic approach, we are nonetheless fascinated mostly by Norman Fairclough’s. 
dialectical-relational approach’ to CDA 
The Norman Fairclough’s model of CDA is a model that consists of three inter-related 
processes of analysis which are further tied to three inter-related dimensions of 
discourse. Namely; 
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1. The object of analysis (including verbal, visual or verbal and visual texts). 
2. The processes by means of which the object is produced and received 
(writing/speaking/designing and reading/listening/viewing) by human 
subjects. 
3. The socio-historical conditions which govern these processes.  
And furthermore to Fairclough each of these dimensions requires a different kind of 
analysis1 text analysis (description), 2 processing analysis (interpretation), 3 social 
analysis (explanation). Fairclough's ( 1995:98) Janks(1997:329). Structurally, our 
analysis is basically that of Fairclough. 
3.5.1  How The Above Content and Structure of Fairclough Synchronises With 
this Research. 
It is at this point pertinent to examine how Norman Fairclough’s structural outline 
above, synchronises with our analysis of the South African situation. In this research, 
our object of analysis is the seven volumes of the TRC report as well as some online 
live video of the settings where evidence of gross abuse and human right violations 
were narrated. What we did here was to read the documents manually and subjected 
them to textual analysis. At this stage, our concern was mostly a description of what 
human right violations took place as well as how it happened. In the process, we were 
able to isolate the dominant themes that animate the process which we already listed 
above. 
The second stage, going by the same Fairclough’s structure above, we began to process 
the information crisscrossing them over one another, seeing how they relate or 
contradict each other and how they point to specific narratives. At this stage, we were 
engaged in interpretations. This is the stage where we observed that the elements 
became fused thematically in binary forms that were at first, complementary and later 
in oppositions as a result of deconstruction processes. 
The third stage is that of social analysis; This is where we seek to understand the 
implications of the above formations in the light of Derridean/Agamben’s philosophy 
of inclusion by exclusion and how that translates in concrete terms towards achieving 
the overall narrative of societal peace amidst apparent contradictions.   
The world divides, through a system of para-tactical equivalences, into 
two camps “related only in the mode of negative reversal. More recent 
instances are terrorism or totalitarian absolutism. By contrast, properly 
political relations are marked by neither fusion nor fission: social 
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identities are neither objectively given nor totally dissolved, but rather 
emerge through constant renegotiation (or a process of challenge and 
response). ’Thus, the two conditions of a hegemonic articulation,” 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985:18) Dallmayr (1987:129) 
This is why we understood that the binary fusion and reversal of the ideas underlying 
the mediation process were natural as Derrida might argue. More significantly is the 
fact that they expressly stated that in the ensuing narrative, absoluteness could not be 
achieved. It is a float midway between compromises that could neither achieve any of 
the extremes in the mediation process. Again it reveals that mediation is an ongoing 
process that involves negotiations and renegotiations. This fact kept featuring in the 
TRC report. 
3.6 Relevance of the Chosen Methodology to this  Research. 
This methodology is entirely relevant to this research since it is concerned with the 
analysis of existing documents and primary records as well as reports of mediation 
processes and conflict resolution strategies that South Africa used in transposing its 
hitherto intractable conflicts to a tractable one. The analysis of the choice of words, of 
the forms of communication between the mediators and warring factions, would 
through CDA reveal the underlying elements, contradictions and paradoxes that 
animates the mediation process. 
Following the criterion set up above, it is obvious that this research focuses primarily 
on, the social problems and political problems of societal conflict mediation. 
Particularly on how South Africa was eventually able to surmount its hitherto 
intractable conflict, rather than on current paradigms and fashions. Therefore, it is 
empirically adequate for the current research because it involves a critical analysis of 
the social problems of societal conflict within the multidisciplinary structure that 
encompasses international relations, politics, conflict studies, philosophy, 
communication and general linguistic analysis. Besides, CDA is largely relevant to 
this research to the extent that rather than merely describe discourse structures, it tries 
to explain them regarding properties of social interaction and especially social 
structures that accounts for how the conflict was eventually deescalated. Finally, the 
relevance of CDA to this thesis lies in the fact that More specifically, CDA focuses on 
the ways discourse structures enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce or challenge 
relations of power and dominance in society. This explains why this work goes beyond 
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the facts as presented and unearths the underlying factors that lie between and within 
the communication process during conflict resolution, which largely determines why 
the process fails or succeeds. That again is why the truth and reconciliation Report of 
South Africa becomes relevant. While dealing with these documents, in line with the 
general tenets of CDA. However, in  ‘dealing with such social problems, we were 
sufficiently discursive, and we situated it within the SA society and culture in which 
they feature, and operate with a clear understanding of the apartheid, ideological 
framework within which they feature. We also followed through historically to give 
chronological order and ensuring that there is a logical link between the research and 
the real world, which is why in this work, we were not just interpretive, but equally 
explanatory to the point where we ensured that our theories find relevance as a social 
phenomenon.( Fairclough & Wodak ,1997: 271-80) 
3.7 How We  Practically Applied CDA to This Research.  
In applying CDA to this research, we relied only on original materials. Other 
supporting materials were accessed but stepped down to subordinate positions as just 
literature review. In other words, books, journals, periodicals that are functions of 
interpretations on the subject matter were assigned subordinate positions. Not only was 
the original report of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report 
relied upon, but it was further scrutinised such that interpretations and reported 
speeches, contained in the documents were often disregarded in favour of direct 
speeches of the individual and stakeholders in the South African project. Moreover, 
speeches, utterances, gestures, insinuations, innuendos, metaphors, paradoxes, 
euphemisms and direct speeches were subjected to rigorous linguistic analysis in the 
process of determining the dominant themes that collectively animates the mediation 
and reconciliation process. This became necessary in order to avoid any form of 
misrepresentation or interpretations that could affect the fallibility and reliability of 
this research. This is especially so because it could lead to errors of omission or 
commission. 
Furthermore, this method not only compels us in the course of our analysis and 
interpretation of discourse, to quote more often verbatim but do so extensively, making 
it possible for every interpretation to be scrutinised for accuracy by the excerpt that is 
being interpreted. This again is because, CDA goes beyond just the literary words and 
their meanings to insinuations, innuendos, metaphors, paradoxes, and contradictions 
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that may reside between and within the lines of the excerpts. It includes the context 
within which certain pronouncements featured. The dominant, tune, tone, mood, mode, 
gestures, attitudes and general idiosyncrasies which combines to give information and 
meaning that could be inferred from both the letter and spirit of the research. Hence, 
for the credibility of assertions, and accuracy of judgment, the quoting of extensive 
passages sometimes are unavoidable in this research especially from chapter four 
where the findings of the research began to emerge in couplets of paradoxes. Hence 
paraphrasing which is often favoured over extensive direct quotations in general 
research becomes inadequate and sometimes, counterproductive. 
Against this backdrop, we downloaded and printed the seven volumes of the TRC 
report. Read them over and over again in the first two years of this research, and 
subjected them to critical analysis and evaluation. We then found out that there were 
dominant themes and sub-themes, running across the volumes. Some of the themes 
were crisscrossing in alignment thematically and repetitively.  These themes were 
individually identified, isolated and written down. They were further subjected to more 
rigorous analysis and classifications that helped to prune-down the list with delicate 
caution in order to avoid the avoidable repetitions. However, both structurally and 
thematically we followed closely the ensuing narratives that were emerging and 
interplaying between the constitution providing the enabling act, between the members 
of the TRC who were not mere listening to the petitions, but passionately subsumed 
and subdued emotionally and of course the victims and petitioners themselves.  
The rigorousness of analysis went beyond the lines to the underlying emotions and 
passions that lay underneath the text. The zeal to bring about peace and stability to this 
age-long conflict at all cost on the part of the members of the TRC tend to produce a 
sort of binary fusion of complements, that soon changed with the reality on the ground 
to the binary fusion of opposites. It became apparent that a better understanding of the 
dynamics at play could only be facilitated within an Agamben’s inclusive, exclusive 
philosophy of Homo Sacer which at any rate seem to be an extension of Derridean 
supplementary logic.  
3.8 Philosophical Underpinning /Orientation of this Research. 
By this, we are referring to the underlying character of the chosen research 
methodology.  Our concern is to identify both the underlying epistemological and 
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ontological underpinning surrounding the method of investigation in order to ascertain 
its reliability and credibility. This research is more consistently applied to the 
rationalist perspective as against empiricist who favours positivism instead of 
interpretivist and humanism perspectives which our research adopts. The approach 
chosen for this research was deductive and not inductive as the positivist would 
advocate. The reason is that we did not also see knowledge as objective as perhaps a 
positivist would argue. Instead, and more realistically, we advocated subjective 
interpretivism. These are the original theoretical journey that this research followed. 
 “Subjectivity” clearly defines the difference between the kinds of data we are seeking 
after in this work as distinct from those of the physical sciences. Baronov (2012:111ff.) 
argues that “the principal distinction between inanimate objects and human beings, is 
human subjectivity”. He, therefore, went further to argue that “Subjectivity ‘is a 
shorthand reference for various forms of human expression. Which, according to him, 
includes, emotions, ideas, desires and that subjectivity refers to whatever meaning 
people attach to their words, thoughts, or actions. It explains why there is a significant 
difference between how phenomena, are explained in the physical sciences as to how 
they are explained in the social sciences. Baronov went further to compare societal 
disruption by the earthquake and by riot. With one belonging to the physical sciences 
and the other social sciences. He argues that in the case of the volcano, a researcher 
would identify the causal chain of geological events while that of the riot, the causal 
chain would necessarily include some subjective judgements on the part of the 
researcher regarding the rioter’s actions. Among such concerns would be, according 
to Baronov, “why are the rioters upset? Why did they react in this manner? Why did 
they stop whereas the geologist is not concerned with any of such? Hence 
hermeneutics according to him, see human beings as intentional beings who create 
meaningful social phenomena, and by so doing, has about four consequences which 
include that,  
- human beings are intentional creative beings 
- People’s creations such as physical objects have the meaning which is the 
expression of their subjectivity 
- Human subjectivity operates at both the individual and state or societal levels. 
Here Baronov sited an example that to understand the meaning of a book fully, 
one must first analyse the historical circumstances in which the author lived 
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and identified the author’s position in society. To that extent, the book is seen 
as an expression of the author’s subjectivity as well as expression of the 
historical and circumstances in which the author lived. This explains much of 
why we were interested not just in the historical antecedents upon which SA 
was founded, but also in the diachronic and synchronic analysis of the 
dominant themes that came to play in the South African apartheid saga.  
The last of the implications is the concept of critical social phenomena which Baronov 
argues, may include any form of communication, verbal or nonverbal, wink, nod, and 
shrug. All these and more explain why our understanding and creation of meaning, as 
well as interpretation, goes beyond what was implied but what was said, how it was 
said, remorseful or arrogantly, the gestures surrounding the circumstances of the event. 
These are why the mood, mode and modalities help in interpretation and 
meaningfulness of the events that we seek to understand especially of how peace was 
achieved in SA against popular predictions. (Baronov, 2012:111-112.) 
3.9 Summary of the Methodology Chapter  
The interesting dimension in the choice of the methodology for this research is the fact 
that we are not seeking what South Africa should do in order to surmount its hitherto 
intractable conflict. At the time of the research, South Africa had successfully de-
escalated its intractable conflict, and as such, our interest was in knowing what South 
Africa did to achieve this. We saw that South Africa embarked on an internally grown 
negotiations and institution of the TRC. However, the significant part of it all was that 
fundamental theoretical principles underlined these and so our interest was to identify 
these principles. Hence, that influenced the kind of data we were seeking, and that 
informed our choice of methodology, which in this case is the Critical Discourse 
Analysis. (CDA) which helped in the analysis of essential documents that were 
subjected to further evaluation, interpretation and synthesis in building up of theories 
and principles that create meaning and understanding of what transpired beyond the 
surface levels.  
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Chapter 4:  Peace without Reconciliation and Unification without Harmony 
4.0 Introduction to the Chapter on Peace without Reconciliation and Unification 
without Harmony 
This chapter deals with the identification and analysis of the phenomenon of peace 
without reconciliation as well as that of unification without harmony within the South 
African peace process. This chapter will examine the themes underlying the peace 
narratives in South Africa (SA) as well as the analysis of how this paradox was derived 
and how they manifest within the synthesises that actualises peace through the 
Agamben’s exclusive, inclusive philosophy of the Homo Sacer.  
4.1 Peace without Reconciliation 
4.1.1 Analysis of Peace based on Reconciliation transformed into Peace without 
Reconciliation   
Shortly before the collapse of apartheid, the contradictions that threw itself up from 
the fierce racial tension between the blacks and whites reached its highest peak. The 
dominant narrative that emerged from all quarters was how to prevent full-scale 
hostilities and also maintain the corporate existence of South Africa as one indivisible 
unit. To achieve this, it became imperative that the warring parties must be reconciled 
in order for peace to reign. The implication is that once the people are reconciled, peace 
will automatically follow. This was the desire of the founding fathers of the South 
African peace process. They were after “peace derived from reconciliation”. The 
question now is if this is attainable, given the level of acrimony that already took place 
within the past  48years?  If it is unattainable or difficult to attain, what then is 
possible? What alternatives exist, and how do we achieve it? 
In an attempt at finding a way out of this puzzle, we turn to CDA and Agamben’s 
philosophy of exclusive inclusion. The principle allows one to pick any binary 
phenomenon where one part poses a threat to the main goal or objective of that 
phenomenon. The one half of the concept that is volatile is excluded and pushed into 
the realm of complacency which Agamben calls “bare-life” where its potency is 
reduced as the phenomenon loses one of its vital elements, for an “invalid” one. This 
process inevitably created seemingly contradictory narratives that are paradoxical. 
Hence peace with reconciliation became “peace without reconciliation.”. The main 
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objective here is to achieve the primary goal of peace, even if it is at the expensive cost 
of being without reconciliation. The question that immediately comes to mind is the 
contradictions that seem to be manifest in this equation.  This fact is already spotted 
by Agamben himself who sees such derivation as inconsistent at first glance. In simple 
terms, it means achieving peace even if it is without reconciliation. This is equivalent 
to the life of the Homo Sacer who can be killed but not sacrificed. 
The above paradox is one of the seven elements derived in the course of the transition 
from apartheid to democratic rule. The whole process of negotiations and the 
subsequent institution of the TRC and its working were precipitated on one major 
principle, and this principle is the “deconstruction of absolute ideas” or what we may 
call “deconstruction of the ideal” and replaced with a “relative” or a “lesser ideal”. To 
achieve this in the realm of Agamben involves stripping the original idea of its bios 
and reducing it to bare-idea. It was through this mechanism that the South African 
peace process thrived. This was against popular logical predictions that were 
conclusive about the fact that the South African societal ship was destined for a 
“Titanic” sink. Fortunately, these predictions did not happen mainly because the South 
African peace process was hinged on the above principle, as well as the already 
outlined seven paradoxical couplets. These couplets were not arbitrarily imposed. 
They were rigorously and theoretically derived from the narratives that emerge in the 
course of the analysis of the interactions between all the stakeholders during the 
mediation process. 
As we can see that the above paradox, like all the others, has two essential elements, 
namely, “Peace” and “Reconciliation” If we are allowed to borrow the language of 
quantitative research method, for clarity, the concept “Peace” above will be the 
independent variable, while reconciliation is the dependent variable. Peace is the 
constant denominator that remains and needs to be fulfilled at all cost; it is the most 
crucial element in the couplet since it carries the weight as an umbrella concept under 
which we can subsume reconciliation, while the subordinate one is reconciliation. 
Reconciliation helps to actualise “peace. In essence, reconciliation is that part of the 
couplet that needs to be deconstructed if it is posing any threat to the attainment of the 
primary objective, which in this case, is peace.  It is a logic derived from Agamben. 
To make it clearer, the basic idea, arguing from the point of  CDA was that the 
possibility of perfect peace, tailgating from a  true and genuine reconciliation had 
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effectively been excluded from the political by a sovereign act which Agamben calls 
the “ban”. That simultaneously founded peace at the heart of the political. What we 
shall be doing in the subsequent section is to show how in concrete terms the events 
and dynamics in South Africa, replicated and actualised these theories. 
 Our analysis will begin by unpacking the two concepts synchronically and 
diachronically.  
4.2 Peace 
When we talk of peace, about what exactly are we talking? What is the full implication 
of the concept of peace? Does it exist in a holistic form or relative form? Can it exist 
in absolute terms or degrees? At what point can peace be said to have been achieved? 
What, for instance, was the extent of peace that SA was aiming? We will find out in 
the following lines that the word “peace” is a summation of a web of other fundamental 
concepts that are in tension with one another but cleverly woven to carry the weight of 
peace in South Africa. These concepts were identified in the words of Arch Bishop 
Desmond Tutu to include such concepts as “confession, forgiveness, reconciliation, 
injustice, healing and truth”(TRCR 1998: vol.1:16 -17) 
Furthermore, Arch. Bishop Desmond Tutu made some fundamental allusions with 
regards to the historical antecedents that have brought SA thus far and its journey 
towards the attainment of peace.  His analysis throws more light on the roughness of 
the route towards the attainment of peace in apartheid South Africa and that 
understanding leads to other issues within the structure, and that has necessitated 
quoting him extensively for accuracy. In the words of the Arch Bishop Tutu as 
contained in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Report (TRCR 1998: vol.1: 
16 -17)  
…It is certain that we would not, in such circumstances, have 
experienced a reasonably peaceful transition from repression to 
democracy. We need to bear this in mind when we criticise the 
amnesty provisions in the Commission’s founding Act. We have 
the luxury of being able to complain because we are now reaping 
the benefits of a stable and democratic dispensation. Had the 
miracle of the negotiated settlement not occurred, we would have 
been overwhelmed by the bloodbath that virtually everyone 
predicted as the inevitable ending for South Africa…I want to 
suggest that apartheid and racism played a similar defining role in 
the history of the period under review. The vast majority, if not all, 
of the gross violations of human rights that were perpetrated in this 
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period, happened at the hands either of those who sought to defend 
the unjust apartheid and racist dispensation or those who sought to 
resist and ultimately overthrow that system. … Indeed, if the key 
concepts of confession, forgiveness and reconciliation are central 
to the message of this report, it would be wonderful if one day some 
representative of the British/English community said to the 
Afrikaners, “We wronged you grievously. Forgive us.” And it 
would be wonderful too if someone representing the Afrikaner 
community responded, “Yes, we forgive you - if you will perhaps 
let us just tell our story, the story of our forebears and the pain that 
has sat for so long in the pit of our stomachs unacknowledged by 
you.” As we have discovered, the telling has been an important part 
of the process of healing. To lift up racism and apartheid is not to 
gloat over or to humiliate the Afrikaner or the white community. It 
is to try to speak the truth in love… They have healed the wound of 
my people lightly, saying “Peace, peace,” when there is no peace.  
It is to give substance to our cry from the heart that politicians 
should really stop playing ducks and drakes with our future - for the 
greatest sadness that we have encountered in the Commission has 
been the reluctance of white leaders to urge their followers to 
respond to the remarkable generosity of spirit shown by the victims. 
This reluctance, indeed this hostility, to the Commission has been 
like spitting in the face of the victims.”  (TRCR. 1998: Vol.1: 16 ) 
From the above quotation, one can infer that the phrase “ a reasonably peaceful 
transition” is suggestive of the fact that the phenomenon of peace does not have to be 
absolute. There is a level that can be considered reasonable peace. In that sense, what 
SA was out to achieve could not have been a state of absolute serene tranquillity. Again, 
to say ‘We have the luxury of being able to complain because we are now reaping the 
benefits of a stable and democratic dispensation’.  (TRCR. 1998: 16 ) 
This is equally suggestive of the fact that a stable democratic dispensation was 
sufficiently a demonstration of attainment of peace and not absolute peace or 
reconciliation in the real sense of it. Hence it is part of the goals or objective of the 
commission to ensure societal stability much more than any form of cursory 
reconciliation or even that of justice. It is also clear that from the conception of 
Desmond Tutu, that Peace can be synonymous with the absence of “bloodbath that 
virtually everyone predicted as the inevitable ending for South Africa”. In order to 
appreciate the phenomenon of peace more accurately and how it has been conceived 
within the South African agenda, it has to be examined in the light of an understanding 
of what it entails. 
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Looking at the word Peace, synchronically and diachronically, we have employed a 
linguistic and eclectic approach to gathering all possible information that will enrich 
our understanding, especially with regards to how this impact on our current research. 
This approach is further justified by John Kelly (2013) who argues that;   
Linguistics can deepen our understanding of the realities of conflict, 
and help us to gain a better appreciation of something as remote and 
removed from our lives as a conflict in a foreign land. One way in 
which it can do this is through the study of etymology, a branch of 
historical linguistics that studies the origins of and developments in 
the forms and meanings of words. Exploring where our words come 
from can provide edifying insights and tell interesting stories about 
what words mean, providing us with a different view of how we 
understand conflict. (Kelly, 2013:1) 
Against this backdrop, therefore, we examine the concept of peace.  According to 
Kelly (2013), The word “peace” found its way into the English Language at about the 
middle of the 12th century. Its original meaning connotes freedom from disorder and 
that the word came through French (pais) from Latin. The Latin word is pax, which 
equally connotes peace as well as treaty or agreement. According to him, this Latin 
noun, developed from a verb, pacisci which means ‘to bargain for’ or ‘agree upon’. 
Elaborating further, Kelly argues that in pax, one might recognise the modern French 
paix, Spanish paz, or Italian pace. The English word peace and its Romance language 
cousins are worth noting. They are known as cognates: forms of words that have 
descended from the same source. (Kelly, 2013) 
Arguing genealogically, Kelly further gave some insights into the diachronic 
development of this word by maintaining that, the original Latin word, Pax has a Proto-
Indo-European root *pag-/*pak-, which means ‘fasten’. He then went further in his 
analysis to give us background information that Proto-Indo-European is, in fact, the 
ancestor of the Indo-European language family.  This family according to him is based 
on historical linguists’ knowledge of the vocabularies and structure of many 
subsequent languages and that this family is made up of several hundred languages 
that range from modern English, all the way back to ancient Sanskrit including 
everything from Celtic to Iranian in between. 
That is not all, in his linguistic analysis, Kelly maintains that in the case of words such 
as *pag- and *pak-, asterisks are used to indicate that they have been hypothesised by 
linguists, based on their knowledge of Indo-European languages. The hyphen indicates 
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that the root could take on inflexions, elements of a language that changes the 
grammatical function of a word. Other forms of *pag-/*pak- developed in other Indo-
European languages: Sanskrit has pasa-, meaning 'cord' or 'rope'; Avestan, pas, 
meaning 'a fetter'; Ancient Greek, pegnynai, means  'to fix, make firm, fast, or solid', 
and  also in Latin - pangere, meaning 'fix' or 'fasten', from which pax eventually 
emerged. English words as varied as fang, impinge, propagate and page, among others, 
also derived from this root (Kelly,2013). 
We can then infer that from the meaning of the stream of words that have 
diachronically evolved and emerged eventually as peace, that the word peace is not an 
absolute one-stop term. Such words as fastening, or pact, which implies agreement and 
negotiations that binds two opposing factions together, all add to the elastic and 
extended meaning of the word peace. We can therefore reasonably and succinctly 
conclude in the words of Kelly that “. In light of its etymology, we might think of 
peace not merely as a state, but as an action, that of binding ourselves together firmly 
and fixedly, through words. Peace, then, can be seen as a performance of language, 
and it takes work to fasten the agreement and to keep it fastened”. (Kelly,2013:1)  
This last bit is quite crucial; meaning that it is not sufficient to achieve peace, but to 
ensure that it is enduring and sustainable. This conclusion seems to underlie the South 
African TRC, whose main duty seems to be that of “binding the South African society 
together firmly and fixedly through allowing people to express their hurts freely. This 
free expression is necessary so that they can exercise closures and this has to be done 
in words and languages most convenient for them, devoid of so much bureaucracy 
often associated with the legal justice system and supported by CDA a methodology 
that is based on the use of text and talks in the generation of ideas. 
It is exciting to note that among the most fundamental theory that seems to have 
emerged from the preceding, is the fact that peace is not the absence of war; there may 
be no war in place, and yet, peace may not exist.  This is similar to the situation in 
South Africa during apartheid when full hostilities were not declared, yet peace was 
absent. The situation of the cold war is another one. Thomas Hobbes describes the 
situation of no war, yet no peace as the “known disposition thereto” which is as bad as 
war itself and sometimes worse because terrorism falls under such situation of no war, 
yet no peace. (Hobbes, 2006:76) 
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Locating the point of peace is a bit elusive. Agamben will probably see it as falling 
into the zone of indistinction. It is a zone that is What is the use of teaching a Bantu 
child mathematics wholly of peace nor war. Within the exclusive, inclusive philosophy 
of the homo sacer. It will largely depend on functional definition and delimitation.  
Hence, peace cannot be described as clearly black, nor can it be outrightly white but 
may lie within the zone that Derrida calls grey. (Derrida: 2016) 
Furthermore,  Amstrong (1931) who presented Kant’s ideas to justify his argument, 
wherein he maintains “ that peace is to be brought about, not through an international 
organisation, but by the cultivation of right principles and peaceful sentiments in the 
minds of men” Amstrong (1931:199).  This assertion is very crucial because it seems 
to be one of the pointers to why South Africa ’s peace process was successful in the 
sense that it seems to adhere to this idea of homegrown peace to the extent that no 
external arbiter was involved in the negotiations in apartheid South Africa. Rather, the 
right principles and peaceful settlements that address the minds of men and their inner 
emotions were employed. This same view was corroborated by Guelke (2005)  who 
argues that “the absence of international involvement, in the negotiations that brought 
about peace to South Africa’s political settlement has been touted by some of the 
participants as one of the ingredients of the success of the process” (Guelke, 2005:188)   
However, Kant further argues that a permanent state of international peace is 
unattainable by man. Some ground for this contention is found in Kant's statements in 
which he demonstrated his awareness of the obstacles that stand in the way of his ideal. 
Such ideals include the selfishness of individuals and nations, the tendency of states to 
follow the path of expansion and conquest, the folly of rulers who, as he believes, wage 
war almost as a game, heedless of the suffering and the loss which they bring upon 
their subjects. Kant went further to appreciates as well, the difficulties, in principle and 
of practice, which beset the establishment of a league of independent states. Hence, 
Kant is led to express doubt-more markedly, it would seem, as the years go on whether 
the literal realisation of his ideal is to be considered possible or otherwise. (Armstrong, 
1931: 199) 
Furthermore “Kant resumes his role as the philosopher of a priori reasoning by 
reflecting on human problems from the transcendental point of view. Hence he 
considers a state of war, as that which does not necessarily imply warfare or actual 
 
 
87 
 
hostilities. He opines that nations are in a state of war so long as their relations are not 
regulated by law, obligating each to peace through the will of all. The principle of such 
a constitutional order is not derivable from experience, but only through the a priori 
analysis of the Ideal and its establishment is a matter of duty. Therefore, for Kant,  the 
idea of peace is grounded in the authority of reason itself while reason is functioning 
in its practical form so that the empirical question of its practicability is beside the 
mark. Therefore, perpetual peace is a standard or goal to be approached by a gradual, 
or perhaps by an infinite process. In other words, peace is an on-going process, not one 
perfect point.  (Armstrong, 1931)  Hence, The idea of peace as a process is something 
that has to be continuously and actively maintained just as the originary violence in 
the Agamben, provoked the Sovereign ban which produces the Homo Sacer, who must 
necessarily be in perpetual flight in order to achieve self-preservation even outside the 
polis. The implication of this is that a one-stop point is imminent death, while uneasy 
perpetual flight guarantees safety. Hence strategic peace and self-preservation are only 
guaranteed by an endless flight, and precautions let lose by the ban. 
Furthermore, the vocabulary.com dictionary (2016) conceives peace as a stress-free 
state of security and calmness that comes when there is no fighting or war; It is a state 
when everything is coexisting in perfect harmony and freedom. It further maintains 
that in our war-torn world, it seems like there is not nearly enough peace, whereas, 
peace can be holistic or fragmented. This point is crucial to this research, in the sense 
that the word peace does not connote absoluteness; it could be in degrees and 
graduations. This means that no matter how small or big the level of peace is, it does 
not obliterate the fact that it is still peace. This is often seen in entire countries or in 
brief moments. After a war, two countries may sign a peace treaty, agreeing not to 
fight anymore just as it was in Sweden who has avoided war since 1814 and enjoyed 
the peace that the lack of conflict brings. (vocabulary.com, 2016). 
Furthermore, three primary meaning of peace were identified, namely, the prevalent 
state of affairs when war is absent, here war refers to the outbreak of full hostilities. 
The next is when public places are considered safe and secure; this refers to the absence 
of terrorism, and this seems to be far from our contemporary world with terrorist 
attacks everywhere.  Lastly, when there is an absence of mental stress or anxiety. This 
last bit is significant because it encapsulates situations such as the cold war or tension 
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of uneasy peace as against full-blown wars. Thomas Hobbes in the Leviathan attempts 
in Part 1 chapter XIII to distinguish war from peace when he argues that, 
during the time men live without a common power to keep them all 
in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a 
war as is of every man against every man. For war consisteth not in 
battle only, or the act of fighting, but in a tract of time, wherein the 
will to contend by battle is sufficiently known: and therefore the 
notion of time is to be considered in the nature of war, as it is in the 
nature of weather. For as the nature of foul weather lieth not in a 
shower or two of rain, but in an inclination thereto of many days 
together: so the nature of war consisteth not in actual fighting, but 
in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no 
assurance to the contrary. All other time is peace” (Hobbes,2006: 
76). 
 Furthermore, peace is variously defined as “the state prevailing during the absence of 
war, while war is a legal state created by a declaration of war and ended by official 
declaration during which the international rules of war apply” (Vocabulary Dictionary 
of Peace: 2016:1)  
The dictionary further identifies six types of peace. The first is what it calls Amity, 
which refers to astate of friendship and cordiality. This type of peace was excluded in 
the goals of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission ( TRC ) mainly 
because it is difficult to achieve given the years of bitterness and exposure of the gross 
human right violations which makes forgiveness difficult. The next is armistice, cease-
fire or truce, which is a temporary state of peace agreed to by conflicting parties so 
that they can discuss and consolidate peace terms. South Africa (SA) started with this 
through the negotiations leading to the new constitution and the subsequent TRC to 
concretise the process. The next is conciliation, which is described as a state of 
manifesting goodwill and cooperation after being reconciled. This refers to cordiality 
and stability that follows peace accords. This would refer to the aftermath of the TRC 
in South Africa. The next is Collective Security, which refers to peace at the level of 
international relations; this is part of the problem necessitating this research. The 
international society is still overwhelmed by intractable conflicts that keeps tearing the 
world apart. Syria is a living example. The next is Pax Romana, which is the Roman 
peace, and it refers to the long period of peace imposed and enforced on states in the 
Roman Empire. The last category is Peaceableness or peacefulness, which refers to a 
state of calmness and tranquillity. Again, that seems to be utopian and elusive and 
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seem to refer to absolutism. (The Vocabulary Dictionary of Peace, 2006; 
Vocabulary.com, 2016 ) 
Hence, the idea of peace from a critical discourse analysis point of view mainly as the 
narratives emerged from the TRC report, indicates that the kind of peace that was 
relevant to SA as revealed in the report is not that of a perfect one but that of 
compromises. It was not going to be a finished one-stop venture but a continuous one 
that requires some form of continuous servicing without which imminent collapse was 
inevitable. Details of these narratives will be articulated in the section on the paradoxes 
below. 
4.3 Reconciliation    
What is reconciliation?  Desmond Tutu in trying to unpack this concept in the light of 
the South African situation raised a number of tensions between a number of concepts 
that are allied to reconciliation beginning with the concept of truth, to confession, pain, 
to reality and finally touched implicitly on the fact of ‘enduring and sustainability’ of 
peace achieved thereafter. These tensions would be discussed in details later in this 
section. However, let us begin by examining what Desmond Tutu has to say about 
what reconciliation entails. In his own words, 
 “Some have been upset by the suggestion that the work of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission could have resulted in making people 
angrier and race relations more difficult, as indicated by a recent 
survey. It would be naïve in the extreme to imagine that people would 
not be appalled by the ghastly revelations that the Commission has 
brought about. It would have been bizarre had this not happened. What 
is amazing is that the vast majority of the people of this land, those 
who form the bulk of the victims of the policies of the past, have said 
they believe reconciliation is possible…The trouble is that there are 
erroneous notions of what reconciliation is all about. Reconciliation is 
not about being cosy; it is not about pretending that things were other 
than they were. Reconciliation based on falsehood, on not facing up to 
reality, is not true reconciliation and will not last. (TRCR, 1998: 
vol.1:17 )  
Desmond Tutu succeeded in telling us what reconciliation, does not entail,  but yet to 
tell us what it is. One is not sure that Desmond Tutu is exempted from his bracket of 
people who have an erroneous notion of what reconciliation is? Alternatively, is 
reconciliation so broad that it could be understood relatively? Alternatively, is its scope 
and delimitation dependent on the definer’s aims and objectives? These and many 
more questions would necessitate further unpacking. Although an important element 
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was alluded to here which is the fact that the reconciliation being referred to here is 
not that which is absolute (being cosy) rather it must be a relative one which is far 
from being perfect. 
Furthermore, Desmond Tutu argues poetically with a refrain “we know “connoting the 
power of revelation, confession or truth-telling which unfortunately has created a 
difficulty for reconciliation. However, the purpose of Desmond Tutu’s refrain here is 
to create a kind of parallelism that exonerate no individual or group of individuals from 
blame and to that extent neutralises the claim of victims as an exclusive reserve of any 
group, removing the claim to villain or victim by any one group. Although, at other 
times, we see the inconsistency in such claims by Desmond Tutu who is seen 
pronouncing that the bulk of victims are blacks and victimisers white at one point, and 
yet at another, present the opposite. Tutu is here saying, “Nevertheless, the bulk of 
victims have been black, and I have been saddened by what has appeared to be a mean-
spiritedness in some of the leadership in the white community”.(TRCR,1998 vol.1: 
18) . However, whenever Tutu maintains the exact opposite, it seems to be part of the 
“deconstruction of absoluteness” that underlies the entire process. This inevitably 
creates a kind of fluidity or flexibility for the commission to push any narrative at any 
point in time to achieve its goals of societal stability, irrespective of the need for 
consistency which at any rate is made inferior to the goal of societal stability and peace. 
The exciting bit is that there are some inconsistencies that are though, consistently 
featuring. The entire peace process in apartheid South Africa gives the impression that 
the inconsistencies were part of the master plan designed to return peace to South 
Africa. Even the emerging paradoxical couplets appear inconsistent until they are 
unpacked. Hence, pushing the narrative of equality of victim and victimised on both 
sides of the divide Desmond Tutu employed the refrain “We Know” to drive home his 
point as we can see in the excerpt below part of which we already cited above. 
 “ We believe we have provided enough of the truth about our past 
for there to be a consensus about it. There is consensus that 
atrocious things were done on all sides. We know that the State 
used its considerable resources to wage a war against some of its 
citizens.  We know that torture and deception and murder and 
death squads came to be the order of the day. We know that the 
liberation movements were not paragons of virtue and were often 
responsible for egging people on to behave in ways that were 
uncontrollable. We know that we may, in the present crime rate, 
be reaping the harvest of the campaigns to make the country 
ungovernable. We know that the immorality of apartheid has 
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helped to create the climate where moral standards have fallen 
disastrously.” (TRCR.1998 vol.1:18) 
Now if we analyse the above statement of Desmond Tutu, in line with the requirements 
of CDA, which permits us to begin with “ 1 text analysis (description), 2 processing 
analysis (interpretation), 3 social analysis (explanation)”. Fairclough's ( 1995:98) 
Janks (1997:329)  Hence, the above extract fulfils that of textual analysis which is 
purely descriptive. The next involves interpretation which we have engaged in through 
linguistic and literary forms by showing how repetition and refrains were employed to 
drive home the points and finally is the analysis showing the implications and 
underlying elements why the literary forms were employed in the manner in which 
they were deployed. It is this analysis that made it possible for us to read between the 
lines to the extent of discovering the contradictions and inconsistencies all over. He 
says “We believe we have provided enough of the truth” which means it is not the 
whole truth which would have meant absoluteness. Just enough, which is why some 
perpetrators walked away unscratched. Desmond Tutu continuously advises on the 
part of caution. The phrase that most aptly captures this is that which warns against  
“casting the net too wide”, a phrase ascribed to Judge Marvin Frankel. This phrase is 
an example of imagery taken from fishing? It was to convey the same need for caution 
in order to avoid derailing the entire peace process. The impression given here is that 
of walking on eggshell or some minefields for fear that carelessness might spell doom 
for the whole process. 
The details as recorded in the TRC report, says; 
A nation divided during a repressive regime does not emerge suddenly 
united when the time of repression has passed. The human rights 
criminals are fellow citizens, living alongside everyone else, and they 
may be very powerful and dangerous. If the army and police have been 
the agencies of terror, the soldiers and the cops aren’t going to turn 
overnight into paragons of respect for human rights. Their numbers 
and their expert management of deadly weapons remain significant 
facts of life.... The soldiers and police may be biding their time, 
waiting and conspiring to return to power. They may be seeking to 
keep or win sympathisers in the population at large. If they are treated 
too harshly - or if the net of punishment is cast too widely - there may 
be a backlash that plays into their hands. But their victims cannot 
simply forgive and forget. (TRCR,1998:vol.1:6) 
Desmond Tutu, further said, “There is consensus that atrocious things were done on 
all sides” This is being economical with the truth. Yes, but in what magnitude? Tutu 
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deliberately avoided that. Besides if Tutu is truly aware that “the immorality of 
apartheid has helped to create a climate where moral standards have fallen 
disastrously”, then why will Tutu, not recognise the law of cause and effect and stop 
equating those perpetrating with those resisting as equal criminals? It is all part of the 
design to tread softly. To create false parallelism in order to pamper those who still 
wield power to give it up, in the overall interest of societal peace and cooperate 
existence of South Africa in the years to come. Some of the empirical elements that 
substantiate these claims featured later in the body of the work at various places where 
actions, pronouncements and functions of the TRC were cited to substantiate the 
arguments which we have tended to limit at this stage in order to limit the 
repetitiveness that occurs.  
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Desmond Tutu elsewhere was unequivocal 
in declaring that some of the concepts that emerged in the process of the working of 
the TRC were fuels for non-reconciliation. By this Tutu means such things as 
“confession without remorse” or “truth without justice”. Those tensions that were 
created irrespective are still the only way to societal peace. He argues that the 
conditions for reconciliation are the same reality that gives room for its disunity.  This 
is evident in his declaration that; 
We should accept that truth has emerged even though it has initially 
alienated people from one another. The truth can be, and often is, 
divisive. However, it is only on the basis of truth that true 
reconciliation can take place. True reconciliation is not easy; it is 
not cheap. We have been amazed at some almost breath-taking 
examples of reconciliation that have happened through the 
Commission. Examples abound in the chapter on reconciliation. I 
want to make a heartfelt plea to my white fellow South Africans. 
On the whole we have been exhilarated by the magnanimity of 
those who should by rights be consumed by bitterness and a lust for 
revenge; who instead have time after time shown an astonishing 
magnanimity and willingness to forgive. It is not easy to forgive, 
but we have seen it happen. And some of those who have done so 
are white victims. Nevertheless, the bulk of victims have been black 
and I have been saddened by what has appeared to be a mean-
spiritedness in some of the leadership in the white community. 
They should be saying: “How fortunate we are that these people do 
not want to treat us as we treated them. How fortunate that things 
have remained much the same for us except for the loss of some 
political power.(TRCR.1998: 18) 
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One interesting thing is that almost immediately Tutu created the parallelism of 
equality of victims, he went below in the same chapter to say, that the bulk of the 
victims were indeed blacks as cited above. This is a further confirmation of the 
inconsistencies that seem to be deliberately built into the system in the interest of the 
objective of nation-building, societal peace, and stability, which seems to supersedes 
every other thing. Hence, when it becomes convenient to uphold certain narratives in 
the interest of this primary objective, it holds, and when to maintain a contrary position, 
it equally holds. To that extent, the truth becomes a relative phenomenon. 
Furthermore,  Douglas, (2016) traces  the word “reconciliation” to   mid-14century  
when it evolved from an Old French word “ reconciliacion” which in turn took its 
source directly from the Latin word, “reconciliationem” with its nominative form, 
“ reconciliatio” which presupposes "a re-establishing, a reconciling," noun of action 
emanating from the past participle, “reconciliare” .   He further maintains that though 
the word reconciles is said to have originated directly from the Latin word,  reconcilare 
" which means to bring together again; regain; win over again, while “conciliate”, is 
from re- "again" + concilare "make friendly". Similarly, the word “conciliate” began 
to feature from around 1540s, from the Latin word, conciliatus, which is the past 
participle of conciliare “meaning, to bring together, to unite in feelings, or to make 
friendly," from concilium "council”. Its reflexive sense is recorded from the 1530s. 
Meaning, "to make discordant facts or statements consistent" and this is from the late 
14th century. Intransitive sense of "become reconciled" is from the 1660s. Other related 
forms are reconciled or reconciling. 
Against this backdrop, the word reconciliation is further associated with three original 
meaning to the noun, reconcile to include the following,   
1. an act of reconciling, as when former enemies agree to an amicable truce.  
2. the state of being reconciled, as when someone becomes resigned to something 
not desired.  
3. the process of making consistent or compatible.  
Beyond these, the verb form is further broken down to include, verbs used with objects 
such as in, reconciled or reconciling which implies, The act of causing a person to 
accept or be resigned to something not desired: such as,  He was reconciled to his fate. 
The next is to win over to friendliness; cause to become amicable: to reconcile hostile 
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persons. Others include composing or settling a quarrel, or dispute. To bring into 
harmony or agreement; make compatible or consistent: to reconcile differing 
statements; to reconcile accounts. To re-consecrate a desecrated church or cemetery. 
To restore an excommunicated or penitent person to communion in a church. 
(Etymology Dictionary;2016 ) 
From the above expositions, it is sufficiently clear that the implication of 
reconciliation within the South African context, is the fixing and mending of a broken 
link. However, the details of the modus operandi are left to other elements in the 
process, which were to determine the extent to which this broken link was fixable. 
Looking at Desmond Tutu’s submission above in the light of the expositions, it 
becomes clear that the purpose of the TRC was not to go all the way to achieve 
reconciliation in absolute terms, not to restore friendship per se, because it is difficult. 
Within the difficulty, it is possible to avoid vengeance and forgive for societal 
stability.  
This fact is the whole essence of what Desmond Tutu was referring to when he 
maintained as we have sighted above that “True reconciliation is not easy; it is not 
cheap … It is not easy to forgive, but we have seen it happen”. .”(TRCR.1998: Vol. 
1:18). 
 It must be affirmed that the concept leading to reconciliation opens up the tension 
between truth, confession, forgiveness and reconciliation. These tensions came about 
because Desmond Tutu already affirmed that reconciliation is impossible without truth 
and the danger of confessing the truth of gross human violation was a rekindling of the 
pain and trauma associated with heartless cruelty. Such truth that leads to bitterness is 
ordinarily incompatible with forgiveness, particularly from people who think that after 
knowing such cruelty, what they deserve is the kind of justice that is negated by the 
phenomenon of forgiveness. Hence, to overcome this hurdle, a rigorous narrative, that 
did not deny the need for justice, was being constructed. It was that which advocates 
that justice need not necessarily be retributive but could be restorative.  The narrative 
says; 
 “We have been concerned, too, that many consider only one aspect 
of justice. Certainly, amnesty cannot be viewed as justice if we 
think of justice only as retributive and punitive in nature. We 
believe, however, that there is another kind of justice - a restorative 
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justice which is concerned not so much with punishment as with 
correcting imbalances, restoring broken relationships – with 
healing, harmony and reconciliation. Such justice focuses on the 
experience of victims; hence the importance of 
reparation”.(TRCR,1998:vol.1: 9) 
Moreover, to understand the emerging narratives, it is pertinent to define the primary 
stakeholders around whom these narratives are woven. First, we have the white 
minority South Africans who held power for 48years who not only institutionalised 
apartheid but continuously defended it with all state apparatus of violence. This class 
were personified by the National Party and all military and security personnel of the 
state. The other directly antagonist group are the black majority South Africans who 
are suffering under the yoke of apartheid and have continuously put up resistance to 
its domination and oppression first through peaceful means and later via armed 
resistance. These groups were personified by the ANC liberation movement. Other 
smaller units are sub-groups of these two major groups. Within this black majority, are 
the elitist group who believed in carefully easing out the white minority government 
cautiously and persuasively to wrest power from them by overlooking their wrong 
deeds as long as they are willing to surrender power genuinely. The other subgroup 
here are largely victims of apartheid and their families and sympathisers who are 
adamant. They believe that any arrangement no matter how well intended that is short 
of providing retributive justice was inappropriately promoting impunity. Whereas, the 
elitist within this group who formed the bulk of the membership of the TRC had their 
objective aligned with that of the apartheid leaders who were prepared to give up 
power as long as there will be no consequences. On the other hand are the black elitists 
who wanted power at all cost and as such prepared to sacrifice justice on the altar of 
power and political stability. The tensions emanating from these relationships 
produced the complex narratives under which the South African peace process was 
hatched. The class of South Africans that we refer to as the “ hardcore South Africans”  
are the justice-seeking ones that do not believe in the above narrative. instead, believe 
that it is no justice unless it is punitive, The commission also packaged a different 
narrative for these class of South Africans; This narrative ensures that the phenomenon 
of confession had to be distilled or upgraded to attain the level and status of punishment. 
Hence, confession is equated with punishment in the excerpt below where Desmond 
Tutu said that;  
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Those who have cared about the future of our country have been 
worried that the amnesty provision might, amongst other things, 
encourage impunity because it seemed to sacrifice justice. We 
believe this view to be incorrect. The amnesty applicant has to 
admit responsibility for the act for which amnesty is being sought, 
thus dealing with the matter of impunity. Furthermore, apart from 
the most exceptional circumstances, the application is dealt with in 
a public hearing. The applicant must therefore make his admissions 
in the full glare of publicity. Let us imagine what this means. Often 
this is the first time that an applicant’s family and community learn 
that an apparently decent man was, for instance, a callous torturer 
or a member of a ruthless death squad that assassinated many 
opponents of the previous regime. There is, therefore, a price to be 
paid. Public disclosure results in public shaming, and sometimes a 
marriage may be a sad casualty as well. (TRCR,1998:v. 1:8-9)  
However, even if we agree that a public confession is a form of punishment, we cannot 
agree that the punishment is commensurate with the offence.  To that extent, it is 
difficult to say it is nonetheless justice. Then, it must also be understood that the goal 
and objective of the TRC were not to deliver justice although without expressly 
affirming it. Instead, it is ensuring societal unification and stability through 
reconciliation. The complexity of the work of the commission is further highlighted 
by Desmond Tutu who argues that;  
 The task assigned to the Commission proved to be riddled with 
tensions. For many, truth and reconciliation seemed separated by a 
gulf rather than a bridge. Moreover, in the process of implementing 
its obligation to consider amnesty for perpetrators (as required by 
the interim Constitution), the concept of justice also came under 
constant scrutiny. “We’ve heard the truth. There is even talk about 
reconciliation. But where’s the justice?” was a common refrain. 
Before explaining how the Commission dealt with the overlapping 
and apparently contradictory goals of truth, reconciliation and 
justice, it is necessary to highlight two more general sources of 
tension. (TRCR, 1998:vol.1:104) 
The tensions were further aggravated by the fact that the interlocking concepts were 
difficult to unpack, which is why we are dealing with “peace and reconciliation” in 
this section and the question of “justice” is beginning to peep into it even though we 
have assigned a separate space for it.  According to Desmond  Tutu;  
The overarching task assigned to the Commission by Parliament 
was the promotion of national unity and reconciliation. Debates 
within and outside the Commission demonstrated that the 
interpretation of this concept was highly contested. While there is 
no simple definition of reconciliation, the following essential 
elements emerged. Reconciliation is both a goal and a process. The 
work of the Commission highlighted the many different levels at 
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which reconciliation needs to take place. Some of these levels, and 
the complex links between them, are illustrated in the chapter on 
Reconciliation. They include… the theme of reconciliation, coming 
to terms with painful truth  In some cases, especially where the 
remains of loved ones were exhumed and dignified reburials were 
made possible, the Commission’s disclosure of truth helped people 
to reach ‘closure’, to make peace with what had happened. 
However, the reconciliation of victims with their own pain is a 
deeply personal, complex and unpredictable process. Knowing the 
complete picture of past gross human rights violations, or even the 
facts of each case, may not lead to reconciliation. Truth may, in fact, 
cause further alienation.(TRCR,1998: vol.1:106-107)  
The last five lines of this quotation confirm that the pain and complexities associated 
with human right violations accounted for how and why “reconciliation” was 
expunged and expelled from the political to the personal. This expulsion tends to fulfil 
the transition of the citizen in the polis to the Homo Sacer in exile. In the Polis, the 
citizen was composed of both zoe and bios, where zoe is the individualism and bios is 
the political and social,  “peace fused with reconciliation” is the “marriage “ of both 
the political and personal”  while “peace stripped of reconciliation” is at the level of 
the personal. The personal is less sophisticated and open to all possible manipulations, 
which are why it is amenable towards fixing the dislocation in the society, operating 
at half measure. This narrative happened exactly to all the seven paradoxes that 
animate the mediation process.  
 Furthermore, let us state here at the outset that because of how the narratives were 
woven together, it is impossible to speak of this phenomenon in strict isolations of the 
others. They are all inter-linked and interwoven. Though we are discussing primarily, 
peace and reconciliation, we cannot avoid pulling in some of the other phenomena 
identified above as they are the properties that further help in the elucidation of the 
concepts under review. This is why we are simultaneously talking about truth, 
forgiveness, confession, remorse, which are all properties of reconciliation. 
However, some scholars have interrogated this South African concept of reconciliation 
and equally concluded that the theme of reconciliation is a complex and controversial 
one. There seems to be difficulty in reaching a consensus on the implication and 
application of this from the perspective of the individual on the one hand and the 
society on the other hand. However, for this analysis, let us rely on Kevin Avruch and 
Beatriz Vejarano (2002).   In their analysis which began by x-raying the South African 
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experience from a theoretical perspective which made them critical of some of the 
proclamations of Desmond Tutu who seem overzealous with some of his ambitious 
claims drawn against the background of the Christian conception of forgiveness 
combined with the African notion of “Ubuntu”.  
Furthermore,  Kevin Avruch and Beatriz Vejarano (2002) agrees with other scholars 
such as Gobodo-Madikizela 1997, Winslow 1997, Villa-Vincencio and Verwoerd 
2000, Battle 2000,  and Borris 2000, in maintaining that to many other key players and 
Bishop Tutu in particular, the only reasonable price would be one able to “purchase” 
peace, at the expense of reconciliation, and perhaps forgiveness. Again it was a similar 
narrative that he used in solving the problem of justice. Moreover, he went further to 
distinguish between retributive from restorative forms of justice. That was not all; Tutu 
further argues that “restorative justice” reflects a fundamental and venerable African 
value of healing and nurturing of social relationships at the expense of exacting 
vengeance, which is nothing short of the quality of humane sociality called.“Ubuntu”  
Ubuntu, therefore, seem to be a philosophy that subsumes the individual in the 
collective and the collective in the individual. (Gobodo-Madikizela 1997, Winslow 
1997, Tutu 1999 and 2000, Villa-Vincencio and Verwoerd 2000, Battle 2000, Borris 
2000) 
Furthermore, some scholars have asked about the mechanisms by which truth-telling 
connects to peace and reconciliation and the role of forgiveness in it all. Montville 
(1989, 1995) and Lederach (1997), are among such scholars. Similarly, there are, of 
course, others who considered the role of reconciliation in the broader context of post-
conflict peacemaking. ( Avruch and Vejarano, 2002)    
An important fact needed to be made here that different scholars have attempted to 
align and crisscross these concepts underlying the peace process in South Africa 
indiscriminately and pursuing all kinds of arguments that manifest either as major or 
minor themes in the process of the South African transition to democracy. All the 
arguments were taken on board, but the alignments adopted in couplets of 
contradictions in this thesis were not arbitrarily determined. They emerged from the 
trend of the narratives that underlie the entire process, coupled with the roles that the 
stakeholders played in the transition process. Interestingly a pattern of inconsistencies 
that were though consistent emerged and interestingly, Agamben’s Homo Sacer could 
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effectively and accurately explain the contradictory dynamics to a large extent as if the 
narratives were based initially on the Agamben’s philosophy, but of course, we do 
know that it was probably not. 
Furthermore, this diversity in arguments made Avruch and Vejarano (2002) conclude 
that the entire area of reconciliation and forgiveness remains controversial as it raises 
more questions in literature than the answers it provided. One such questions, 
according to them, is finding out if contrition and forgiveness or even reconciliation, 
affected at a collective level, is adequate for a nation’s “coming to terms with its past?” 
For them, one premise of most truth commissions is to answer this question in the 
affirmative, while the other, is to argue that reconciliation, is part of how these 
commissions successfully affect the transition from regimes based upon violent 
oppression to those operating under  “the democratic rule of law” which is so crucial 
to peace and stability. Further arguments from Wilson(1999) has it that  “reconciliation, 
like all central unifying metaphors, would function best as a kind of social glue when 
it was left indeterminate. Different groups with dissimilar agendas could then appeal 
to reconciliation to advance their own objectives” (Wilson, 1999:1)  
However, some other scholars think “reconciliation”  it is about learning to coexist, 
while some think it is being able to put one in other people’s shoes and be able to 
understand what motivates them. Even the Commissioners were said to have very 
different understandings.  Some think it is about finding in a sense a politically 
workable solution to allowing people to live side by side, and in a way that eliminates 
violence and that requires an ongoing process that includes accountability whereas, for 
some others reconciliation must embrace the notion of some truth and accountability.  
(Pigou, 2002). 
This divergence of opinion is documented in Phillips (2008) who argues that, 
“Some commissioners perceive reconciliation as, “coming to terms 
with – being able to live with – being able to accept and move on from. 
So to take an experience or a time in one’s life or an event and work 
through it and say, ‘OK, it happened, but it is not going to continually 
drag me down, bring me back, you know, make me vengeful and 
revengeful and angry and so on. I’m now going to put it in a place 
which is going to allow me to progress.” (Phillips, 2008:1)  
There were also those that see reconciliation as a psychological thing that exists within 
the individual in which he is seen reconciling with himself and carrying on with his 
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life. In other words, it is only when this internal reconciliation has been effected, that 
it is possible to talk about forgiving others and reconciling with perpetrators. The 
former Director of Research for the TRC, and later Executive Director of the Institute 
for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in Cape Town, defined political reconciliation as 
a “process of exploring ways of living together in peaceful coexistence.” He, however, 
felt that the TRC was more interested in truth and justice than in reconciliation, which 
was supposed to facilitate living together. Unfortunately, it only opened up the wounds, 
brought confrontation, and the demand for justice.  Hence the emphasis on political 
reconciliation as against personal or individual thing which does not need to deal with 
a profound spiritual thing even though they may keep intervening. However, it appears 
that the dominant narrative here is that all that matters is not to love one another but to 
be tolerant of one another and not engage in killing one another. The clear narrative 
here is that what is needed is a qualified reconciliation, a limited form of reconciliation, 
a tolerable one, not a fully fleshed one involving a profoundly spiritual thing. This 
form of reconciliation is what we regard as “without reconciliation” while the totality 
of the absence of any and every form of reconciliation would be “with no 
reconciliation.” 
 Furthermore, Philip (2008), therefore concludes that while the Christian conception 
of reconciliation can be admitted inclusively, it was not sufficient. A genuine 
reconciliation must include real material needs of victims such as money, medical help 
and psychological counselling, economic redistribution, and restoration of the dignity 
of blacks through whites becoming compassionate and remorseful for previous wrongs 
than mere artificially manufactured scenes of blacks and whites embracing publicly. 
(Philip, 2008) 
 Although, the arguments were neither here nor there, and they could go on and on. 
However, despite the individual’s perspectives, it is an undeniable fact that apartheid 
ended. Power shifted from minority to majority, violations were exposed, and society 
remained one even with its imperfection, and to that extent, the peace process in SA 
was a considerable success. The role of this thesis is therefore to identify the 
underlying narratives so responsible for this success story and prominent among the 
seven paradoxes that underlie this peace process, is that of “peace without 
reconciliation”. 
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4.4 Peace without Reconciliation 
Peace without Reconciliation is one of the seven paradoxical couplets through which 
South Africa was able to deliver peace without the predicted or anticipated violence. 
It appears implausible and unrealistic to conceive peace without reconciliation. 
Unfortunately so, but that is the reality of the element that delivered peace in apartheid 
SA. Just as in Agamben’s philosophy, at a glance, it appears to be a paradox of 
contradiction or inconsistency to talk of peace without reconciliation when in the first 
place; it is only among reconciled people that peace can triumph. However, “looking 
closely”,  at the words of Agamben, it implies unpacking after which the seeming 
contradiction fizzles away.  
Perhaps we can begin this analysis by affirming that the original intention of the 
architects of the TRC would have been to reconcile South Africans on an ideal note or 
standard, by which we mean, “Peace and reconciliation”.  The evidence of this is 
implicitly underlying the narratives as they emerge in the course of the work of the 
commission. Reading beyond the lines, we can infer that the intention of the 
commission would have been that of absolute perfection. To deliver, the peace that is 
borne out of genuine reconciliation. “The kind that transcends the division and strife 
of the past” This is nothing short of “absolute Peace” This is evident in the excerpt 
below;  
I have the privilege and responsibility to introduce today a Bill 
which provides a pathway, a stepping stone, towards the historic 
bridge of which the Constitution speaks whereby our society can 
leave behind the past of a deeply divided society characterised by 
strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and commence the 
journey towards a future founded on the recognition of human 
rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence, and development 
opportunities for all South Africans irrespective of colour, race, 
class, belief or sex. Its substance is the very essence of the 
constitutional commitment to reconciliation and the reconstruction 
of society. Its purpose is to provide that secure foundation which 
the Constitution enjoins: ‘...for the people of South Africa to 
transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross 
human rights violations... and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and 
revenge’. Dullah Omar, Minister of Justice introducing the 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act in Parliament, 
17 May 1995(TRCR. 1998: vol.1: 48) 
Unfortunately, this holistic and absolute ideal kind of reconciliation and peace was 
unrealisable for the fact that “if reconciliation and unity are to become a reality in 
South Africa, the energy and commitment of all of its people will be required.” 
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(TRCR1998 vol.1: 306)  However, this is not the only obstacle to genuine 
reconciliation. It includes the fact that  “  People were victimised in different ways and 
a range of gross human rights violations was committed. The result demands extensive 
healing and social and physical reconstruction at every level of society. Sometimes 
these different needs themselves compete with one another, leading to fresh conflicts. 
This makes reconciliation a complex, long-term process with many dimensions. ” 
(TRCR, 1998 vol.1: 350) The implication of the above submission is a confirmation 
of some of the reasons why a balanced, straightforward reconciliation based on 
complementary narratives were unrealisable. Hence the paradoxical, contradictory 
ones. It is again for the same reason that the South African conflict remained 
intractable for such a long time. The complexity and difficulty in achieving peace 
through reconciliation were further espoused in the excerpt, which confirms that 
“ Reconciliation is a never-ending process, is costly and often painful. For this process 
to develop, it is imperative that democracy and a human rights culture be consolidated. 
Reconciliation is centred on the call for a more decent, more caring and juster society. 
It is up to each to respond by committing ourselves to concrete ways of easing the 
burden of the oppressed and empowering the poor to play their rightful part as citizens 
of South Africa.” ( TRCR.1998 vol.1: 349) Another confirmatory narrative that shows 
the impossibility of peace based on reconciliation is that which argues that “while truth 
may not always lead to reconciliation, there can be no genuine, lasting reconciliation 
without truth. Certainly, lies, half-truths and denial are not a desirable foundation on 
which to build the new South Africa. Second, it is readily conceded that it is not 
possible for one commission, with a limited life-span and resources, on its own to 
achieve reconciliation against the background of decades of oppression, conflict and 
deep divisions” (TRCR,1998 vol.1:306) 
All these and many more in the TRCR were the compelling narratives that clearly 
show that “Peace with Reconciliation was unrealistic and hence needed to be 
reconstructed to “peace without reconciliation”. This means that despite the 
unattainability of reconciliation in its absolute sense, the goal of societal peace in South 
Africa remained non - negotiable. The compelling narrative, therefore, is that with or 
without reconciliation, the goal of peace was nonetheless imperative. The difficulty 
now is how then do we achieve peace without reconciliation? This is only possible if 
situated within Agamben’s inclusive, exclusive philosophy of the Homo Sacer. Hence, 
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the narratives have clearly shown that pursuing reconciliation in the absolute sense of 
what reconciliation should be, would be a sort of  “wild goose chase” that is 
unattainable considering years of animosity and gross cruelty of human right violation 
that have contributed immensely to the unreliability of peace, and yet, the goal of 
societal peace remains imperative. The only option would be a deconstruction that 
would ensure peace without that element that disturbs it, and in this case, it is 
reconciliation.  
In the light of Agamben’s philosophy, “Peace without reconciliation” does not 
necessarily mean peace with no reconciliation at all. It only means peace with traits of 
only the reconcilable, which is the bit of reconciliation that is possible in the light of 
the rough and rugged journey towards the attainment of peace. It is a limited fragment 
of reconciliation. The type that would not tamper with the process of peace. Hence, 
when reconciliation like Agamben’s Citizen is stripped of its bios, which is the 
disturbing elements, the remaining zoe nevertheless still has in it the elements, or traits 
of the excluded bios which is why the Homo Sacer in banishment, is still under the 
command of the sovereign power that banished him and could determine what death 
befalls him. In other words, he is excluded yet included in some limited senses. To that 
extent, in concrete terms, therefore, peace without reconciliation manifests itself in 
South Africa as this principle underlies the entire peace process. This paradox is 
reflected in some ways. For instance, Amnesty was granted to people who committed 
gross violations for reeling out the truth irrespective of the manner in which it was 
done, without regret or with arrogance. A move that was incapable of ensuring genuine 
reconciliation, yet he is guaranteed at least temporary peace. This geometry of analysis 
pervades the entire working of the commission. It is for this same reason that 
implicated people who did not apply for amnesty were not pursued vigorously and 
forcefully brought to book. It is to ensure peace even though there may be no genuine 
reconciliation. It is the same logic of analysis that made Judge Frankel advice against 
casting the net too wide because, that way, we can infer that it could proverbially catch 
crocodiles and hippopotamus which may proverbially tear the net and even pull the 
fisher into the water. According to  
Judge Mahomed, then Deputy President of the Constitutional Court 
and now our Chief Justice, quoted Judge Marvin Frankel. In his book, 
Out of the Shadows of the Night: The Struggle for International 
Human Rights, Judge Frankel wrote:…The soldiers and police may 
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be biding their time, waiting and conspiring to return to power. They 
may be seeking to keep or win sympathisers in the population at large. 
If they are treated too harshly or if the net of punishment is cast too 
widely - there may be a backlash that plays into their hands 
(TRCR.1998, vol.1:6). 
The critical point with Agamben, for instance, especially in a recent study on 
Guantanamo Bay, seems to reaffirm that this concept of exclusion is fused with 
inclusion such that there is still a hold on whatever is excluded by inclusion in some 
forms. Hence the excluded thing is not allowed to wander off somewhere unmonitored 
because even in its exclusion, its part and role within the excluded circuit remain 
actively relevant as the traits of it would always remain functional in some forms. 
Hence, it involves holding the excluded in the position of the Homo Sacer, stripping it 
down to bare life.  Such that in this scenario, the lack of reconciliation exclusion of 
reconciliation includes “reconciliation” in some external modulated form where it is 
stripped down and divested of all political expressions. Hence, reconciliation has been 
excluded, but still included in some modulated, fragmented version within “peace”. it 
is not totally terminated or obliterated. This seems to be the basic argument of 
Agamben when he argues that: 
Western politics has not succeeded in constructing the link between 
zoē and bios, between voice and language, that would have healed the 
fracture. Bare life remains included in politics in the form of the 
exception, that is, as something that is included solely through an 
exclusion. How is it possible to "Politicize" the "natural sweetness" of 
zoē And first of all, does zoē really need to be politicized, or is politics 
not already contained in zoē as its most precious center? The 
biopolitics of both modern totalitarianism and the society of mass 
hedonism and consumerism certainly constitute answers to these 
questions. Nevertheless, until a completely new politics -- that is, a 
politics no longer founded on the exceptio of bare life -- is at hand, 
every theory and every praxis will remain imprisoned and immobile, 
and the "beautiful day" of life will be given citizenship only either 
through blood and death or in the perfect senselessness to which the 
society of the spectacle condemns it. Carl Schmitt's definition of 
sovereignty ("Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception") 
became a commonplace even before there was any understanding that 
what was at issue in it was nothing less than the limit concept of the 
doctrine of law and the State… Today, now that the great State 
structures have entered into a process of dissolution and the 
emergency has, as Walter Benjamin foresaw, become the rule, the 
time is ripe to place the problem of the originary structure and limits 
of the form of the State in a new perspective.(Agamben:1995:10) 
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Similarly, Michael Peters:(2014:330-331)  equally presented in a more practical sense 
this Agamben’s thesis by aligning it with the originary violence, which is the 
Sovereign ban that necessitated the exception in the first place., linking theory with 
application. According to him,  
Homo Sacer (1998) is hugely signiﬁcant because it is in this work that 
he ﬁrst examines the logic of sovereignty, introduces Homo Sacer and 
famously posits the camp as biopolitical paradigm of the modern. 
Agamben infers that while Foucault began with the prison and forms of 
spatial internment (grande enfermement) his biopolitical studies never 
led him to the analysis of the concentration camp. For this missing 
analysis he turns to Hannah Arendt and her studies of totalitarian 
regimes as forms of total domination but he maintains both miss the 
link between their ideas and the camp in its ‘intimate symbiosis with 
bare life’ in a fundamental shift from ‘the juridico-political foundation 
of classical politics’ (p. 71). He traces bare life as the new political 
subject as implicit in the 1679 writ of habeas corpus and highlights the 
new centrality of the ‘body’ in the politico-juridical model: in Descartes 
and Newton, and in Hobbs’ Leviathan but also in the ‘thanatopolitics’ 
and eugenics of the Nazis death camp that places it outside ‘the normal 
juridical order’ (p. 97) and linked to the concept of state of exception. 
He concludes with three theses: (1) The original political relation is the 
ban (the state of exception as zone of indistinction between outside and 
inside, exclusion and inclusion). (2) The fundamental activity of 
sovereign power is the production of bare life as originary political 
element and as threshold of articulation between nature and culture, zoe 
¯ and bios. (3) Today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the 
fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West (p. 102)…During the 
Bush years, however, Agamben’s investigations of sovereign authority, 
the state of emergency (or exception), and the concept of ‘bare life’ 
seemed to speak directly to the most immediate and pressing political 
concerns of the day: the emergency powers claimed in the War on 
Terror, the fate of the ‘detainees’ kept in the lawless zone of 
Guantanamo Bay, and the general reassertion of the kind of state 
sovereignty that globalization was supposed to be rendering irrelevant. 
Despite being coincidentally topical, however, there is still much that 
is puzzling about the political works themselves. Homo Sacer, which 
infamously claims that the paradigm of all modern politics is the 
concentration camp, proceeds by way of an investigation of an obscure 
ﬁgure in Roman law — the homo sacer (‘sacred man’) who could be 
killed with impunity but not sacriﬁced. (Peters:2014:330-331) 
In other words, every element that tends to promote a lack of reconciliation is 
downplayed by being stripped of its bios, not being given any political voice. It is 
excluded but still inclusive in a controlled manner or regulated form in which it is not 
allowed to be freely thought of, and where one does, it is explained out in a manner 
that one accepts it as part of the structure that is given but not debatable. For instance, 
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we have gotten peace;  peace is in place. However, if this lack of reconciliation 
becomes a theme, that is going to disturb the peace, in any shape or form, it is, stripped 
down to its bare form, where it becomes less lethal or potent. This, in a way, is the 
originary violence that provokes the ban in the narration above. At this point, it is in 
the position of the Homo Sacer in exile.  
 Although, not left to wander off, because while out there, it remains functionally 
contributory in some ways to the totality of the societal peace. This form of geometry 
stripes reconciliation of its absoluteness. Hence, the extent to which non-reconciliation 
becomes compatible with peace, in the final analysis, determines the extent of peace 
achievable. This boils down to the fact that even though there is peace, there is no real 
reconciliation because real reconciliation was capable of opening up some other new 
and complex dimensions of justice, which would make peace itself unattainable. 
However, for peace to be attained, some level of reconciliation is necessary. Hence, if 
reconciliation becomes a threat to peace, it must be fundamentally pushed to the 
background, leaving only those elements and traits of it (reconciliation) that is 
compatible with peace. Meaning that even though, reconciliation is excluded in order 
for peace to thrive, yet traits of it remain because no reconciliation at all, is in itself a 
threat to peace.  This is why, as mentioned above that perpetrators were not vigorously 
pursued as doing that would be inimical to the overall intention of peace and 
reconciliation.  Even though this had often been explained away, yet reading 
holistically the report reveals that in the overthrow of apartheid, caution was exercised, 
mainly because the forces of apartheid still had the monopoly of the use of force 
through the control of state apparatus and machinery. This is why at the beginning of 
the report, Desmond Tutu said that if it were not for the amnesty provision, this same 
dominant class of oppressors would have “scuppered” the mediation process. It is this 
action of pushing disturbing elements to the background that Desmond Tutu refers to 
here without explicitly admitting it when he said, “the precise question of motives of 
perpetrators was often not fully canvassed by amnesty panels, nor by special hearings 
of the Commission. These shortcomings should be attributed to partial failings of the 
Commission itself, rather than to systematic bias.”(TRCR,1998:vol.1:260) 
From the above narrative, it is reasonable to disagree with Desmond Tutu as this is 
neither an error of omission nor commission. It seems part of the general design to 
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gloss over issues that if dug into, it could be detrimental to the overall objective of 
societal peace, which again is why “the net must not be cast too wide”.  However, we 
do know that following Agamben; it is systematic to exclude anything that would stand 
against peace. This is why Tutu remarked that the idea of absolute reconciliation that 
requires cosiness was not what was required in the case of South Africa. Instead, it is 
a deconstructed and excluded reconciliation whose elements entail tolerance that is 
required. (TRCR.1998: 17) 
However, reconciliation has been variously equated with justice, truth, forgiveness and 
a host of other such concepts. Nevertheless, for the avoidance of repetition as much as 
possible, it will suffice to end the analysis in this section on the note that from the 
manner in which the narratives emerged and developed, the concept of “peace” was 
projected as superior and should take precedence over the concept of “reconciliation”. 
Hence, any act capable of derailing peace was pushed to the realm of “bare life” where 
its relevance and strength is considerably reduced, but not terminated. However, in its 
reduced or inactive state, it remains selectively useful in contributing to the overall 
agenda of societal peace. This act of degeneration into bare life is the essence of the 
Agamben's exclusive, inclusive philosophy of the Homo Sacer. 
Besides, there was no consensus on what reconciliation is among the members of the 
TRC, Phillips (2008) insinuated that this could have been deliberate to allow for 
fluidity in its application and manipulations in the overall interest of the commission 
which is mainly societal peace and stability. In the words of Phillips (2008) “a 
politically workable solution to allowing people to live side by side and in a way which 
negates the need for violence” is another way of advocating for peace without 
reconciliation. Because “a politically “workable” solution is not an absolute ideal, but 
peace of some sort. Whereas living side by side in a way that negates violence, is also 
not necessarily reconciliation, it connotes more of tolerance in the interest of peace 
and not that of friendship at all. This is the key to peace in South Africa. Key issues 
that brought about criticism of the commission at various levels were particulars and 
manifestations of this objective of peace without reconciliation.  
Even the case of top leaders of apartheid that were left off the hook while their 
subordinates were indicted, is a pointer not just to the fact that “truth was exposed, yet 
justice was denied” for the same overriding interest of societal peace and stability. 
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Again, it is why some have argued that they were treated with kid gloves, it was not 
impossible to have treated them differently in the pursuit of justice, because it could 
be counterproductive to derail the entire peace process. Hence, it was better to be 
unreconciled by allowing criminals off the hook than jeopardise the entire process of 
societal peace altogether.  The phrase used by David Phillips to describe it as would 
be seen below is “political prudence” It is this same geometry of argument that 
Desmond Tutu was pushing when he said, in the TRC report that; 
We have the luxury of being able to complain because we are now 
reaping the benefits of a stable and democratic dispensation. Had 
the miracle of the negotiated settlement not occurred, we would 
have been overwhelmed by the bloodbath that virtually everyone 
predicted as the inevitable ending for South Africa.(TRCR.1998: 
vol.1:5)  
The impression given here is that of a delicately managed transition where moderation 
is applied in order to guard the process carefully to prevent a derailment which was 
imminent given the balance of power at that time. It is this same caution that Desmond  
Tutu was referring to when he said as variously cited above that ‘the net should not be 
cast too wide’ in the pursuit of human right violators. It gives the impression of 
compromise and complicity of some sort in the pursuit of societal peace which is why 
there is no vigorous and absolute pursuit of those who perpetrated injustices in 
different forms and shapes through gross violations of human rights. Hence, we must 
understand that some of the criticisms against the commission in those respects were 
essentially not errors but part of the grand design to bring back peace through the 
various paradoxes of inconsistency, of contradictions, and irregularities. This again 
can only be understood after careful dissection of the web of narratives that ensued in 
line with the theoretical backgrounds against which these narratives were pitched. In 
the words of Philip, (2008) 
The TRC was assigned a massive political, social, and moral 
role.  Natural justice suggested that victims and their families had a 
right to expect both prosecution and reparation.  International 
Human Rights Law demanded that, as with Pinochet in Chile, the 
leaders of the apartheid regime such as P.W. Botha, should be 
punished, to deter others from running similar regimes.  Yet 
political prudence suggested that all the conflicting groups in 
South Africa should try to live together in the future, hence the need 
for national reconciliation.  Perhaps it was the most sensible course 
to take – to trade amnesty for perpetrators in return for their putting 
their misdeeds on the public record.  This could be rationalised as 
an essential reconciliation to which was added a gloss of religion 
 
 
109 
 
and morality, by invoking the virtues of Christian forgiveness and 
indigenous ubuntu. Many South Africans are not happy at the 
thought that many of the guilty perpetrators (White ones, in 
particular) have escaped prosecution.  But, in its favour,  the TRC 
has also left a permanent historical record of detailed disclosures by 
some of the perpetrators of atrocities which the forces of ‘law and 
order’ committed in defending apartheid South Africa, thus at last 
confirming what many people claimed in the face of repeated 
official denials during the apartheid years. The TRC didn’t – it 
couldn’t – satisfy all the high hopes placed on it by both South 
Africans and the international community.   Its brief was to produce 
both ‘truth’ and ‘reconciliation’.  But perhaps you can’t have both 
at once,  and it may have served truth at the expense of 
reconciliation . (Phillips,1998: 3)  
Reading between the lines of the above excerpt, we could rightly infer that a couple of 
the derived paradoxes that were key to the return of peace to South Africa were 
reflected here. The first is that of “peace without reconciliation” as we have argued 
earlier, there is also the connotation in the use of the word “try” in the expression, “all 
the conflicting groups in South Africa should try to live together in the future”, is a 
reference to the paradox of tolerance without friendship. Moreover, closely associated 
with this narrative is also the paradox of “unification without harmony” Amnesty 
without forgiveness is fused with confession without remorse in the expression, “– to 
trade amnesty for perpetrators in return for their putting their misdeeds on the public 
record. “ They merely put their misdeeds on records by confessing it to fulfil all 
righteousness, not in repentance or remorse of any kind and consequently unable to 
elicit forgiveness in any shape and form. Underlying all these is the fact of the paradox 
of “Truth without justice” as can be seen in the excerpt, that “Its brief was to produce 
both ‘truth’ and ‘reconciliation”, not truth and justice. Hence, of the seven paradoxes 
upon which the South African peace was based, it is only one that did not feature 
explicitly in this excerpt, and that is “healing without forgetting” which again can be 
subsumed under the canopy of peace as a whole. 
4.5 Summary of the Discussion on Peace without Reconciliation 
From the above, it is clear that that the kind of peace that was desired in Apartheid 
South Africa was one that results from reconciliation. Unfortunately, the damage done 
to the relationship between the oppressors and the oppressed have been too extensive 
that such absolute reconciliation was impossible and yet, the attainment of peace was 
not negotiable. The option available was to create a narrative in which even though, 
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the kind of peace desired was not possible, yet the attainment of peace must inevitably 
be achieved. Perhaps in the long years of seeking peace in SA, the society had 
remained rigid about attaining peace on the platter of reconciliation which is why it 
was never achieved until now that the narratives changed against the rigorous 
theoretical base of Agamben. It must also be mentioned that we have been rigorously 
extensive in the analysis in this couplet to lay a foundation for the other couplets that 
followed the same geometry of analysis with variation only in particularity. 
Unification without Harmony  
4.6 Introduction to Unification without Harmony  
This section deals with the identification and analysis of the phenomenon of 
Unification without Harmony within the South African peace process. It examines the 
themes underlying the peace narratives in South Africa (SA) as well as the analysis of 
how the paradox of Unification without Harmony was derived and how it 
operationalises itself within the Agamben’s exclusive, inclusive philosophy of the 
Homo Sacer. This paradox like the others, has two elements, Unification and Harmony. 
What do these concepts entail and how were they activated as part of the underlying 
paradoxes with which peace and societal stability were returned to apartheid South 
Africa? In this couplet, unification is the constant independent variable that does not 
change. It is that which needs to be fulfilled at all cost in order to achieve societal 
peace while harmony is the dependent variable that needs to be deconstructed and 
fragmented through a process of distillation in order to fulfil the objective of the 
dominant variable, which in this case is Unification. It appears that Unification as 
against annihilation is a significant consideration for the narratives that emerged in the 
peace process in Apartheid SA.  
4.7 Analysis of Unification with Harmony transformed into Unification without 
Harmony 
Just as with other paradoxes in the mediation process, the original intention of the TRC 
was to deliver unification of the South African state on a clinically harmonious ground. 
In the interest of societal peace, the architects of the TRC were eager to maintain the 
corporate existence of SA as one indivisible political unit based on a carefully packed 
peaceful narrative.  It was interested in building a united society based on mutual 
understanding, societal peace and tranquillity, despite the disintegrating and 
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disharmonious narratives that had been created by long years of apartheid animosity 
and startling revelations from the TRC. To the architects of the TRC, the objective of 
keeping South Africa one supersedes every other consideration.  Unfortunately, 
because such harmonious and the smooth sailing equation was unattainable given the 
historical antecedents of apartheid South Africa, The equation had to be reversed in 
order to ensure that the primary objective of unification is sustained against all the 
odds. This is why despite disharmony between the blacks and whites, it was necessary 
to sacrifice any other element that would run counter to this goal of Unification. Again, 
it is Agamben at work. We must also remark that because peace was delivered without 
reconciliation, unification with harmony was impossible. Because healing was 
delivered without forgetting, unification with harmony was impossible. Because 
amnesty was delivered without forgiveness, unification with harmony was impossible. 
Because Truth was delivered without justice, unification with harmony was impossible. 
Because confession was delivered without remorse, unification resulting from 
harmony was impossible, and because tolerance was delivered without friendship, 
unification as a result of harmony was impossible. What then was possible? It is 
unification without harmony. Hence the deconstruction that ensured that even though 
there were large-scale disharmony and discontent within the South African society, the 
goal of unification remained non-negotiable.  
In this case, the Independent variable is unification, while harmony is the dependent 
variable. Unification is the constant that Derrida refers to as the phenomenon that is 
projected arbitrarily over the other. It is in order to fulfil unification that harmony had 
to be deconstructed and stripped of all political expressions that could have made it 
inimical to the thriving of the primary objective, which in this case, is unification. 
Hence, it is essentially harmony that has been stripped of its bios and pushed to the 
realm of reductionism and impotence. This is where it is less lethal and poses minimal 
threat to unification. What then is Unification and Harmony? What do they entail and 
how have they contributed to the development of peace in apartheid South Africa? 
4.8 What is Unification?  
The online Etymology dictionary, affirms that the word unification is a noun form of 
the verb, unify which is traced as far back as to the A.D. 1500s. Its origin is traced to 
the French word “unifier” meaning,  "to make into one," and from the Latin word ,  
“unificare " which means “make one," . The latin word uni- means “one" and when 
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this is combined with facere, it carries the connotation of "to make".  Further dictionary 
inquiry reveals that Unification means “to make or become a single unit; unite: to unify 
conflicting theories; to unify a country”. (Harper, 2001. 1)  
However, our interest here is in its usage as it applies to the unification of a country, 
and in this case, the country in question is South Africa. Hence, our interest is in all 
acts that helped in keeping the country together as one indivisible political entity 
known as South Africa, despite threatening realities that almost tore the society apart. 
The ferocity of apartheid was such that in its last days, the only rational synthesis that 
could be logically and consistently deduced from SA, was not just the popularly 
predicted civil war of unprecedented magnitude, but of course, it was a society heading 
for disintegration if not total fragmentation and annihilation. The goal of unification 
aimed at holding together the corporate existence of South Africa as one integrated 
political unit became imperative. This inevitably became a cardinal goal for the TRC. 
4.9 What is Harmony? 
The word harmony connotes agreement; accord; harmonious relations.  It implies 
consistency, orderliness, in which there is a pleasing arrangement of parts; congruity. 
The word finds relevance firstly in music where it connotes, any simultaneous 
combination of tones. Particularly when blended into chords pleasing to the ear; 
chordal structure, as distinguished from melody and rhythm. Hence, harmony is the 
blending of synchronised sounds of different pitch or quality. It also implies the 
science of the structure, relations, and practical combination of chords. It also connotes 
an arrangement of the contents of the four synoptic Gospels, or of the first three,  which 
are designed to show their parallelism, mutual relations, and differences argues the 
online Etymology dictionary.   Similarly, the Oxford English dictionary conceives 
harmony as an agreement in action, opinion, feeling, or accord. It also implies 
orderliness or congruity of parts to their whole or one another. While in music, it 
connotes agreeable sounds when all these are transported to the political realm, it 
carries the connotation of a society that is smoothly blended in one accord. A society 
of mutual understanding and orderliness, of unity in diversity, a society devoid of 
chaos and cataclysm. It is a society of peaceful coexistence and tranquil orderliness. 
(Harper, 2001; Murray et al., 1970.)  
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4.10 What is Unification without Harmony?  
It must be expressly stated here that because of the peculiarity of this research, where 
all the themes and narratives are interconnected and interrelated with one leading to 
the other, It becomes impossible to avoid some repetitions entirely.  Hence some 
quotations used to substantiate other arguments elsewhere might again be employed 
in buttressing other arguments in other parts of the work where they would easily be 
clearer. Some of the arguments were explicit, while others were implicit. It is equally 
observed that the meaning of some of the terms used in this research was not fixed. 
The meaningfulness of some propositions is contextual. In other words, reconciliation 
at one time of usage may refer to unity at another time; it may imply harmony, and we 
find that reoccurring all over the work. Hence, the meaning of concepts at different 
times becomes a function of constructs.  To that extent, we functionally define the 
terms and usage as they unfold within different contexts. 
The very idea of Unification without harmony is akin to that of tolerance without 
friendship. It is like saying that although we are physically together as one 
geographical and political entity but spiritually apart in fragments and out rightly in 
disunity. The same geometry of analysis applies here. Thinking correctly, or ideally, 
the architects of the TRC would probably be interested in building a new SA that is 
founded on Societal Unification, based on both individual and corporate harmony of 
the different groups that make up the society. The word harmony here can be 
substituted with friendliness or friendship while unification can be synonymous with 
the cooperate existence of the society at large, based on the principle of tolerance and 
not of friendship. However, Unification founded on that “perfection” called harmony 
is unattainable, yet unification is indispensable, as far as the South African project was 
concerned. So deconstruction became inevitable. Also, our instrument of 
deconstruction is Agamben’s philosophy. The narrative leading to this paradox affirms 
that,   
National unity accepts different communities, accepts different 
cultures, accepts different value systems, accepts different religions, 
and even accepts different histories, provided there is some shared 
history. The work and activities of the Commission will certainly 
contribute to the further development of a shared history. However, 
such a history cannot be force-fed. (TRCR, 1998: vol.5:443) 
 To attempt “ force-feeding”, it would amount to trying to advocate for the absolutist 
idea by trying to enforce unification with the harmony, which is unrealistic and could 
 
 
114 
 
become counterproductive. This narrative was further analysed by the Commission 
who saw clearly that without deconstruction of the statuesque, there could be no 
societal peace. It is this that is implicitly expressed in the argument that,  
 
To think or to argue that there is no national unity without 
reconciliation and no reconciliation without truth would be to imply 
that the Commission has to achieve or pursue its mandate in stages. 
This is not the structure of the Act. It is not in keeping with the spirit 
of the postamble to the interim Constitution. The postamble posits the 
Constitution as the foundation for transcending division and strife. 
The postamble is in a sense eschatological in its essence. It posits the 
unity which is to be achieved, nurtured and promoted amidst all the 
different views and understandings. (TRCR, 1998: vol.5:439) 
 This is the same thing as advocating for unity in diversity or more precisely, unity 
despite disharmony or divisions. The resultant deconstruction perhaps informed the 
following narrative that argues that “Reconciliation does not necessarily involve 
forgiveness. It does involve a minimum willingness to co-exist and work for the 
peaceful handling of continuing differences”. (TRCR, 1998: vol.5:435) The use of the 
word “minimum” here, presupposes that the deconstruction underlying the success of 
the TRC was not absolutist, which would have been the perfect ideal and that would 
ordinarily be preferred. In the light of Agamben, the ideal had already been excluded 
given that it inimical to success and the “un-ideal” now operates like the rule even 
though, it is the exception. 
 
Furthermore, it is important to state from the outset that, in the drive towards societal 
unification and nation-building, it is argued that, 
emotions may run high when considering the actions of perpetrators, 
and that perspectives may differ sharply, leading to difficulties with 
reconciliation. Some will tend to blame, condemn and feel 
bitterness towards perpetrators while others are able to demonstrate 
empathy, understanding, sympathy or even praise for those who did 
some of these deeds. Given the divisions of the past, such varying 
perspectives towards perpetrators from the varying sides of the 
struggle are not surprising. It is neither simple nor easy to take a 
neutral or wholly objective stance towards perpetrators of evil 
deeds. Nevertheless, this part of the report needs to provide an 
understanding of dreadful deeds, without condemnation. At the 
same time, as Browning, a leading Holocaust scholar, puts it: 
“Explaining is not excusing, understanding is not forgiving”. The 
Commission, in this chapter, is seeking to fulfil its objective to 
promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of 
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understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions of the 
past (.TRCR. 1998: vol.5:271) 
The above excerpt leaves no one in doubt about the intention of the commission.  
Utterances such as “Understanding of dreadful deeds”  is synonymous with 
Unification without harmony. Despite realising that they were dreadful deeds, yet it 
was understood or condoned in the spirit of societal peace and stability. Understanding 
that they are dreadful people may keep one on his guards even though one still living 
with them. 
Moreover, just as “Explaining is not excusing” and  “understanding is not forgiving”, 
Unification is not harmony. The excerpt also affirms why Unification with harmony 
was difficult when it says “emotions may run high when considering the actions of 
perpetrators, and that perspectives may differ sharply, leading to difficulties with 
reconciliation” It is this difficulty that informed the exclusion that made Unification 
with harmony turn into unification without harmony. The goal is to “promote national 
unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts 
and divisions of the past” in other words, in our opinion, this is the same thing as 
saying that they would unify despite the atmosphere of disharmony. What is required, 
therefore, is a deconstruction that reduces harmony to its barest form where its 
remnants would not be repugnant to societal unification and stability.  
This must also be done with the understanding that “A nation divided 
during a repressive regime does not emerge suddenly united when the 
time of repression has passed. The human rights criminals are fellow 
citizens, living alongside everyone else, and they may be very 
powerful and dangerous. If the army and police have been the 
agencies of terror, the soldiers and the cops aren’t going to turn 
overnight into paragons of respect for human rights. Their numbers 
and their expert management of deadly weapons remain significant 
facts of life.... The soldiers and police may be biding their time, 
waiting and conspiring to return to power. They may be seeking to 
keep or win sympathisers in the population at large. If they are treated 
too harshly - or if the net of punishment is cast too widely - there may 
be a backlash that plays into their hands. But their victims cannot 
simply forgive and forget” (TRCR .Vol.1 pg. 6)  
The reality of this bleak picture painted by Bishop Tutu, above, is a clarion call for 
caution while the balance of power is still tilted in favour of the opposition. This seems 
to be confirming the view of Professor Ola Rotimi in his book; The gods are not to 
blame, (an African adaptation of Oedipus Rex) where he said that “until the rotten 
tooth is pulled out, the mouth must chew with caution” This caution is so imperative 
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especially when it is clear that we are embarking on a goal of unification among 
disharmonious people. Trying to harmonise them in order to unify them, would be a 
tall dream that may be unrealisable in the immediate, hence the need for a 
deconstruction that would proceed with unification together with all the baggage that 
comes with disharmony. 
 
The first paragraph of Desmond Tutu’s foreword in vol.1 of the TRC report; Tutu not 
only confirm that the primary goal of the TRC was nation-building and societal 
unification but not without the recognition that it was going to be a tough one 
considering that it was a society that has been grossly torn apart with an endless list of 
events that readily reminds us of how disharmonious the society has been. Tutu 
confirmed this in his statement when he said “  
All South Africans know that our recent history is littered with 
some horrendous occurrences - the Sharpville and Langa killings, 
the Soweto uprising, the Church Street bombing, Magoo’s Bar, the 
Amanzimtoti Wimpy Bar bombing, the St James’ Church killings, 
Boipatong and Sebokeng. We also knew about the deaths in 
detention of people such as Steve Biko, Neil Aggett, and others; 
necklacings, and the so-called  ‘black on black’ violence on the East 
Rand and in KwaZulu Natal which arose from the rivalries between 
IFP and first the UDF and later the ANC. Our country is soaked in 
the blood of her children of all races and all political persuasions. 
(TRCR, 1998: vol.1:1) 
It must be argued that what Desmond Tutu has done here is to confirm the disharmony 
with a list of evidence, yet at the end of it all, he introduced the unifying clause, which 
is not exactly the whole truth but expedient in order to achieve the narrative of 
unification despite disharmony. Some theorists such as Steve Tesich (1992),  Ralph 
Keyes(2004), Eric Alterman (2004) Kathleen Lonsdale (1957) to mention just a few 
call it, “Post Truth” theory. The statement is that “Our  country is soaked in the blood 
of her children of all races and of all political persuasions.” (TRCR,1998:vol.1:1) 
The argument is that a rhetorical unification is effected within the discourse, despite 
the evident disharmony. This is the production of ‘the nation’ in an ‘Imagined 
Communities’ manner. The application of Agamben was adopted to point out the 
originary violence at the founding of the state. In this couplet, the ban excluded 
harmony because harmony exists only at a lower level of zoe while unification with 
harmony is at the level of the collective, bios. Though bios is expunged, yet the 
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remaining zoe has bios within it. This reason is why unification without harmony, 
could still in this deformed state provide a modulated societal stability.  
Tutu did not make any distinction here as would be seen later that it was not an equal 
loss on the part of the white minority perpetrators of apartheid and the black majority 
anti-apartheid forces. He carefully glossed over the intensity and tilt now to emphasise 
unification that tends to obliterate who suffered the most in the saga. Whereas in 
chapter two of volume one, page 24, Tutu, affirmed a contrary view, quoting Chief 
Justice DP Mahomed who argued that,  
For decades South African history has been dominated by a deep 
conflict between a minority which reserved for itself all control 
over the political instruments of the state and a majority who 
sought to resist that domination. Fundamental human rights 
became a major casualty of this conflict ... the legitimacy of the law 
itself was deeply wounded as the country haemorrhaged in the face 
of this tragic conflict ...(TRCR,1998.vol.1:24) 
This is not all. This false equality of victims did not last. In a similar development, 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu had no choice but to affirm the reality that one group was 
more at the receiving end of the evils of apartheid even if for unification purposes, it 
is not allowed to be expressed. For instance, on page 34 of vol.1, Tutu argues 
extensively that, 
human rights abuse was: for nearly half a century ... the warp and 
weft of their experience ... defining their privilege and their 
disadvantage, their poverty and their wealth, their public and 
private lives and their very identity ... the system itself was evil, 
inhumane and degrading ... amongst its many crimes, perhaps its 
greatest was the power to humiliate, to denigrate and to remove the 
self-confidence, self-esteem and dignity of its millions of victims. 
45 Thus, while only some 21 300 persons filed gross human rights 
violations petitions with the Commission, apartheid was a grim 
daily reality for every black South African. For at least 3.5 million 
black South Africans it meant collective expulsions, forced 
migration, bulldozing, gutting or seizure of homes, the mandatory 
carrying of passes, forced removals into rural ghettos and increased 
poverty and desperation. Dumped in the ‘national states’ without 
jobs, communities experienced powerlessness, vulnerability, fear 
and injustice.  (TRCR,1998:vol.1:34) 
However, to achieve unification and nation-building, vendetta must not be pursued. 
Which is why Desmond Tutu further affirmed strongly that;   
Everyone involved in producing this report would have loved to 
have had the time to capture the many nuances and unspoken truths 
encapsulated in the evidence that came before us. This, however, is 
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a task which others must take up and pursue. A Dutch visitor to the 
Commission observed that the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission must fail. Its task is simply too demanding. Yet, she 
argued, “even as it fails, it has already succeeded beyond any 
rational expectations”. She quoted Emily Dickinson: “the truth 
must dazzle gradually ... or all the world would be blind”. However, 
the Commission has not been prepared to allow the present 
generation of South Africans to grow gently into the harsh realities 
of the past and, indeed, many of us have wept as we were 
confronted with its ugly truths. However painful the experience has 
been, we remain convinced that there can be no healing without 
truth. My appeal to South Africans as they read this report is not to 
use it to attack others, but to add to it, correct it and ultimately to 
share in the process that will lead to national unity through truth 
and reconciliation.(TRCR.1998: vol.1: 4) 
The above excerpt is quite revealing of the underlying goal of the commission. In this 
piece, there is no mention of the word justice, but truth appeared six times and all 
pointing to the direction of the overall objective of the commission, which in this case 
is nation-building and societal unification. From, the text; it is evident that Desmond 
Tutu’s conception of truth is neither epistemological nor ontological, but political:  a 
means towards an end, ultimately societal unification, founded on the problematic 
concept of truth. Desmond Tutu even in this text subscribes to being cautious in the 
revelation of truth to ensure that it is not detrimental to the primary objective that is 
why “ truth must dazzle gradually” Tutu recognises unspoken truths, ugly truths whose 
“harsh realities” cannot be allowed to tamper with the goal of national unity. This is 
Agamben in action. Justice has no place here but forgiveness that is implied even 
though the word forgiveness was not expressly mentioned at this stage but implied in 
phrases that are suggestive of deep moral obligations outlawing retaliation or punitive 
actions of any kind;  such as expressed by Emily Dickinson above. 
In Desmond Tutu’s foreword in vol.1, Paragraph 16, he talks of Unity, truth and 
reconciliation. While in paragraph 18, he argues more paradoxically and ontologically 
by referring to the need for future generations to romanticise the legacy of the TRC. 
This should be done as they search the document for “clues that lead endlessly, to a 
truth that will, in the very nature of things, never be fully revealed”.  This all sounds 
very much like the mythology of nationhood.  It is a reference to a hidden truth at the 
origin of the collective.  All these are pointers to the underlying goal of nation-building, 
societal unification and stability, which are considered superior to any idea of truth or 
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justice in any form. However, ironically, the very idea on which this notion is built 
will only be buried within the invisible crevices of the report for which endless search 
can never fully revealed. This sounds quite ontological and highly informative to the 
extent that the TRC carefully crafted a more profound superstructure on which the 
societal stability was to be laid, and the very idea of revelation here underscores the 
epistemological issues of appearance and reality. These and many more reveals that 
the South African TRC seems to have been crafted on the highly rigorous 
philosophical basis such as those of Derrida or Agamben’s exclusive, inclusive 
philosophy of the Homo Sacer. It is only by a clear articulation of this philosophy that 
an understanding of how unification can occur without harmony. This bit is what the 
section on a theoretical framework was all about. 
It is similarly revealed that “The objective conditions of inequality make it clear that 
South Africa is a highly stratified society, characterised by intense structural and 
institutional injustice and violence”. (TRCR,1998:vol.5:142-143)   
This is an apparent confirmation that the society is full of disharmony apart from its 
looming breakup. The choice is one of two evils, the break-up or the disharmony. It is 
a case of opportunity cost where one of the alternatives must be forgone. Breaking up 
is a loss, loss game, but maintaining its corporate existence while working towards 
societal stability through the blending process of harmonisation was a better option. 
To that extent, the narrative of Unification without harmony becomes the goal to be 
pursued. The implication is that the perfect blend of society was not immediately 
necessary, ensuring its corporate existence is primary. Sounding more like 
existentialism where existence precedes essence. 
It is important to reiterate here that the whole essence of the TRC was to ensure that 
SA as a political unit does not fall apart given the systemic and systematic violations 
of human rights that have vitiated the society for so long and has created not just bad 
blood but hatred and the constant call for justice. The divisive nature of South African 
society threatens the corporate existence of the society. The TRC’s main task, therefore, 
seems to be primarily, the preservation of this edifice, at all cost, by unifying the 
society irrespective of its disharmony. The casualty of such narrative was the 
traditional conception of justice. To achieve this, the TRC embarked on some 
theoretical deconstruction in line with Agamben’s philosophy where the philosophy 
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of retaliation in all its forms was ousted while that of forgiveness was instituted in its 
place. Among the elements that were necessarily excluded was that of harmony while 
unification was inclusive. There is no doubt that these theoretical narratives brought 
immediate peace and stability to South Africa. What is difficult to guarantee, is 
futuristic stability especially as the current peace was delivered, not without its 
reservations which are like an unfinished business, that creates uncertainties for the 
future of societal peace and stability, which is left to the unfolding rhetoric of the future. 
This again is dependent on how the narratives are managed as the society develops and 
moves forward. 
What Desmond Tutu seems to be saying below is that amnesty was a tool of societal 
harmony, given in order to achieve unification considering the alternative of violent 
disintegration that would have followed. There is some sort of irony and paradox in 
Vol; 1, paragraph 49 of the TRC report where Tutu argues that “amnesty is not meant 
for nice people” And there is over romanticising the too soft punishment for a gross 
violation to give it a larger than life image just to overcome the criticism of impunity. 
Confession of the truth may be a price to pay but certainly too soft in the deliverance 
of justice where the scale and sword applies. Unfortunately, the theme of forgiveness 
and reconciliation also took precedence over justice here in the pursuit of societal 
unification and stability over the predicted bloody war that was supposed to be the 
inevitable end of South Africa. Underneath this is the theme of over prised freedom 
and societal stability, which is what Desmond Tutu refers to when he says “Amnesty 
is a heavy price to pay. It is, however, the price the negotiators believed our country 
would have to pay to avoid an “alternative too ghastly to contemplate”.  The alternative 
too ghastly to contemplate here is a reference to the total breakup of the society, in a 
bloody circumstance. 
The goal of unification was considered a priority over harmony. This is why for 
instance, Desmond Tutu in Vol.1 page 15 of the TRC report, he chronologically 
showed how the international community variously condemned apartheid and the TRC 
was compelled as it were, to consistently follow suit, instead, it inconsistently refused 
to follow it through logically. For instance, in the interest of societal unification, it was 
agreed that apartheid is a crime against humanity among other pronouncements. 
However, it failed to see the perpetrators of such crime against humanity as villains 
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while anti-perpetrators as valiant fighters of a just course or a just war. This should 
ordinarily have been reflected in the category of those that should seek amnesty. Such 
exemption was not given. Everyone was seen as equally guilty, in a warped narrative 
that assigned false equality to both sides, as the principle of cause and effect were 
suppressed in the interest of national unity. Such blanket categorisation is painfully 
inimical to harmony as the only plausible explanation for this, by victims is injustice 
and incapacitation of some sort. 
Nevertheless, the architects of the TRC would instead choose such disharmony than 
threaten unification.  The choice of words and chronological presentation of these facts 
by Desmond Tutu is a demonstration of the extreme care or delicate manner in which 
it navigated through the contradictions from within which societal unification was built. 
According to Archbishop Desmond Tutu;  
 Mercifully the international community, and not just the 
Communist bloc, has already declared apartheid to be a crime 
against humanity. For the international community, indeed, this is 
no longer a point of debate. The world Christian community has 
declared that the theological justification of apartheid is a heresy. 
Closer to home, the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk has said that 
apartheid is a sin. Some of the most senior judges in our country - 
who could not by any reasonable person be described as 
demagogues or lackeys of the ANC – have called apartheid a gross 
violation of human rights. Thus, the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission is a latecomer in this area. The world would indeed be 
surprised if the Commission had not found apartheid to be a crime 
against humanity (TRCR,1998:vol.1:15) 
It is interesting to note that the original intention of the narrative under review, was to 
promote “unification founded on harmony”. This fact was carefully buried in between 
the lines below in page 15-16 of vol.1, of the TRC report when Tutu’s says,  “To lift 
up racism and apartheid is not to gloat over or to humiliate the Afrikaner or the white 
community. It is to try to speak the truth in love. It is to know the real extent of the 
sickness that has afflicted our beloved motherland” (TRCR,1998: vol.1: 15-16) 
Speaking the truth in love is another way of saying unifying the country by harmony. 
On the other hand, it is what some might call, embarking on constructive criticism. 
Hence, using such literary terms such as “engaging in lovely reprimand” It may be 
lovely, even though, it is a reprimand which underscores modality or modus operandi.  
Again, the use of the word “try” here is a reference to the difficulty and complexity 
involved in such narrative, and so it was going to be an attempted struggle to swim 
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against the tide. This was the initial desire of the architects of the TRC, but the real 
fact is that this was not feasible and as such, the deconstruction that compels us to 
embark on unification without harmony had to take place for peace to return to SA. 
Furthermore, the expression of Desmond Tutu where he used the word “reconciliation 
and cosiness” which had though, been cited elsewhere to buttress some points within 
the same geometry is here again functionalised. In the excerpt,  
What is amazing is that the vast majority of the people of this land, 
those who form the bulk of the victims of the policies of the past, have 
said they believe reconciliation is possible. The trouble is that there 
are erroneous notions of what reconciliation is all about. 
Reconciliation is not about being cosy (TRCR,1998: vol.1:17)  
What Tutu is saying in essence here is that the South African victims of apartheid 
believe that “Unification is possible” especially if it is without the insistence that it had 
to be with harmony. The Word “reconciliation” as it appears at that point, can be 
substituted with unification successfully without fear of contradiction. That is not all; 
this is why he went further to clarify that the error comes in when it is wrongly 
conceived that unification would automatically imply that it must be done with 
harmony. The use of the word “cosy” in this context would be an adequate substitute 
for “harmony” In other words, Unification is possible, and the trouble is that there is 
an erroneous notion of what unification is all about. Unification is not about being 
harmonious (cosy). It is about maintaining the corporate existence of the society as 
one unified entity, despite her diversity. This is one of the dominant narratives that 
returned peace to SA. 
The poetic form in which the reality of painful search for unification that was grossly 
short of harmony in which the harrowing experiences of the past were narrated, was 
quite remarkable. The narrative did not shy away from the deeply dis-harmonising and 
harrowing experiences that that dampens not just the very being of the victims alone, 
but even those who were supposed to be impartial umpires.  They could not obliterate 
this impact, which reaffirms the extent of pain and diversity as well as the need for 
healing and unification of the society at any cost. The graphic presentation of this trend 
in vol.1 of the TRC report is worthy of note. As the imagery of hope was inevitably 
affirmed.  According to Desmond Tutu,  
It has been a gruelling job of work that has taken a physical, mental 
and psychological toll. We have borne a heavy burden as we have 
taken onto ourselves the anguish, the awfulness, and the sheer evil 
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of it all. The interpreters have, for instance, had the trauma of not 
just hearing or reading about the atrocities, but have had to speak in 
the first person as either a victim or the perpetrator, they undressed 
me and opened a drawer and shoved my breast into the drawer 
which they then slammed shut on my nipple! [or] I drugged his 
coffee, then I shot him in the head. Then I burned his body. Whilst 
we were doing this, watching his body burn, we were enjoying a 
braai on the other side. The chief of the section that typed the 
transcripts of the hearings told me: As you type, you don’t know 
you are crying until you feel and see the tears falling on your hands. 
We have been given a great privilege. It has been a costly privilege 
but one that we would not want to exchange for anything in the 
world. Some of us have already experienced something of a post-
traumatic stress and have become more and more aware of just how 
deeply wounded we have all been; how wounded and broken we all 
are. Apartheid has affected us at a very deep level, more than we 
ever suspected. We in the Commission have been a microcosm of 
our society, reflecting its alienation, suspicions and lack of trust in 
one another. Our earlier Commission meetings were very difficult 
and filled with tension. God has been good in helping us to grow 
closer together. Perhaps we are a sign of hope that, if people from 
often hostile backgrounds could grow closer together as we have 
done, then there is hope for South Africa, that we can become 
united. We have been called to be wounded healers. 
(TRCR,1998:vol.1: 21-22)  
On page 49 of vol.1 of the TRC report, Desmond  Tutu recognises the fact that though 
the goal of unification without harmony was paramount, but only as a first step in the 
whole scheme of affairs, for SA to continue to enjoy the fruit of such unification, it 
requires a harmonisation of all subgroups that must outlive the TRC. According to 
Archbishop Tutu, 
In the course of fulfilling its mandate, it became clear to the 
Commission that organs of civil society – such as faith communities, 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based 
organisations (CBOs) and ordinary citizens - all have a role to play 
in achieving the goal of national unity. South Africans will need to 
continue to work towards unity and reconciliation long after the 
closure of the Commission. In the words of a participant at a public 
meeting of the Commission, we need to ensure that “reconciliation 
is a way of life”. Another acknowledged that the Commission could 
do no more than ‘kick start’ the process. (TRCR,1998: vol.1:49)  
This is necessary, especially when it is observed that apartheid was not just a 
systematic process of racial discrimination, but also a systemic agenda. It is an agenda 
that not only created the divisions of the day, but lays a foundation for the futuristic 
perpetration of violations, for instance; education is a major causality that will long 
 
 
124 
 
after apartheid create an unfillable gap of not just the unemployed, but also the 
unemployable. 
The Bantu Education Act laid the basis for a separate and inferior 
education system for African pupils. Based on a racist notion that 
blacks needed only to be educated, in the words of Dr Verwoerd, 
“in accordance with their opportunities in life”, the Act transferred 
the control of African schools from the provinces to a central Bantu 
Education Department headed by Dr Verwoerd himself.” 
(TRCR,1998: vol.1.:32) 
Hence, this report further gave a more vivid picture of what was to create further 
problems of imbalance and unsuppressible conflicts in generations to come by 
reporting one of the greatest tragedies of apartheid. The reconciliation that that later 
provided equal opportunities for all emerge, but is it able to obliterate 48 years of 
youths marginalisation? Sadly, this huge class of unemployable youths may eventually 
spell the doom of the delicate peace arrangement now reached in some future times. 
One of the most iniquitous acts of apartheid was the separation of 
educational facilities and the creation of the infamous system of 
Bantu education. Mission schools which had provided some 
schooling to African people were closed down and generation after 
generation of African children were subjected to teaching that was 
deeply inferior in quality to that of their white counterparts. Prime 
Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, the ‘architect’ of apartheid, said: The 
school must equip the Bantu to meet the demands which the 
economic life will impose on him … What is the use of teaching a 
Bantu child mathematics when it cannot use it in practice? … 
Education must train and teach people in accordance with their 
opportunities in life …” (TRCR,1998: vol.1:61-62)  
The above fact is one of the deep crevices that make unification with harmony 
impossible, hence the need to deconstruct to unification without harmony, given that 
unification with harmony would have been absolute and deconstructing absolutist 
ideas brings us to unification without harmony, which is one of the fundamental 
ideologies behind the success of the South African peace process.   
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Chapter 5:  
Healing without forgetting and Confession without Remorse    
5.0 Introduction To Chapter On Healing Without Forgetting And Confession 
Without Remorse    
This chapter deals with the identification and analysis of the phenomenon of Healing 
without Forgetting as well as Confession without Remorse within the South African 
peace process. The chapter will examine the themes underlying the peace narratives in 
South Africa (SA) as well as the analysis of how the paradoxes were derived and how 
it operationalises itself within the Agamben’s exclusive, inclusive philosophy of the 
Homo Sacer. This paradoxes like the others have two elements each. Healing and 
Forgetting, as well as Confession and Remorse. What do these concepts entail and how 
were they activated as part of the underlying paradoxes with which peace and societal 
stability returned to apartheid South Africa? 
Healing without forgetting 
5.1 Healing as a result of forgetting transformed into Healing without forgetting 
Reading between the lines of the report of the TRC, there is evidence that supports 
positing that South Africans saw the opportunity of the TRC as that in which they 
could heal the wounds of victims of apartheid, by encouraging not just forgiving but 
also forgetting the traumatising situation they had gone through under apartheid. This 
drive towards this sort of healing was the purpose of allowing victims and their 
families to come forward and narrate their ordeal publicly to listening ears and 
sympathising minds that will acknowledge their ordeal, perhaps for the first time. 
Some of which they had been living with for so long. This narration was to make it 
possible for “closure” to take place. It is to help in ensuring that wounds of the heart 
were healed. However, it soon did on the Commission that forgetting was unrealistic 
and somewhat unattainable and as long as this remains so, healing is out of reach. 
Besides if there is no healing, forgiveness, reconciliation and peace would for certain 
be equally out of reach. It is in fact, this realisation that led to the transition of the 
above paradox through the process of deconstruction or the what Agamben calls 
exclusion by inclusion or the “ban” that occurred as a result of the originary violence 
that was the foundation of the political. This led to the transition from “healing with 
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forgetting” to “healing without forgetting” it is reminiscent of a transition from the 
absolute to the relative. , from the realm of the collective to that of the personal. .It was 
a deconstruction that would ensure that healing is nevertheless delivered, even if it is 
going to be a palliative kind of healing or a half-measure kind of healing. It is the kind 
that is without forgetting. Using CDA, the research can embark on linguistic analysis 
by employing imagery from medicine to depict what transpired here. The image here 
is reminiscent of that of a sick man, who is diagnosed with a septic leg that will 
potentially infect the whole body and lead to death. The emerging medical advice is 
two; one is to sever the infected part, or keep the leg and treat with an antibiotic 
provided the body responds to treatment. Two situations emerge. Healing with the leg 
or healing without the leg. The former is the perfect ideal or absolute ideal, while the 
latter, is a second-order arrangement, a half measure necessitated by compelling 
circumstance. Translating this to Agamben,  the complete healing or perfect healing 
with all the components of both zoe and bios is what obtained in the polis. However, 
as a result of the originary violence, there was the sovereign ban that excluded the bios 
leaving only the zoe, but then the zoe also has elements of bios in it to some degree 
which made it possible for a solution to emerge. The situation is what supports the 
paradox that produces peace in the RSA. Agamben describes it as excluded but 
inclusive, outside but inside.” The fundamental categorial pair of Western politics is 
not that of friend/enemy but that of bare life/political existence, zoe¯/bios, 
exclusion/inclusion’ “(Peters,2014:328) 
The paradoxical nature of the discourse reveals something fundamental, which is that 
the extreme of all ends is not feasible in solving societal issues. The effective parts are 
those that share in both ends.  The paradoxes, at first sight, appear contradictory, but 
the fact in them after due analysis, it cannot be rejected, yet they could easily be thrown 
out when taken purely on face value. “This is the fate of Agamben’s homo Sacer who 
can be killed but cannot be sacrificed. “Homo Sacer, which infamously claims that the 
paradigm of all modern politics is the concentration camp, proceeds by way of an 
investigation of an obscure figure in Roman law — the homo sacer (‘sacred man’) who 
could be killed with impunity but not sacrificed”(Peters,2014:330). It is this in-
between position that is called “exception” which ultimately leads to “indistinction” 
Confirming this, Peters (2014) says “The original political relation is the ban (the state 
of exception as a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exclusion and 
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inclusion) The fundamental activity of sovereign power is the production of bare life 
as originary political element and as threshold of articulation between nature and 
culture, zoe¯ and bios. “(Peters, 2014:330). Agamben concludes that “a different 
economy of pleasures and vital functions would once and for all resolve the 
interlacement of zoē and bios that seems to define the political destiny of the West. 
This biopolitical body that is bare life must itself instead be transformed into the site 
for the constitution and installation of a form of life that is wholly exhausted in bare 
life and a bios that is only its own zoē. Here attention will also have to be given to the 
analogies between politics and the epochal situation of metaphysics. Today bios lies 
in zoē exactly as essence.(Agamben,1995:121) 
The above imagery from medicine tends to help make the narrative clearer. It must be 
recognised that it is an onerous task to heal while remembering vividly the callous and 
calculative cruelty that ripped families apart, during which spilling of innocent blood 
was done with impunity.  However, with this gory picture, vividly remembered, 
healing nevertheless was still expected to take place. That may seem logically out of 
reach. With the aid of rigorous theoretical analysis, we could navigate out of it.  How 
then do we navigate through this awkward situation?  Peters(,2014: 331) quoting 
Agamben says , “What does it mean to say as Agamben’s does in the conclusion of 
Homo Sacer that Only a politics that will have learned to take the fundamental 
biopolitical fracture of the West into account will be able to stop this oscillation and 
to put an end to the civil war that divides the peoples and the cities of the earth?” The 
solution seems to be recognising the mutually exclusive disruption in which healing is 
expected despite not forgetting. Hence, so long as healing does not take place, then 
societal peace and stability would remain elusive. In light of the above that Agamben’s 
exclusive inclusion becomes imperative because it is the philosophy of “exception” 
that can make healing possible despite not forgetting. To achieve this objective,  
“remembering” has to be excluded because it stands against healing, while at the same 
time, it includes remembering of only a sieved, modulated, moderated, regulated, 
relativistic and positive remembrance; a remembrance that is not potent enough to 
deter healing. That again is why exclusion does not mean annihilation. Some of the 
empirical evidence of this paradox can be seen in the words of Desmond Tutu as 
reflected in the Truth and Reconciliation Report of South Africa (TRCR) where he 
argues that;   
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“People were victimised in different ways, and a range of gross 
human rights violations was committed. The result demands 
extensive healing and social and physical reconstruction at every 
level of society. Sometimes these different needs themselves 
compete with one another, leading to fresh conflicts. This makes 
reconciliation a complex, long-term process with many dimensions.” 
(TRCR, 1998: vol.5:350) 
It is clear here that healing was a necessary ingredient for the nation–building. In this 
case, “healing” is the constant independent variable. That is the variable factor that 
takes precedence over forgetting in the couplet formation. That is at the base of the 
South African peace process in this segment. Whereas, forgetting is the dependent 
variable that has to be deconstructed. In other words, Forgetting has to be pushed into 
the realm of bare life where its two elements of “nature” and “nurture” are no longer 
together. Its got nature though with traits of nurture, which made it possible to be 
outside two extremes. Potency to disturb the attainment of healing is reduced; it is in 
this realm that it is rendered impotent. The impotence does not suppose castration, 
because while it is impotent, it is still useful to some degrees selectively because of 
the traits left in him. It is this act of being made impotent, yet still partially potent to 
some real extent, that Agamben refers to as excluded, yet inclusive. Just as the Citizen 
was stripped of its potency and potentialities and banished, consequent upon which he 
lost all potent civic and religious rights and made worthless and vulnerable to all forms 
of attack,  in the form of the Homo Sacer, so also is the concept of forgetting. In its 
impotent state, it is not allowed any form of political expressions that could make it a 
threat to healing. In this same state, it is still useful at least for positive remembrance 
that helps to immortalise victims and commemorates the day that freedom was attained 
for black majority South Africans. This is invariable, the very foundation of the South 
African new state. It commemorates that there was a time in history when their lot was 
that of slavery and servitude under apartheid, but that has now become history, and 
they are now free. The exception and exclusion is a kind of censor of what is allowed 
to be remembered and what is not allowed because it could threaten the healing which 
is a fundamental ingredient for nation building, societal peace and stability. 
5.2 Healing  
What then is healing? Healing according to vocabulary .com dictionary is “the natural 
process by which the body repairs itself” In other words, it is a self-activating 
mechanism. This is key because SA looked inwards to resolve their age-long crisis 
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internally without an external mediator.  These scholars went further to identify four 
variations of healing, which includes, convalescence, recovery, or recuperation; which 
involves “gradual healing (through rest) after sickness or injury”. The next one is 
conglutination or union; which implies an ‘a process of healing involving the growing 
together of broken bones or the growing together of the edges of a wound. Hence, 
employing CDA, we can link the literary with the accompanying events. For instance, 
within the South African context, this is like societal unification and harmony. Even 
literarily, in South Africa, the situation led to several broken bones that need healing. 
The next is lysis which presupposes “recuperation in which the symptoms of an acute 
disease gradually subside” which is like the peace process, and finally, we have rally ; 
which is “a classical recovery of spirits or strength or during an illness” The constant 
denominator here is the constancy of recovery and gradualism. It is, therefore, 
understandable that healing is a process that takes time. This fact repeatedly featured 
in the speeches of Desmond Tutu in the TRC report, (1998) 
Similarly, Dictionary.com equally identifies four conceptions of healing to include the 
act of ‘making whole, healthy,  or sound; restore to health; free from ailment’. The 
next consists of the act of bringing to an end or conclusion, conflicts between groups, 
or people usually with the strong implication of restoring former enemies together by 
settling or reconciling them. It also means being free from evil; cleanse or purify. 
Lastly, “to effect a cure.”  The implication of this is that healing is not just restoration 
of what had been dislocated or lost from society; it is synonymous with reconciliation. 
This explains why the terms are all interwoven and interconnected and to that extent, 
we cannot discuss them strictly in isolation without them crisscrossing each other 
which may necessarily be an acceptable repetition particularly when it is to buttress 
new facts. 
The origin of the word in English has been traced to 900bc when it was derived from 
the word “Hale, or the whole” However, the figurative sense of "restoration of 
wholeness" did not appear until the early 13century whereas, the meaning associated 
with “touch that cures" dates back to the 1670s.  Hence it is clear that the very idea of 
healing has been with humanity for so long. (Collins, 2017) 
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5.3 Forgetting   
What then is forgetting? dictionary.com equally defines forgetting variously as  the act 
of ceasing or failing to remember; be unable to recall, to omit or neglect 
unintentionally, to leave behind unintentionally; neglect to take, to omit to mention,  
leave unnoticed,  to fail to think of or take no note of, to neglect wilfully,  disregard or 
slight, to cease or omit to think of something.  In the same vein, the online etymological 
Oxford dictionaries .com introduced two opposing dimensions to the definition of 
Forgetting; It started by defining forgetting as “failing to remember”. The two versions 
of this include,  
1. Inadvertently neglect to do, bring, or mention something. e.g. 
‘I forgot my raincoat’ the second sense is  
2. Deliberately cease to think of. e.g. 
‘Forget all this romantic stuff.’ 
It is reasonable to infer through the use of the tools of CDA, that forgetting could be 
both a conscious or inadvertent action, which is why it could be both descriptive and 
prescriptive. It should be remarked that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) was operating at the prescriptive level, which is the level where the state 
precludes the individual from remembering certain things while allowing him to 
remember others that are not harmful to the objective of healing. 
However, within the body of the TRC report, the narratives concerning forgetting were 
painted in such a manner that it highlighted the difficulty in forgetting. It is argued that 
while it is much easier to forgive, it is much more difficult to forget. Moreover, as long 
as forgetfulness becomes difficult, the bitterness of past injustices, re-kindles the light 
of un-forgiveness. There are some narratives across the report which emphasises the 
inability to forget. Some explicit while others implicitly buried within the enormity of 
the suffered harm or injustice. According to the TRC report, Mr Ndoyisile Mari was 
arrested in 1964 and jailed for seven years on Robben Island for underground activities. 
His wife, Ms Vuniwe Angelina Mari, told the Commission that the family had been 
harassed repeatedly by police while they searched for him before his arrest. She told 
the Commission that: 
Inside the house if they [the police] don’t find him they used to kick 
me, chasing my children in and out the house, forcing me to tell of 
his whereabouts. As a result, my second child from there on 
suffered from a mental sickness because he was hit against the wall 
also. He could not manage even to go to school …[My husband was 
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eventually arrested.] … That was the worst day of my life seeing 
my husband naked, leaving my house to a car, kicked, and I still 
have that picture. His clothes were like washing hung on a line from 
his arms. (TRCR, 1998: vol.3:45). 
The imagery presented here is not just memory; it is that of a “motion picture” which 
can be readily played back. The transition from this un-forgetfulness to healing would 
only be based on a firm theoretical basis for it to be effective. 
Similarly, a victim who suffered permanent disability as a result of a grenade attack 
remarked about the role of memory and why he would never forget. The closest thing 
to forgetfulness is un-forgiveness, not pardon. How this can then translate into societal 
peace and stability is critical. In the words of the victim, Mr Weber told the 
Commission his feelings about the attack: 
“My life was changed overnight … I’ve accepted it and I have to carry on with the 
daily routine of life. It’s not something that will be forgotten about and it’s something 
that I think justice should be done about.” (TRCR 1998:vol.3:148) 
Sometimes, the pattern of torture and abuse, as well as violations, are not expressly 
described as unforgettable, but the vivid imagery with which the narrative is being 
undertaken, confirms this much. The use of CDA helps to identify such implicit facts. 
Without a doubt, they are harrowing experiences that could not be easily forgotten in 
a hurry and its implication for societal peace is suspect. Forgiveness does not seem to 
be logically derivable from the vividness of this narrative. A similar example appears 
in Vol.3 page 169 where torture was reported in such metaphorically rich expression 
with a simile that provided a picture of lifelessness and insensitivity often associated 
with butchers and their meat hanging up . According to this report, 
One morning in November 1975, police surrounded Xaba’s 
house, rounded up all six members of his family and took them 
to Loop Street police station in Pietermaritzburg. Xaba says he 
was taken upstairs where he was systematically assaulted, 
tortured and interrogated for two days. He was bleeding 
heavily and lost consciousness a number of times. His torture 
included being hung out of the window by his feet while the 
policemen swung him backwards and forwards and banged his 
head against the wall. His arm was broken in the process. At 
one point during the torture, he said he could hear the screams 
of his wife in the adjoining room. On his second day of torture, 
Xaba’s hands were cuffed behind his back and he was 
suspended from the ceiling like “meat in the butchery. (TRCR, 
1998:vol.3:169) 
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The image is that of meat hanging up in an abattoir. Again, such literary analysis of language is to 
expose specific facts concerning the difficulty of forgetting and by implication, forgiving is 
invisibly buried between the lines in the above excerpt. This victim not only goes through the 
trauma daily, but it has also affected the mental stability of his spouse. The police equally refused 
her audience. The transition from here can only lead to further bitterness and vengeance, not 
forgiveness or even the least forgetting.  
In a similar chaotic and lawless development created by apartheid, there was also the 
case of un-forgetful brutality unleashed by a group of  South African youths on a 
woman old enough to be their mother; the TRC report stated that, 
The four youths were the same age as her youngest child…They 
pushed her inside. Meshack Ngubane came out to see what was 
happening and the couple was pushed into the bedroom where they 
were repeatedly assaulted. Mr Ngubane was then forced into a 
chair.…Justice  Nkwanyana tore Ms Ngubane’s pinafore with a 
knife and stabbed her on the feet. The others joined in the assault, 
and she was held on the bed whilst Nkwanyana raped her in front 
of her husband. The others stood next to Mr Ngubane and, when 
he averted his eyes or bowed his head so that he could not see what 
was being done to his wife, they hit him and forced him to watch… 
It’s the  most humiliating thing that can happen to anybody. These 
boys took away my dignity. I don’t have the words to express the 
kind of pain and anguish I experience. I think about this every day. 
My husband has since been mentally disturbed. Life’s very 
difficult .(TRCR,1998:vol.3:317-318)  
This excerpt is very clear. She does not just remember, but it has become a way of life 
for her because she remembers daily. Even if she forgets, the state of the husband is a 
constant reminder. Now this tells us that forgetting is just a myth in the situation of SA 
with which they must live. The way to peace must, therefore, necessarily involve 
healing despite remembering. 
There is also another element about forgetting that seem to appear here below, which 
is the fact that it can be a conscious pro-active venture to forget, or one can be coerced 
into forgetting, or instructed to forget in which case, even when you claim to have 
forgotten, you really haven’t forgotten but merely obeying a command. Such 
command to forget is evident in the excerpt; “I was visited by a Sergeant who tried to 
bribe me to testify against my comrades. He came to me carrying a bottle of Klipdrift 
brandy. I told him I would not co-operate. He then told me I must forget about being 
released.” (TRCR,1998:vol.3:449) 
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The type of forgetting here is an imposition in which one accepts unfavourable state 
bitterly. It has got nothing to do with memory. It is an imposition and demonstration 
of the power of subjugation and dominance expressed in oppression and repression. 
5.4 Healing without forgetting 
The narrative here follows the same pattern as the previous ones.  As a result of the 
overlapping nature of the narratives, they could hardly be separated from each other 
entirely. From this particular narrative flowing from the previous ones above, we could 
argue that it would have been the desire of the founding fathers of the TRC for the 
healing of wounds of the heart to be delivered on the total obliteration of the memory, 
then societal peace and unification would have been automatic. Unfortunately, a 
significant hindrance to healing is memory or remembrance of pains of gross violations. 
To that extent, a perfect option to achieve societal peace would have been to forget the 
past entirely. That is why the architects of the TRC would have desired the delivery of 
healing on the platter of forgetting, but because forgetting cannot be excluded, 
Remembrance itself is a positivity that gives the struggle its meaning and which in turn 
provides credence to the very essence of healing. The dominant narrative, therefore, 
became healing without forgetting, or healing, despite not forgetting. However, what 
kind of remembrance is it? “Respectful remembrance.” 
The importance of respectful remembrance was clearly expressed by 
Mr Haroon Timol, testifying about the death in detention of Mr 
Ahmed Timol, at the Johannesburg hearing, 30 April 1996: …what 
many South Africans would like to have, is that their loved ones 
should never, ever be forgotten…in Ahmed’s case a school in his 
name would be appropriate. But at the end of the day I believe that 
South Africans in future generations should never, ever forget those 
that were killed in the name of apartheid. …The road to reconciliation 
requires more than forgiveness and respectful remembrance. It is, in 
this respect, worth remembering the difficult history of reconciliation 
between Afrikaners and white English-speaking South Africans after 
the devastating Anglo-Boer/South African War (1899-1902) 
(TRCR,1998:vol.1 116-117 
Hence, the narrative of healing without forgetting is further projected clearly in vol.5 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Report, where it states that “Reconciliation does not 
wipe away the memories of the past. Indeed, it is motivated by a form of memory that 
stresses the need to remember without debilitating pain, bitterness, revenge, fear or 
guilt. It understands the vital importance of learning from and redressing past 
violations for the sake of our shared present and our children’s future”. 
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(TRCR,1998:vol.5:435) To get to this level of not forgetting, and yet achieve healing, 
is a function of deconstruction. Forgetting was stripped of its bios and reduced to “bare 
life” before it became a potent instrument for peace in SA.  
Furthermore, running through the volumes of the TRC report, we found some 
narratives that reaffirms the impossibility of forgetting, which is why the only option 
left was to ensure healing without forgetting. This is because healing with forgetting 
will be incompatible.  It is compelling to reel out some such circumstances here 
undiluted with the voices of the victims, being heard. However, some other narratives 
have appeared in which healing is tied to other elements within the same geometry.  
The phenomenon of healing became somehow extended to even some members of the 
Commission who only listened to the different narrations; This ended up in making us 
become emotionally messed up. This research found out that even at such indirect level, 
members of the Commission equally needs healing and if that is the case, then the need 
for healing by the direct victims themselves and their families cannot be 
overemphasised. It was further revealed elsewhere that, even those typing the reports 
confirmed how emotionally engrossed they were when listening to some of the moving 
pathetic stories of violations. They sometimes get so carried away with the need to be 
politically correct that they seldom realise that they were weeping until tears suddenly 
drop on their hands. This explains why even members of the Commission especially, 
“Those who, through the Commission, witnessed the scars on so many human bodies 
and spirits as well as the deep scars on the country as a whole, found themselves unable 
to remain onlookers. They came to acknowledge their own complicity, their own 
weakness, and accepted their own need for healing”. (TRCR.,vol:5:1998:.307). 
There is no doubt that some of these violations cannot be forgotten, no matter how we 
try. It is worth recalling a few of them here as were recorded in the Report of the TRC 
in order to further justify the assertion that forgetting was impossible even though we 
know that time heals. 
Mr Mthembeni Sipho Magwaza was attending a peace rally when 
members of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) abducted him and 
five of his friends. One of his friends and five other people were 
shot and killed. His shop was later looted and destroyed. He 
described his psychological state: I am a living zombie; 
psychologically and emotionally, I am dead. (TRCR,1998: 
vol.5:131). 
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Similarly, the TRC report gave an account of how in ‘1981, Brigadier Rodney Goba 
Keswa was arrested and eventually detained by the Security Police in the Transkei. 
There, he was exposed to mental torture. At the Lusikisiki hearing, he described his 
first view of his cell the morning after his first bitterly cold night in detention in his 
submission, he said,  
When dawn eventually broke, I had the first opportunity of looking 
around my cell. What I saw still haunts me to this day. The wall on 
the one side of my cell was smeared with faeces. The spot where 
the night soil bucket stood was a pool of urine ... The blankets were 
old, threadbare, smelly, dusty, coarse, with tell-tale signs of 
perverse sexual acts. I tried walking towards the door, but I 
staggered about sick to the bottom of my gut ... I remembered 
stories about tactics of killing someone without laying a finger on 
them.(TRCR,1998: vol.5:129) 
In this case, he did not only remember, but he also had a vivid picture of it boldly 
engraved in his heart. Despite this, the TRC requires healing. What type of healing 
would it be? “ healing without forgetting” 
Similarly, The TRC report also gave an account of how Mr Sizwe Kondile went into 
exile as a result of constant harassment by the police. However, in 1981, he was 
arrested and eventually killed in detention. His mother, Ms Charity Nongqalelo 
Kondile , at the East London hearing described the effects and aftermath on the family 
who had never forgotten. According to the TRC report,  
Lindiwe and Sizwe have been very close, were very closely placed. 
Lindiwe never reconciled. She never accepted the fact that her 
brother [had] been killed. Until recently she suffered from 
depressive psychosis which the doctors at the hospital referred to 
as some depression that has been bottled up for a long time, and I 
feel that this [was] the result of all that she has been bottling up for 
all these years.(TRCR,1998:vol.5:130) 
 It should equally be noted that this account emphasises the therapeutic role of the 
commission in allowing people to come and un-bottle all that had been forcibly sealed 
in them during the apartheid days with a view that some category of healing would 
take place. 
Some of the ripple effects of such human right violations that cannot be forgotten even 
though healing is expected to take place include the ‘recurring thoughts of traumas that 
have been experienced. Some of these traumas have continued to invade the lives of 
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many South African, includes that of Mr Madala Andres Ndlazi’s sixteen-year-old son 
who was shot by the police on 16 of June 1986 He told the Commission, at the 
Nelspruit hearing,  that memories of his son’s death haunted him to that day. In his 
exact words; 
I found my child brought to the home. I found him in the dining room. 
He was lying dead there in the dining room. When I looked at him, it 
was very painful for me to see how injured he was - and I controlled 
myself together with my wife as Christians. We knew very well that 
we will have to die one day but we know there are many ways to pass 
away from this earth. But the way in which my son, Sidney Ndlazi, 
was injured, it makes me very painful. I cannot forget this. It is almost 
ten years now.(TRCR,1998:vol.5:134) 
The remark here is scary! They say time is a healer, but even after a decade, this victim 
could still accurately remember what happened. It is apparent that forgetting had not 
taken place, yet healing is expected to take place by the simple fact that this victim is 
allowed to express it, it is going to be difficult. 
Furthermore, the TRC report equally gave another account of people who were not 
direct victims, yet have not been able to recover from the trauma created by their 
experiences. If this is the situation, how would anyone expect direct victims to forget? 
It became apparent that forgetting was impossible, and consequently healing would 
therefore equally be unattainable, but here is the TRC that was set up to ensure among 
other things, that healing takes place since it is one of the first steps in achieving 
societal peace and stability. With this goal being imperative, then there is no other 
choice than deliver healing without forgetting. The feasibility of this now lies within 
the Agamben’s exclusive, inclusive philosophy of the Homo Sacer. In his account, Mr 
Sean Callaghan told the Commission at the health sector hearing that;  
 [I was] confronted with a patient who had no arms or legs, was blind 
and was deaf. [He] had been in a mortar pit launching 80mm mortars 
when one of them exploded in the pipe. That was the first patient I 
ever saw in the operational area. Right there and then I realised that, 
as an eighteen year old, I am not going to be able to handle this after 
six months of training. I had applied for medical school ... and I went 
for an interview with Wits medical school during [my] leave, and 
said to them, “I don’t want to be a doctor anymore, not after what 
I’ve seen” ... I was hyper-vigilant. I was having screaming 
nightmares every night for at least six months. I was very anti-
establishment, anti-social. I was cold. Whenever I heard a loud noise, 
I would dive to the ground. When I heard helicopters, I would look 
for somewhere to hide. (TRCR,1998:vol.5:135) 
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Similarly, the TRC report equally gave a detailed account of how ‘Mr Lennox 
Mbuyiseli Sigwela was paralysed as a result of a police shooting and attack by 
Witdoeke vigilantes in Crossroads in 1986. A man who was once the family 
breadwinner became dependent on family members. His situation, as reported, 
provides an example of the interconnectedness of psychological, physical and 
economic consequences of human rights violations. At the KTC hearing, he was 
reported to have told the Commission in his words that’;   
We are struggling; we are struggling. The children at my home are 
suffering for new school uniforms, for clothes. That is why I will 
never - although I have accepted this - I will never, I will never forget 
what happened because, when I look at the way we struggle at home, 
sometimes I feel like committing suicide. It is therefore difficult to 
distinguish between the response to the psychological effects of the 
violation and other stressful events in the life of the victim. 
(TRCR,1998:vol.5:136)   
The above is not an isolated case, The cruelty and impunity with which some of the 
crimes were committed were shocking. The pathetic case of  Ms Evelyn Masego 
Thunyiswa who was arrested on her way to attend the funeral of Steve Biko in 1977, 
was harrowing.  At the Mmabatho hearing, she was reported to have told the 
Commission that she had been beaten and shocked on her genitals. In her account, she 
said,   
After torturing me like that, they trucked us off the road. When I tried 
to urinate, I was urinating blood. Because I left on my own - it was 
not through the permission of my parents - I was scared to even tell 
my mom where I had been to because of the whole situation. I stayed 
like that for a month or two. I remember I went to the doctor in the 
beginning of November and then I said to my mother I have tonsils, 
because I realised this sickness of mine was getting worse and worse 
despite receiving treatment”, Evelyn was said to have reported 
recurring symptoms. According to her, “ In 1992, the pains came back. 
The pain that I felt when I was tortured came back in 1992. That was 
the same pain that I felt when I was tortured. As I [told] you, when it 
attacks me I stay three or four days not going outside and I cannot 
even urinate. I have never given birth since that time and I am a 
married wife. (TRCR,1998:vol.5:138) 
With this regular painful reminder, forgetting was impossible. Despite that, healing 
must necessarily take place. This trauma is a dominant narrative in the drive towards 
peace in Apartheid South Africa.  
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In a similar development, the TRC report gave a similarly detailed account of how the 
mystery of the death of a young man was revealed to the family and how not knowing 
had helped to sustain their grief. However, then a vital fact was emphasised here that 
anniversaries can help re-kindle the trauma or pain that had remained on the soul for a 
long time. The TRC report says;  
with Wallace, there are so many questions that are still unanswered. 
In my struggle with my grief, I would like to know where exactly he 
died. How it had happened. Who was there with him when it happened? 
Did anybody help him to prevent it from happening? Who was the 
doctor who attended to him? I’ve never had the opportunity to ask 
these questions. Nobody has ever explained anything to me about my 
son’s death. They can say nobody asked, but who do you ask? And 
even if you do, you will not get any answers. I sometimes see Wallace 
in the streets. I remember two distinct occasions, when I thought I was 
seeing him. And it turned out to be somebody who looked like him. 
My grief becomes more intense on the anniversaries of my son’s death 
and on his birthday. He would have turned thirty in January. I’ve kept 
an album of all his photographs, as a way of dealing with the many 
feelings I have about the loss. But it is very hard, when there are so 
many things you are not sure about.  In a very poignant follow-up to 
this statement, the Commission facilitated a meeting between Ms 
MacGregor and a young man who had been with Wallace when he 
died. He told her exactly what had happened. As he described 
Wallace’s last moments, she looked at him and said, “So, Wallace is 
really dead” and wept inconsolably for about ten minutes. It was only 
at that moment that she actually acknowledged and accepted that her 
son was dead.(TRCR,1998: vol 4:242) 
Now it is possible for closure to be made here but not forgetting. There is no doubt 
that with time, this closure could bring about some forms of healing but “forgetting” 
may be impossible which is why the TRC report argues that, 
The transition to a democratic South Africa, coupled with the very 
public process of the Commission, has complicated the healing 
process for many ex-conscripts suffering from post-traumatic stress 
disorder. Many of the conscripts treated by Ms De Ridder reported a 
recurrence and/or intensification of their symptoms as a result of some 
of the testimonies to the Commission and, particularly, the trial of and 
television documentary (“Prime Evil”) about Eugene de Kock. To 
some extent, the Commission has helped release traumatised ex-
conscripts from ’the prison of silence’ surrounding their experiences 
and, more importantly, their emotional responses to their experiences. 
Ms De Ridder says, however, that many others experience the current 
process as a form of re-traumatisation (TRCR,1998:242)  
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The implication here is that in achieving healing, wounds have to be opened and pain 
needed to be expressed which is why Desmond Tutu while discussing reconciliation 
was unequivocal in arguing that, 
 
Many people also saw reconciliation as an activity that could take 
place without tears: they felt threatened by the anger of victims. It is, 
however, unrealistic to expect forgiveness too quickly, without 
providing victims with the necessary space to air their grievances 
and give voice to previously denied feelings. “It would not have been 
even remotely decent for a non-Jewish person to have suggested to 
Jews that they ought to become reconciled to the Germans 
immediately after World War II”, observed a Dutch visitor to the 
Commission. Relationships can only be healed over time and once 
feelings of hurt and anger have been acknowledged. The resistance 
and hostility of some victims, directed at times at the Commission 
itself, required understanding and respect.  (TRCR,1998:vol.4:115) 
The further panacea for healing as identified in the TRC report includes, the 
fact that 
In order to heal, trauma victims must ultimately put words to their 
experience and thereby integrate the traumatic experience in order 
to find new meanings for themselves and their place in the world. 
An essential feature of recovery from trauma is re-establishing and 
normalising relationships of attachment with others… Yet, while 
many victims of violations spoke of psychological problems that 
resulted from trauma, many others spoke of the strength and 
resilience they drew from friends and comrades in times of hardship. 
Courage, love and support networks kept many families and 
communities functioning and intact.(TRCR,1998: vol.4:137-138) 
Members of the commission were affirmative in declaring that “without adequate 
reparation and rehabilitation measures, there can be no healing or reconciliation”. 
(TRCR,1998:170) . This was not all; there were other criteria to be fulfilled before 
reconciliation can be achieved. All these were laid down in the excerpt below. 
Although part of this quotation has been cited above, a detailed analysis of the point 
being discussed compels us to quote it more vividly. The TRC report states that; 
There were others who urged that the past should be forgotten - 
glibly declaring that we should ‘let bygones be bygones’. This 
option was rightly rejected because such amnesia would have 
resulted in further victimisation of victims by denying their awful 
experiences. In Ariel Dorfmann’s play, Death and the Maiden, a 
woman ties up the man who has injured her. She is ready to kill 
him when he repeats his lie that he did not rape or torture her. It is 
only when he admits his violations that she lets him go. His 
admission restores her dignity and her identity. Her experience is 
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confirmed as real and not illusory and her sense of self is affirmed.  
The other reason amnesia simply will not do is that the past refuses 
to lie down quietly. It has an uncanny habit of returning to haunt 
one. “Those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it” are the 
words emblazoned at the entrance to the museum in the former 
concentration camp of Dachau. They are words we would do well 
to keep ever in mind. However painful the experience, the wounds 
of the past must not be allowed to fester. They must be opened. 
They must be cleansed. And balm must be poured on them so they 
can heal. This is not to be obsessed with the past. It is to take care 
that the past is properly dealt with for the sake of the future.  In our 
case, dealing with the past means knowing what happened. Who 
ordered that this person should be killed? Why did this gross 
violation of human rights take place? We also need to know about 
the past so that we can renew our resolve and commitment that 
never again will such violations take place. We need to know about 
the past in order to establish a culture of respect for human rights. 
It is only by accounting for the past that we can become 
accountable for the future.  (TRCR,1998vol,1::.7) 
The implication of the phrase “not be allowed to fester” above is ensuring that though 
they are remembered, they are not allowed any political expression. They are gaged 
and restricted regarding what can be allowed to be expressed and what cannot be 
allowed. This censorship is only possible if the phenomenon had been pushed outside 
bios into the realm of bare life. It is only this way that healing can take place despite 
remembering. The refrain “They” is a reference to deconstruction. That has been 
stripped of its bios before application.  
Nevertheless, the dominant theme here is healing and forgetting; it is difficult to 
restrict discussions exclusively to only these concepts here because they are all inter-
linked, as we have continuously mentioned. This is why we argue that as a result of 
the overlapping nature of the narratives, they could hardly be separated from each other 
entirely. This particular narrative, therefore, flows from the previous one above, it 
would have been the desire of the founding fathers of the TRC for the healing of 
wounds of the heart to be delivered on the total obliteration of the memory, and then 
societal peace and unification would have been automatic. However, then, a significant 
hindrance to healing is a memory, remembrance of pains of gross violations. To that 
extent, a perfect option to achieve societal peace would have been to forget the past 
completely. Which is why the architects of the TRC would have desired the delivery 
of healing on the platter of forgetting, but because forgetting cannot be excluded, 
Remembrance itself is a positivity that gives the struggle its meaning and which in turn 
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provides credence to the very essence of healing. The dominant narrative, therefore, 
became healing without forgetting, or healing, despite not forgetting. Nonetheless, 
what kind of remembrance is it? “Positive remembrance”.  
As we can see below, the word reconciliation is at times used as a synonym for peace. 
Hence, the narrative of healing without forgetting is further projected clearly in vol.5 
of the TRC report where it states that; “Reconciliation does not wipe away the 
memories of the past. Indeed, it is motivated by a form of memory that stresses the 
need to remember without debilitating pain, bitterness, revenge, fear or guilt. It 
understands the vital importance of learning from and redressing past violations for 
the sake of our shared present and our children’s future”. (TRCR,1998:vol.5:435) 
 To get to this level of not forgetting, and yet achieve healing, is a function of the 
Agamben deconstruction. Forgetting was stripped of its bios and reduced to “bare life” 
before it became a potent instrument for peace in SA. Furthermore, the narrative of 
healing without forgetting was demonstrated in the TRC report  where it says 
categorically, that;  
The Commission sought to uncover the truth about past abuses. This 
was part of ‘the struggle of memory against forgetting’ referred to by 
Milan Kundera. But it was, at the same time, part of the struggle to 
overcome the temptation to remember in a partisan, selective way; to 
recognise that narrow memories of past conflicts can too easily provide 
the basis for mobilisation towards further conflicts, as has been the case 
in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. An inclusive remembering of 
painful truths about the past is crucial to the creation of national unity 
and transcending the divisions of the past. (TRCR, 1998:116)   
Furthermore, in the interest of national unity, exclusion and abandonment of the 
phenomenon of forgetting were crucial. Also, it is clear here that the phrase “without 
forgetting” does not refer to “vivid remembrance”, but partial and relative one in which 
case what is allowed to be remembered are “partisan and selective” such that they must 
not be potent enough to derail healing. The commission interestingly used the phrase 
“inclusive remembering” though without mentioning Agamben. That goes to show 
that what was happening was an interesting theoretical framework at play, and that is 
what largely accounted for the success of the TRC’s work. It should also be noted that 
all the paradoxes were at the base of the policies, decisions, negotiations and the entire 
peace narrative that brought apartheid to its knees. 
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There seems to be some a form of corroboration of these arguments that the South 
African peace process must have been set against some rigorous theoretical 
background which accounted for its success after 48 years, in the works of Nietzsche 
as cited by Petar Ramadanovic who in his analysis, maintains that in, 
the second of his untimely meditations, Nietzsche suggests  that a 
cow lives without boredom and pain, because it does not remember. 
Because it has no past, the cow is happy. But the animal cannot 
confirm its happiness precisely because it does not have the power 
to recall its previous state. It lives unmindful of the past, which, as 
it gives happiness, also takes it away from the animal. Nietzsche 
uses this example to point to the liberating power of what he terms 
"active forgetting," a  willfull abandonment of the past that is 
beyond the capacities of the cow (Ramadanovic, 2001:1)    
It will be recalled that it has already been established at the beginning of this section, 
that a remembrance of the inhumanity and pain suffered from the perpetrators of 
apartheid could only breed nothing but hatred, bad blood, and disunity. However, one 
of the objectives of the TRC is to ensure healing from all those past traumas. 
Nevertheless, here is one element that stands against the realisation of this noble 
objective; it is the phenomenon of “remembrance,” i.e. “not forgetting”.Hence, it is 
given that natural human traits of un-wilful forgetting were impossible, and to that 
extent, healing was unrealisable. It is at this juncture that the need for deconstruction 
or exclusion that would help in delivering healing even without forgetting becomes 
necessary. Therefore, healing with forgetting would have been ideal, but it is 
impossible because we cannot forget, which is why we have to deliver healing without 
forgetting. 
Nevertheless, that also poses a problem. How do we achieve this? This is where 
Nietzsche comes in. He agrees that one cannot forget naturally, but one has to 
consciously do what Nietzsche calls “Wilful abandonment of the past or active 
forgetting”. By this he means, yes, One has not forgotten, but to achieve healing, one 
must actively take control of that faculty and deliberately refuse to remember. It is 
there in the subconsciousness, but one is under obligation to refuse to allow it to come 
into consciousness. This is what Agamben sees as a de-politicisation process. This is 
where things that are inimical to the success of the dominant theme are not allowed 
any political expressions. This is because they have been pushed into the realm of zoe. 
Nietzsche, just like Agamben, argues that any element that could be a threat to the 
primary objective or phenomenon should be excluded while including only aspects 
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that are complementary to that objective. This selective deconstruction is what 
Nietzsche seems to be referring to here as active forgetting- selective remembrance, 
which is what we in this work refers to as “without forgetting”. Hence, without 
forgetting does not refer to the vivid remembrance of all that had gone awry, but 
selectively remembering only those that help in the actualisation of the central 
discourse. This is made more explicit in the excerpt below;  
Nietzsche calls for an abandonment of the past because, as he says, it 
"returns as a ghost and disturbs the peace of a later moment”. Too much 
past precludes action, happiness, and further development. As an 
antidote to this predicament he suggests a critical discourse on the past 
that would be attentive to the needs of the present and able to 
distinguish between what in the past is advantageous and what is 
disadvantageous for life. Thus "active" forgetting is selective 
remembering, the recognition that not all past forms of knowledge and 
not all experiences are beneficial for present and future life. Active 
forgetting is then part of a more general attempt to rationalize the 
relation to the past and to render conscious--in order to overcome--all 
those haunting events that return to disturb the calm of a later moment. 
(Ramadanovic, 2001:1)     
It is interesting to note that what is spelt out here is undoubtedly Agamben’s exclusive, 
inclusion but done without the mention of Agamben. It is also a confirmation of the 
underlying theoretical framework of exclusive inclusion, which is crisscrossing in this 
narrative. Hence “without forgetting” connotes not forgetting, but not the traditional 
absolute forgetting, instead, it is partial remembrance. It is a selective one where there 
is consciousness in the selection of what is to be forgotten and what is allowed to be 
remembered because of how lethal or fatal they could be to the dominant rhetoric. 
Arguing further, Ramadanovic says; 
Near the beginning of the second meditation, after he has 
emphasized the transitory nature of existence, Nietzsche counsels 
caution with respect to both the degree of forgetting and the 
imperative to know or remember the past. He notes that: There is a 
degree of sleeplessness, of rumination, of the  historical sense, which 
is harmful and ultimately fatal to the living thing, whether this living 
thing be a man or a people or a culture... The unhistorical and the 
historical are necessary in equal measure for the health of an 
individual, of a people and of a culture… An individual or a people, 
when actively forgetting, seeks to strike a balance between knowing 
and not knowing, between remembering and forgetting the past, for 
life demands not simply an oblivion of the past, but a balance 
between the historical and the active, between reflection and 
experience. (Ramadanovic, 2001:1)     
This is not all. Ramadanovic, concludes by arguing that, 
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The man wondering at the cow begins next to wonder at himself and 
realizes that he cannot learn to forget but clings relentlessly to the 
past: however far and fast he may run, this chain runs with him." 
Nietzsche describes time as "a moment, now here and then gone, 
nothing before it came, again nothing after it has gone." The moment 
"nonetheless returns as a ghost and disturbs the peace of a later 
moment…Moreover, with active forgetting, Nietzsche is attempting 
not to avoid the past but to open up a possibility for the future 
together with a different understanding of what history 
is.(Ramadanovic, 2001:1)     
Similarly, when Tutu says, that “We pray that wounds that may have been re-opened 
in this process have been cleansed so that they will not fester; that some balm has been 
poured on them and that they will now heal.” ( TRCR. 1998: Vol.1:20)  Desmond Tutu 
is invariably confirming that the process of TRC itself is a process that not only 
annihilates forgetting; it essentially thrived in promoting remembrance. However, in 
promoting remembrance, it was done in the spirit of Agamben’s excluded inclusion 
such that the remembrance was selectively non-toxic, it was a remembrance that had 
been stripped of all its negativity such that what it was capable of eliciting was only 
healing not disunity. This was part of the narrative that returned peace to South Africa.    
5.5 Summary of the paradox of Healing without Forgetting   
In this chapter, we have argued that a major requirement for the return of peace to 
South Africa was the phenomenon of healing. This time around, we are talking much 
more beyond the physical healing of the injuries created by apartheid but also those of 
the mind. Unfortunately, a major hindrance for the actualisation of this phenomenon 
is the concept of “forgetting”. In order to heal, the option is to forget the cruelty and 
pain that had rested on the heart and minds of the people. However, narratives 
undoubtedly revealed that forgetting was impossible. Nevertheless, healing is highly 
desirable because, without it, societal peace would remain a myth to South Africa. The 
way to go was to ensure healing despite not forgetting. This is difficult. Hence the need 
to deconstruct forgetting in line with Agamben’s philosophy until it is reduced to bare 
life when it is no longer potent enough to derail healing, and it is when this was 
achieved that healing became possible. There was still remembrance, but a qualified, 
modulated and controlled remembrance in which what was permitted to be 
remembered was not fatal enough to derail the peace process. Instead, it was to 
immortalise victims. 
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Confession without Remorse  
5.6 Introduction to Confession without Remorse  
This chapter deals with the identification and analysis of the paradox of Confession 
without Remorse within South African peace process. It examines the themes 
underlying Confession without Remorse in South Africa (SA) as well as the analysis 
of how the paradox of Confession without Remorse was derived and how it 
operationalises itself within the Agamben’s exclusive, inclusive philosophy of the 
Homo Sacer. This paradox like the others, has two elements, Confession and Remorse: 
What do these concepts entail and how were they activated as part of the underlying 
paradoxes with which peace and societal stability was returned to apartheid South 
Africa? In this couplet, confession is the constant independent variable that does not 
change. It is that which needs to be fulfilled at all cost in order to achieve societal 
peace while remorse is the dependent variable that needs to be excluded and 
fragmented through a process of reductionism leading to some form of abandonment 
in order to fulfil the objective of the dominant variable which in this case is Confession.  
5.7 Confession with Remorse transformed into Confession without remorse 
As was the case in other couplets, this particular one equally comprises of two 
phenomena that are paradoxical in demand for analysis not just as interpreted in the 
TRC but as intellectual, philosophical concepts. Again just as with the previous 
concepts, the architects of the TRC desired Confession with remorse, which would 
have made their job less problematic, but the trend and narrative that emerged were 
unwittingly tailored towards Confession without Remorse. Linguistically, it looks like 
an adverbial clause of manner, which details how the confession has to be done for it 
to be effective and potent in the establishment of societal peace and stability in 
apartheid SA. The methodology of CDA has enabled us to dig deep into this modus 
operandi with the ultimate aim of sieving from it, relevant information that helps in 
the analysis of this narrative.  
There is a significant question to ask here; Why confession without remorse? What is 
the implication of confession with remorse? What are we confessing? All these are 
important because the entire TRC work is fundamentally tied to this fact.  What needed 
to be confessed to, are the truth that had either been denied, suppressed, or distorted 
concerning gross human right abuses in the apartheid years. The enabling act of the 
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TRC already made such confessions the condition for granting amnesty to perpetrators. 
This is, in other words, state pardon. However, how does the state who is an indirect 
second order victim grant pardon without fusing it directly with those of the primary 
victims? This interrogates the legitimacy of such pardons. In other words, how does 
the state justify such pardon as deserved? Hence a set of the criterion was listed among 
which is confessing to the whole truth but carefully avoided the manner of such 
confession because it could annihilate the entire process. From the earlier analysis, 
some of the perpetrators believed that they were fighting a just cause against 
communism and to get remorse from such category of people may be a great dream. 
Besides, the goal of societal peace and stability, as well as the continued existence of 
SA as one peaceful indivisible political entity, were superior to other nuances such as 
the manner of confession. To that extent, any phenomenon that would tamper with that 
process is pushed outside the realm of relevance in the Agamben fashion. 
Unfortunately, an average victim in SA if unable to bring perpetrators to book, for the 
fact that they have confessed willingly, wants to be sure that such pardon was well 
deserved. In which case, they would love to hear and see a genuinely broken-hearted 
perpetrator displaying regrets, genuinely sorry indeed, sufficiently apologetic and 
sympathetic in the narration of such bitter cruelty perpetrated. Unfortunately, the 
tensions between the belief of such perpetrators and the desire to see a remorseful 
perpetrator would negate the entire peace process. Moreover, in the interest of the 
overall objective of societal peace and peaceful coexistence, it was safer to align with 
confession without remorse which is not the same as a confession with no remorse at 
all in the operation of the TRC. 
Again, there are two terms here:  Confession and Remorse: what do they entail and 
how have they contributed to the development of peace in apartheid South Africa. 
5.8 What is Confession?  
There is a close affinity between the word confession and truth. One confesses to the 
truth. The truth is the product of the process of confession. Hence, the process of 
unveiling what is hitherto unknown is the confession, while the information that is 
brought forth is the truth. In this section, our interest is not in the product, but in the 
process. 
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What then, is a confession?  Online Dictionary.com variously defines confession as 
the act of ‘Acknowledgment; avowal or admission. It also connotes disclosure 
acknowledgement of sin or sinfulness, particularly to a priest to obtain absolution, 
something that is confessed,   a formal, usually written, acknowledgement of guilt by 
an accused person. This is also called confession of faith, which is a formal profession 
of belief and acceptance of doctrines, as before being admitted to church membership.  
The origin of the concept has been traced to the late 14c.,  when it implies the "action 
of confessing," which occurs originally in religion, It took its source from both  Old 
French word, confession which came into effect in the  10c., and  from the Latin word 
“confessionem” whose  nominative word is confession, meaning "confession or 
acknowledgement."  It is a noun of action that originates from the past participle stem 
of confiteri or confess. Historically, the word as used in law, began in the 1570s, when 
it implies "that which is confessed" whereas, in the mid-15c. it is traced to an Old 
English word ; andettung, or scriftspræc.’ (Harper, 2001.) 
Going beyond this classical history of the word, confession, Desmond Tutu equally 
explored another major theme upon which the mediation process lies. It is the theme 
of punishment, by which we mean for offences committed under retributive justice. 
Although,  within the confines of restorative justice, the confession itself is considered 
a form of punishment even, though other forms of punishments take the form of injury 
to the offender. Nevertheless, punishment to an offender has no direct restorative role 
to the victim except that it has a psychological satisfaction to see the other suffer 
despite that it has not removed his pain or suffering. Similarly, confession is both a 
form of punishment for the offender and a form of therapy for the victim. 
This is reminiscent of Foucault’s view which argues that; “ if examination is the 
technique of objectifying people, then of course confession is the technique of 
subjectifying them. Hence he affirms that ‘the western man has become a confessing 
animal’ (1981:174) fundamentally, therefore, the theme of confession is a major one 
to be undertaken in this research. In Foucauldian terms, confession is about performing 
subjectivity and represents a bio-political use of power by the TRC. Hence, Foucault 
defines confession in overtly discursive terms as a ritual of discourse’.  
Similarly, Fairclough, argues that confession is defined first by topic-the speaking 
subject is also the subject of the statement’ and then by the power relationship between 
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those involved. One does not confess without the presence (or virtual presence) of a 
partner who is not the interlocutor but the authority who requires the confession, 
appreciates and prescribes it, and intervenes in order to judge, forgive, console, and 
reconcile. (Fairclough, 1981:61) 
From what Fairclough is saying here, we can posit that confession is like a double-
edged sword that works in 2 opposite directions.  One for the confessing victimiser 
and the other for the victim who gets some therapeutic satisfaction similar to the ones 
we get when an offender has been made to suffer pain under legal justice system even 
if the damaged done is irreparable. People often go to rest and gets contented that they 
have gotten justice. Hence for him, confession has the peculiar feature that the very 
act of doing it changes the person who does it. In other words, it ‘exonerates, purifies 
and redeems him; it unburdens him of his wrongs, liberates him and promises him 
salvation’ Fairclough (1981:62) Furthermore, Fairclough, (1992:54) maintains that 
“the value of confession, is increased by the obstacles and resistance one has to 
overcome to make it. For instance, the examination includes medical, educational, 
interviews while confession includes religious, therapeutic, and counselling of varying 
forms.  Fairclough (1992:54).   
5.9 What is Remorse? 
The word remorse, according to the English dictionary, means deep and painful regret 
for wrongdoing; compunction. It also means, Obsolete. Pity or compassion. Its origin 
is traced to the late 14c., from an Old French word “remors” which is pelt in Modern 
French as “ remords”. This actually took its source from a Medieval Latin word; 
“remorsum”, with variations such as “ remorsus” or “ conscientiæ”   which translates 
into Middle English as ayenbite of inwit. Its verb, form is “remord” meaning “to strike 
with remorse, touch with compassion or prick one's conscience." Hence to be 
remorseful is to be repentant, to be sorry for wrongdoing. (Harper, 2001). 
There is a close affinity between remorse and forgiveness, and because we have 
discussed forgiveness extensively, what we shall do here is just the bit as related to 
remorse.  Another word for remorse is repentance. However, one only repents when 
one has the conviction that one is wrong. Nevertheless, within South Africa, both the 
perpetrator and the victim believed that they were rightly fighting a just war and that 
created a problem for forgiveness. Besides, as it is portrayed under the section on 
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forgiveness that scholars were divided over what kind of forgiveness was required. Is 
it a forgiveness that is conditionally based on repentance as in the Christian theology 
or the unconditional forgiveness as in the Derridean philosophy that does not require 
remorse, but remains ideologically inexistent, otherwise, it gets negated, while 
confession is a voluntary uncovering of hitherto covered facts as a result of some form 
of inducements, depending on context. 
Zaibert (2009:374) did try to show that there is this relationship between forgiveness 
and repentance, which determines mostly what its outcome would be. Scholars are 
divided over this, and it reduces the venture to either a descriptive one or a prescriptive 
one. According to Zaibert,  
The widespread claim that forgiveness requires repentance is often hard 
to assess because it is not clear whether what is meant is that, as a matter 
of logic, it is impossible to forgive the unrepentant, or, rather, that as a 
normative matter, forgiving the unrepentant is objectionable. This is not 
only the result of the looseness with which many authors shift between 
descriptive and  normative enterprises .... For, as we have also seen, the 
very paradox of forgiveness which occupies our attention has a part 
which is purely descriptive and a part which is to an extent normative. .. 
the appeal to repentance is unsuccessful in resolving the paradox. 
Although there are numerous defences of the thesis that forgiveness 
requires repentance, the best starting point for this discussion is 
Kolnai’s seminal  article, ... In this article Kolnai forcefully argues that 
if so-called forgiveness were to be granted to the unrepentant, then it 
would not really be forgiveness, but, at best, mere  condonation . 
Kolnai’s distinction between forgiveness and condonation occurs in the 
context of distinguishing forgiving from all sorts of related phenomena, 
such as pardoning, absolving, forgetting, and the like. Surely this is a 
salutary enterprise, which by now has become rather common. In fact, 
Kolnai’s distinction is particularly valuable in that it also contains a 
rather enlightening account of the terms used to refer to forgiveness and 
related phenomena  ( Zaibert ,2009:374) 
Although our immediate interest here is not forgiveness, yet repentance or lack of it 
undoubtedly shapes the narrative that ensues when forgiveness becomes an important 
subject matter. In South Africa, the resolution of the conflict began with the invocation 
of the Christian doctrine of forgiveness which is personified by Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu, yet it was not smooth sail because it requires repentance yet, despite coercive 
attempts to technically enforce repentance or even feign it, it was not a smooth sail 
either. Then, of course, a Derridean conception of forgiveness without repentance 
would have been a natural alternative. Unfortunately, that again only ends up in an 
ideological nihilism. When this happens, then it again perhaps lead to the invocation 
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of the philosophy of Ubuntu which seems to absorb the limitations primarily as it is 
founded on the Agamben’s philosophy of exclusive inclusion where any element that 
poses a threat to the primary objective is pushed into the realm of irrelevance and 
impotence through being depoliticised. Hence, the narrative for the successful de-
escalation of the South African conflict emerged as “confession without remorse.” 
  
5.10 What is Confession without Remorse? 
The very idea of confession has religious undertones, especially as in Catholicism. The 
purpose of confession here is to elicit forgiveness. However, this Christian forgiveness 
must come from a demonstration of repentance, being sorry for wrongdoing and must 
be done in such pious, diligent, and remorseful manner that shows that it is genuine 
before forgiveness can follow. Transporting this to the political realm, It would have 
been confession with true repentance or remorse, but the reality of the elements of state 
building in Apartheid South Africa did not support this assertion. Insistence on this 
would probably have truncated the mediation process in SA. This perhaps explains 
why the architects of the TRC excluded remorse from the terms of the mandate. The 
confession was enough. The manner of doing it was not significant in achieving 
amnesty. This again justifies this same phenomenon which had consistently run 
through the entire process; it is the deconstruction of the absolute. Hence, the narrative 
changed after being stripped of all political expressions. Otherwise, it will stand 
against the overall goal of reconciliation and societal peace, which is why the narrative 
for peace in SA became partly, “confession without remorse” It is a given constant that 
the independent variable here is “confession”, It is a requirement before amnesty can 
follow. Unfortunately, the enabling Act was silent over the modus operandi of such 
confessions. To that extent, its manner became irrelevant towards securing amnesty 
but not to the victims who believe that detached, unemotional, unrepentant manner in 
the fashion of reeling out a shopping list was incongruence with forgiveness. Hence, 
such insensitive confession may be capable of ensuring state pardon, (amnesty) but 
not those of the individual direct victims who are direct stakeholders and think that 
unless there is a show of true repentance, they were not ready to forgive. This raises 
other questions such as the legitimacy of a third party granting forgiveness or pardon 
on behalf of victims. This bit about the expectations of the victims regarding the modus 
operandi of confession was visibly presented below. According to the TRC report;    
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The religious conversion model of confession, repentance and 
forgiveness is by the very dogma of religion at the level of the very 
personal, of the individual as against his or her God or offended 
neighbour. There is no short cut. Yet with regard to the crime of 
apartheid (and its evils), there was much rhetoric about how whites 
or Afrikaners should acknowledge the violations, accept the 
responsibility apologise to blacks and experience the liberation of 
their forgiveness. The religious paradigm is tendered as a solution 
for our ills. There is a call for representative confession, repentance 
and forgiveness. Experience shows that, despite “handsome 
apologies” by leaders in virtually every sphere of Afrikaner society, 
there are continued calls for an Afrikaner leader to stand up and 
apologise in order to experience the level and extent of black 
readiness to forgive. (TRCR, 1998: vol.5: 442-443) 
At the hearings, was not only the clear existence of accusations of outright lies and 
denials, especially of the higher category of leaders but also that only half-truth was 
presented as whole truth to get amnesty. Sadly they were often with arrogance and 
without remorse. Unfortunately, such criticisms were incapable of derailing the 
process because the mandate of the commission already excluded “remorse” which 
again leads to the question of whether justice exist in that bracket or not? 
Demonstrating this, as recorded in the TRC report was the testimony  
illustrated in the recent book by Vlakplaas operative Colonel Eugene 
de Kock, where repeated acts of violence are described in a matter-
of-fact manner: I continued to shoot at him. He finally fell down 
dead. Nortje shot him in the temple … he died instantly. I took the 
decision to kill them because I was convinced they were armed. We 
beat him very badly and for a long time. He was a broken man by 
the time we were finished. I shot him with a .38 Special revolver. He 
died instantly. The body was destroyed … Mabotha was utterly 
blown up. I reduced the charges to about 60kg to 80kg. They were 
placed in the cellar. The explosion shook Johannesburg, and we 
celebrated at Vlakplaas with the Minister of Police, Adriaan Vlok. 
[On blowing up Khotso House.] (TRCR,1998: vol.5:271-272) 
It must, however, be reiterated here that the dominant narrative that was supposed to 
have, returned peace to SA, in conjunction with others, was confession irrespective of 
whether it was done callously and without repentance. It was sufficient that confession 
is made. Its potency does not lie in its mannerism, but the very fact of its revelation.  
Except that, confession without remorse can only lead to amnesty but without 
forgiveness. Forgiveness here refers to those of the victims themselves as the state is 
incapable of granting forgiveness for crimes committed indirectly against the state. 
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Perusing the TRC report, we equally found another similar show of insensitivity and 
heartlessness in the testimony of  a Koevoet member in the then South West Africa, 
dealing with a wounded SWAPO operative who said that ; 
Even at that stage he was denying everything and I just started to go 
into this uncontrollable rage and he started going floppy … and I 
remember thinking, “how dare you” and then – this is what I was told 
afterwards – I started ripping. I ripped all the bandages, the drip which 
Sean had put into this guy … pulled out my 9mm … put the barrel 
between his eyes and fucking boom … I executed him. I got on the 
radio and said to Colonel X … “We floored one … we are all tired, and 
I want to come in. (TRCR, 1998:vol.5: 272) 
Similarly, talking about the show of arrogance and demonstration of lack of regret or 
repentance came not just from the foot soldiers, as expressed above, but also top 
policymakers of apartheid. The peaceful manner in which the commission handled 
such matters, attracted so many criticisms which are suggestive of the fact that it was 
a demonstration of the tilt of the balance of power that was mostly in the hands of the 
perpetrators of apartheid. Hence, dealing with them required a delicate and cautious 
procedure that evidently, demonstrates helplessness on the part of the majority anti-
apartheid forces who saw that confession itself was somewhat selective and the manner 
of rendition, was equally without repentance. Unfortunately, that was the narrative that 
was capable of guaranteeing a smooth transition from apartheid to democracy. This 
seems to be what is being partly expressed here below; 
Many here and overseas have criticised us sharply for having been so 
conciliatory and accommodating towards Mr PW Botha. We have 
been accused of handling him with kid gloves; of bending over 
backwards whilst he has responded with arrogant defiance and 
intransigence.(TRCR,1998: vol.1:9 ) 
The narrative of confession without remorse, was not restricted to the apartheid forces 
only, even the anti-apartheid forces not only confirmed this narrative but tries to justify 
their insensitivity under the “ argument of just war” as can be seen in the excerpt below; 
General Andrew Masondo was national political commissar of the 
ANC between 1977 and 1985, and earlier a Robben Island prisoner. 
In a section 29 hearing, when responding to enquiries about atrocities, 
including executions in the Angolan Quatro camp, he repeatedly 
stated that “we were at war”: You remember I said we were at war … 
There might be times that I will use third degree, in spite of the fact 
that it is not policy. People who it was found that they were enemy 
agents, we executed them, and I wouldn’t make an apology. We were 
at war. (TRCR,1998: vol.5:262) 
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From the above excerpt, the statement “we executed them, and I wouldn’t make an 
apology. We were at war“, is a clear demonstration of the narrative of “confession 
without remorse” There was also the argument that not only were there confessions 
without remorse, but some of the so-called confessions were also either, half-truths or 
no truths at all. The commission not only demonstrated its impotence in dealing with 
top leaders of apartheid, they selectively celebrated confessions of foot soldiers while 
the source of commands was allowed to flitter away. There were narratives to confirm 
that these were no errors but consciously part of the design for peace. This created 
anger, that was variously expressed by some of the foot soldiers, who not only felt 
used but betrayed. Although, the fact remains that such critics do not understand that 
the underlying narrative was to ensure societal peace and stability within the structure 
of nation-building, than of any redress that is justice-seeking. The excerpt below 
affirmed the same; 
Colonel Eugene de Kock in the closing pages of his book:4 Yet the 
person who sticks most of all in my throat is former State President FW 
de Klerk. Not because I can prove, without a shadow of doubt, that he 
ordered the death of X or cross-border raid Y. Not even because of the 
holier than thou attitude that is discernible in the evidence he gave 
before the [Commission] on behalf of the National Party. It is because, 
in that evidence, he simply did not have the courage to declare: “yes we 
at the top levels condoned what was done on our behalf by the security 
forces. What’s more, we instructed that it should be implemented. Or – 
if we did not actually give instructions we turned a blind eye. We didn’t 
move heaven and earth to stop the ghastliness. Therefore let the foot 
soldiers be excused (TRCR.1998: vol.5:264) 
After reading some of the confessions, the question that comes to mind is that are these 
human beings, or animals in human clothing? Moreover, do these “animals” deserve 
amnesty? While contemplating that, we remember that elsewhere, Desmond Tutu has 
said that we should not forget that “amnesty is not for good people.”  The TRC report 
did a sort of comparative analysis of the perception and impact of gross violations on 
the perpetrators on the one hand, and the victims on the other. The analysis reveals 
unmistakably that the victims were always at the receiving end while the perpetrators 
were at the giving end, and that determines the extent to which an individual is affected 
by the events. Unfortunately, the arrogance and impunity with which these perpetrators 
go about these acts is everything but remorseful. The pain often inflicted on the soul 
and heart of the victim remains traumatising ad-infinitum. The explanation for such 
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inhuman cruelty is incomprehensible by the victims while the perpetrators find 
sufficient justification for their cruelty. This is demonstrated in the excerpt below;  
the magnitude gap manifests in different time perspectives. The 
experience of violence typically fades faster for perpetrators than for 
victims. For victims, the suffering may continue long after the event…  
Moral evaluations of the events may differ: actions may appear less 
wrong, less evil, to the perpetrator than to the victim. While victims 
tend to rate events in stark categories of right and wrong, perpetrators 
may see large grey areas…Discrepancies exist between victims and 
perpetrators regarding the question of motives and intentions, the 
crucial question of why? Victims’ accounts show two versions, one 
which emphasises sheer incomprehensibility – the perpetrator had no 
reason at all – and the other which presents the perpetrator’s action as 
deliberately malicious, as sadistic, as an end in itself. By contrast, the 
vast majority of perpetrators, even if they admit wrongfulness, provide 
comprehensible reasons for their actions, and almost never admit to 
being motivated by sheer maliciousness or the wish to inflict harm as 
an end in itself. (TRCR. 1998:.vol.5:271) 
In furtherance to this comparative analysis carried out by the TRC, they equally 
examined one particular individual who was a principal perpetrator of violence against 
black South Africans and at another time, he was a victim of violence himself, and his 
view on both ends was quite remarkable and crucial in understanding the temperament 
that features on both sides. 
The report in Vol.5 page 272 says ; “ This perspective gap may be 
illustrated by the case of Mr John Deegan, a former member of the 
Security Branch and a Koevoet operative responsible for various 
atrocities. In a testimony dated 30 June 1996, he reports as follows on 
the recent death of his father: “ He was cold-bloodedly shot dead and 
his murderers escaped. I cannot come to terms with his death in that it 
was a senseless act of violence in the pursuit of greed. This is the first 
time that my family and I have come so close to experiencing the horror 
of violence so directly in this country. (TRCR. 1998: vol.5:272) 
It is interesting to note that the same man who was the victim above, was the 
same one who arrogantly narrated how he got into a rage and blew up 
somebody. 
Here is the perspective of the victim. But this is the same man who, in 
a report dated 23 August 1993, appeared as perpetrator, a Koevoet 
member in then South West Africa, dealing with a wounded SWAPO10 
operative:  “ Even at that stage he was denying everything and I just 
started to go into this uncontrollable rage and he started going floppy … 
and I remember thinking “how dare you” and then – this is what I was 
told afterwards – I started ripping. I ripped all the bandages, the drip 
which Sean had put into this guy … pulled out my 9mm … put the 
barrel between his eyes and fucking boom … I executed him. I got on 
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the radio and said to Colonel X … “We floored one … we are all tired 
and I want to come in.( TRCR,1998: vol.5:272-273)  
The TRC did not stop just at presenting the two sides of this same coin, They subjected 
it to brief critical analysis and came to the conclusion of irreconcilability but failed to 
realise that human nature is inherently selfish and egoistic. It is all right to be 
monstrous to others but unfair for others to be monstrous to us. The golden rule does 
not seem to exist anymore. We must equally recall that it was in an attempt for man to 
flee from himself that made him submit to the social contract in the first place which 
in turn threatens his freedom with the emergence of absolutism as evident in both 
Hobbes and Rousseau. Of important remark is the arrogance and insensitivity as well 
as lack of remorse with which this man dealt with the captive without sympathy and 
in turn, seeks sympathy when he was a victim himself. This seems to be what is being 
expressed in the excerpt below. 
From the point of view of the victim, violence is a “senseless act” and 
he experiences it with horror (the first time he claims to have had such 
an experience), yet as the perpetrator he has reasons and strong 
emotions, even expressing outrage (a moral stance) at the apparent 
defiance of his captive. The magnitude gap is a discrepancy between 
two quite different and irreconcilable positions. (TRCR.1998: 
vol.5:272-273) 
Similarly, we found an interesting twist to the argument of confession without remorse 
as a dominant narrative with most of the white perpetrators of apartheid essentially 
confessing without remorse, but the exception found did not as it obliterated the 
dominant narrative of “confession without remorse”. In the Excerpt below, the anti-
apartheid ANC leader confessed but with remorse. He was not diplomatic with this; 
he mainly used the phrase “I express my deep regret”, while this is encouraging, it 
does not seem to be the general trend or rule as the case may be. The report says;  
Mr Ismail described the Dolphin Unit, established in 1982, which “had 
been established inside the country to carry out operations within the 
broad mandate of the ANC and MK [the ANC‘s armed wing, 
Umkhonto weSizwe]”. In an amnesty hearing in May 1998, Mr 
Mohammed Shaik, head of the Dolphin Unit, described thirty-two 
carefully planned operations against police, embassy, magistrate’s 
court and state department targets within South Africa. Mr Shaik stated 
in conclusion that: At all times I acted within the policy and guidelines 
laid down by the ANC; I was comprehensively briefed on the modus 
operandi of special operations in MK. I accordingly attempted to avoid 
or minimise civilian casualties whenever I conducted operations. To 
this end, whenever circumstances permitted, I timed my operations 
after hours, when targeted buildings had been vacated by civilians. I 
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accept that, in the end, there was always a possibility of civilian 
casualties. Where there were civilian casualties these were never at any 
stage intended to be targets, but were rather caught in the crossfire. To 
the extent that there were civilian casualties, I express my deep regret 
to those who experienced pain and suffering. The apartheid state left us 
no choice but to take up arms. (TRCR.1998: vol.5:262) 
Let us reiterate, why is the issue of confession without remorse or without repentance 
or more like it, confession without feeling sorry or regret. This is closely related to the 
issue of forgiveness. Within the context of Christianity, confession is a significant 
phenomenon. What then is its purpose? It is intended to facilitate forgiveness. 
However, its modus operandi is vital as stated in the bible, for instance in the book of 
Proverb, chapter, 28, verse 13 says that “He who conceals his transgressions will not 
prosper, But he who confesses and forsakes them will find compassion”. The word 
forsakes them here connotes repentance.  Meaning when one confess and repent of it, 
which is the same thing as being remorseful, then one find compassion, which is a 
reference to forgiveness. 
Similarly, the book of 2Chronicles, chapter 7 verse 14 says “If my people, who are 
called by my name, will humble themselves and pray and seek my face and turn from 
their wicked ways, then I will hear from heaven, and I will forgive their sin and will 
heal their land”.(Bible, Chronicles:7vs14)  This other one is even more precise. It 
means confession must be done humbly in an attitude of humility, through prayer, 
which connotes solemnness, and then change of attitude in which the offender would 
cease from his old ways, then he would have been deemed to have met the requirement 
for forgiveness and healing can also follow. 
It is against this backdrop of expectations that the concept of confession within the 
TRC is popularly conceived. Presumably, perpetrators of apartheid were expected to 
come before the commission, apologetically, remorsefully, regrettably and sorrowfully 
to confess their atrocities before they can be forgiven and then possibly get the state 
pardon which is amnesty. Unfortunately, it was not going to be so. This sort of 
expectation and picture belonged to the initial equation of confession with remorse, 
which is the perfect ideal that the TRC would have desired, but such cannot come from 
a people who felt that they were doing the right thing fighting agents of communism. 
To them, confession is a hand twisted exercise that they unwittingly submitted to, 
which is why Tutu practically coerced amnesty seekers into doing. Unfortunately, the 
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enabling act did not subject or subsume confession to the harrowing claws of remorse. 
Neither did it subject it to the uncontrollable discretionary whims and caprices of 
individual’s forgiveness, which would have derailed the entire process because that 
way, remorse would have been given political expressions that it should have been 
stripped off,  in the interest of societal peace and stability, which Agamben allows. 
So what was done was that confession remained the independent variable, while 
remorse, the dependent variable. However, because confession with remorse was 
impossible, the deconstruction had to push remorse into the realm of Zoë, where its 
potency at destabilisation of societal peace, becomes minimal. This again is so if we 
remember that with Agamben, confession without remorse does not mean confession 
with no remorse. It only means that what is obtained is not full-blown remorse but 
some fragments of it, which does not constitute an obstacle to confession. Otherwise, 
the individual victims, coming from the background of deep sorrow, would have 
impeded the smooth transition. On the other hand, on the part of the arrogant 
perpetrator who is still fully aware of his strength, given the balance of power that still 
existed at the time of the negotiation, would equally have provided the alibi for why 
societal peace would have been unattainable.   
Hence, the architects of the TRC came up with a safe narrative in which confession, 
even without remorse, was still able to guarantee societal peace and stability. This is 
even though the individual victims could not forgive, yet it did not derail the transition. 
No matter how unfair or unjust that this may sound, hence, within the Agamben’s 
philosophy, the only plausible narrative, within which peace could return to South 
Africa, was confession without remorse. 
 
Furthermore, the TRC report in vol.6, sect.3 page 206, gave a vivid account of how a 
small proportion of the security force engages in torture. The report captured 
horrifying testimony of torture techniques used by members of the Security operatives, 
which technically creates more problem for forgiveness. One applicant described it as 
follows; 
C A P T. ZEELIE: … there were methods used, common assault, 
slapping with an open hand or with fists. Then there was also the 
tube method that was used and at that stage we used a wet bag that 
was pulled over a person’s head … and basically the person was 
suffocated for a short while. And then we also used shock methods 
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where, at that stage, two electrical wires which were connected to a 
telephone-like device, was attached to the person. We would at that 
stage put a stick between a person’s teeth so he can bite on it and 
then the telephone handle was turned and this sent a shock through 
the person, and at that stage that also sort of suffocated the person. 
And then what I can recall now is the method of a broomstick where 
a person is handcuffed and his hands are pulled over his knees and 
the broomstick is pushed in-between, through his arms and legs and 
he’s hung between two tables, and it is in that position that he is 
questioned…you took the person’s mind and you made him believe 
that something could happen to him … I took a hand grenade and it 
was a hand grenade that has been secured, there’s no explosives in 
it, there’s no detonator that could go off. And then that hand grenade, 
this is what I did, I would for example, take it and have the person 
hold it between his legs while his hands are bound behind his back 
and then psychologically you made him believe that if he opens his 
legs the hand grenade will drop to the floor and it will blow him up. .. 
and then, for example, we also used methods where persons would 
be assaulted by an interrogator and then the assault would be ceased 
and then perhaps the following day you would use another 
interrogator and that interrogator would be the so-called ‘nice guy’ 
and he would speak nicely to the person and then psychologically 
that man will, this guy who is nice to him, he would trust this guy 
more and supply information to him …I will honestly say that it was 
general practice in the Police and specifically in the final years where 
I was involved in the Security Branch. There was never any person 
that was ashamed to say that he had assaulted a person or had applied 
certain techniques in order to obtain certain information. 
(Bloemfontein hearing, 9 October 2000.)  (TRCR,1998:vol.6:206) 
The above excerpt is a sort of dispassionate confession that is devoid of any 
emotions. No signs of regret or remorsefulness could be seen in this confession. He 
declared at the end that no one was ashamed of such inhumanity. In other words, it 
is a thing of pride to them all. When such attitudes come to the public glare, it could 
elicit nothing but un-forgiveness. 
In a similar narrative, “A former member of a KZP hit squad, now 
serving a number of life sentences for murder, told the Commission: 
There was no difference between the KwaZulu Police, the IFP and the 
KwaZulu government. In my opinion they were one entity. I received 
instructions [to kill people] from Captain Langeni (KZP), Mr MZ 
Khumalo (KwaZulu government) and [Mr Daluxolo] Luthuli (IFP). 
(TRCR,1998: vol.5:230)  
Again, the attitude of the speaker here is that of a carefree person who is not bothered 
about human life and quite unremorseful. It is the same kind of argument that is being 
projected here below; rather than regret, the human right violation was a thing of pride 
among perpetrators. This is especially so because there is a kind of psychological 
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conviction that they were fighting a just war. This is what is being expressed here 
below ;  
In a situation regarded as war, violent actions were undertaken with pride 
rather than with distress and embarrassment. In this regard former senior 
security force member Major Craig Williamson said: The psychological 
effect of fighting such a counter-revolutionary war should not be 
underestimated, especially when this entailed long periods of covert 
operations. The members of the security forces, especially in covert units 
… saw themselves as the elite frontline troops in a critically important 
theatre of the overall war. Security force successes … produced praise, 
pride and relief from pressure. (TRCR,1998: vol.5:263) 
There is another twist to the above narrative, in the course of confession, denying that 
errors were made and wrong decisions that were taken could not possibly have thrived, 
yet, the humility to be remorseful was still not there. Hence,  its deconstruction was 
such that it could still not prevent amnesty even though it could not elicit forgiveness. 
This is evident in Mr FW de Klerk’s submission below;  
 Mr FW de Klerk, answering questions on widespread torture during the 
1980s in the second NP submission, said: I’m not saying we were perfect 
… I’m not saying we didn’t make mistakes. Detailed operationalisation 
(of security policy) takes place at a much lower level … that is where, 
either through over-zealousness or a male fide approach, where things 
get out of hand. History has subsequently shown that, as far as the policy 
of apartheid was concerned, they were deeply mistaken. None of these 
unconventional projects was intended to lead to any gross violations of 
human rights … but … they did create an atmosphere conducive to 
abuses. (TRCR,1998:.vol.5:267) 
Although this quotation has been used elsewhere, one is compelled to quote it again to 
buttress our argument here because it provides an explicit picture of the argument here 
that though confessions were made, they were unrepentant both in their spirit and in 
the letter. The implications, therefore, were that it creates a problem for forgiveness, 
particularly from the victims, yet it could not preclude amnesty from being granted. 
That again leaves the future with some bleakness of some sort, despite immediate 
attainment of peace.   
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Chapter 6: Amnesty without forgiveness and Tolerance without Friendship 
6.0 Introduction to Chapter On Amnesty Without Forgiveness And Tolerance 
Without Friendship 
This chapter deals with the identification and analysis of the phenomenon of Amnesty 
without forgiveness as well as that of Tolerance Without Friendship within the South 
African peace process. It examines how these narratives emerged and how they 
contribute to the success of the peace and nation-building process in South Africa (SA) 
as well as how the narratives operationalise itself within the Agamben’s exclusive, 
inclusive philosophy of the Homo Sacer. These paradoxes, like the others, equally, 
have two elements each. Amnesty and forgiveness, tolerance and friendship. What do 
these concepts entail and how were they activated as part of the underlying paradoxes 
with which peace and societal stability were returned to apartheid South Africa? In 
these couplets, Amnesty and tolerance respectively are the constant independent 
variables that do not change and that needs to be fulfilled at all cost in order to achieve 
societal peace. On the other hand, forgiveness and friendship are the dependent 
variables that needed to be deconstructed and fragmented through the process of 
reductionism in order to fulfil the objective of the dominant variables which in this 
cases are Amnesty and Tolerance.   
6.1 Amnesty flowing from forgiveness transformed into Amnesty without 
forgiveness 
The idea of Amnesty and especially forgiveness is most central to this thesis. It is the 
most fundamental of all the paradoxes that animate the mediation process. Next to it 
is that of truth and justice. Hence the elaborate and extensive treatment that we shall 
dedicate to it. Just as it is with other paradoxes in the mediation process, the original 
intention of the TRC was to deliver amnesty to the perpetrators of human right 
violation in such a manner that victims are not opposed to it, because of they too in 
their capacities as individual victims, would have forgiven the perpetrators. The result 
of such a perfect smooth sail arrangement would be a serene and peaceful society 
devoid of any form of animosity. Hence, the architects of the TRC were eager to pacify 
not just the aggressor by granting them amnesty, but also the aggressed by ensuring 
that such amnesty granted, does not appear to promote grudge or seen to encourage 
impunity. In other words, they desired a granting of amnesty that is not only acceptable 
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to the aggrieved but justifiably seen as deserving even by the violated. It was an 
amnesty that should not be seen as irresponsible and recklessly granted out of the 
display of desperation to pacify those who should have been handled as criminals. It 
is essential that if such an arrangement were possible, it would be in the class of 
absolute perfection. Unfortunately, the generality of victims of apartheid saw it 
differently. The danger in subsuming amnesty to individual’s whims and caprices was 
dangerous and could derail the whole process because it is complicated to move people 
from grievous hurt, and painful losses that have in some cases chattered people’s lives 
irretrievably to the point of forgiveness or pardon, all in the overall interest of societal 
peace and nation-building. It became imperative and prudent that state pardon should 
be given despite the denial of the individual pardon in a manner that societal peace and 
stability is not compromised. This again is a problematic contradiction, and it can only 
make sense when situated within the Agamben’s exclusive, inclusive philosophy of 
the Homo Sacer. It became clear within the contradictions that emerged, that Amnesty 
with forgiveness was unrealistic in the face of violations that took place in apartheid, 
South Africa. 
Nevertheless, amnesty must be granted for societal unification and continuity. In order 
to achieve this, stability, an exclusion must take place that would ensure that state 
pardon is granted, irrespective of victims’ denial of pardon. In a way, it is akin to 
saying that there is forgiveness despite un-forgiveness. That is amnesty without 
forgiveness. 
6.2 What is Amnesty?  
The complexity involved with amnesty can be understood more when we peruse the 
report of the TRC extensively. It must be emphasised that not only is amnesty the 
Independent variable in this equation with forgiveness as the dependent one, the 
enabling act carefully guided, safeguarded, protected and insulated “amnesty” even 
from members of the Commission because it is one element that carries the burden of 
the TRC. In volume one, page 116 -117, of the TRCR,  some of the safeguards were 
revealed which seem to undermine justice and level playing ground technically. 
However, it must be understood that the South African peace process was not anchored 
on justice at least in the traditional sense, though not on injustice either, even though, 
some narratives, particularly from victims, seems to be suggestive of this. Otherwise, 
it would have failed.  According to the TRC report,   
 
 
162 
 
The negotiated agreement in South Africa averted the costly return to 
the politics of confrontation and mass mobilisation. It made the 
historic bridge provided for by the interim Constitution possible. It did 
not, however, allow for a choice between amnesty and justice in the 
sense of large-scale prosecutions and punishment. Indeed, 
Nuremberg-style tribunals were simply not a viable political option, 
given the balance of military and political forces that prevailed at the 
time. (TRCR,1998:vol.1 116 -117) 
The impression given here is that of a carefully and cautiously manage peace 
arrangement where machinery was set in motion, with a clear directive of its path and 
route of navigation that are not subject to the control of the captain, who is helpless 
especially as its operation is not within his whims and caprices. This is precisely the 
fate of the TRC as the narratives show.  Further substantiation of this claim, is revealed 
in the subsequent excerpt here below;  
The postamble of the interim Constitution states: In order to advance 
such reconciliation and reconstruction [of society], amnesty shall be 
granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences with political 
objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts of the past. 
The implementation of this amnesty agreement proved to be very 
difficult indeed: [The granting of amnesty] is a difficult, sensitive, 
perhaps even agonising, balancing act between the need for justice to 
victims of past abuse and the need for reconciliation and rapid 
transition to a new future; between encouragement to wrongdoers to 
help in the discovery of the truth and the need for reparations for the 
victims of that truth; between a correction in the old and the creation 
of the new. It is an exercise of immense difficulty interacting in a vast 
network of political, emotional, ethical and logistical considerations. 
Two particular tensions need to be noted: a First, if justice is seen 
merely as retribution, it becomes difficult to make the appropriate 
connections between amnesty and justice. While both the interim 
Constitution and the Commission expressed strong opposition to acts 
of revenge, it is necessary, nevertheless, to acknowledge that the 
desire for revenge is an understandable human response. Suppressed 
anger undermines reconciliation. ( TRCR,1998:vol.116 -117)  
Further analysis reveals that there is so much controversy and justification of this 
phenomenon and that can be seen in the following lines in which the place of justice 
was interrogated. It argues extensively that the,  
tendency to equate justice with retribution must be challenged and 
the concept of restorative justice considered as an alternative. This 
means that amnesty in return for public and full disclosure (as 
understood within the broader context of the Commission) suggests 
a restorative understanding of justice, focusing on the healing of 
victims and perpetrators and on communal restoration.  b Second, 
amnesty as an official act of pardon can all too easily be 
misinterpreted as ignoring responsibility and accountability. As such, 
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amnesty can be seen to be encouraging a culture of impunity. Some 
victims felt that amnesty results in insufficient social repudiation and 
that, by refusing to punish those responsible and allowing 
perpetrators to walk free, it constitutes a failure to respect their 
suffering.   It is important, therefore, clearly to understand the 
various justifications for the concept of amnesty implemented by the 
Commission, with its unique focus on individual accountability. 
Similarly, the relationship between the Commission and the formal 
justice system merits attention: The context of transition: 
accountable amnesty versus impunity (TRCR,1998: vol.1:117) 
The general underlying principle of the South African TRC was everything short of 
absolutist ideas. The relative and perspectival approach were upheld in almost all cases. 
Reading between the lines carefully and taking note of the choice of words in the 
excerpt below, we could make some logical deductions that are suggestive of the fact 
that a full-scale resolution was undeniably not even the target in South Africa 
especially when we consider some of the underlying tones. We must remark that it is 
only the methodology of CDA that gives us such opportunities to make deductions 
from the linguistic and literary rendition of the report.  
“The postamble of the interim Constitution thus placed an 
obligation on South Africa’s first democratic government to make 
provision for the granting of amnesty, while giving it some 
discretion as to the circumstances in which amnesty could be 
granted. The choice was, essentially, between blanket amnesty and 
qualified amnesty. Through extensive negotiations, which included 
broad-based public debate, the notion of a blanket amnesty for 
undisclosed deeds was rejected as an inadequate basis for laying the 
past to rest. A middle path was required, something that lay 
between a Nuremberg option and total amnesia. The choice, 
ultimately, was for amnesty with a considerable degree of 
accountability built into it”. (TRCR,1998:vol.1:117)  
From a CDA point of view, one could argue that the use of the word “obligation” 
above seems to connote compulsion. The South African first democratic government 
does not have a choice but must comply. Moreover, what the enabling act gave was 
not absolute power but “some discretion”. Similarly, it must be noted that it does not 
concern itself with whether amnesty should be granted or not. This has already been 
taken out of its jurisdiction. What it was to decide is modality. The phrase “A middle 
path” here is a reference to the non-absolute principle underlying the entire mediation 
process. 
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Moreover, within the same geometry of analysis, what they are after is “amnesty with 
a considerable degree of accountability”. Just a considerable degree would be 
sufficient not necessarily full-scale accountability. Hence, when former agents of 
apartheid come forward to give what people perceive as half-truths, and yet got 
amnesty, it is no doubt still consistent with the intention of the founding fathers of the 
TRC who expects only “a considerable degree of accountability” and not a full scale 
one despite what the mandate of the TRC spelt out. This gives credence to the 
overriding principle behind the entire process; it is “deconstruction of absoluteness.” 
in favour of a relative, imperfect and less ideal. what we can see here are principles of 
relativity and not of absoluteness. It then means that the South African peace process 
was hinged upon a system that tries to exclude absolute ideas in favour of relative ones 
in every sector of the mediation process. This is not superimposed; it is manifestly 
clear from the emerging narratives.  
What then is amnesty?  
 a general pardon for offences, especially political offences, against a 
government, often granted before any trial or conviction. Pushing the 
argument further, it maintains that it is “an act of forgiveness for past 
offences, especially to a class of persons as a whole”. According to these 
scholars, It equally refers to “ the act of  “forgetting or overlooking of 
any past offence”.  Generally, speaking, therefore, ‘ to grant amnesty to, 
is to pardon’.  The word is said to have appeared between 1570 and 1580 
and it and has its root in both French(amnestie)  and Greek (amnēstía) 
origins. Similarly, Vocabulary .com added the  dimension of “forgetting” 
and argued further that “Amnesty can mean a pardon for a wrongdoing, 
or it can also signal a government's willingness to overlook something. 
In its own analysis, He maintains that “Amnesty sounds a little like 
"amnesia," and that's because in its more specific sense amnesty means 
"forgetting."  And to that extent,  “The government will essentially 
forget about whatever crime was committed, or whatever horrible things 
were said. As part of a truce, amnesty can be granted to opposition 
forces in civil disputes. Amnesty to illegal aliens means the government 
will deliberately overlook their illegal entry to the country. There can 
also be a period of amnesty when people can turn in something that they 
would otherwise get in trouble for. An example of this given by 
Dictionarycom is that “The city offered a period of amnesty for 
everyone to turn in illegal guns. ( Dictionarycom, 2016:1) 
Following CDA, it is possible to argue that there is a consensus from the above excerpt, 
that amnesty does not imply “not guilty” but implies a pardon for whatever illegality 
or offence committed, and this pardon is not at the individual level but the corporate 
state level. Corroborating this assertion further is  Thesaurus.com  which argues that 
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pardon itself is a “kind indulgence, as in forgiveness of an offence or discourtesy or 
intolerance of a distraction or inconvenience, a release from the penalty of an offence 
or a penalty remission by a governor. Alternatively, the document by which such 
remission is actualised. It could also be forgiveness of a severe offence or offender, a 
papal indulgence, to make courteous allowance for or to excuse, to release (a person) 
from liability for an offence. To remit the penalty of an offence. (Thesaurus.com, 
2016:1) 
There are a couple of synonyms that are closely associated with this idea of amnesty. 
These synonyms were espoused in the excerpt below. It left no one in doubt about 
what amnesty entails. It was clear that amnesty is not an acquittal. It is mere discharge, 
not conditional, neither is it based on remorse. It is discretionally detached from all 
conditionalities; 
Pardon, amnesty, reprieve are nouns referring to the cancellation, or 
delay with the possibility of eventual cancellation, of a punishment or 
penalty assigned for the violation of a military regulation or a civil law; 
absolution from guilt is not implied, merely a remission of the penalty. 
A pardon is granted to an individual, often by the action of a government 
official such as a governor, president, or monarch, and releases the 
individual from any punishment due for the infraction of the law, as a 
death sentence, prison term, or fine: to be released from prison with a 
full pardon. An amnesty is a pardon granted to a group of persons for 
past offences against a government; it often includes an assurance of no 
future prosecution: to grant amnesty to political prisoners; an amnesty 
period for delinquent taxpayers during which no penalties are assessed 
( Thesaurus.com, 2016:1) 
The critical point to note is that amnesty is incompatible with justice in any form or 
shape. Its concern is not with whether the pardoned person was guilty or not; it only 
presupposes that the guilt is overruled. Furthermore, amnesty is non-conditional, nor 
is it depended on any requirement, as we would find in forgiveness. However, within 
the TRC, it was attached with conditions, yet the conditions were not above the 
underlying rule to ensure that it is not held down by absoluteness. Which is why a 
significant level of leverage and flexibility was applied in its implementation that made 
critics argue that it encourages impunity as we shall see in the arguments as they unfold. 
6. 3. The idea of Forgiveness 
Zaibert, (2009: 367) dealt with this idea of forgiveness extensively. He had three 
central conceptions of the idea. One is personal to him, next is that of Derrida, and the 
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last is that Kolnai. Zaibert’s analysis of the three fundamental conceptions of 
forgiveness began with that of Kolnai, The interesting bit here is that what seemed to 
be paraded regarding the notion of forgiveness in operation in South Africa, was a 
mere smokescreen covering the real conception that of forgiveness upon which they 
based the functioning of the TRC.  The fact is that it appeared as though, it was the 
Christian conception of forgiveness that was in operation with the imposing image of 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, but the Christian conception of forgiveness could not have 
successfully sailed through the process. The reason is that it is deficient at least in the 
sense that it cannot be logically and coherently pushed through conclusively if one is 
not a Christian or religious, This was why “Ubuntu”: the African philosophy of societal 
unification was brought about to compliment it. The actual narrative at work, in South 
Africa, seems a bit elusive or more of a hybrid between Aurel Kolnai ,  Derrida and 
Leo Zaibert as well as those of some other scholars who toiled with the concept. In his 
analysis, Zaibert, (2009:367) began by quoting Kolnai who maintains that, 
either forgiveness is objectionable and ungenuine inasmuch as  there 
is no reason to forgive,  the oﬀender having undergone no  metánoia  
(‘Change of Heart’), but persisting in his plain identity  qua  
oﬀender … [or] at the other end of its spectrum, forgiveness seem to 
collapse into mere  redundancy , or the mere registering  of moral 
value in the place of moral disvalue.(Kolnai, 1973:98)  
This position of Kolnai is similar to most victims of apartheid in South Africa who 
could not see reasons to forgive. However, in his analysis, Zaibert (2009:366) argues 
that Kolnai’s idea of forgiveness is internally incoherent and schematically, 
synonymous with the famous request that Jesus made on the cross. He is referring to 
where Jesus said,   ‘Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do’.  Zaibert 
argues that if, on the one hand, they truly know not what they were doing, then, of 
course,  assuming that this ignorance was not itself culpable, it then follows that they 
should be excused, which is not the same thing as forgiveness. Forgiveness, as a matter 
of logic, presupposes (perceived) culpable wrongdoing. Whereas, if they did know that 
they were doing something wrong, then presumably they should have been punished, 
and, again, that would ostensibly not be forgiveness. For him, forgiveness can only 
happen when there is remorse; otherwise, it is not forgiveness even if it has a 
resemblance to it. This was what Zaibert was referring to when on page 367 he argues 
that, 
the Kolnaian paradox has two parts. The ﬁrst part is indeed ‘chieﬂy 
logical’: putative instances of forgiveness are in fact spurious since 
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they are instances of other sorts of phenomena: often what looks like 
forgiving is something else: excusing, exonerating, forgetting, 
exculpating, or, crucially for Kolnai, condoning. The second part of 
the paradox, however, is not ‘chieﬂy logical’, since it relates to the 
robust normative discussion concerning the justiﬁcation of 
forgiveness”. (Zaibert,2009:367)  
Unfortunately, the enabling act that granted state “forgiveness” or amnesty to 
perpetrators of apartheid did not make remorse a condition for amnesty nor did it make 
individual victim’s forgiveness a condition for the state one. Hence we had victims 
saying we did not forgive yet the state” forgave” or gave amnesty. However, Kolnai 
would probably say that what they got was not forgiveness but other things such as 
condoning because forgiveness, in his opinion, was not possible without remorse. 
However, a closely related but distinct position was that of Derrida whom Zaibert 
(2009:367) pitched against Kolnai. According to Derrida ( 2001:32-33)  
the very concept of forgiveness, logic and common sense agree for 
once with the paradox: it is necessary … to begin from the fact that, 
yes, there is the unforgivable. Is this not, in truth, the only thing to 
forgive? The only thing that calls for forgiveness? … One cannot, or 
should not, forgive; there is only forgiveness if there is any, where 
there is the unforgivable. That is to say, that forgiveness must 
announce itself as impossibility itself. It can only be possible in doing 
the impossible. ( Derrida, 2001:32-33) 
The implication of what Derrida is saying here is that the very criteria which Kolnai 
argues authenticate forgiveness in order to be forgiveness, (remorse) is in fact that 
which renders it invalid with Derrida. Hence for forgiveness to be forgiveness, in the 
Derridean sense, the offender must still be fully culpable, and in fact, his offence must 
be so grievous that he is unforgivable or unpardonable. Hence it is forgiveness only 
when it is impossible to forgive.  
Throwing more light on this, assertion, Zaibert (2009:367) argues further argues 
extensively that ; 
The main reason why I pit Kolnai and Derrida against each other is that 
that the former is primarily interested in what is widely known as 
‘conditional forgiving’, whereas Derrida can be seen as primarily 
interested in ‘unconditional forgiveness’, and the opposition between 
these two views of forgiveness ... As we shall see, Kolnai ‘resolves’ the 
paradox of forgiveness by appealing to the idea of repentance 
( metánoia , in the preceding quotation): what renders forgiveness 
‘genuine and unobjectionable’ is that the wrongdoer has (in the 
forgiver’s eyes, at least) repented—as we shall also see, this is a rather 
inﬂuential view. In what follows, … the Kolnaian move, arguing that 
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the appeal to repentance does not help us overcome the paradoxical 
nature of forgiveness.  In contrast, by linking forgiveness to the 
unforgivable, Derrida simply refuses to ‘resolve’ the paradox of 
forgiveness; and he, rightly in my opinion, suggests that the 
phenomenon of forgiveness chieﬂy worth our attention is independent 
of whether the wrongdoer repents or apologizes. I will argue that 
forgiveness is also independent of many things with which it is usually 
considered (even by Derrida himself) to be essentially linked. 
Unfortunately, however, Derrida’s formulation of the paradox is yet 
more unhelpful than Kolnai’s, as Derrida fails to adumbrate, even in 
rough outline, what the analysis of this forgiveness-without-repentance 
which he describes could turn out to be, and thus I cannot defend his 
position on the matter. I think, however, that, if I understand him 
correctly, I will here defend the  spirit  of the Derridian position (or at 
least part of it). Going beyond Derrida, I shall present an  analysis  of 
the sort of forgiveness I think he has in mind…to forgive is to 
deliberately refuse to punish. This account sounds, perhaps, too broad, 
and while it may still sound problematically broad (Zaibert, 2009:367-
368) 
To further elucidate much more elaborately, the Derridean argument and its ambiguity, 
we shall rely on Zaibert (2009:368) who threw further light on the arguments 
extensively maintaining that;  
Derrida’s style may be unique, but in the passage quoted he commits 
a rather ordinary mistake. The error has to do with the ambiguous use 
of the term ‘unforgivable’. Although there is great obscurity as to what 
exactly this locution means, it typically seeks to suggest that some 
wrongs are of such immense gravity that they should not be forgiven. 
Nazi atrocities, say, or child molestation, are customarily held to be in 
this sense unforgivable; arguably the point being made is that these 
very serious wrongs should be punished, and should not be forgiven. 
To be sure, it is only by assuming that Derrida uses ‘unforgivable’ in 
the sense of ‘ought not to be forgiven’ (and not in the sense of ‘cannot 
(logically) be forgiven’) that his quoted views make sense. 
Forgiveness presupposes, on my interpretation of Derrida, that the act 
to be forgiven is, prima facie at least, something that we should not 
forgive. For if we ought to forgive a given act, then, and indeed 
paradoxically, this act would no longer be as interesting a case for 
being forgiven (it will often just be a case in which the alleged 
wrongdoer is excused, justiﬁed, not really a wrongdoer, etc.). What 
Derrida means by ‘there is only forgiveness … where there is the 
unforgivable’, is, then, that forgiveness can only occur as a response 
to something that should, in principle, in some sense, not be forgiven. 
(Zaibert, 2009:368) 
In putting this Derridean thesis in clearer perspective, Zaibert appeals to Collingwood 
whose argument Derrida equally at some point alluded to. This is to the effect that “to 
forgive the no longer guilty is no longer to forgive” and arguing within the same 
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geometry of analysis, Zaibert maintains that there is, a kind of analytic connection 
between punishment and forgiveness which is in the fact that it is only what is 
punishable, that is forgivable, and vice versa.  Whereas, not just wrongdoing, but 
culpable wrongdoing, has a logical precondition of both punishment and forgiveness. 
Demonstrating this relationship, he presented the argument of some scholars such as 
Hannah Arendt, who argues that, 
we ‘are unable to forgive what [we] cannot punish’. Now, this thesis 
entails neither that (1) whenever we blame someone for her 
wrongdoing, we must either punish or forgive her, for punishment and 
forgiveness are not jointly exhaustive—not only can we do other 
things too, but we can refuse to do anything at all, as we shall see in 
due course, nor that (2) if we do punish the culpable wrongdoer, then 
we cannot forgive her (or vice versa). While I will eventually suggest 
that punishment and forgiveness are mutually exclusive 
(synchronically), the analytic connection just uncovered does not by 
itself support the mutual exclusivity thesis.   My suggestion thus far is 
strictly this: (perceived) culpable wrongdoing is a necessary condition 
for the very possibility of forgiving X, just as it is for punishing X. 
Strictly speaking, then, whatever  on these grounds  cannot be forgiven 
cannot be punished either (and vice versa)—of course, something may,  
on some other grounds , be unpunishable but forgivable (and vice 
versa). But whether something should be punished or forgiven is a 
diﬀerent discussion. The paradox, again, is that sometimes an act 
which presumably ought to be punished (and which, therefore, is 
simultaneously punishable and forgivable), somehow ought to be 
forgiven as well.  The term ‘unforgivable’ is thus ambiguous: it refers 
(in its strictest sense) to the impossibility of forgiving, and also (in a 
looser but much more widespread sense) to the inappropriateness of 
forgiving.(Zaibert,2009:369-370) 
Another issue that tends to emerge in the whole set up is the confusion between 
descriptive and normative enterprise, which is why Murphy, (1988:23) argues that 
“The Question ‘What is Forgiveness?’ cannot after all be sharply distinguished from 
the question ‘How is forgiveness justiﬁed?’ … We cannot deﬁne forgiveness and then 
ask what moral reasons make it appropriate” (Murphy, 1988:23) 
For Murphy, forgiveness is not something you do unconsciously; it is what we do for 
a moral reason irrespective of whether this moral reason is good or bad. For instance, 
in SA, the call to forgive perpetrators of gross human violations is morally based, 
whether the action was good or bad to forgive such villains is a different thing entirely. 
However, the popular argument that forgiveness requires repentance is challenging to 
articulate. This is because we are not sure if it implies that it is impossible to forgive 
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an unrepentant person as Kolnai probably would argue or as a normative matter, 
forgiving the unrepentant is objectionable. Alternatively, even both depending on the 
context. Kolnai further argues that if forgiveness is granted to the unrepentant, then it 
would no longer be forgiveness but what he calls “condonation”  but then how do we 
define condonation?  
Kolnai’s central thesis is that condonation and forgiveness are 
dramatically diﬀerent, condonation is still closer to forgiveness than 
all these other related phenomena—indeed condonation is, in an 
unexplained sense, a ‘simulacrum of forgiveness’.   Yet, Kolnai and 
followers seem to forget this very point: that condonation is in fact 
rather similar to forgiveness … In Kolnai’s opinion, condonation 
diﬀers ‘sharply’ from forgiveness,  however, in that ‘it does not 
presuppose and nullify the original retributive  position’…Sadly, 
however, Kolnai says precious little as to what this retributive position 
is, or about how it is that forgiveness  alone  nulliﬁes it. Surely it is 
part of the logical structure of forgiveness that it is a response to 
(perceived)  culpable  wrongdoing—and with this Kolnai agrees, 
although he has not shown that this need be diﬀerent regarding 
condonation. In fact, Kolnai hardly discusses the reasons why the 
condoner condones. Abruptly, and somewhat gratuitously, Kolnai 
tells us that: ‘condonation is … virtually “conniving” and 
immoralistic; in its gravest forms, it is not only undigniﬁed and self-
soiling but unfair’.     Not only is this dismal opinion of condonation 
odd in light of the fact that by his very own admission, condonation is 
more like forgiveness than are the host of other related phenomena 
which he discusses, but also in light of the fact that Kolnai asserts that:  
to condemn all condonation might, however, amount to over-severity; 
for it seems plausible that without condoning some faults we could 
not possibly live together, nor, for that matter, with our self.” 
Kolnai(1973:96-98)  ; Zaibert (2009:376) 
There is an exciting alignment here with what happened in Apartheid South Africa. 
Even though Kolnai sees condonation as second best and imperfect, he gave a window 
of when it becomes necessary to go with that imperfection. He boldly declared that “it 
seems plausible that without condoning some faults we could not possibly live together” 
which seem to be the underlying philosophy of the TRC. Perfection was deconstructed. 
Absoluteness was discarded for relativistic ideas. Nation building, societal unification 
and stability of South Africa was the overarching agenda that was paramount, and to 
that extent, condonation became imperative. This argument was succinctly and 
explicitly discussed extensively by Zaibert (2009:376) where he maintained that it is 
true that we cannot possibly live together or even in peace with our very selves if we 
did not do some undigniﬁed, self-soiling, or unfair things. Hence,  he maintains that if 
condonation in some cases allows us to live with others and with ourselves, then, of 
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course, we should be careful before we ﬂatly condemn condonation. Whereas,  
condemning condonation ﬂatly is precisely what Kolnai does. 
Nonetheless, he distinguishes condonation from forgiveness in that the latter is 
‘supposed to contribute to the eradication of wrongdoing’ while the former in a way 
contribute ‘to the fostering of it’.  However, the justiﬁcation and the deﬁnition of 
forgiveness (and of condonation) is problematic. Although, it is not clear that 
forgiveness is capable of contributing to the eradication of wrongdoing, or that 
condonation does not. (Zaibert,2009:376-377) Zaibert, therefore, argues that 
The standard opinion is that punishment (and not the refusal to 
punish— of which both forgiveness and condonation are instances) 
contributes to the eradication of wrongdoing. Whether or not 
punishment indeed contributes to the eradication of wrongdoing, 
however, says little about the logical structure of the phenomenon of 
punishment itself; similarly, whether or not condonation and 
forgiveness would diﬀer as to their eﬀects vis-à-vis the eradication 
of wrongdoing is not to pick out a diﬀerence in the structure of the 
two phenomena. Kolnai, however, summarily and facilely decrees 
that condonation and forgiveness are ‘sharply’ diﬀerent, and he 
conﬁdently moves along, focusing on the ‘unobjectionable and 
genuine’ forgiveness which occurs only when we forgive the 
sincerely repentant. (Zaibert,2009:376-377) 
We did mention earlier that pure forgiveness that is unconditional is ousted by the fact 
that it makes it pure and to that extent does not exist concretely in the Derridean sense. 
Again the principle of deconstruction of absoluteness does not allow SA to pursue the 
absolute idea of forgiveness, even though it borrowed significantly from it, the 
principle of unrepentant forgiveness which Kolnai calls condonation. For him, 
forgiveness is better because it requires repentance. However, the bottom line is that 
the phenomenon of forgiveness is complex with diverse interpretations and forms. This 
complexity makes it difficult for the South African TRC to adopt a straight-jacketed 
conception of forgiveness as each has its positive and negative sides especially as it 
complements or at variance with the overall agenda of the TRC. The safest thing was 
an eclectic adoption, based on the principle of relativism, deconstruction of 
absoluteness and to that extent, where there is a conflict of interest, the rebellious 
phenomenon following the Agamben’s philosophy is deconstructed and pushed 
outside the realm of zoe. Hence it is depoliticised and stripped of dissenting elements 
that are capable of derailing the peace process. In South Africa, Ubuntu was brought 
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in to complement the Christian doctrine of forgiveness in order to obliterate the 
weakness of the Christian doctrine that requires repentance. 
However, operating within the paradox that facilitated the resolution of the South 
African conflict, forgiveness is the dependent variable that needed to be deconstructed 
if it is going to be a threat to “amnesty”, and the enabling act did this very well by 
ensuring that state pardon was not dependent on the individual pardon. The 
unquestionable power of the sovereign over the individual subjects in both the 
Hobbesian and Roussean social contract was carefully brought to the fore. However, 
what does this concept essentially entail, and what kind of narrative did it fulfil within 
the rhetoric of the TRC of SA? Hughes (2016) in The online Stanford Encyclopaedia 
of Philosophy argues that. 
Forgiveness has over the past forty or so years engendered the interest 
of scholars and practitioners in such disparate fields as psychology, 
law, politics, international affairs, sociology, and 
philosophy…Generally regarded as a positive response to human 
wrongdoing, forgiveness is a conceptually, psychologically, and 
morally complex phenomenon. There is disagreement over the 
meaning of forgiveness, its relation to apparent cognates, the 
psychological, behavioral, conceptual, and normative dimensions of 
forgiveness, and when and under what conditions forgiveness is 
morally permissible, required, or wrong. Moreover, the many legal 
and political analogues to forgiveness raise questions about what 
human behaviors may be properly described as forgiveness. (Hughes, 
2016:1)  
That is not all; these scholars further argued extensively and more elaborately that, 
from time immemorial, ‘forgiveness has typically been regarded as a personal response 
to having been injured or wronged. On the other hand, it is a condition one seeks or 
hopes is bestowed upon one for having wronged someone else. While citing The 
Oxford English Dictionary which defines ‘forgivable, or more precisely ‘forgives,’ as 
that which “may be forgiven, pardonable, excusable,” and by which he is referring to 
the quality of deserving to be forgiven’.  
This scholarly discussion about forgiveness is extensive. It all began with Jesus' appeal 
to God to forgive on account of ignorance.  (Luke 23:34) This seems to suggest that 
ignorance is sometimes a condition that negates or tempers culpability, rendering 
wrongdoers forgivable. Nevertheless,  the association with excusing conditions, 
forgiving is not, strictly speaking, the same thing as excusing. The reason is that 
whenever any wrongdoing is excused entirely, then there is nothing left to forgive 
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since wrongs that are completely excused are no longer blameworthy or culpable. 
Although excuses that mitigate, instead of negating, culpability, may serve as a 
rationale for forgiveness, even though they are not the same as forgiveness. 
Nonetheless, the application of the concept of forgiveness to non-moral behaviour, 
even though, forgiveness is not always or necessarily a moral term.  
Furthermore,  ‘the term ‘forgive’ is said to have been derived from the word, ‘give’ or 
to ‘grant’, which means ‘to give up,’ or ‘cease to harbour wrath or resentment,.’ Again, 
while ‘forgive’ refers to the act of giving up a feeling of resentment, or a claim to 
requital or compensation. Moreover, the term ‘forgiveness’ is further associated with 
the action of forgiving or pardoning of a fault. It also includes the remission of a debt, 
or some forms of responses to injury, obligation or wrongdoing. Hence, the term, 
forgiveness is considered a dyadic phenomenon involving a wronged person, and a 
wrongdoer. What defines the relationship is the fact of acknowledging in order to move 
past such transgressions. Though the relationship is dyadic, it transcends individuals 
interaction and includes those of groups,  Hughes (2016) 
From this extensive exposition, it is ostensibly clear that there is a fusion of meaning 
between amnesty and forgiveness. It also entails “official pardon”, but that has not 
obliterated their fundamental dichotomy. However, to understand the difference 
between amnesty and forgiveness, we may need to unpack the concept of pardon much 
more since it appears to be the link in both cases. While amnesty is synonymous with 
state or official pardon, forgiveness is synonymous with a personal, unofficial 
individual pardon. Hence both are still pardons. 
In his analysis, Hughes (2016) argues more elaborately quoting reliable authorities to 
support his assertion, maintains that; ‘ In the United States, for example, the President 
has the power to grant pardons for federal offences, and state governors may pardon 
crimes against the state.’ Such actions are what is called amnesty. Nonetheless, reasons 
for exercising the power of pardon often resemble those given for forgiving 
wrongdoers, just as when Ford, a former US President pardoned Richard Nixon in 
1974 on the account that there is need to move the country beyond an ugly criminal 
transgression that is disruptive. One fundamental difference between pardon and 
forgiving is that third-parties necessarily exercise pardon while victims of wrong 
exercises forgiveness. Nevertheless, standard philosophical views contend that there 
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are good reasons for thinking that, with one important exception, third-party 
forgiveness is impossible, since forgiveness is the prerogative or right of the victim of 
wrong’. This point is crucial, in the sense that, in the case of SA, the state certainly 
may grant amnesty as the third party but incapable of granting forgiveness on behalf 
of the victims and their families. The implication is that the state may grant official 
pardon to perpetrators whose victims refused to grant forgiveness because they felt 
that it was not deserved (Bingham, 2009).  
Nevertheless, judging from other perspectives, forgiveness is also an offer, especially 
where reconciliation between a victim and an offender is attempted. (Tombs, 2006)  
However, the primary sense of forgiveness does not seem to involve the notion of an 
offer at all, let alone an that which must be accepted by the offender. This is in order 
to facilitate forgiveness and accomplish at least some of its ends, such as to discharging 
one's duty, in order to forgive others as God commanded or to move beyond a 
potentially paralysing negative emotion. Hence, legal or political pardons by their very 
nature reduce or even eliminate punishment, whereas forgiveness need not affect 
punishment in any way. Hence, forgiveness also admits of an entirely self-referential 
variety (i.e. self-forgiveness). Nevertheless, official acts of self-pardoning are, in a 
way, controversial, and possibly without legal or political justification. These 
considerations are suggestive of the fact that despite some similarities, pardon and 
forgiveness are significantly different notions. (Hughes, 2016) 
Furthermore, scholars have argued that there is no consensus over this component of 
forgiveness, which is why some scholars often disagree. Butler's opinion was that 
forgiveness involves overcoming vengeful anger or resentment (of some sort) that are 
directed at a wrongdoer. Although, that does not include revising one's critical 
judgments of such wrongdoers. Other writers argue that forgiveness requires a 
complete overcoming of negative judgments and emotions that are aimed at a 
wrongdoer. Others scholars claim that retaining negative moral judgments and feelings 
about a wrongdoer is compatible with forgiveness. Hence, retaining such convictions 
but in a manner that does not constitute “holding it against” the offender, is enough for 
forgiveness, or if forgiving or punishing a wrongdoer are compatible actions, 
especially if punishing a wrongdoer is a way of holding the wrong against him, and 
many more are contentious among scholars. (Radzik, 2008; Zaibert,2009A.; Hughes, 
2016) 
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There is a fascinating dimension here in the expression “Whether retaining such 
convictions but in a way that does not constitute “holding it against” the wrongdoer 
is enough for forgiveness” Hughes, 2016:9) is synonymous with the Agamben’s 
exclusive inclusion that forms the bedrock of our theoretical framework. Which is like 
excluding forgetting but in a manner that it is only its active elements that could work 
against healing, that are excluded while retaining its passive elements that could be 
channelled towards the objective of healing. The same geometry of analysis applies to 
the couplet on Amnesty and forgiveness. 
However, while this is persuasive when considering SA victim’s forgiveness viz a viz 
state amnesty, other conflicting arguments are worth considering. It is argued that, that 
there can be no third-party forgiveness. That is understood to mean that one person 
cannot forgive a wrongdoer for an offence committed against another individual. This 
impossibility seems to stem from the personal nature of the reactive attitudes, such as 
resentment, often engendered by being wronged. It is only the direct victims of wrong 
can overcome such emotions. Hence, it is only the victims can forgive. Others may 
forgive a wrongdoer for an offence that also victimises them. An example is that of 
parents of a murdered child. They may rightly forgive the wrongdoer, as victims 
themselves not as representatives of the primary victim because they have no authority 
or moral standing to do so. Put differently; forgiveness is the victim's prerogative’ 
(Govier and Verwoerd, 2002 Swinburne, 1989;). Although, it does not mean that third-
parties cannot convey messages of forgiveness on behalf of someone offended, but 
that will be acting in the role of a messenger of forgiveness, not in the role of a forgiver 
per se”. (Hughes, 2016) 
To this extent, amnesty without recourse to the victim for forgiveness seem untenable 
that third-party intrusion that does not have the same effect as those of the victims. 
This had variously contended. The argument below seems to justify amnesty that does 
not recourse to individual’s forgiveness for expedient reasons. 
Despite the widespread assumption that only the primary victim of 
wrong has the standing or authority to forgive wrongdoers, a number 
of philosophers have challenged it. Murphy (2009) acknowledges his 
departure from this assumption, and Pettigrove, in his “The Standing 
to Forgive” (2009), argues that four common arguments that purport 
to show that only the immediate or direct victim of harm has the 
standing to forgive are unpersuasive, and that second or even third 
parties, who are not properly regarded as “victims” of the wrong, can 
nevertheless forgive a wrongdoer. And Radzik (2010) claims that the 
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idea that only the immediate victim of wrongdoing can forgive is false, 
since it is a commonplace that people who are neither direct nor 
indirect victims of a wrong may nevertheless experience moral anger 
over a wrong (e.g. an injustice) done to others. Forgiveness in such 
cases may be part of an effort to repair a relationship between a 
wrongdoer and those non-victims whose relations to the wrongdoer 
have been compromised by the wrong that was done. (Hughes, 
2016:10) 
However, while a third party here play this role, it may be contributory to the general 
societal peace and stability, but it does not in precise terms have the same effect as the 
interpersonal forgiveness exercised by victims or secondary co-victims. Some of the 
distinct difference between a state pardon for instance and forgiveness, some have 
argued is to hold one excused from an offence, Unlike the granting of a pardon, which 
may be merely allowing the offender to go unpunished. Hence, the act of forgiveness 
involves refusing to blame. To make it explicit, what these scholars seem to be saying 
is that. “amnesty” is a discharge while forgiveness is an acquittal. However, the 
complexity in these phenomena is not in doubt, and the arguments can go on 
indefinitely. For instance, there are arguments in Jewish tradition that advocates for 
compensation for victims but also, the aggressor must be remorseful, and when this 
happens, the onus is on the victim to forgive which is where justice fuses with mercy.  
The concept of forgiveness and not retaliation underlies the TRC. What is forgiveness, 
and what will be the justification for forgiveness? The entire theory of the TRC rest 
largely on this principle of forgiveness. Forgiveness so far seems to be affirming guilt, 
yet removing the guilt in order to set free to go.  That is is simply allowing to go scot-
free and not making one pay for a wrong done, while amnesty which is the same as 
state pardon, is not concerned with affirming guilt but merely allowing to go scot free. 
What are the criteria for a perpetrator to get forgiveness either from the victims or the 
state?  
Desmond Tutu indicated above that to qualify for the state pardon known as amnesty; 
three criteria must be fulfilled namely. These are that the act took place between 
March 1960 and May 1994; and that it was associated with a political objective, 
and that the applicant was considered by the committee to have fully divulged 
all relevant truths on the violation” The core requirement here is “truth-telling”. 
That again creates some problems. Is the concept of forgiveness superimposed 
on the TRC, or is there any logical relationship between truth-telling and 
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forgiveness? Scholars have been unable to establish this relationship 
conclusively, and that explains why they have argued that merely telling the truth 
without remorse does not command forgiveness. Unfortunately, these are not 
part of the requirement for amnesty. Even if a victim chooses not to forgive a 
perpetrator after reeling out the whole truth about his atrocities, he could still 
walk away with freedom in the name of truth-telling. No doubt hearing the truth 
could have some therapeutic effects on the mind of a victim, but it does not 
automatically guarantee forgiveness which would come only when a victim is 
satisfied that the offender has sufficiently and commensurately suffered for the 
wrong done. Although, this would then be punitive, which is outside the 
objective of the TRC. However, it appears that it is only within the Christian 
faith that the concept of forgiveness can be understood just from mere truth-
telling though not without its limitations. 
Archbishop Tutu had always insisted as if it is automatic that ‘forgiveness will follow 
confession, while healing will follow and that would lead  to national unity and 
reconciliation’ and  further argues that the amnesty arrangement was a positive process 
towards what he called ‘restorative justice’ as against ‘retributive justice’  which 
epitomizes  the African virtue of  Ubuntu. Tutu enthusiastically and overzealously 
claims that  “ most amnesty applicants have expressed remorse and asked for 
forgiveness from their victims”, and that most victims are often moved to respond to 
the apology by forgiving the culprit, but critiques have argued that this picture painted 
by Tutu is more of his desires than what obtained at the trials. David (2008) argues 
that ‘most perpetrators who went to the Amnesty Committee did not make apologise 
or express contrition. He further maintained that only a few victims or their families 
expressed a willingness to forgive; many firmly said that they refused to forgive, and 
why they would not forgive’ rather Tutu’s ideas were overwhelmingly beclouded by 
the Christian doctrine of forgiveness even though it does not translate logically nor 
does it apply in the case of the TRC. Arguing further, according to Tutu, “God wants 
to show that there is life after conflict and repression – that because of forgiveness, 
there is a future.”  This is why critiques argue that ‘If one supports the TRC’s pursuit 
of both Truth and Reconciliation but is neither Christian nor religious, it is difficult to 
identify with Tutu’s approach; it is hard not to feel that he restricted himself to a narrow 
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view of what reconciliation was, and of what the TRC was supposed to achieve. (Philip, 
2008) 
Furthermore, Wilson (2000) observed that forgiveness was not an external artificial 
pronouncement that could be superimposed to fulfil all righteousness as Desmond 
Tutu was seen doing in the early days of the TRC hearings when he practically induces 
victims of gross violations to do even when there is no sufficient reason to forgive. He 
argues that ‘ in the first six months of HRV hearings, the Commissioners specifically 
pressed those testifying to say whether or not they forgave the offender, and praised 
those who indicated that they harboured no feelings of revenge against the perpetrator’.  
However, forgiveness is like the pivot on which the wheel of the entire TRC 
rotates. This is why Philip (2008) maintains that despite the laudable objective of 
the TRC, it could not achieve both reconciliation and justice particularly because the 
prerequisite of genuine peace and reconciliation was erroneously thought to be 
superimposed artificial lip service forgiveness that is devoid of remorse, reparation 
and prosecution.  Rather, it was hinged on truth-telling, which is just its first step. 
(Philip, 2008) 
Furthermore, Desmond Tutu was reported to have cited two cases. These were cases 
where victims were willing to let go past injustices they have suffered. It was as if it 
was the trend in most cases, whereas the issue of forgiveness was more controversial. 
According to Philip (2008), who was critical of Tutu, argues that Tutu’s suggestion in 
these cases were common – but in fact, they were far from it.  Many victims felt 
pressured by the TRC to forgive their perpetrators but felt no necessary inclination to 
do so. For example, there was Mrs Charity Kondile,  the mother of Sizwe Kondile who 
was murdered and his body burned by Dirk Coetzee.  Coetzee publicly asked her 
forgiveness.  Her lawyer replied on her behalf,  “You said that you would like to meet 
Mrs Kondile and look her in the eye.  She asked me to tell you that she feels it is an 
honour … you do not deserve.  If you are really sorry, you would stand trial for the 
deeds you did.”  Mrs Kondile added to this:  “It is easy for Mandela and Tutu to 
forgive  …  they live vindicated lives.  In my life nothing, not a single thing has 
changed since my son was burnt by barbarians … nothing.  Therefore I cannot forgive.” 
(TRCR,1998) 
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The complexity of the idea of forgiveness is thus here revealed. There is no necessary 
connection between truth-telling and forgiveness. Besides the current state of the 
victim after surviving the atrocities perpetrated against them, also determines the 
ability to forgive. For instance, Mandela came out of jail alive and then became the 
president of democratic South Africa. Unfortunately, not everyone’s sad story had 
such a happy conclusion. That in itself is a problem for forgiveness. Of course, there 
is a fallacy committed by the victim who tries to equate remorse with the trial. No, 
being sorry does not mean willingness to be prosecuted. One could be genuinely sorry 
and still wish to escape punishment.  
Again, the idea of forgiveness was seen rather as inconsistent with the outplay at the 
amnesty trials. Instead, it was seen as a Christian theological imposition that made no 
sense outside Christianity. It explains why Philips (2008) citing one critic, Richard 
Wilson, (2000) who called the TRC’s “religious-redemptive narrative” he further 
maintained that ‘amnesty is presented as a positive good of Christian forgiveness, and 
the wish to prosecute perpetrators through the criminal justice system is portrayed as 
a nasty wish for vengeance.  Of course, Tutu was an Anglican Archbishop, and it was 
his job to urge Christian forgiveness on people.  But not everyone involved with the 
TRC was either Christian or religious, and there was no reason why everyone else 
should have to share Tutu’s view of reconciliation and forgiveness; the TRC Act talks 
about reconciliation, but says nothing about any requirement of forgiveness.’  
Some scholars have similarly argued that natural justice requires that victims and their 
families had a right to expect both prosecution and reparation.  International Human 
Rights Law equally expects that, as the case was with Pinochet in Chile, in a similar 
fashion, the leaders of the apartheid regime such as P.W. Botha and De Clark should 
be prosecuted, to deter others from future abuses; unfortunately, they escaped while 
others under them were brought to book. This goes to show that no matter the good 
intention of the TRC, it just could not deliver justice in any shape or form as may have 
been desired. Although Philip (2008) tries to justify this by arguing that ‘political 
prudence suggested that all the different groups in South Africa should try to live 
together in the future, through national reconciliation. This was why he argues further 
that, perhaps it was the most sensible course to take – to trade amnesty for perpetrators 
in return for their putting their misdeeds on the public record.  This could be 
rationalised as an essential reconciliation to which was added a gloss of religion and 
 
 
180 
 
morality, by invoking the virtues of Christian forgiveness and indigenous Ubuntu.  He 
remarked that a good number of South Africans are not pleased with the thought that 
many of the guilty perpetrators who were whites have escaped prosecution. Although, 
in its favour,  the TRC has also left a permanent historical record of detailed 
disclosures by some of the perpetrators of atrocities which the apartheid forces of ‘law 
and order’ committed while defending apartheid South Africa, and by so doing 
confirming what many people claimed in the face of repeated official denials during 
the apartheid years’. Philip (2008) 
 Furthermore, Wilson (2000) observed that forgiveness was not an external artificial 
pronouncement that could be superimposed. Hence, he argues that a set of people who 
worked for a victim support group, known as Khulumani which literarily means “speak 
out” in Zulu language affirmed this view when one of them Tlhoki Mofokeng argue 
that Tutu’s Christian approach is a “problem”, which led to pressure being put on 
victims to forgive. In his criticism, he maintained that Tutu presses for “reconciliation 
at all cost”, he said, “I think Tutu could have used much more done, less hug and kiss.” 
Whereas his counterpart, Thandi Shezi, who was less critical, maintains that Tutu 
could be excused because forgiveness was part of the Christian faith that the 
Archbishop represents even if it does not make sense. One can understand that religion 
is largely based on dogmatic faith and not on logical or rational thinking. Wilson 
(2000 ) 
Others have made the unequivocal condemnation of the TRC’s fantasy that 
forgiveness was a mechanical thing that happens just by proclamation. One of such is, 
Marius Schoon whose wife and six-year-old daughter were both killed by a parcel 
bomb delivered to them by the team of security policeman Craig Williamson, who was 
subsequently granted amnesty, In clear terms, Marius Schoon proclaims that  “There 
can be no indemnity, no forgiveness, without remorse.  ‘We see no signs of Craig being 
sorry.  I mean, are we going to have a situation where people can qualify for indemnity 
just by saying as if they were reeling off a grocery list, ‘I killed this one and poisoned 
that one and beat the shit out of the third one’.  It seems untenable to me, morally and 
philosophically.’ It is apparent here that merely telling the truth does not elicit 
forgiveness rather entrenches bitterness and confirms that beyond truth exists another 
criterion that is a catalyst to forgiveness which is the “manner in which the truth is 
being said. but this was not one of the criteria for granting forgiveness or amnesty. 
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Besides, the dissatisfaction and un-forgiveness of a victim do not preclude a 
perpetrator from receiving amnesty. Similarly, Gillian Slovo, the daughter of Ruth 
First who was also killed through one of Craig William’s letter bomb described how 
disgusting she was hearing how Williamson freely narrates how he unrepentantly send 
out letter bombs, and how much she disgusts him and reluctant to ever forgive him or 
even shake his hand. (TRCR;1998) 
6.3.1 Christian Forgiveness 
The Christian value of forgiveness also features in several other kinds of literature, 
such as Hope (1987) and Hay (1999). However, the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation was at its inception, criticised for being too Christian in outlook. 
Nonetheless, Desmond Tutu associated the Christian basis of reconciliation with the 
African value of “Ubuntu”. Similarly, scholars have argued that it is unacceptable for 
perpetrators of heinous crimes to comes before the victims with insensitivity and 
recklessness in reeling out dozens of atrocities and killings, as if they were reeling out 
a shopping list, without the slightest show of regret and remorse. It is pathetic mainly 
when this is done to meet the criteria for amnesty, not minding the fact that it has left 
indelible scars on the minds and hearts of people. Some of such people have been 
incapacitated permanently. 
This leads to the question of whether forgiveness can exist on its own for its own sake 
and not fall within the economics of trade. Alternatively, should forgiveness 
necessarily be dependent on some other set of values, which qualifies one for it? If that 
were so,  would it be sufficiently potent within the context of TRC? Perhaps we can 
carefully examine the Christian concept of forgiveness to see how it fits into the 
scheme of the TRC.  
Forgiveness within the Christian faith is a derivative of two forms of sins. The first 
type is the one against God, namely, the original sin, which we may call the “fixed 
sin”. On the other hand, is the day to day sin which we may call the “recurrent sin”. 
The Christian faith believes that by the very nature of being human and being a 
descendant of Adam who committed the original sin of falling in the garden of Eden, 
all men have sinned for inheriting the original sin for which he needs forgiveness. 
(Romans 3:23)  The book of Romans, chapter 3 verse 3 seem to affirm this by saying 
that “For all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God” But again that falls into 
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the circular concept of offence and payment. To be free from this sin, Jesus Christ 
came to die. As the bible says in (Romans 6:23) “For the wages of sin is death, but 
the free gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord” So Jesus got the death 
penalty as payment for the sin of man. This death on the cross of Calvary is linked to 
salvation in that he paid the ultimate price, on behalf of all humankind who have sinned 
for the singular fact that their ancestor, Adam sinned. To be covered by this sacrifice, 
there must be an alignment of some sort to Christ, which will be to accept Jesus Christ 
as “lord and personal saviour”. (Acts 10:43 ) “To him, all the prophets bear witness 
that everyone who believes in him receives forgiveness of sins through his name.” , 
(John 3:16) “For God so loved the world, that he gave his only Son, that whoever 
believes in him should not perish but have eternal life”.  
The recurrent sin is not the inherited one, but that which the individual humans commit 
as vulnerable mortals. (Ecclesiastes 7:20) “Surely there is not a righteous man on earth 
who does good and never sins” To get forgiveness for this second category of sin also 
requires some sort of give and take. It requires first confessing which is synonymous 
with truth-telling in TRCs and asking for forgiveness in the name of Jesus who 
similarly paid for the original sin, which is like the Amnesty in TRC.( 1 John 1:9 )says 
“If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to forgive us our sins and to cleanse us 
from all unrighteousness”.  This explains why Catholicism engages in the ritual of 
“confession” to the Rev. Fr. who as God’s representative among mortals confirms that 
you have been forgiven whereas other protestant denominations merely remove the 
priest from the chain and expect the confession to be done in the individual’s private 
prayer sessions. 1 John 1:9-10  says “If we confess our sins, he is faithful and just to 
forgive us our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness. If we say we have not 
sinned, we make him a liar, and his word is not in us”. Proverbs 28:13 says “Whoever 
conceals his transgressions will not prosper, but he who confesses and forsakes them 
will obtain mercy”.  This seems to be the underlying criterion for truth-telling for 
amnesty. However, reading between the lines here shows that even within Christianity, 
mere confession alone was not sufficient to achieve forgiveness and so it added “and 
forsake them” This carries the notion of repentance, of remorse and of deep sorry and 
regrets without which the criteria for forgiveness would not have been met. 
Unfortunately, this bit was left out of the TRC’s requirement for amnesty and equally 
overlooked and downplayed by Desmond Tutu. Hence, undermining genuine 
 
 
183 
 
forgiveness and reconciliation. However, it must also be mentioned here that this may 
not have been an oversight on the part of Tutu. Instead, it is part of the original game 
plan that any narrative that will be inimical towards the attainment of the primary 
objective of societal peace and unification must be pushed to the realm of silence and 
irrelevance.  
 Apart from these two categories of sins against God directly, there are also the sins 
committed against fellow human beings for which forgiveness is required from those 
individuals that have been wronged. Just as the atrocities of apartheid. Moreover, the 
victims are duty bound to forgive those who ask for forgiveness for two reasons, one 
in emulation of how Christ has forgiven them, Ephesians 4:32 “Be kind to one another, 
tenderhearted, forgiving one another, as God in Christ forgave you.  Colossians 3:13 
“Bearing with one another and, if one has a complaint against another, forgiving each 
other; as the Lord has forgiven you, so you also must forgive”. Hence, the second 
reason to forgive is the anticipation of forgiveness from God. Mark 11:25 “And 
whenever you stand praying, forgive, if you have anything against anyone, so that your 
Father also who is in heaven may forgive you your trespasses.”  Matthew 6:15 says 
“But if you do not forgive others their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your 
trespasses”.  
Again forgiveness in Christian don is inelastic and does not depend on gravity. 
Matthew 18:21-22 “Then Peter came up and said to him, “Lord, how often will my 
brother sin against me, and I forgive him? As many as seven times?” Jesus said to him, 
“I do not say to you seven times, but seventy times seven” which is 490 a day. The 
Christian principle of forgiveness abhors retaliation; Luke 6:27 “But I say to you who 
hear, Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you. Romans 12:18-19 If 
possible, so far as it depends on you, be at peace with all men. Never take your own 
revenge, beloved, but leave room for the wrath of God, for it is written, "Vengeance is 
mine, I will repay," says the Lord. The Christian doctrine recognises that offence and 
crimes must necessarily attract punishment which again brings us to the unfortunate 
give and take or double-edged economics of trade in moral issues, which is the same 
problem with the traditional concept of justice. Unfortunately, the difference here is 
that the individual victim is not allowed to administer it. Just as the state equally 
administers the punishment meted out by the court on behalf of victims rather than 
allowing the individual to put laws into their hand by embarking on self-retaliation. 
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Within Christianity, it does appear that vengeance is somehow allowed but an 
exclusive reserve of God. It is for God to take vengeance on behalf of the victims. 
Proverbs 20:22 Do not say, "I'll pay you back for this wrong!" Wait for the LORD, 
and he will avenge you. Proverbs 24:29 Do not say, "I'll do to them as they have done 
to me; I'll pay them back for what they did. "Jeremiah 51:36 Therefore this is what 
the LORD says: "See, I will defend your cause and avenge you; I will dry up her sea 
and make her springs dry. Romans 12:17 Do not repay anyone evil for evil. Be careful 
to do what is right in the eyes of everyone. In law, ignorance is not excusable but 
within the Christian faith, it is permissible. Jesus himself confirmed this while on the 
cross, when he like Socrates,  proclaimed that the perpetrators of evil against him 
should be forgiven because they “know not what they are doing” (Luke 23:34). Truly 
some of the Apartheid security forces believed erroneously that they were fighting a 
just war which is directed at Communist subversion and under such emergency 
conditions, extraordinary high handed measures to protect national security are 
required. This seems to justify the Socratic notion that no one does evil deliberately, 
and that when they do, they must have erroneously believed that what they were doing 
have some benefits of some sort. However, then this principle of avoidance of double 
negation no doubt introduces order and avoids chaotic situations similar to those of the 
Hobbesian state of nature where it involves a war of all against all. 
From the analysis above, it seems evident that the TRC of South Africa borrowed 
significantly from this Christian doctrine of forgiveness, vengeance and truth-telling 
but falls short of forgiving for its self. It is still operating within the economy of trading 
fundamental human virtues of forgiveness for something and to that extent, incapable 
of guaranteeing a genuine reconciliation. It only makes sense to Christians or religious 
people 
6.4 Amnesty without Forgiveness  
Amnesty and forgiveness are technically synonyms but operating at different levels. 
For Agamben, amnesty would be said to be operating at the level of bios while 
forgiveness at the level of zoe. In other words, amnesty is at the collective state or 
societal level, while forgiveness is at the individual level. Expectedly, the crime for 
which pardon is being sought was committed against the individual and not the state 
directly. To that extent, a state pardon should invariably flow from the individual 
pardon. Hence, if a perpetrator is unable to secure the forgiveness of his victim directly, 
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such violator expectedly should not get state pardon, which is amnesty. However, if 
this is subjected to the individual will, it may derail the broader objective of peace and 
societal unification, which is why it had to be excluded, just as Agamben would push 
any contending element into the realm of irrelevance or bare-life, so that it will not 
disturb the primary objective as in the situation of the Homo Sacer. Hence, amnesty 
with forgiveness had to be stripped of its bios, and we are left with amnesty without 
forgiveness.  
The enabling act of the TRC requires “The full disclosure of truth and an 
understanding of why violations took place to encourage forgiveness”. (TRCR,1998: 
435) Unfortunately, the attitude of the perpetrators who in the first place were 
practically coerced into appearing before the commission was to fulfil all 
righteousness, that is a formality, knowing that sufficient immunity and insulation has 
been built into the constitution, the door to impunity was wide open. Such arrogance 
and lack of regret could hardly elicit forgiveness. Reeling out the truth or half-truth as 
the case may be, ensured amnesty but without forgiveness which in a way provided 
immediate societal unification but founded on a time bomb for a future explosion. 
These narratives were documented in the work of the commission, and some have 
come out boldly despite efforts, on the contrary, to declare that they did not forgive. 
Moreover, this earned the commission, much criticism which Desmond Tutu tried hard 
to explain when he argues that amnesty is not designed for excellent people and so the 
outcry may not be necessary. According to him, it seems as though we have suddenly,  
forgotten the raison d’être for amnesty. Amnesty is not meant for nice 
people. It is intended for perpetrators. There are strict criteria to be met 
and we believe that the Committee has used those criteria to determine 
whether or not amnesty should be granted. Amnesty is a heavy price to 
pay. It is, however, the price the negotiators believed our country would 
have to pay to avoid an “alternative too ghastly to contemplate”. Sadly, 
in almost all cases, there was an outcry only when the victim was white 
and the perpetrator black. I wonder whether people have considered 
how the Trust Feed Farm community must have felt when Brian 
Mitchell got amnesty since it was his misinterpreted orders that led to 
the death of eleven persons in that community?  As a matter of fact, the 
Amnesty Committee has granted only about 150 amnesties out of 7 000 
applications, with a further 2 000 still to be dealt with. This can hardly 
be described as an avalanche of reckless decisions”.(TRCR, 1998: 
vol.1: 12)  
From the above, it is clear that granting of amnesty is technically recognised here as a 
painful exchange for truth and democracy because in a way it excludes justice at least 
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in the retributive sense. Furthermore, the narrative in support of amnesty without 
forgiveness was strongly reinforced here, when it argues that, “amnesty as an official 
act of pardon can all too easily be misinterpreted as ignoring responsibility and 
accountability. As such, amnesty can be seen to be encouraging a culture of impunity. 
Some victims felt that amnesty results in insufficient social repudiation and that, by 
refusing to punish those responsibly and allowing perpetrators to walk free, it 
constitutes a failure to respect their suffering”. (TRCR,1998:118)  This is why they 
cannot forgive, yet in the overall interest of national unity and nation building, the 
phenomenon of forgiveness must be deconstructed to justify amnesty even if it had to 
be without forgiveness.  
 It is interesting to note that granting of amnesty was an incentive provided by those 
who negotiated the transition to ensure that it was safely delivered without violence. 
But in doing so, it was not dependent on whether the victims actually forgave or not, 
because to do that would emasculate amnesty, and subsequently derail the whole 
process of a smooth transition. This is what Agamben’s theory would not allow 
happening. Agamben would, as it pushed the contending phenomenon into the realm 
of bare life or impotence. However, as part of the safety guide, to cushion the effect of 
the pain of taking away the right of prosecuting a confessing “murderer” compensation 
for losses were built into the system although not at the same level of importance. For 
instance, while the commission could outrightly grant amnesty, it could not do so with 
compensation, it is allowed to make recommendations to the government for execution. 
Hence, in the South African context, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, made 
provision for the granting of reparation as an essential element, to counterbalance 
amnesty. Since the granting of amnesty denies victims the right to institute civil claims 
against perpetrators. The government should thus accept responsibility for reparation. 
(TRCR, 1998:170) 
Just as we have always advocated that CDA help us to identify some concepts that 
underlie the success of the South African mediation process. Moreover, in the course 
of our analysis, it is  observed that the concepts fused themselves together in couplets 
of seven paradoxes, the basis on which the peace process was based. Interestingly, the 
paradoxes first emerged as those of compliments and after that transformed into those 
of opposites before it was capable of diffusing the Apartheid conflict in South Africa. 
In the case of the couplet under review; Amnesty and Forgiveness, It will be seen from 
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the wishful thinking of Desmond Tutu as quoted below that the original intention of 
the founding fathers of the TRC was to deliver Amnesty on an understanding of 
forgiveness. It was to grant people amnesty that is willfully given, not imposed, based 
on genuine repentance and forgiveness, especially from victims. Unfortunately, this 
remained wishful thinking because it would not happen and because forgiveness could 
not happen, then amnesty would have been out of reach which is why it had to be 
deconstructed to Amnesty despite un-forgiveness which must necessarily be imposed 
in the interest of the overall objective that must not capitulate. Such original desire 
justifies the complementary narrative of “amnesty with forgiveness” before the 
deconstruction was evident in Tutu’s exposition below; when he said,  
if the key concepts of confession, forgiveness and reconciliation are 
central to the message of this report, it would be wonderful if one day 
some representative of the British/English community said to the 
Afrikaners, “We wronged you grievously. Forgive us.” And it would 
be wonderful too if someone representing the Afrikaner community 
responded, “Yes, we forgive you - if you will perhaps let us just tell 
our story, the story of our forebears and the pain that has sat for so 
long in the pit of our stomachs unacknowledged by you.” As we have 
discovered, the telling has been an important part of the process of 
healing. (TRCR. 1998: vol1: 16)  
From the above excerpt, we can see the wishful thinking in the expressions of Tutu. .It 
was the desire for a smooth, perfect transition where amnesty if it were still necessary, 
would have been with forgiveness, but the reality on the ground did not produce such 
narrative which is why what was produced was that which favours “amnesty without 
forgiveness”. 
Such action of delivering amnesty without forgiveness did not pass unnoticed. There 
were wide  criticisms of the amnesty provision by the common people who had no 
access to the serious theoretical framework in action, and that necessitated Tutu to 
explain out some of the facts which include reminding South Africans, that those 
granted amnesties are no heroes by any standard, neither have they escaped payment 
for their sins. The requirement to get amnesty itself is a form of punishment which 
may though appear soft, but potent. In his analysis, Tutu maintains that “Amnesty is a 
heavy price to pay. It is, however, the price the negotiators believed our country would 
have to pay to avoid an “alternative too ghastly to contemplate” (TRCR. 1998:vol.1: 
12) 
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Furthermore, it may be expedient to reiterate here that the purpose of this chapter is to 
demonstrate that from the empirical data, the evidence abounds which confirms that 
the narrative for peaceful resolution of the South African conflict among others is 
amnesty, though without forgiveness. The excerpt below, clearly confirms the state of 
mind of most of the victims who were unequivocal in confirming that no matter what 
the desire of Tutu and his commission is, they just can’t find themselves forgiving. 
Some for lack of knowledge of whom to forgive and others, the justification for such 
forgiveness. We must quickly remark here that despite this narrative of unforgiveness, 
it did not deter amnesty from taking place and consequently, the emergence of the new 
democratic state of South Africa. The report says,“ Father Michael Lapsley, who lost 
both arms and an eye in a near-fatal security police parcel bomb attack in Harare in 
1990, told the Commission: “I need to know who to forgive in order to endeavour to 
do so”. (TRCR. 1998:.vol.1:107 ) 
 This statement confirms that not only were crimes of the past shrouded in obscurity, 
even confessing perpetrator’s attitudes were largely unrepentant. Some of the 
perpetrators who came before the commission came to present what is considered half-
truths. Some of these were deliberately shrouded in obscurity and inconsistencies. Also 
revealed was the fact that there was no clear channel of authority to be held responsible 
for any violation, especially of those who gave what orders, who interpreted it, to 
whom it was given and who executed it. This is why “Many victims justifiably insisted 
that they were not prepared to forgive if this meant that they must ‘close the book on 
the past’, ‘let bygones be bygones’ or ‘forget about the past and focus on the future’. 
(TRCR.1998:vol.1:116)  
Further exposition confirms that Amnesty was everything while forgiveness was 
nothing. 
A major source of conflict in public debate concerned the question of 
amnesty. As already mentioned, the decision to grant amnesty was a 
feature of the negotiated political settlement and became a central 
responsibility of the Commission. Many participants, however, saw a 
contradiction between the work of the Human Rights Violations 
Committee, which devoted its time and resources to acknowledging 
the painful experiences of victims of gross violations of human rights, 
and the work of the Amnesty Committee, which freed many of the 
perpetrators of these violations from prosecution (and from prison) on 
the basis of full disclosure… This tension was deepened by the fact 
that the Amnesty Committee was given powers of implementation, 
while the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee could, by and 
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large, only make recommendations. Perpetrators were granted 
immediate freedom. Victims were required to wait until Parliament 
had accepted or rejected the recommendations of the Commission. 
(TRCR.1998:vol.1: 105) 
 Such waiting time for victims only aggravated their frustration and anger and as such 
further ruled out forgiveness even though amnesty was without such bottle-necks. 
Although again this is consistent with the fact that the working narrative is amnesty 
without forgiveness. 
Furthermore, the report argues that “amnesty as an official act of 
pardon can all too easily be misinterpreted as ignoring responsibility 
and accountability. As such, amnesty can be seen to be encouraging a 
culture of impunity. Some victims felt that amnesty results in 
insufficient social repudiation and that, by refusing to punish those 
responsible and allowing perpetrators to walk free, it constitutes a 
failure to respect their suffering. It is important, therefore, clearly to 
understand the various justifications for the concept of amnesty 
implemented by the Commission, with its unique focus on individual 
accountability. Similarly, the relationship between the Commission 
and the formal justice system merits attention”: (TRCR. 
1998:vol.1:.118) 
From the above excerpt, we can infer that the original intention or desire of the 
commission would have been to deliver amnesty on the basis of forgiveness especially 
when the white community show understanding that they were being treated more 
fairly than they deserve, given the kind of treatment they meted out when they were in 
power. Their full cooperation and repentance would have encouraged amnesty with 
forgiveness, and perfect peace would have returned to SA, not a modulated one. 
Unfortunately, this was not the case, which was why deconstruction had to take place. 
These facts are hidden in between the lines of the excerpt below; in paragraph 71, of 
page 18 of Vol.1 of the TRC report, Tutu, could no longer suppress the reality of the 
degree of victimisation weighing heavily to one side than the other despite the equality 
discourse that was to remove or downplay accusation of bias. It shows the 
irrepressibility of truth. Even though we know that, such inconsistencies were part of 
the peace narrative. In the words of Tutu; 
On the whole we have been exhilarated by the magnanimity of those 
who should by rights be consumed by bitterness and a lust for revenge; 
who instead have time after time shown an astonishing magnanimity 
and willingness to forgive. It is not easy to forgive, but we have seen 
it happen. And some of those who have done so are white victims. 
Nevertheless, the bulk of victims have been black and I have been 
saddened by what has appeared to be a mean-spiritedness in some of 
the leadership in the white community. They should be saying: “How 
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fortunate we are that these people do not want to treat us as we treated 
them. How fortunate that things have remained much the same for us 
except for the loss of some political power. (TRCR.1998: vol.1:18) 
Furthermore, Archbishop Tutu had always insisted as if it is automatic that forgiveness 
will necessarily follow confession and healing will automatically happen, and by so 
doing, contribute to national unity and reconciliation. He also, argues that the amnesty 
arrangement was a positive process towards what he called ‘restorative justice’ as 
against ‘retributive justice’, which epitomises the African virtue of ubuntu. Tutu 
enthusiastically and overzealously claims that  “ most amnesty applicants have 
expressed remorse and asked for forgiveness from their victims”, and that most victims 
are often moved to respond to the apology by forgiving the culprit, but critiques have 
argued that this picture painted by Tutu is more of his desires than what obtained at 
the trials. David Philip wrote, “Most perpetrators who went to the Amnesty Committee 
did not apologise or express contrition, and relatively few victims or their families 
expressed a willingness to forgive; many said plainly that they refused to forgive, and 
why they would not forgive” (Philip, 2008:1)   
However, Tutu’s ideas were overwhelmingly beclouded by the Christian doctrine of 
forgiveness, even though it does not translate accurately in the case of the TRC. 
According to Tutu, “God wants to show that there is life after conflict and repression 
– that because of forgiveness, there is a future.”  This is why critiques argue that “If 
one supports the TRC’s pursuit of both Truth and Reconciliation but is neither 
Christian nor religious, it is difficult to identify with Tutu’s approach; it is hard not to 
feel that he restricted himself to a narrow view of what reconciliation was, and of what 
the TRC was supposed to achieve.” (Philip,2008:1) 
6.5 Summary of Amnesty without forgiveness 
In this chapter, it was a struggle between what should take precedence over the other. 
Is it state pardon or pardon from the victims? The clear facts are that the victims are 
the direct sufferer of the violations while the state is the indirect victim. Hence, 
common sense would require that the individual pardon should be superior to that of 
the state and as such, the state pardon should be subject to and subsumed under the 
individual pardon. The implication of this would have meant that once a perpetrator is 
unable to convince his victims and obtain their pardon, then he would not get that of 
the state and that means he is liable to answer for his deeds under apartheid by way of 
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facing prosecution. However, what obtained in South Africa was the reverse. The state 
pardon (amnesty) was made superior to individual pardon. The fact that a victim 
expressly affirms that he would not forgive is inconsequential in obtaining state pardon. 
This bit was not negotiable, and it was not within the power of the commission to 
tamper with such things. They were sacrosanct. This is why the amnesty provision was 
criticized as encouraging impunity. It must then be recalled that the overall goals of 
the TRC were societal peace and stability. The narratives that emerged reveals that 
amnesty was a fundamental requirement for the continuous existence of South Africa 
as one indivisible, peaceful society. One element that threatens this is the individual 
victim’s forgiveness. This was mostly not forthcoming. All forms of narrative, 
including the Christian concept of forgiveness, were employed and where the Christian 
one was logically and naturally defective, the African concept of Ubuntu was 
introduced to compliment it. It became clear that amnesty was inevitable. Hence, 
forgiveness must, therefore, be deconstructed to a point when it was not going to be 
detrimental to amnesty in line with Agamben’s philosophy. Thus, in the interest of 
societal peace and stability, amnesty was given even though it was without forgiveness. 
6.6 Tolerance without friendship  
6.7.1 Introduction to Tolerance without friendship  
This section of the chapter deals with the identification and analysis of the 
phenomenon of Tolerance without friendship within the South African peace process. 
It examines the themes underlying the peace narratives in South Africa (SA) as well 
as the analysis of how the paradox of Tolerance without friendship was derived and 
how it operationalises itself within the Agamben’s exclusive, inclusive philosophy of 
the Homo Sacer. This paradox like the others has two elements, namely, Tolerance 
and friendship. What do these concepts entail and how were they activated as part of 
the underlying paradoxes with which peace and societal stability were returned to 
apartheid South Africa? In this couplet, tolerance is the constant independent variable 
that does not change. It is that variable that needs to be fulfilled at all cost in order to 
achieve societal peace while friendship is the dependent variable that needs to be 
deconstructed and fragmented through a process of reductionism and exclusion in 
order to fulfil the objective of the dominant variable, which in this case is tolerance. 
Hence, tolerance is the element that carries a higher premium in the transitional process. 
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6.8 Tolerance resulting from friendship translated into Tolerance without 
friendship 
Again, Tolerance without friendship does not seem to be the original desire of the 
architects of the TRC who would have gladly been willing to build tolerance of the 
society, on a foundation of interpersonal friendliness at least on the individual level. 
The desired goal at this level was more of a new beginning where the animosity and 
bitterness of the past, would be outrightly obliterated, while a harmonious and 
gleefully united and happy society bound together in one accord is instituted.  
Unfortunately, this was a great dream for the commission, because of the long year’s 
animosity and the complexities that had been created over the years. Hence, the 
original narrative of achieving tolerance resulting from friendship became 
deconstructed in line with the Agamben’s exclusive inclusion and translated into 
tolerance without friendship. 
Again as it is with other paradoxes, It sounds outrageous, maybe not as bad as others 
such as “truth without justice”, but equally startling especially when we begin to 
imagine that the original intention of this thesis, which sets out to find the narrative 
that essentially delivered success in the South African conflict. Also, here we are 
talking of tolerance without friendship when it is clear that intolerance essentially 
thrives with enemies.  Yet we cannot lose sight of the issues at stake even though we 
may not be friends, we may not necessarily be enemies, and tolerance itself becomes 
more functional when we are dealing with enemies because, if tolerance has any 
resemblance to managing or struggling to bear, then it may not even apply within the 
context of friendship. In other words, one would not need to tolerate friends; one 
accepts them automatically, whereas, it is those who are not friends in the real sense 
of it even if they feign to be that one struggles to accept which brings in the question 
of tolerance. However, within the phenomenon of friendship, exist the very idea of 
acceptance, which is somewhat a superior version of tolerance. 
Interestingly, this particular paradox is not on it's own explicitly visible, but implicitly 
so, its importance is seen in traces that underlies other paradoxes within the same 
geometry of arguments. To that extent, our references might crisscross and overlap 
stretching into other paradoxes that tends to confirm this paradigm. However, most 
importantly, to understand what was going on here, we need to dissect and unpack the 
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two phenomena under review critically. It is within this sufficiency that we can come 
to a clearer understanding of how this dynamics actualises itself within the South 
African peace process.    
Understanding the deconstruction that took place to make the narrative workable in 
the attainment of societal peace, in South Africa, is necessary in order to understand 
the dynamics that are at play in the transitional process. It is therefore compelling to 
have a quick look at page 71 of Karl Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies, 
where it was revealed that, 
a changing thing must give up some properties and acquire the 
opposite property. It is not so much a thing as a process of transition 
from one state to an opposite state, and thereby a unification of 
opposite states: cold things become warm and warm things become 
cold: what is moist becomes dry and what is dry becomes moist 
…Disease  enables us to appreciate health…life and death , being 
awake and being asleep, youth and old age, all this is identical; for the 
one turns into the other and the other turns into the one …what 
struggles with itself becomes committed to itself: there is a link or 
harmony due to recoil and tension, as in the bow or the lyre…The 
opposites belong to each other, the best harmony results from discord, 
and everything develops by strife…The path that leads up and the path 
that leads down are identical…The straight path and the crocked path 
are one and the same… for gods, all things are beautiful and good and 
just; men, however, have adopted some things as just…the good and 
the bad are identical( Popper,2002:71)  
Hence, this Popper’s philosophy of relativity seems to be a reaffirmation if not a re-
echoing of the Agamben’s philosophy of exclusive inclusion where that which is 
excluded is still partly included in some forms or shapes. Hence, friendship in the 
absolute sense is deconstructed, yet included in some relative senses. This is why 
tolerance without friendship is not the same as tolerance with enmity or with no 
friendship at all. In other words, some degree of friendliness is given, for tolerance to 
take place.  
The dominant narrative is that we do not necessarily have to be friends in the real sense 
of being cosy, but we are duty bound to be civil enough to tolerate each other for 
harmonious living. Desmond Tutu spelt this out when he said that, 
The trouble is that there are erroneous notions of what reconciliation 
is all about. Reconciliation is not about being cosy; it is not about 
pretending that things were other than they were. Reconciliation based 
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on falsehood, on not facing up to reality, is not true reconciliation and 
will not last. (TRCR, 1998: vol.1: 17)  
The word reconciliation as used here presupposes compromise or at best, tolerance, 
and this does not necessarily have to be based on interpersonal friendliness as such. 
This has to be deconstructed and stripped of its bios. On the question of tolerance and 
peaceful coexistence, Desmond Tutu argues further that,  
Let us move into the glorious future of a new kind of society where 
people count, not because of biological irrelevancies or other 
extraneous attributes, but because they are persons of infinite worth 
created in the image of God.( not because they are our friends as 
the case may be)  Let that society be a new society - more 
compassionate, more caring, more gentle, more given to sharing - 
because we have left “the past of a deeply divided society 
characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice” and are 
moving to a future “founded on the recognition of human rights, 
democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities 
for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex.” 
( or any friendly affiliation) (TRCR, 1998:vol.1:22)  The emphasis 
in the brackets is mine to drive home the point without consuming 
space. 
Tolerance 
6.9 What is tolerance? 
Scholars trace the word tolerance down to the early 15c. when the word was equated 
to " fortitude and endurance in the face of pain and hardship.  It is further traced it to 
an Old French origin dating back to the (14c.) when tolerance is seen as a derivation 
of the Latin word,  tolerantia which connotes "a bearing, supporting, endurance,". This 
in turn took its source from the word,  tolerans, which is the present participle of 
tolerare " meaning, to bear, endure, tolerate" It also refers in a sense to the "tendency 
to be free from bigotry or severity in judging other," which is  a usage that is traceable 
to 1765. Similarly, it refers to  "allowable amount of variation" which dates from 1868. 
(Harper, 2001. ) 
Furthermore, the word tolerance has been defined as a noun that connotes, “ a fair, 
objective, and permissive attitude toward those whose views,  beliefs, practices, racial 
or ethnic origins, differ from one's own such as freedom from bigotry. It also refers to 
a fair, objective, and permissive attitude toward opinions, beliefs, and practices that 
differ from one's own. Similarly, it connotes interest in and concern for ideas, opinions, 
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practices, that are foreign to one's own such as a liberal, undogmatic viewpoint.  It also 
means the act or capacity of enduring; endurance. (Online English Dictionary, 2007) 
From the above, it is apparent that the very idea of tolerance is a departure from the 
ideal. We tolerate when the existing statuesque is at variance with the norm. It is thus 
a creation of some artificiality that is intended to achieve some moderate civility, given 
societal plurality and diversity. Hence the very nature of tolerance is unnatural and 
short of absolute. This is why the dictionary says it is “permissive attitude toward 
opinions”  Hence, working within Agamben’s philosophy, we find expressions that 
entail ousting or deconstructing certain things that could be detrimental to the overall 
objective of societal peace by pushing them out into the realm of bare life where they 
are less volatile. It is the realm of control where they are not allowed any political 
expression that is inimical to success. It is the realm of distinction where only certain 
things are permitted to be said and in a particular manner. This was evident during the 
life hearing of the TRC when participants are practically often teleguided by 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu to show morally regulated actions of remorse, and 
magnanimity of forgiveness and apology, which were all not part of the formal 
requirement of the mandate of the TRC especially in the granting of amnesty to 
perpetrators. 
Again, tolerance or its other counterpart, toleration, which is restricted to a tolerance 
within religious confines, seems to be an elastic phenomenon that could run out. Even 
though it is the Independent variable here, yet it carries the connotation of temporality. 
In other words, tolerance seems synonymous with forcefully curtailing, or swimming 
against a tide, suppressing, holding down, in the interest of societal ideal. It is apparent 
that it has an explosive point when such ability of containment runs its course and what 
happens is that which has hitherto, been held down by the force of political correctness, 
explodes.  The implication is that tolerance, by its very nature, has a limit. This seems 
to be the view of Karl Popper in Open Society and Its Enemies where he maintains 
that, 
Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we 
extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are 
not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the 
intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. 
(Popper, 2002:962)  
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Popper is in effect saying that absolute tolerance is self-destruction. Tolerance itself 
must be elastic. There is a point when tolerance becomes suicidal, especially against 
the intolerant who would end up destroying both the tolerant and his idea of tolerance 
when absolute, unlimited tolerance is given. Again, the absolutist idea is here excluded 
for a relativist one. 
What then is the relationship of tolerance with friendship? It does appear that it is only 
those who are not our friends that need tolerance or need to be tolerated. As friendship 
already by its very nature connotes acceptance in its holistic form. Also, it is when one 
falls outside this bracket of friendship that he needs tolerance in order to be still able 
to maintain a moderate level of relationship good enough to sustain peaceful 
coexistence. 
Friendship: 
6.10 What is Friendship? 
Scholars conceive friendship as “the state of being a friend or being in a friendly 
relation or intimacy. It also implies a friendly feeling or disposition. Whereas, a friend 
is “a person attached to another by feelings of affection or personal regard. It also 
includes a person who assists; patron; supporter, or at best, a person who is on good 
terms with others such that a person who is not hostile. Also, in some senses, it refers 
to a member of the same nation or party. (English Dictionary, 2016) 
To this extent, friendship and tolerance are poles apart. Friendship implies intimacy, 
affection devoid of hostility. The implication here is that if such disposition exists in 
society, then the idea of tolerance as the basis for societal peace and harmony falls into 
the realm of irrelevance because this is the ultimate mechanism for societal unification, 
peace and stability. 
 However, in South Africa, the bond of friendship had been severely damaged by years 
of human right violations under apartheid, and a return to this state of perfection 
became outrightly impossible. Societal peace and unification are imperative. To 
achieve this, the deconstruction that must necessarily follow should achieve the 
narrative that would take cognisance of the fact that the perpetrators of apartheid and 
the anti-apartheid forces could no longer be friends in the absolute sense as above, yet 
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they must live together in one united South Africa under peaceful coexistence. 
Therefore, the narrative that could achieve peace under this disposition is that of 
tolerance even though we are no friends. The critical factor here, is to live together 
civilly, peacefully and harmoniously, we do not have to be friends.  In the light of 
Agamben’s philosophy, friendship had to be deconstructed because friendship in this 
equation, falls within the purview of the absolute while tolerance, on the other hand, 
falls within the realm of the relative. It is clear that the absolute in this sense was going 
to be detrimental to achieving tolerance, which is why it had to be deconstructed. 
Again, the phenomenon of friendship is even made more complicated in Derrida‘s 
work,  Politics of Friendship, where he derides the idea of friendship that is mutually 
a two-way phenomenon of giving and receiving or at least the expectation of getting 
something in return. This kind of friendship is impure and insincere. He, therefore, 
advocates a kind of friendship that is unconditionally selfless, in which one gives and 
expects nothing in return. It is, in fact, that kind of pure friendship that is equated with 
justice. This may sound utopian and unrealistic. However, if all and sundry apply such 
selfless friendship, then it would follow that all would give, and all would receive in 
diverse forms and shapes. That in itself would have created a selfless society where 
friendship would override and exterminate the idea of tolerance, given that tolerance 
is only a second fiddle venture that applies when the first and preferred perfect state is 
impossible. This is when we opt for the second imperfect state, which is tolerance. For 
Derrida, if all that exists is this two way kind of friendship, then there are no friends 
in the real sense of it. “oh my friend, there are no friends” which is an old quotation 
credited to Aristotle and Montaigne. Hence, on page 633 of the article “the politics of 
friendship, Derrida argues that; 
I am already virtually installed in the dominant code, in the very 
constitution of one of the great canonical discourses of philosophy on 
friendship, the very one which Montaigne was quoting, Aristotle's. 
The distinction between dynamis and energeia is never far away, in 
the Nicomachean Ethics, when the issue is the distinction between the 
"good men who are friends in the rigorous sense of the term" and "the 
others who are so only accidentally and by analogy with the first" [viii, 
ch. 4], or again when, after having defined the three "forms of 
government," Aristotle declares that "friendship appears [there] in the 
same proportion as justice," or, if man is a "political being" [Ix, ch. 
10], "political friendship" is only a kind of friendship, that which he 
calls "Concord" [homonomia]. (Derrida, 1998:688) 
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Arguing further on what friendship actually entails, Derrida gave a detailed analysis, 
which one is compelled to quote verbatim despite how extensive the analysis is in 
order to elucidate much clearly the fundamentals of the arguments here.  According to 
him, what we call friendship is an imperfect form or an aberration of what it should be, 
and to that extent, friendship does not exist. If friendship in its perfect form exists, then 
it would most likely produce a perfect and just society. Against this backdrop, it is 
clear that within the context of Derridean analysis, the phenomenon of friendship that 
would most certainly create peace within SA was unattainable because according to 
Derrida, there is no friend. Hence, it does not exist. It became imperative that 
friendship must necessarily be excluded because it would pose a threat to tolerance 
and within Agamben’s philosophy, such phenomenon must be pushed into the realm 
of zoe or bare-life where its potentialities of negation are minimal and controllable.  
Arguing more extensively,  Derrida maintains that,  
friendship, as Aristotle also said, consists rather in loving than in being 
loved [viii 9, 25-30], a proposition on which we have not yet finished 
meditating, listen to me, be sensitive to my cry, understand and be 
compassionate; I am asking for sympathy and consensus, become the 
friends to whom I aspire. Accede to what is at the same time a desire, a 
request, a promise, and, one could also add, a prayer. And let us not 
forget what Aristotle said about prayer (eukhe): it is a discourse (logos), 
but it is a discourse that, somewhat in the manner of a performative, is 
neither true nor false [all'ouzte alethe's ouite pseudes]. There are no 
friends, that we know, but I beg you, make it so that there will be friends 
from now on. What is more, how could I be your friend, and declare my 
friendship for you (and the latter consists more in loving than in being 
loved) if friendship did not remain something yet to happen, to be 
desired, to be promised? How could I give you my friendship where 
friendship would not be lacking, that is, if it already existed-more 
precisely, if the friend were not lacking? For the apostrophe does not 
say: "there is no friendship," but rather "there is no friend." Perhaps this 
is because we have an idea of friendship and what it should be, in the 
ideality of its essence or telos, and thus in the name of friendship we 
must conclude, alas, that, if there is friendship, "there is no friend." 
(And this is just what Montaigne means to say in the context determined 
by the most thematic of his intentions, which dominates this passage up 
to a certain point: it is while thinking about "common friendships," 
"ordinary and customary" ones, that we are obliged to sigh with regret. . 
(Derrida, 1998:636-637) 
 
 
199 
 
With this extensive expositional analysis of the categories and implication of what 
friendship entails, Derrida further affirms that the idea of perfection only leads to void 
and none existence which is why every element that tends to justify perfection, is 
relegated in this work and the imperfect is taken as the norm. Hence Derrida concludes 
that,  
These common friendships are not "the most perfect of their kind": that 
is why "there is no friend.") But, if there is no friend at present, then 
precisely let us make it so that there will be friendships from now on, 
friendships that are "the most perfect of their kind." Here is what I am 
calling you to, answer me, it is our responsibility. Friendship is never a 
given in the present; it belongs to the experience of waiting, of promise, 
or of commitment. Its discourse is that of prayer and at issue there is that 
which responsibility opens to the future. But the apostrophe 'O my 
friends' turns also toward the past. It recalls, it makes a sign toward that 
which must be supposed so as to let oneself be understood, if only in the 
non-apophatic form of prayer. You have already shown me this minimal 
friendship, this preliminary consent without which you would not 
understand me, would not listen to my appeal, or be sensitive to what is 
hopeful in my cry. Without this absolute past, I could not, for my part, 
have addressed myself to you in this way. (Derrida, 1998:636-637) 
The above analysis affirms that what  Derrida seems to be saying is that though the 
very idea of friendship in its absolute sense of what it ought to be is known, which 
makes friendship to exist in its idealistic form, but in practical senses, no friend could 
actualise the existing idealistic friendship. What is required regarding qualities of what 
a friend indeed should be, seem out of reach. 
Derrida, therefore, concluded that there is still a futuristic hope for friendship in the 
real sense of the word when he argues that, 
We would not be together in a sort of minimal community-but one 
which is also incommensurable with any other-speaking the same 
language or praying for translation within the horizon of the same 
language, even were it so as to manifest a disagreement, if a sort of 
friendship had not already been sealed before any other contract: a 
friendship prior to friendships, an ineffaceable, fundamental, and 
bottomless friendship, the one that draws its breath in the sharing of a 
language (past or to come) and in the being-together that any allocution 
supposes, including a declaration of war. Will one say, in a rather 
Aristotelian move, that this friendship has merely an accidental and 
analogical relation with friendship in the strict or proper sense, or with 
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the friendship that is "perfect of its kind" (Montaigne)? The question 
thus becomes: "What is friendship in the proper sense?" "Is it ever 
present?" "What is the essence of friendship?" If we are not close to 
answering this question, it is not only because of the very great number 
of philosophical difficulties still in front of us and which we are going 
to try to approach...Behind the logical game of contradiction or paradox, 
perhaps the 'O my friends, there is no friend' signifies first and last this 
surpassing of the present by the undeniable future anterior which would 
be the very movement and time of friendship. Undeniable future 
anterior, the absolute of an unpresentable past as well as future, which 
is to say of traces that one can only ever deny by summoning them 
(Derrida, 1998:636-637) 
6.11 Tolerance with Friendship Translated to Tolerance without Friendship? 
Just as in the previous paradoxes, the architects of the TRC would have been interested 
in delivering to SA, a form of perfect cordiality between the citizens under a new Post-
apartheid South Africa.  This will be a kind of cosy or cordial relationship among its 
citizens. She would have advocated a kind of tolerance that is synonymous with a 
friendship, where friendship itself is a perfection that is unattainable.  The type that is 
devoid of any form of animosity. This is a reference to a friendly relationship that will 
not only overtake tolerance but will ultimately terminate tolerance. This is so because 
the type of friendship would engender a relationship that will no longer require 
tolerating the other but accepting in a natural, uninhibited way.  Unfortunately, this 
perfect serene state was unattainable given the historical antecedents that brought 
South Africa that far. Hence friendship had to be deconstructed to allow for an 
imperfect situation, which is tolerance, despite not being friends.   
6.12 What is Tolerance without Friendship? 
The need for tolerance was variously advocated within the TRC report if the society 
must move forward; the emphasis was far from the ideal, which is to foster friendly 
relations between those that had been torn apart by apartheid. This was the argument 
of  Desmond  Tutu in the TRC report when he said, “We hope that many South 
Africans and friends of South Africa will become engaged in the process of helping 
our nation to come to terms with its past and, in so doing, reach out to a new 
future”(TRCR,1998:vol.1:2.) 
Coming to terms with and reaching out to a new future is an inevitable reference to 
tolerance in the interest of societal unification and nation-building. Furthermore, 
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Desmond Tutu argued that “the disqualification or removal from public office of 
people who have been implicated in violations of human rights. The Commission 
considered this question carefully and finally decided not to recommend that this step 
be pursued.” (TRCR,1998: vol.1:3.) 
The critical fact underlying this action is not that such people are friends of the society 
that do not deserve punishment, but in the spirit of tolerance and societal peace, 
harmony and nation-building, it decided not to make such recommendation. Hence, 
they may be discharged, but understandably not acquitted. 
Furthermore, it will be seen that rather than for the commission to call for friendship 
among the people, they chose to push that to the background and emphasise the fact 
that,  
the Commission has not been prepared to allow the present generation 
of South Africans to grow gently into the harsh realities of the past 
and, indeed, many of us have wept as we were confronted with its ugly 
truths. However painful the experience has been, … My appeal to 
South Africans as they read this report is not to use it to attack others, 
but to add to it, correct it and ultimately to share in the process that 
will lead to national unity through truth and reconciliation. 
(TRCR,1998: vol.1:4.) 
It should be noted that what is being advocated here is not a return, to say the least, 
mutual friendship coming from such deep animosity, but a relationship of tolerance 
despite the traumatising experiences of the past, into a future of harmonious living. It 
is this same narrative that is being further advocated here when Tutu says,“Thus, we 
have trodden the path urged on our people by the preamble to our founding Act, which 
called on “the need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but 
not retaliation, a need for “Ubuntu” but not for victimisation.” (TRCR,1998: vol.1:8)  
He was inevitably preaching tolerance with the use of words such as “understanding”, 
“not vengeance”, “Ubuntu” “not victimisation” while at the same time, he carefully 
avoided preaching friendship. 
Furthermore, Desmond Tutu highlighted the personal emotions of the members of the 
commission and drew lessons that have broader dimensions of raw pain but 
emphasised the need to go beyond it. In the words of Tutu,  
 The chief of the section that typed the transcripts of the hearings told 
me: As you type, you don’t know you are crying until you feel and see 
the tears falling on your hands. We have been given a great privilege. 
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It has been a costly privilege but one that we would not want to 
exchange for anything in the world. Some of us have already 
experienced something of a post-traumatic stress and have become 
more and more aware of just how deeply wounded we have all been; 
how wounded and broken we all are. Apartheid has affected us at a 
very deep level, more than we ever suspected. We in the Commission 
have been a microcosm of our society, reflecting its alienation, 
suspicions and lack of trust in one another. Our earlier Commission 
meetings were very difficult and filled with tension. God has been 
good in helping us to grow closer together. Perhaps we are a sign of 
hope that, if people from often-hostile backgrounds could grow closer 
together as we have done, then there is hope for South Africa, that we 
can become united. We have been called to be wounded healers. 
(TRCR,1998: vol.:22) 
It must be remarked that the dominant narrative buried between the lines of the above 
excerpt is tolerance without friendship.  Tutu clearly shows the painful trauma that that 
rest on the heart and mind of the people actually makes friendship impossible and the 
particulars of this impossibility according to Tutu includes “alienation, suspicions and 
lack of trust” yet it this still is incapable of preventing our unification, based on 
tolerance even though it is without harmony. The use of the phrase, “grow closer 
together” is a reference to the forging of a tolerant society.  The same geometry of 
analysis that applies elsewhere equally applies here to tolerance without friendship, as 
well as that of unification without harmony. There is no doubt that the paradoxes are 
overlapping and interconnected, and to that extent, one leads to the other and some 
facts that were used just to justify one paradox could effectively apply in another. 
Desmond Tutu’s submission tends to give a panoramic view of almost all the seven 
paradoxes on which the South African peace process was based. In his words, 
 Ours is a remarkable country. Let us celebrate our diversity, (it is a 
reference to tolerance amidst differences) our differences. God 
wants us as we are. South Africa wants and needs the Afrikaner, the 
English, the coloured, the Indian, the black.(this is unification even 
if there is no harmony)  We are sisters and brothers in one family - 
God’s family, the human family. Having looked the beast of the past 
in the eye, having asked and received forgiveness and having made 
amends, let us shut the door on the past (shutting the door to the past 
refers to healing) - not in order to forget it but in order not to allow 
it to imprison us.( but without forgetting) Let us move into the 
glorious future of a new kind of society where people count, ( This is 
a reference to unification based on tolerance ) not because of 
biological irrelevancies or other extraneous attributes, (even if they 
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are not our friends or relatives ) but because they are persons of 
infinite worth created in the image of God. Let that society be a new 
society - more compassionate, more caring, more gentle, more given 
to sharing - because we have left “the past of a deeply divided society 
characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice” and 
are moving to a future “founded on the recognition of human rights, 
democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities 
for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or 
sex.”(moving to a future founded …….is a reference to unification 
without harmony) (TRCR,1998:vol.1:22) All the emphasis in 
bracket is mine. 
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Chapter 7:  Truth without justice 
7.0 Introduction to Truth without justice 
This Chapter deals with the identification and analysis of the phenomenon of Truth 
without justice within the South African peace process. It is one of the most central 
paradoxes of this research. It examines the themes underlying Truth without justice in 
South Africa (SA) as well as the analysis of how the paradox of Truth without justice 
was derived and how it operationalises itself within the Agamben’s exclusive, 
inclusive philosophy of the Homo Sacer. This paradox like the others, has two 
elements, Truth and justice what do these concepts entail and how were they activated 
as part of the underlying paradoxes with which peace and societal stability were 
returned to apartheid South Africa? In this couplet, the truth is the constant 
independent variable that does not change. It is that which needs to be fulfilled at all 
cost in order to achieve societal peace while justice is the dependent variable that needs 
to be deconstructed, excluded, and fragmented, through a process of reductionism and 
modified in order to fulfil the objective of the dominant variable, which in this case is 
Truth.  
7.1 Truth that leads to justice transformed into Truth without justice 
As was the case with other couplets,  this particular one comprises two phenomena 
that are equally problematic not just as interpreted in the TRC’s report but as classical 
philosophical concepts. Interestingly, the truth was the independent variable, while 
justice was the dependent variable. This is unlike in the criminal justice system when 
the truth is only a means to justice. Here the truth seems to be an end in itself. Just as 
with the previous concepts, the architects of the TRC would have desired truth with 
justice, but the trend and narratives that emerged were unwittingly tailored towards 
truth without justice from the outset. On a broader view, therefore, the phenomenon of 
justice was already excluded by the enabling act because it was going to create an 
insurmountable problem for the overall agenda of nation-building and societal peace 
at large given the antecedent and historical narrative through which South Africa had 
journeyed so far. This is why the entire society,  especially those who had suffered 
gross human violation thought the TRC would be historically an opportunity for the 
actualisation of justice at least in the traditional way by which we conceive “retributive 
justice”. Unfortunately, such justice would have created greater animosity than 
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societal unification and tranquillity. No wonder, the emphasis of the commission, was 
inverted and deconstructed it in such a manner that the myth was stripped from justice 
and built around the truth. This does not appear to be an inadvertent omission that the 
name of the Commission was not “Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission. This 
probably is because it is not based on knowing the truth, the whole truth and nothing 
but the truth as required under the criminal justice system where justice would 
normally be dispensed only when the indubitable truth has been seen to have been 
attained. Again, that narrative would have been dangerously subversive of societal 
peace and stability. It would have created a situation where it is only when justice is 
seen to have been done, that reconciliation can take place. Nevertheless, because of 
the long years of animosity, tensions and pains of human right violations coupled with 
the complexity of the phenomenon of justice itself, if it is not so deconstructed. It 
would have inevitably posed as a threat to the overall objective of societal peace,  
unification, harmony and stability. 
For Agamben, such a phenomenon must be pushed out to the realm of bare life where 
it will be less lethal. Therefore, the truth became the primary objective and justice, the 
subordinate one in the operation of the TRC. Hence, the search is for truth, over and 
above justice, became primary. Again, as already mentioned above that the truth being 
searched for, is not the truth that would lead to prosecution as in retribution, but that, 
which is founded on a moral phenomenon that forbids revenge and discourages the 
immoral principles of an eye for an eye in order to institute restorative justice. The 
problems created by this narrative is complicated, but then, to what extent is it 
appropriate to impose a form of justice on the people? Would it not be undemocratic 
in the journey towards democracy? This and many more defined the logic where truth 
had to take precedence over justice.  
According to Arch Bishop Desmond Tutu, “we have trodden the path urged on our 
people by the preamble to our founding Act, which called on “the need for 
understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not retaliation, a need 
for ubuntu but not for victimisation”. (TRCR,1998vol.:8)  
This is why justice as traditionally understood had to be deconstructed in line with the 
narrative that, 
If justice is seen merely as retribution, it becomes difficult to make 
the appropriate connections between amnesty and justice. While 
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both the interim Constitution and the Commission expressed strong 
opposition to acts of revenge, it is necessary, nevertheless, to 
acknowledge that the desire for revenge is an understandable 
human response. Suppressed anger undermines reconciliation. 
(TRCR, 1998: vol.1:117)  
Furthermore, this same geometry of analysis accounted for the narrative, 
which maintains that;  
The tendency to equate justice with retribution must be challenged 
and the concept of restorative justice considered as an alternative. 
This means that amnesty in return for public and full disclosure (as 
understood within the broader context of the Commission) suggests 
a restorative understanding of justice, focusing on the healing of 
victims and perpetrators and on communal restoration. (TRCR, 
1998: vol.1: 118)  
The trend of this narrative implies that disclosure of the truth of gross human violations 
with impunity, could not typically lead to the prosecution of perpetrators. Instead, it 
leads to amnesty, irrespective of whether the victims forgive or not and as such, it is 
the truth but without at least, the retributive conception of justice except restorative 
which nonetheless seems imposing. This is even though the so-called confession of 
the truth or in most cases, half-truths were done arrogantly without repentance or 
remorse of any kind and yet expected to restore the dignity of the victims.  This is the 
general narrative that is prevalent mainly because the primary goal of unity and nation 
building was given pre-eminence over every other consideration. There were massive 
revelations of the complicity of the leadership of Apartheid in all forms and shapes; 
yet, it ended up as ordinary revelations that have lost their fervour or potency in the 
ensuing deconstruction of truth but without justice. This is the narrative in the excerpt 
below; 
Can we imagine the anger that has been caused by the disclosures that 
the previous government had a Chemical and Biological Warfare 
Programme with projects that allegedly targeted only black people, and 
allegedly sought to poison President Nelson Mandela and reduce the 
fertility of black women? Should our land not be overwhelmed by black 
fury leading to orgies of revenge, turning us into a Bosnia, a Northern 
Ireland or a Sri Lanka? Dear fellow South Africans, please try to bring 
yourselves to respond with a like generosity and magnanimity. When 
one confesses, one confesses only one’s own sins, not those of another 
(TRCR, 1998: vol.1:18 ) 
The narrative above made some interesting allusions to some other volatile intractable 
conflicts on the globe, where there seem to be no solutions in sight. The need to differ 
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from these other ones, seem to be the focus here. Hence the principles which seem to 
fuel these other situations necessarily needs to be avoided desperately. 
7.2 What is the Truth? 
The complication involved with this phenomenon and the difficulty in being able to 
define this concept of “truth” is as old as human civilisation. We would recall that as 
philosophical and as intellectually sound as Jesus Christ was, when he was confronted 
with the same question while facing trial before Pontius Pilate, and after perceiving 
the regal and calm posture of Christ, Pilate did ask if Jesus was a king? This was no 
rattling question for him at all to answer. Hence, Jesus answered swiftly in John 18:37 
that “You say that I am a king. For this purpose, I was born, and for this purpose, I 
have come into the world—to bear witness to the truth. Everyone who is of the truth 
listens to my voice.” (John 18:37) 
Moreover, in the fashion of the Socratic dialectics, Pilate proceeded with his cross-
examination by asking Jesus the next though, relevant but complex philosophical 
question; which is "What is truth?" this was a question that Christ himself could not 
provide an answer to and this had remained a problematic question till date both in 
practical and theoretical discourse. Hence, what we shall be doing here is just a 
surface scratch that can help us in the understanding of how it is being conceived 
in the light of the TRC’s work 
Some scholars have traced the origin of truth to an old English West Saxon word 
“triewð” and the Mercian version, “treowð “  which translates into "faithfulness or 
quality of being true. It also carries the connotation of "accuracy or correctness" as 
from the 1560s, whereas, it was in the mid-14c. That Noun sense of "something that is 
true" was first recorded.  It is also said to include the fact that the phenomenon of truth 
is a noun that implies,  the quality of being true, genuine, actual, or factual in the sense 
that “ the truth of his statement was attested “. Other senses of truth connote something 
that is true as opposed to being false for example, “you did not tell me the truth”, and 
the last sense is a proven or verified principle or statement or fact as in the “ the truths 
of astronomy “. Harper(2010) 
Furthermore, the concept of truth has been associated with the actual state of affairs. 
Other senses of usage include conformity with fact or reality. Others are a verified or 
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indisputable fact, proposition, principle, or the like, the character or state or of being 
true or real, actual or factual in existence. It could also connote an obvious or accepted 
fact; truism; platitude, honesty; integrity; truthfulness is all synonyms of the 
phenomenon of truth. 
Furthermore, Glanzberg (2016) examined some traditional philosophical theories of 
truth by maintaining that, 
The most significant for the contemporary literature being the 
correspondence, coherence, and pragmatist theories of truth. These 
theories all attempt to directly answer the nature question: what is the 
nature of truth? They take this question at face value: there are truths, 
and the question to be answered concerns their nature. In answering 
this question, each theory makes the notion of truth part of a more 
thoroughgoing metaphysics or epistemology. Explaining the nature 
of truth becomes an application of some metaphysical system, and 
truth inherits significant metaphysical presuppositions along the way. 
(Glanzberg, 2013:1) 
In his analysis, Glanzberg further maintains that ‘The basic idea of the correspondence 
theory is that what we believe or say something is true if it corresponds to the way 
things really are, or to the facts on the ground. This idea according to him, was later 
rejected by G E Moore and Russell as the source of idealism and in its place, accepted 
the identity theory, which posits that a true proposition is identical to a fact. Next is 
also the Coherent theory of truth which advocates that “A belief is true if and only if 
it is part of a coherent system of beliefs.” Whereas a different perspective on truth was 
offered by the American pragmatists, who argue that it is dependent on what practical 
value truth has. The pragmatic theory of truth goes with some typical slogans. Such as 
the one held by Peirce to the effect that: “Truth is the end of inquiry”. While both 
Peirce and James are associated with the slogan that: “Truth is satisfactory to believe”. 
(Glanzberg, 2013:1)   
However, one important fact is that these classical notions of truth have continuously 
been challenged and moderated from both the epistemological and ontological 
perspectives of scholars across generations. The important thing to note therefore is 
that the very idea of “truth” is not unidimensional. Its understanding at various times 
is dependent on the discourse and purpose at any given time. 
However, within the context of the TRC, in SA, the kind of truth that is required is 
functionally defined. It clearly states that   
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The preceding discussion rejects the popular assumption that there 
are only two options to be considered when talking about truth - 
namely factual, objective information or subjective opinions. There 
is also ‘healing’ truth, the kind of truth that places facts and what 
they mean within the context of human relationships - both amongst 
citizens and between the state and its citizens. This kind of truth was 
central to the Commission. The Act required that the Commission 
look back to the past and forward to the future. In this sense, it was 
required to help establish a truth that would contribute to the 
reparation of the damage inflicted in the past and to the prevention 
of the recurrence of serious abuses in the future. It was not enough 
simply to determine what had happened. Truth as factual, objective 
information cannot be divorced from the way in which this 
information is acquired; nor can such information be separated from 
the purposes it is required to serve. It is in this context that the role 
of ‘acknowledgement’ must be emphasised. Acknowledgement 
refers to placing information that is (or becomes) known on public, 
national record. It is not merely the actual knowledge about past 
human rights violations that counts; often the basic facts about what 
happened are already known, at least by those who were affected. 
What is critical is that these facts be fully and publicly acknowledged. 
Acknowledgement is an affirmation that a person’s pain is real and 
worthy of attention. It is thus central to the restoration of the dignity 
of victims.  (TRCR,1998:vol.1:114) 
The theme of truth defined above is not that simple either. Complexity has always 
dominated discourses on Truth. It is a phenomenon that is not by any standard easy to 
conceptually apprehend and comprehend. This is because it is more often biased in the 
interest of the definer. Traditionally, in philosophical discourse, just as mentioned 
above, there are three main theories of truth namely, Correspondence theory of truth, 
coherence theory of truth and pragmatic theory of truth and these have been further 
fragmented linguistically, logically, epistemologically, hermeneutically and 
phenomenologically. 
Discussing it contextually does not make it easier either. Traditionally, we have often 
defined truth as the act of “saying what is that it is, and what is not, that is not”. Without 
necessarily going into the complexity of this definition, we shall rely on the argument 
of Kevin Avruch and Beatriz Vejarano (2002). These scholars argue that world 
experience in practical life situations has shown that even amid overwhelming 
evidence, there are still denials, especially of the Holocaust, genocide and gross 
violations of human dignity. That in itself, according to them, did not help matters not 
just in theoretical discourse but practical life situations. This compels them to argue 
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that “many truth and reconciliation commissions find themselves operating in 
epistemologically relativistic and rhetorical contexts which would make the most 
steadfast of academic postmodernists blush. The issue of the multiplicity of truth and 
complexity is a central one that connects the complex demands of justice and the hopes 
for reconciliation. It also falls within the arena in which the parties’ competing versions 
of history and the politics of memory play themselves out. Especially in a “ dirty war” 
This no doubt aptly captures the situation. (Avruch and Vejarano, 2002). 
Furthermore, these scholars further cited some Truth scholars which includes  Lerche 
(2000) whose emphasis was on knowing what really happened as well as Villa-
Vicencio and Verwoerd (2000) whose own focus was on the complexity of seeking 
the truth. In the ensuing analysis, a different conception of truth that seems all-
embracing were variously presented. This includes, “historical truth, moral truth, 
factual or forensic truth, personal or narrative truth, social or dialogue truth, as well as 
healing and restorative truth”. The aim of some of these sorts of truth is to make an 
ineffaceable inscription on history. “Forensic truth,” for example, according to them, 
is from a field that is almost single-handedly established by Clyde Snow together with 
many physical anthropologists. They argued that he has trained and supported some 
experts over the years some of which includes those of the Argentine Forensic 
Anthropology Team as well as those of the Foundation for Forensic Anthropology of 
Guatemala. This group is said to aspire to uncover overwhelming material evidence 
that would help to establish an indisputable “facticity” − and present it in such a 
compelling and unquestionable scientifically irreproachable way, to such an extent that 
“no one can dispute the fact that these killings never took place. Some of such truths 
equally emerged at the South African Truth, and Reconciliation Commission’s 
hearings, where it created authoritative and indelible memory conveyed through 
“narratives” or “personal” truths, emerging from both victims’ and perpetrators alike ’. 
( Avruch and Vejarano, 2002) 
Furthermore, these public testimonies were directed at ensuring that individual acts of 
oppression and victimisation by individuals cannot be forgotten in a hurry. Besides, it 
helps to ensure through truth-telling, no one in South Africa will be able to deny 
knowing what really happened.  However,  while emphasising further, the complexity 
of this phenomenon of truth especially as applicable to South Africa, they argue that 
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“The Apartheid security forces and the Latin American generals and colonels 
apparently believed that they were fighting Communist subversion under emergency 
conditions and that justifies the use of ruthless measures, to protect national security 
unconditionally. This is without prejudice to the fact that some among them who 
appeared before various commissions and admitted their acts and expressed regret for 
their victims and offered apologies to the survivors.” ( Avruch and Vejarano, 2002:2)  
This, according to these scholars, shows that shared facts do not necessarily conduce 
to shared truths.  
Also, they argue that even if they did, it was in some objectivist and positivist ways. 
This position seems to be reflecting Jesus’s proclamation on the cross that ignorance 
was morally excusable even if not legally so when he said: “Father forgive them for 
they know not what they are doing”. Again, it seems reminiscent of the Socratic 
proclamation that no one deliberately does evil and that evil is a function of ignorance.  
This is a statement, which appears untenable at face value, but with further insight 
reveals that the one who does evil, whether rightly or wrongly believes in some sort of 
positivity that it is intended to generate. Even though such benefit may be parochial 
and selfishly serving the interest of the perpetrator, at other times, the perpetrator may 
believe that it is meant to teach a lesson and that in itself, may end up being erroneous. 
Nonetheless, it is not like embarking on evil deliberately without believing that it has 
positive results. This explains why this individual internal self-conviction of acting 
rightly and justifiably against communism creates a situation where the belief of 
fighting a just war in the South African situation was not a one-sided affair after all. It 
could even explain why some perpetrators just came to reel out catalogues of callous 
abuses with impunity mainly to meet the requirement for amnesty without showing 
remorse. There is no doubt that there were those who understood it differently and 
very well knew their actions were merely repressive, but again perhaps for some flimsy 
and untenable parochial reason of benefits.  Nevertheless, for the former, that was the 
“truth”. 
Furthermore, Some of these scholars further agreed in their analysis, that the problem 
of truth always circles back to the exigencies of justice, and punishment. This same 
view was equally maintained by Popkin (2000) particularly when combined with 
immunity from the trial, with pardons, or with amnesty,  then, of course, the wages of 
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truth-telling may become contested.  Christodoulidis (2000), Avruch and Vejarano 
(2002)   
These scholars went further to substantiate their claim by quoting Bishop Tutu (1999), 
who argued that “freedom was exchanged for truth.” Moreover, Heribert Adam (1998) 
who wrote about “trading justice for truth.” All these, according to them, created a 
problem of identifying which is bigger or primary? Truth or Justice? How fair then is 
accepting truth-telling in batter exchange for justice? What benefit does truth on its 
own have if it cannot guarantee justice? What is the rationale behind the legal justice 
system that goes in the pursuit of proving the truth beyond a reasonable doubt it if it is 
an end on its own and incapable of delivering justice? These and many more may have 
influenced scholars such as Avruch and Vejarano (2002)  and Henderson (2000) who 
have examined the relationship between truth and justice and maintains that it raised 
the ethically impacted problem of fungibility.   This brings up the interrogation of the 
phenomenon of truth and what its cost could be as well as what could replace it? 
TRCR,(1998), Avruch and Vejarano (2002)   
All these engaged the thought of these scholars in their analysis of the relationship 
between truth and justice. 
Furthermore, the concept of truth-telling as it applies to the South African TRC is as 
obscure as any of the phenomenon in question, because by its very nature it is both 
definitive and constant on the one hand, at the same time, relative and subjective on 
the other hand. The concept of truth is dependent on the interest of the teller, the 
purpose, the subject matter, the motive and the intended perception for the recipient of 
the truth, which will typically vary depending on some or, all of these factors. All these 
variations are subsumed in different theories and conception of truth. Expectedly, the 
victor’s truth will be different from that of the vanquished as the probability of being 
on any side of the divide is equal.  
Desmond Tutu (1998) in his opening address in the TRC report equally dealt with the 
phenomenon of truth as it applies to the work of the commission. According to him, 
However painful the experience has been, we remain convinced that there can be no 
healing without truth. However, is truth alone sufficient for healing? Arguments of 
scholars seem to suggest that truth would be capable of ensuring healing only if it is 
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accompanied by punitive justice, which seems to contradict the very essence of the 
TRC. This very realisation seems to underlie the thought of Desmond Tutu himself 
who having realised that truth was similarly capable of unearthing harsh and dangerous 
bitterness that can become a reason and source for vendetta. He, therefore, proclaimed 
that ‘his appeal to South Africans as they read the report is not to use it to attack others’ 
which is very likely especially with the hindsight of how horrifying some of the 
atrocities committed by apartheid which could not be made to fizzle away.  This 
caution would have been unnecessary if truth-telling could automatically translate to 
reconciliation. 
The significance of truth is as applicable to the criminal justice system is as much as 
it is for the TRCs. Unfortunately, while the criminal justice system relies on proofs 
beyond a reasonable doubt, in which all kinds of evidence, investigation as well as 
cross-examination techniques are employed in order to arrive at the much-needed truth. 
This is in order to avoid injustice because it does not have any form of incentive to 
induce truth-telling. This had to squeeze out, and that is not only expensive but also 
time-consuming. Sometimes it is unable to deliver the truth where that evidence is 
absent. This is unlike the TRC that trades truth-telling for freedom and as such, quite 
ahead of the criminal justice system. 
The therapeutic role of truth-telling was further demonstrated in Ariel Dorfmann 
(1991)’s play, titled; Death and the Maiden. In this play, a woman apprehended a man 
who had once raped her. She was in a position to kill him and was really instigated 
towards doing so especially when he unrepentantly, continues to deny ever raping her 
or torturing her painfully. Only when he admitted violating her that she set him free. 
His acknowledgement is reported to restore her identity and dignity therapeutically. 
While her sense of self-became affirmed’ This only confirms that mere admittance has 
the healing capacity, but the question is, does this alone apply in all situations no matter 
the gravity of the crime? No, it sometimes requires more than just truth-telling. 
Desmond Tutu  in the preamble to the Report says, 
In our case, dealing with the past means knowing what happened. Who 
ordered that this person should be killed? Why did this gross violation 
of human rights take place? We also need to know about the past so that 
we can renew our resolve and commitment that never again will such 
violations take place. We need to know about the past in order to 
establish a culture of respect for human rights. It is only by accounting 
for the past that we can become accountable for the future. For all these 
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reasons, our nation, through those who negotiated the transition from 
apartheid to democracy, chose the option of individual and not blanket 
amnesty” This is largely the role of truth in the transition to democracy. 
(TRCR. 1998: vol.1:7) 
In his analysis of the importance and role of truth in the TRC of South Africa, Desmond 
Tutu maintained “One of the criteria to be satisfied before amnesty could be granted 
was full disclosure of the truth. Freedom was granted in exchange for truth”. Is the 
question that is this not too much to trade in for truth?  Yes, the truth may have been 
exposed considerably, but it does not translate automatically to justice or 
reconciliation? As has been argued earlier, beyond truth-telling are other requirements 
that must accompany truth-telling for it to make sense. This includes remorse, regrets, 
apologies and soberness. Tutu listed the impressive and the over-celebrated long list 
of atrocities that truth has been able to uncover.  
According to Arch bishop Tutu “We know now what happened to 
Steve Biko, to the PEBCO Three, to the Cradock Four. We now 
know who ordered the Church Street bomb attack and who was 
responsible for the St James’ Church massacre. We have been able 
to exhume the remains of about fifty activists who were abducted, 
killed and buried secretly. I recall so vividly how at one of our 
hearings a mother cried out plaintively, “Please can’t you bring back 
even just a bone of my child so that I can bury him.” This is 
something we have been able to do for some families and thereby 
enabled them to experience closure. The lies and deception that were 
at the heart of apartheid - which were indeed its very essence - were 
frequently laid bare. We know now who bombed Khotso House. We 
can recall how Mr Adriaan Vlok, a former Minister of Law and 
Order, lied publicly and brazenly about this; how he unashamedly 
caused Shirley Gunn to be detained with her infant son as the one 
responsible for this act. It must be said to his credit that Mr Vlok 
apologised handsomely to Ms Gunn during his amnesty application.  
Thus, we have trodden the path urged on our people by the preamble 
to our founding Act, which called on “the need for understanding but 
not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not retaliation, a need 
for Ubuntu but not for victimisation. (TRCR,1998: vol.1: 7-8) 
7.4 What is Justice? 
The philosophical conception of this concept is as complex as the practical implication 
of the concept itself. Perhaps a simple dictionary meaning would suffice at this stage. 
The English dictionary traced the origin of the word justice to a noun meaning, the 
quality of being just; with a list of synonyms which includes, righteousness, 
equitableness, or moral rightness... The moral principle determining just conduct, or 
conformity to this principle. As manifested in conduct such as “just conduct”. The 
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expression brings to justice, connotes coming before a court for trial or to receive 
punishment for one's misdeeds: as in The murderer was brought to justice, or to do 
justice, to something, implies acting or being treated justly or fairly. (English 
Dictionary,2010) 
Similarly, Harper (2010) equally traced the origin of justice to the “mid-12c., when the 
word is conceived as being synonymous with “the exercise of authority in vindication 
of right by assigning reward or punishment;". It also connotes the "quality of being 
fair and just," The word is said to have essentially originated from the Old French word, 
“ justice”  which similarly implies not just "justice, but also legal rights and 
jurisdiction". Whereas, it is argued that at about the 11c., it was traced to the Latin 
word, “ iustitia” which connotes "righteousness or equity," and from iustus ", words 
such as upright, just" were traced. Similarly, the Old French word had widespread 
senses, including "uprightness, equity, a vindication of right, the court of justice and 
judge." The word essentially became functionally used in the English language, from 
about the c.1200 as a title for a judicial officer. Whereas, its use to Mean "right order, 
or equity" appeared at about late 14c. Justice of the peace first attested in the early 14c. 
(Harper, 2010) 
In a similar argument, Edmunds (2010)  argued extensively that the word "justice" 
featured in many of the United States' most important documents, such as the 
Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and the Pledge of Allegiance. However 
wonders why such an important concept is problematic as to its precise definition 
especially among philosophers, theologians and legislators. She was unequivocal in 
declaring that Justice is often used interchangeably with the word "fairness." Where 
ever it appears in all spheres of life. She argues that everyone wants to be treated fairly.  
Her opinion is that one should not be judged more harshly because of the colours of 
our skin and we should not be paid any less on account of our gender, as well as not 
having to wait longer for a drink because of our dressing. She went further to argue 
that we feel we deserve equal and impartial treatment in all spheres of life.  All these 
falls under the bracket of what justice entails which is why she maintains that it is as a 
result of the fact that “we have this desire for equality and fairness, that the assurance 
of justice is usually a prerequisite for a good society. For a leader to have legitimacy 
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among his or her constituents, he or she must find ways to ensure that the laws of the 
land are just and administered justly”. (Edmunds, 2010:1)   
Nevertheless, the concept of justice may be obscure in definition, but instances of 
justice and injustices are not which is why Molly Edmund became less concerned 
about definitions and took a cursory look at specific cases of injustice in history 
particularly in the US. According to her, 
history is littered with examples of governments that were unjust to 
some citizens. One such example would be the era of slavery in the 
United States. Black people weren't afforded the same rights as white 
people, and it took many years for the government to recognize black 
people as whites' equals. Such an example raises the question of what's 
to be done when an injustice is committed. Over the years, many black 
people have asked the government to make restitution for the years of 
unequal treatment that their ancestors received. When any crime or 
abuse is committed, we want justice, both for the offender and for the 
victim. For the offender, justice means that crimes don't go unpunished, 
but also that the punishment fits the crime. We treat a 13-year-old who 
stole a pack of gum differently than we treat a grown man who 
commits homicide, so justice has some flexibility in its administration. 
For a victim, justice may be seeing a criminal put behind bars, or it 
may be monetary -- the goal is to make the victim feel equal again. 
(Edmunds, 2010:1)    
The above picture painted by Molly is though, of the US but could equally pass for an 
apt description of the situation in SA under the apartheid regime, where not only were 
individuals discriminated against, there were systemic structures that tried to legitimise 
illegality by the promulgation of inhuman laws that further tore the country apart. 
Talking about justice after the demise of apartheid would not be out of place. Molly 
nevertheless affirmed that the phenomenon of justice is complex by every standard. 
Hence she argues that, 
Justice remains a hard topic to pin down because people often disagree 
over what they deserve and whether they're receiving it. In such 
disagreements, we want reasonable and impartial decisions made, 
which is why the images of justice personified often include a 
blindfold. We want blind justice to the extent that such a thing is 
possible. And when people feel that they aren't getting their due, then 
society may become unstable. As proof, witness events like the French 
Revolution, civil rights marches and the fights over universal health 
care. (Edmunds, 2010:1)    
Similarly, Molly was not alone, another thunderous voice on the question of justice is 
that of Pomerleau,  (2005) who describes Justice as one of the most important moral 
and political concepts in western thoughts.  He argues that justice comes from the Latin 
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word,  jus, meaning right or law. This was corroborated by  The Oxford English 
Dictionary which went further to defines a “just” person as one who characteristically 
“does what is morally right” and is disposed to “giving everyone his or her due,”. This 
bit sounds Socratic and platonic, but added to it,  the word “fair” as a synonym for 
justice. According, to Pomerleau, getting beyond,  etymology and dictionary 
definitions, was a priority for, “philosophers who want to consider, for instance, the 
nature of justice, first  as  a desirable quality of political society, and as a moral virtue 
of character  as well as how it applies to ethical and social decision-making.” 
(Pomerleau, 2005:1)  
nevertheless, the above conception of justice is crucial to the extent that, it is only 
within moral philosophy that it is possible to justify why retributive justice should give 
way to restorative justice because the former encourages retaliation or an eye for an 
eye which is considered immoral. It was a principle that made Socrates submit to death 
than to engage in the same act of immorality by escaping judgment when he was 
condemned unjustly by the Athenian state.  
What then is justice to these western philosophers? It is sufficient at this stage to adopt 
the summary of Pomerleau, (2005) who undertook a cursory journey into the history 
of western philosophy as far as the concept of justice was concerned. It gives a 
panoramic view of the idea of the synchronic and diachronic analysis of this concept 
and its implication for contemporary application and understanding. In the words of 
Pomerleau, (2005), 
 “For Plato, justice is a virtue establishing rational order, with each part 
performing its appropriate role and not interfering with the proper 
functioning of other parts. Aristotle says justice consists in what is 
lawful and fair, with fairness involving equitable distributions and the 
correction of what is inequitable.  For Augustine, the cardinal virtue of 
justice requires that we try to give all people their due; for Aquinas, 
justice is that rational mean between opposite sorts of injustice, 
involving proportional distributions and reciprocal 
transactions.  Hobbes believed justice is an artificial virtue, necessary 
for civil society, a function of the voluntary agreements of the social 
contract; for Hume, justice essentially serves public utility by protecting 
property (broadly understood).  For Kant, it is a virtue whereby we 
respect others’ freedom, autonomy, and dignity by not interfering with 
their voluntary actions, so long as those do not violate others’ rights; 
Mill said justice is a collective name for the most important social 
utilities, which are conducive to fostering and protecting human 
liberty.  Rawls analyzed justice in terms of maximum equal liberty 
regarding basic rights and duties for all members of society, with socio-
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economic inequalities requiring moral justification in terms of equal 
opportunity and beneficial results for all; and various post-Rawlsian 
philosophers develop alternative conceptions. Western philosophers 
generally regard justice as the most fundamental of all virtues for 
ordering interpersonal relations and establishing and maintaining a 
stable political society.  By tracking the historical interplay of these 
theories, what will be advocated is a developing understanding of justice 
in terms of respecting persons as free, rational agents.  One may 
disagree about the nature, basis, and legitimate application of justice, 
but this is its core. (Pomerleau, 2005:1)  
The complexity of justice is made more explicit here as everything mentioned above 
as justice is mostly often traditionally associated with fairness or impartiality. It is, in 
fact, a two-way relationship comprising of offence on the one hand and a 
commensurate punishment on the other hand. It is when this process is completed that 
it is believed that justice has been achieved. This is symbolised by the image of the 
lady of justice where the blindfold represents impartiality and equality of persons 
irrespective of status. The weighing scale determines the gravity of the offence in order 
to apportion commensurate punishment to the crime whose weight on the scale is the 
determinant factor and the sword, which represents the punishment. However, the 
question of justice is not only complex but complicated. This legalistic form of justice 
is founded on the principle of revenge or more like it, the Mosaic Law, which 
advocates an “ eye for an eye”  and a tooth for a tooth.  
This underlying principle of justice is becoming unfashionable, particularly by states 
in transition and societies that are perpetrating gross human right abuses and war 
crimes.  Hence the argument of scholars that such principles of “an eye for an eye” 
ends up creating a world full of blind and toothless people. This thinking is evident in 
Louis Fischer (1950) in “The Life of Mahatma Gandhi” wherein he argues that it is 
impossible to inject new ideas into a man’s head by chopping the head off; neither will 
you infuse a new spirit into his heart by piercing it with a dagger. Fischer (1950). 
In a similar argument, King (2010) who having been influenced by Gandhian ideals, 
argues that violence as a way of achieving racial justice does not only lack practicality, 
it is also immoral for being systematically and devastatingly destructive. That is why 
the old principle of retaliation further considered immoral because it seeks to humiliate 
the opponent rather than win his understanding; also,  it seeks to annihilate rather than 
to convert. King, (2010).  These are clearly in opposition to what the TRC stands for 
as pronounced by Desmond Tutu. Unfortunately, our contemporary legal system is 
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based on this form of justice, which is by nature, punitive or retributive. Over time, 
this form of justice has been criticised not only for being expensive and regimental but 
also unethical, laborious, and complicated in its functionality with the result that 
sometimes it is incapable of delivering justice, mainly because it is precipitated on the 
principle of revenge. It is not, therefore surprising that SA covertly rejected justice and 
overtly embraced compromise by adopting restorative justice in place of retributive 
justice. 
There is evidence to suggest that the satisfaction people get under retributive justice 
after the judgement is not mainly dependent on the restoration of any loss, but the 
human desire to see people suffer through the act of vengeance even when it has no 
bearing on resituating their loss. This view seems to be corroborated by Phelps (2004), 
who argues that “the thinking behind TRC is essentially that which is intended to halt 
“disorder and destructiveness of private revenge”. The onus was therefore on the state 
to go all out to convince the people that, “private revenge was not only imprudent but 
also evil”. Hence,  Phelps (2004) argues further that duality was created which puts 
revenge and justice into a false opposition in which revenge was not only completely 
condemned, even the feeling of desiring revenge in any shape or form, was considered 
“immoral and excessive”. They maintained that arrogating such responsibility to the 
state, attracted all manners of moral and religious arguments aimed at contradicting it. 
This did not erase the powerful desire for revenge, even if undercover. She argues, that 
“Revenge is deeply rooted in human need and cannot be moralised away. Even then, 
the retributive form of justice is not in support of private revenge either, but state 
revenge. The question then, is why revenge in any form considered inappropriate? 
What is the alternative to it? Under what theoretical principle can this be justified? 
Therefore, with the situation becoming clearer that the legalistic form of justice might 
ultimately be incapable of delivering fairness, yet there is no guarantee that it is the 
restorative system that could sufficiently deliver it. Unfortunately, the contemporary 
voice against retributive justice seem louder, and that is why most contemporary 
tribunals turn to Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs). Over and above  
Crime Tribunals. (Phelps, 2004)  
However, the theme of justice is the most central to all these commissions. It is, in fact, 
the catalyst for so many other questions concerning whether fairness has been achieved 
or not. Also, by what standard or criteria or by whom among others pervades this issue 
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of fairness and justice. Thus, scholars have argued that no other concern has 
superseded that of justice when the issue of Truth Commissions are considered. (Cf. 
Roht-Arriaza 1995; Landman 1996; Kaye 1997; Nino 1996; Minow 1998; Neier 1998; 
Ball 1999; Popkin 2000; Rotberg and Thompson 2000).  
Hence to some scholars, the appropriate response to the perpetrators of human rights 
abuses, ethnic cleansing, violence and genocide, cannot be anything short of criminal 
proceedings. This has to be by some sort of tribunal, or an international court of law 
that is permitted to do so in order to establish justiciable findings on any such matters, 
give, and at the same time render punishments as appropriate.  (Avruch and Vejarano, 
2002). 
These Scholars have variously argued that truth commissions in all its forms are 
incapable of delivering legalistic justice. Hence the focus of these scholars shifted to 
what they call quasi-justice forms, some of which includes “transitional justice,” 
“restorative justice,” or “retroactive justice,”. The ultimate aim of these justices is to 
move away from strictly the criminal justice system that is based on  − retributive 
justice − and then move toward “truth-seeking” as well as reconciliation, Kritz 
1995:Assefa 1993; 1997; Nino :Hurley 1994; McAdams 1996; Little 1999; Hayner 
2001; Rotberg and Thompson 2000; Tutu 2000).  
Hence it is argued that these alternative forms of justices only indicates that the work 
of truth commissions lies midway between “vengeance and forgiveness.”  Martha 
Minow’s (1998). 
This is why so many controversies and passion, surrounds the functioning of these 
commissions by different parties, especially as it concerns the tension existing between 
the two opposing poles of this continuum: they maintained that there is the natural 
human tendency to impose vengeance or to offer forgiveness,  for gross human 
violation. The struggle has to do as well with arguments about whether the concept of 
“justice” and “truth” are related” or not, and this debate has dominated scholarship in 
this area for a while. Avruch  and  Vejarano  (2002)  
In the case of South Africa, Desmond Tutu vehemently argued in defence of the kind 
of justice sought by the TRC of South Africa in the face of growing criticism about its 
amnesty provision.  According to him, " we have trodden the path urged on our people 
by the preamble to our founding Act, which called on “the need for understanding but 
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not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not retaliation, a need for Ubuntu but not 
for victimisation.”  Tutu expatiated his argument by maintaining that ‘ Those who have 
cared about the future of our South Africa have been worried that the amnesty 
provision might, amongst other things, encourage impunity because it seemed to 
sacrifice justice. However, he says this belief, is incorrect because not only does the 
amnesty applicant need to admit responsibility for the act for which he is seeking 
amnesty, the application is dealt with in a public hearing. Apart from the most 
exceptional circumstances, but the applicant must make his admissions in the full glare 
of publicity. (TRCR, 1998: vol.1:8) 
 Desmond Tutu further argues; “Let us imagine what this means. Often 
this is the first time that an applicant’s family and community learn that 
an apparently decent man was, for instance, a callous torturer or a member 
of a ruthless death squad that assassinated many opponents of the 
previous regime. There is, therefore, a price to be paid. Public disclosure 
results in public shaming, and sometimes a marriage may be a sad 
casualty as well. We have been concerned; too, that many consider only 
one aspect of justice. Certainly, amnesty cannot be viewed as justice if 
we think of justice only as retributive and punitive in nature. We believe, 
however, that there is another kind of justice - a restorative justice which 
is concerned not so much with punishment as with correcting imbalances, 
restoring broken relationships – with healing, harmony and reconciliation. 
Such justice focuses on the experience of victims; hence the importance 
of reparation. (TRCR, 1998vol.1::9) 
From Tutu’s submission, above, it is clear that the South African TRC ‘s mechanism 
of operation at returning peace and stability to SA, is in fact, what it considers as a 
higher form of justice and not impunity which in this case is restorative as against 
retributive justice. Moreover, the need for understanding is imperative in achieving 
this form of justice. It is a form of understanding that transcends vengeance. This 
brings us to the issue of Truth-telling and compensation rather than victimisation. The 
concept of payment still underlies the Tutu’s agenda in that he argues that the very act 
of public confession that tends to bring some form of psychological embarrassment or 
humiliation is its self a form of payment for the wrong done. The question then, is that, 
could this be considered sufficient and commensurate with the atrocities committed? 
If not, is it still justice? What about the perception of the victims themselves? Is it 
essential in granting of amnesty?  This inevitably leads us to the concept of forgiveness 
within the confines of absoluteness in the journey towards democratisation.  
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7.5 The Culture of Ubuntu and its Relevance to Truth and Justice 
Scholars have similarly argued comprehensively that the theme of culture is not as 
central as those of justice, truth, reconciliation, and democratisation. The Christian 
value of forgiveness that features in many other religions dominated the argument of 
Hope (1987). However, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was 
from the outset criticised for being too Christian in outlook argues Mark Hay (1999). 
Nonetheless, Desmond Tutu associated the Christian basis of reconciliation with the 
African value of “Ubuntu”, This perhaps, is because there is only so far that the 
Christian doctrine can go in achieving the overall objective of the TRC if it is not 
supported by another phenomenon that can justifiably move the society forward where 
the Christian one capitulates. There are other scholars such as Wilson (2000), who in 
the local Lekgotla or township courts, provided an alternative notion of justice for the 
human rights abuses that took place under Apartheid. This is a new notion of justice 
that is opposed to the restorative kind of justice upon which the TRC is based. It is a 
kind of justice that calls for both punishment and retribution. Whatever the diversities, 
Wilson’s model may not be feasible in South Africa, given the historical antecedents 
surrounding how South Africa got that far. This is mostly so because it is not a process 
resulting from defeat but negotiation. 
The reference to culture is intended to draw attention to the fact that notions such “as 
justice, truth, forgiveness, reconciliation, and accountability – to mention just a few 
are often socially constructed and culturally constituted. Different modalities for 
“Western”  and Islamic cultures around such principal ideas as justice, peace, 
reconciliation, contrition and forgiveness have already been established by research in 
conflict resolution. Hence, there is no reason to think that cultural differences stop 
there. Arguing further, these scholars maintained that despite the preceding, further 
research suggests that no matter the value of these commissions, “they will 
undoubtedly face new sets of challenges whenever they seek to work to ascertain 
truth(s). Again when they seek to effect a reconciliation, in cultural settings that are 
outside their purview. Especially when they seek to do their work across significant 
cultural borders and even beyond. ( Avruch and Vejarano: 2002)   
Having considered, all forms of religious and academic cultures of societal peace and  
stability, as well as those of reconciliation that have existed both in ancient and 
contemporary times, we found out that a significant problem that seems to negate true 
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and genuine societal peace and harmony, truth and reconciliation is the absence of a 
unidirectional principle of justice. This also includes the principle of peace,  of stability, 
of harmony, of forgiveness, of unity and so on that transcends the two-way economics 
of trade; the type that does not involve giving and receiving.  This was a search for 
pure giving that is detached from the expectation of anything in return. Such a type 
proved quite elusive. It appears that the very nature of the universe and its operational 
laws are in duplicates and mostly in opposites of twos as in good and bad, male and 
female, day and night, positive and negative, ups and downs, giving and receiving to 
mention just a few. Unfortunately, this thinking creates a limitation that makes it 
difficult for anyone to see the reasonable link between truth-telling and genuine 
forgiveness and subsequently, reconciliation in particular until we stumbled on the 
South African concept of Ubuntu.  
Ubuntu was tied to the Christian conception to produce results. Unlike the Christian 
doctrine, Ubuntu is pure giving without receiving. Although it sounds Derridean which 
seem to exist only ideologically but non-existent practically because for him, pure 
forgiveness is only possible where it is impossible to forgive. Again the Derridean pure 
giving without receiving is absolute. Unfortunately, the rhetorics that brought peace to 
SA was a deconstruction of the absolute. However, in the case of Ubuntu, it involves 
pure forgiveness of the self that contains within itself, the all-encompassing and 
inclusive moral philosophy of humanness. Ubuntu is a self-subsisting entity that fuses 
individualism and collectivism as one whole. It is a unifying order of ones. It is a 
holistic philosophy of integration, peace and justice of a higher order that is devoid of 
the economics of trade. It appears to be a philosophy that harnesses both absolute and 
relative phenomenon. 
What is “Ubuntu”? just like most philosophical concepts, it is a phenomenon difficult 
to define. It appears safer to describe its features and principles. However, due to the 
elastic nature of the concept, the strict definition can be tasking because definitions by 
their nature, could be defective in the sense that they could either be too narrow or too 
broad. Hence, JY Mokgoro, in his work titled, Ubuntu and the law in South Africa, 
chose to avoid such unnecessary academic pitfall by taking to description than a 
definition.  According to Mokgoro (1998), the concept of ubuntu “has also been 
described as a philosophy of life. It is a philosophy which in its most fundamental 
sense represents personhood, humanity, humaneness and morality. It is a philosophy 
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that encompasses ‘a metaphor that describes group solidarity where such group 
solidarity is central to the survival of communities with a scarcity of resources,and the 
fundamental belief is that “motho ke motho ba batho ba bangwe/umuntu ngumuntu 
ngabantu”  which, literally translated, means a person can only be a person through 
others. In other words, the individual’s whole existence is relative to that of the group: 
this is manifested in anti-individualistic conduct towards the survival of the group if 
the individual is to survive. It is a basically humanistic orientation towards fellow 
beings’.   Mokgoro (1998:2)  It is a philosophy that collapses both the zoe and bios of 
Agamben into one whole single entity. It fuses the individual interest with that of the 
state in a manner that it supports a unidimensional agenda that is devoid of dissenting 
voices. 
From the above we can deduce that such humanistic orientation has unconditional 
forgiveness within its fabrics and averse to retaliation since the individual is an integral 
part and extension of the whole, they are therefore not two different entities. Hence, 
vengeance is inconsistent with Ubuntu, since it would naturally involve two different 
entities, whereas Ubuntu recognises just one entity that all are participants in.  
Retaliation and harm to one is harm to all and one’s self. The individual does not exist 
outside the group, nor does the group exist outside the individual.  
In furthering his analysis, Mokgoro (1998) maintains that “ ubuntuism is a social 
ideology”  that guarantees the quality of the essence of being human, which 
progressively manifests in degrees and separates men and women from beasts. Hence, 
it is seen as a philosophy of becoming. Which they prefer to call potential of being 
human. This potential, according to him, “can fluctuate from the lowest to the highest 
level during one’s lifetime, where there is constant harmony between the physicality 
and spirituality of life. That harmony is achieved through close and sympathetic social 
relations within the group – thus the notion “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu/motho ke 
motho ka batho ba bangwe,” which also implies that during one’s life-time, one is 
constantly challenged by others, practically, to achieve self-fulfillment through a set 
of collective social ideals. Because the African worldview cannot be neatly categorised 
and defined, in straight-jacketed terms. Hence, any definition would either be too 
simplistic or too extensive. (Mokgoro ,1998:2-3) 
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Further analysis reveals that to have the quality of harmonisation between the physical 
and the spiritual means that ubuntuism is a philosophy of reconciliation that transcends 
the peripheral official forgiveness that is detached from the individual one.  It is, in 
fact, a profoundly convergent philosophy of progression from individualism to 
collectivism that manifests itself in the process of forgiveness and reconciliation which 
is inherently entrenched within and without than it is of mere tolerance which is 
cosmetic and elastic in nature. In which case, Tutu’s definition of reconciliation, which 
implies mere civility, would not apply to Ubuntu. Forgiveness within the philosophy 
of Ubuntu would, of course, be more grounded, and more sophisticated such that it is 
much more real and devoid of any form of artificiality or cosmetic resolution whose 
sustainability beyond the immediate is in doubt.   
Furthermore, in his exposition of the contemporary relevance of Ubuntu to modern 
state apparatus, Mokgoro (1998) maintains that Ubuntu is the founding or underlying 
value of the democracy. It is established by this new Constitution, through the 
institution of human dignity, equality, human rights and freedoms within multi-party 
democracy to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness as well as the rule 
of law. It coincides with some of the main values of ubuntu(ism). Such values include 
those of human dignity, self-respect, inclusivity, compassionate concern for others. It 
also includes honesty and conventionality. Furthermore, the values of ubuntu as an 
agent of collective unity and group solidarity can transform into the spirit of national 
unification and accord, which is anticipated concerning the post-apartheid South 
African society. The group solidarity, collective unity,  and conformity tendencies of 
Ubuntu can largely be coupled to promote a new loyalty and personal stewardship. 
(mokgoro :1998) 
It is therefore clear that Ubuntu epitomises the fundamental basis of the principles of 
unqualified forgiveness, of a higher level of justice that is devoid of both legalism, 
retaliation and genuine reconciliation. The type that could not find a logical and 
coherent basis in both Christian theology and circular proclamations. It is manifestly 
rooted in the infinite, limitless and inclusive manifestation of the moral philosophy of 
“Ubuntu”. The idea of “becoming” in Ubuntuism is synonymous not only with the 
phenomenon of dialectics that is in motion with a purposeful goal of perfection but it 
is also similar to the Aristotelian conception of “being” where he demands that the 
human being must be analysed through its natural propensities, capabilities and 
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possibilities. It is within this triadic relation, between actuality, potentiality and activity, 
that Ubuntuism finds relevance. Hence Ubuntu is not just a philosophy of the 
immediate; it is equally that of the on-going and of course, the future. To that extent, 
potently capable of addressing the South African atrocities of the past, contemporary 
reconciliation and smooth transition to democracy as well as the futuristic harmony 
and stability of the South African State. 
Just as it has been discussed elaborately above, Ubuntu is an African moral principle 
of unity and togetherness based on the idea that you are only human because the other 
person is human and that it is through other people’s humanity that you find your own 
existence of humanity. It is a tautological principle of all belonging to all and operating 
within the same structure. It is an advanced principle of oneness that does not 
accommodate retaliation, 
Nevertheless, Ubuntu is not a stagnant, obsolete philosophy but that which 
accommodates ancient, modernisation and contemporary ideals and goals of human 
perfection with its underlying principle of humanness, collectivism and becoming. Its 
idea of non-retaliation finds a parallel in the Socratic philosophy of the avoidance of 
double negation. A principle that forbids retaliation since it was better to suffer 
injustice than to perpetrate one, especially as it is better to submit to an unjust death 
sentence than to perpetuate an unjust escape. It upholds that Illegality cannot be used 
to redress illegality; otherwise, it would lead society to endless calamities of reprisals. 
This is a philosophy, which Israel and Palestine can learn from. All these have been 
carefully synthesised in the Desmond Tutu’s proclamation that, South Africans should 
embrace restorative rather than a retributive form of justice. 
7.6 Truth without justice 
Truth without justice is one of the seven cardinal paradoxes that were at the base of 
the South African peace process. Just as in the others, this too sounds absurd, 
unfortunately, the circumstance in SA could only succumb to this absurdity for peace 
to return to SA. Again as in other cases, Truth without justice does not presuppose 
Truth with no justice at all. It is only suggestive of the fact that the justice in question 
is a qualified one. It does not have all the paraphernalia of full-fledged justice. It has 
been deconstructed, and what was left was not allowed any political expression that 
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could be inimical to the overall objective of societal peace and stability in post-
apartheid SA. 
The enabling act of the TRC posits that to move the Society forward, the truth about 
all human right violations must be publicly told and that way, it helps some so achieve 
closures and the perpetrator, in turn, gets amnesty in exchange for the truth. These 
were no easy pathways, it was difficult to navigate, but with a clear focus, the desired 
result of societal peace and stability was achievable. This was evident in the 
submission of Desmond Tutu in the TRC report. Where he said that “  
We should accept that truth has emerged even though it has initially 
alienated people from one another. The truth can be, and often is, divisive. 
However, it is only on the basis of truth that true reconciliation can take 
place. True reconciliation is not easy; it is not cheap. We have been 
amazed at some almost breath-taking examples of reconciliation that have 
happened through the Commission. Examples abound in the chapter on 
reconciliation. I want to make a heartfelt plea to my white fellow South 
Africans. On the whole we have been exhilarated by the magnanimity of 
those who should by rights be consumed by bitterness and a lust for 
revenge; who instead have time after time shown an astonishing 
magnanimity and willingness to forgive. It is not easy to forgive, but we 
have seen it happen. And some of those who have done so are white 
victims. Nevertheless, the bulk of victims have been black and I have 
been saddened by what has appeared to be a mean-spiritedness in some 
of the leadership in the white community. They should be saying: “How 
fortunate we are that these people do not want to treat us as we treated 
them. How fortunate that things have remained much the same for us 
except for the loss of some political power.(TRCR,1998:vol.1 :17 ) 
The narrative here is that of “truth without justice” the very idea of Truth that lacks 
justice took its source from the amnesty provision of the TRC where amnesty is 
granted to perpetrators of human right violation in exchange for telling the truth of 
heinous crimes committed under the immunity of apartheid. The greatest bashing that 
the commission got was in granting amnesty for the so-called truth which was not 
truths in the proper sense of it. However,   In Archbishop Desmond Tutu,s did his best 
to defend this by arguing that, 
had the miracle of the negotiated settlement not occurred, we would 
have been overwhelmed by the bloodbath that virtually everyone 
predicted as the inevitable ending of South Africa”…“There is no 
doubt that members of the security establishment would have 
scuppered the negotiated settlement had they thought they were going 
to run the gauntlet of trials for their involvement in past violations. 
(TRCR,1998:vol.1:5)  
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The impression here is that of overpriced transition and underlying it is concepts such 
as compromise, non-trial, impunity, and amnesty. These are secondary themes 
underlying the broader agenda of the commission, which is nation-building and 
societal unification. That again can be linked directly to such main themes such as 
Truth, Justice and forgiveness. These four sub-elements are clearly associated with 
forgiveness and forgiveness is no justice. 
Nevertheless, the architects of the TRC found the magic of societal stability buried 
within the confines of this politicised phenomenon of forgiveness whereas the large 
percentage of South Africans saw the commission as one of redress for justice. While 
admitting the narrative encapsulated by these elements of forgiveness, Tutu 
maintained that within the concept of moral philosophy as against legal philosophy, 
the TRC built a profound theory of societal peace not on injustice, but a higher form 
of justice known as restorative justice. Its focus is on the restoration of one’s dignity 
and humanity as against the legal justice based on the principle of retribution. The tool 
to achieve this is “truth”. How convincing this narrative is, remains debatable. 
However, through both CDA and Agamben, we were able to infer that the idea of 
justice here was probably a smokescreen, The critical element was amnesty and the 
choice of “truth” being what the perpetrators were to give to earn amnesty, was to 
avoid a situation where they will appear not to give anything before they got amnesty. 
Even members of the commission were not allowed to tamper with this idea of amnesty. 
Ultimately, Truths were given, the very act of amnesty denied justice, though, in the 
interest of societal peace and stability. The TRCR says “One of the criteria to be 
satisfied before amnesty could be granted full disclosure of the truth. Freedom was 
granted in exchange for truth. ”(TRCR,1998: vol.1:5) The word exchange here gives 
the impression of barter or equality, and it underscores the idea of justice if mere truth-
telling was sufficient condition for amnesty. There is some form of moral economies 
at play here? How justified is such a trade-off? What is the moral implication of 
confessing the truth to get freedom? Whereas in the legal justice system, confessing to 
gross misconduct and murder of such magnitude only reduces the time wasted on 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt but does not absorb the offender from punishment. 
Tutu argues “ We have, through these means, been able to uncover much of what 
happened in the past” The dominant discourse as represented by Tutu here, seem to 
be “Truth-telling” in the interest of reconciliation and societal stability founded on the 
 
 
229 
 
principle of forgiveness rather than that of justice. Other themes covered here include 
that of trauma, agony, gruesome murder, then of course apology, understanding, 
vengeance, reparation, retaliation and victimisation. 
There seems to be an attempt to over celebrate and blow up the idea of truth-telling to 
a magnificent proportion, deliberately to swell it up and make it look larger than life 
in order to make it sound worthy enough to attract amnesty. 
The lies and deception that were at the heart of apartheid - which were 
indeed its very essence - were frequently laid bare. We know now who 
bombed Khotso House. We can recall how Mr Adriaan Vlok, a former 
Minister of Law and Order, lied publicly and brazenly about this; how 
he unashamedly caused Shirley Gunn to be detained with her infant 
son as the one responsible for this act. It must be said to his credit that 
Mr Vlok apologised handsomely to Ms Gunn during his amnesty 
application. Thus, we have trodden the path urged on our people by 
the preamble to our founding Act, which called on “the need for 
understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not 
retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimisation. (TRCR,1998: 
vol.1:31-32)  
However, Desmond Tutu in the above quotation tried to over celebrate the idea of 
truth-telling. It can not be an error of commission. It is part of the padding strategy to 
show the larger than life part of the narrative that makes confession massive so that 
the benefit that is too large for it would not be seen in that light. We notice that there 
is a rhetorical repetition of “we know now” …which seem to be part of the package 
to make truthtelling a sufficient end in itself and render the idea of justice subservient 
to it. On the part of Tutu to overemphasise the role of truth and revelation over and 
above justice in the journey towards unification and societal stability was a necessity.  
This is undoubtedly an epistemological framework being applied here instead of an 
ethical one which would have emphasised justice over compromise. The same 
argument of artificial balance and unbiased approach nullifies the argument of just war, 
for freedom fighters and puts everyone on the same pedestal; be it, the aggressor or 
aggressed. It was the same line of thought being expressed at the opening of Tutu’s 
forward when he talks of “our children of all races”  Tutu employs epistemological 
tools here because it makes him stand aloof to achieve his goal. 
Moreover, Epistemology being a purely descriptive activity perfectly does the job for 
Tutu who as a priest should ordinarily follow the moral route, but the objective of the 
TRC would not permit that. What one discovers is that Tutu became selective in what 
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he professes. Religious morality when it suits his agenda and epistemological one, 
when morality will derail his objective. Maybe a Machiavellian approach we would 
say. Nevertheless, it seems quite Agamben who would deconstruct and push anything 
that will stand against the primary objective out to the realm of zoe by depoliticising 
it and rendering it impotent or less lethal. 
Furthermore, we shall observe that there were astonishing truths that are difficult to 
reconcile without getting people involved to pay for it through prosecution. Also, such 
created so much anger that impact on the integrity of the commission, which seems to 
give them the image of paper tigers or just a backbiting dog. They were seen as nothing 
short of mere window dressings because it appears that they lack any real independent 
powers of effecting change. This was expressed in different forms that are suggestive 
of encouraging impunity, except when one is thoroughly schooled in the understanding 
of the philosophical undertones that animates the TRC. Hence, the song of impunity 
and injustices was sung all over the place. 
 Can we imagine the anger that has been caused by the disclosures 
that the previous government had a Chemical and Biological 
Warfare Programme with projects that allegedly targeted only black 
people, and allegedly sought to poison President Nelson Mandela 
and reduce the fertility of black women? Should our land not be 
overwhelmed by black fury leading to orgies of revenge, turning us 
into a Bosnia, a Northern Ireland or a Sri Lanka? Dear fellow South 
Africans, please try to bring yourselves to respond with a like 
generosity and magnanimity. When one confesses, one confesses 
only one’s own sins, not those of another. When a husband wants to 
make up with his wife, he does not say, “I’m sorry, please forgive 
me, but darling of course you too have done so and so!” That is not 
the way to reach reconciliation. That is why I still hope that there 
will be a white leader who will say, “We had an evil system with 
awful consequences. Please forgive us.” Without qualification. If 
that were to happen, we would all be amazed at the response. 
(TRCR,1998: vol. 1:18) 
It must be clearly stated here that the narrative in which confession of the truth is 
equated to a form of punishment seems deliberately created to checkmate the hardcore 
South Africans who are not persuaded by anything short of retributive justice. Again,  
there is also the element of what we in the philosophy of logic calls “argumentum ad 
baculum “ built into the narrative which inevitably shows that the TRC were hand 
twisted or had no choice but to accept the restorative , non- punitive approach, against 
the popular clamour for retributive justice. This is because the concentration and 
balance of power of state machinery, and the monopoly of the use of force as at the 
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time of negotiation remain potently under the control of the perpetrators. They could 
derail the process for reason of self-preservation if it is suspected that the policy of 
vengeance or retributive justice was possibly going to be explored. This is what Tutu 
expressed in the excerpt below, where salient threats, mechanical caution and prudence 
dictated the conformist trend that featured at the negotiations. 
In his judgement in the case brought by AZAPO and others against 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Judge Mahomed, then 
Deputy President of the Constitutional Court and now our Chief 
Justice, quoted Judge Marvin Frankel. In his book, Out of the 
Shadows of the Night: The Struggle for International Human Rights, 
Judge Frankel wrote: The call to punish human rights criminals can 
present complex and agonising problems that have no single or 
simple solution. While the debate over the Nuremberg trials still 
goes on, that episode - trials of war criminals of a defeated nation - 
was simplicity itself as compared to the subtle and dangerous issues 
that can divide a country when it undertakes to punish its own 
violators. A nation divided during a repressive regime does not 
emerge suddenly united when the time of repression has passed. The 
human rights criminals are fellow citizens, living alongside 
everyone else, and they may be very powerful and dangerous. If the 
army and police have been the agencies of terror, the soldiers and 
the cops aren’t going to turn overnight into paragons of respect for 
human rights. Their numbers and their expert management of deadly 
weapons remain significant facts of life.... The soldiers and police 
may be biding their time, waiting and conspiring to return to power. 
They may be seeking to keep or win sympathisers in the population 
at large. If they are treated too harshly - or if the net of punishment 
is cast too widely - there may be a backlash that plays into their hands. 
But their victims cannot simply forgive and forget. 
(TRCR,1998:vol.1:.6) 
It must equally be emphasised here that the narrative under review; “Truth without 
Justice” is one of the strongest pillars on which the South African societal peace and 
stability was built. The truth was made the independent variable while justice was the 
dependent variable. In Agamben’s philosophy, any variable that was going to disturb 
achieving the primary objective must be deconstructed and fragmented into bits where 
its potency to derail the process is reduced if not completely terminated. In this case, 
the search for justice was going to prevent anyone from coming to confess the truth 
for fear of prosecution.  However, hearing the truth was beneficial to make closures. 
Hence justice had to be deconstructed in a way that it does not affect the truth from 
being told. How was this done? Justice was redefined. Restorative justice took the 
place of retributive justice. Amnesty was to be granted to all that come out to say the 
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truth no matter how ugly it is or its manner of rendition. This was part of the narrative 
that returned stability to South Africa. It was “truth without justice.” 
 In SA, there was a frantic search for Truth. Unfortunately, it was not the kind of Truth 
that would be used to bring about retributive justice.  It was a self-sufficient truth. The 
kind that was an end in itself. Its role is therapeutic and mostly helps in achieving 
“closure” In the light of  Agamben’s philosophy, even if this truth was incapable of 
bringing about justice, it was not invariably bringing about injustice either. The 
narrative; without justice does not mean the absence of justice altogether; it only refers 
to a softer and more ethical form of justice that is selectively modulated and moderated 
in such a way that it does not disturb truth. It is a kind of justice that is stripped of its 
bios by not being given any political voice. It is bare-justice, and bare justice here is 
what Tutu refers to as restorative justice. It is chosen in the interest of overall societal 
peace and stability. It is a kind of justice that rises above the conventional principle of 
retaliation. It is not the type based on the mosaic principle of “an eye for an eye” Hence, 
Retributive justice is a deconstructed to give way to restorative justice. 
 As mentioned, earlier, for those recalcitrant South Africans who insists on retributive 
justice, the narrative had to equate confession of truth to the punishment of some sort 
simply to obliterate the question of impunity. In the words of the commission, as it 
tries to develop the narrative where a perpetrator is meant to publicly admit that he had 
hitherto been beastly, contrary to previous notions of him. This amounts to 
psychological torture for the confessor, and this cannot be anything short of 
punishment for crimes committed under apartheid. Whether this is commensurate with 
the offence committed is a different thing, the fact remains that he has committed an 
offence and he has been made to pay for it publicly. It is part of the agenda to 
dismember justice or in a way, to deface it until it no longer poses a threat to truth.  
Bishop Tutu includes, in his narrative, the options available to the TRC; outside the 
criminal justice system, and the incentive for Truth-telling. It is interesting also to note 
the gradual departure from convention and a redefinition of concepts and ideas which 
may truly have been why the TRC succeeded in turning such an intractable conflict as 
that of SA to a tractable one.  For instance, there seems to be an over celebration of 
the concept of truth as distinct from that of justice;  This is an interesting thought 
provoking dichotomy that is worth remarking, especially when we realise that truth 
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and justice have been hitherto commonly regarded as a dyad. In the words of Arch 
Bishop Desmond Tutu,  
legal proceedings rely on proof beyond reasonable doubt, the criminal 
justice system is not the best way to arrive at the truth. There is no 
incentive for perpetrators to tell the truth and often the court must 
decide between the word of one victim against the evidence of many 
perpetrators. Such legal proceedings are also harrowing experiences 
for victims, who are invariably put through extensive cross-
examination. (TRCR,1998:vol.1:6) 
There is an interesting twist to the question of the search for truth. It is argued that 
confession alone humbles people and demystifies them. Again, the systematic 
operationalisation of apartheid with its divide and rule policy was brought to its height 
through destructive policies implemented by infiltrating the black community and 
exploiting the differences between the Xhosa people and the Zulu, the ANC and IFP, 
widening the gap between them and promoting greater animosity, not only among its 
people but also among its leaders. This commission in its pursuit of Truth but without 
justice, ensured that such leadership-followership complicity was exposed, although 
with no clear-cut consequences for leaders who gave instruction for gross violations 
and stood aloof at such time of reckoning, to abandon their foot soldiers.  It was not a 
weakness that such leaders got off the hook “casting the net too wide” in the words of 
Tutu, could derail the entire peace process. Hence implementing the narrative of truth 
without justice, helps to reveal the complicity, but that was all. Bringing such great 
men to judgement was cautiously approached. Such was the narrative espoused below 
in the following excerpt.  
From another side of the conflict comes the position of the president 
of the IFP, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. On no occasion has the IFP’s 
leadership ever made any decision anywhere at any time to use 
violence for political purposes. I have always abhorred violence now 
and will die abhorring violence. I personally have never made any 
decision to employ violence anywhere for any purpose whatsoever… 
By contrast, here are extracts from statements by Inkatha members 
applying for amnesty on grounds of numerous murders: Mr Wills: 
Now what was the purpose of this training? Mr Hlongwane: It was to 
protect IFP or areas controlled by Chiefs, as well as to kill the 
ANC…IFP member, Mr Dlamini, said: I will say that it is painful to 
me that after all these activities that we committed that people should 
deny our existence and call us criminals. When I went for training at 
Caprivi, nobody called me a criminal. When I killed people here, I 
was not called a criminal. Today they do call us criminals and deny 
knowledge of our activities and ourselves. No IFP leader is prepared 
to stand before this Commission and admit to these activities. We 
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decided among ourselves to expose these activities. We in fact were 
not mad persons who just took weapons and started shooting people 
at random. Therefore it hurts me very much for the IFP to desert us 
and say that they do not know anything about us – when they know 
that they were in fact responsible for all these things. (TRCR,1998: 
vol.5: 264- 265) 
In furtherance to how the Truth without justice was implemented, There were carefully 
selected words, innuendos and euphemisms that were employed to tone down the 
impact of gross violations which were confessed to, but in manners that make them 
excusable even if not pardonable to some extent. The same vehemence with which 
truth was pursued was toned down when it came to the point of reprimand or 
punishment for these confessed truths. It was no error. It is part of the grand design to 
pursue truth without pursuing justice at the same level.  An interesting trend to diffuse 
confessed truth is the regular use of such refrains “ we admit” “things went wrong”  
“ we made mistakes” and so on., The question is after admitting, what next?  The 
narrative was such that it does not go beyond such admission. A cursory look at the 
excerpt below seems to confirm this. Sufficient alibis were provided for almost every 
revealed truth. It has, therefore, become imperative to quote extensively to show some 
instances where this essentially took place. The revelations that come with the 
chronology of narration that reveals the toughness of truth without justice is hard to 
break merely to avoid the long excerpt.  
Different parties to the conflict admitted that there were errors, 
mistakes and unintended consequences. Several parties contended 
that violence occurred precisely because of the grey areas that 
developed. At one of the hearings on children and youth, Mr George 
Ndlozi, reporting on the activities of SDUs, said things “went wrong” 
because they – had to depend on criminals and people took advantage 
of the situation. They ended up operating out of personal gain. Mr Niel 
Barnard, former head of National Intelligence, said at the hearings on 
the State Security Council: “It is true that instructions and mandates 
were sometimes vague and were communicated poorly [and] … in 
large bureaucratic institutions such as the public sector there is a 
danger that decisions and instructions are not formulated, conveyed 
and interpreted in a correct way.  Mr Johan van der Merwe, former 
commissioner of police, said at the State Security Council hearings 
that “we had to move outside the boundaries of our law”, leading to 
all sorts of blurred distinctions between acceptable and unacceptable 
methods. This point was also conceded by Mr FW de Klerk in the NP 
submission.  General Andrew Masondo, former political commissar 
of the ANC, admitted that they “could have made mistakes” as a result 
of disinformation or when they had to rely on young, inexperienced 
people in authority in the Quatro camp. (TRCR,1998: vol.5:267-268) 
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It was however discovered later that despite de Klerk’s use of innuendos and 
euphemisms to admit complicity, it was not unnoticed, but it was ignored and parallels 
were being sought from among the ANC who were reacting and resisting apartheid. It 
could not be understood ordinarily why such progenitors of apartheid were easily left 
off the hook. However, the theoretical analysis reveals that it was no error of omission, 
nor commission, but part of the design not to cripple the process. It was one of the 
things Tutu was subtly referring to when he warned against “casting the net too wide”. 
The danger of impunity was imminent, but greater is the crumbling of the entire 
process of peace and nation-building as well as the transfer of power from the white 
minority to the black majority in SA. According to,  
 Mr FW de Klerk, answering questions on widespread torture during 
the 1980s in the second NP submission, said: I’m not saying we were 
perfect … I’m not saying we didn’t make mistakes. Detailed 
operationalisation (of security policy) takes place at a much lower 
level … that is where, either through over-zealousness or a male fide 
approach, where things get out of hand. History has subsequently 
shown that, as far as the policy of apartheid was concerned, they were 
deeply mistaken. None of these unconventional projects was intended 
to lead to any gross violations of human rights … but … they did 
create an atmosphere conducive to abuses. (TRCR. 1998: vol.5:267-
268) 
The purpose of bringing in the ANC narrative here is to support the narrative that 
attempts to advance the no victim no vanquished agenda that is built into the process 
to tone down the effect of injustice in the interest of the dominant agenda. In the 
opinion of Tutu, the opportunity to complain of injustice and impunity was only 
afforded because the system successfully teleguided and allowed the main objective 
to thrive at all cost otherwise the consequence of unending civil war would have 
emerged. The presentation  here below, affirms that the,  
Former MK leader Mr Ronnie Kasrils, speaking during the 
Commission’s public debate on the notion of ‘just war’, said: “I’m not 
saying that there weren’t certain departures, certain aberrations”. 
Similarly, the ANC submission to the Commission reported concern 
in late 1987 regarding an increase in “attacks which did not accord 
with ANC policy”, conceding that “some incidents not entirely 
consistent with ANC policy did take place”. In its second submission, 
the ANC repeated that “mistakes were made”. In similar vein the UDF 
stated that the – … activities of the UDF and its allies, while making 
invaluable contributions to the democratisation of South African 
society, had many regrettable consequences. Even in the details of 
operations of bomb attacks, things could go wrong, mistakes were 
made. Regarding the explosion at the Krugersdorp magistrate’s court 
 
 
236 
 
adjacent to a “notorious security police branch”, Mr Mohammed 
Shaik told the amnesty hearing: I prepared two charges; one being a 
decoy which I placed in the toilet used by police officers in the court 
complex, the other being a car bomb. The decoy was to have exploded 
first, drawing out police officers, who in a few minutes would have 
cordoned, cleared and secured the area. Their presence would have 
been very near to the car bomb which was to explode minutes later. 
Unfortunately, the decoy failed to explode due to some malfunction. 
The car bomb detonated as planned. The intended aim of a large 
number of enemy personnel being killed, injured was not achieved. A 
civilian and two security branch members were killed. (TRCR,1998: 
vol.5: 267-268) 
Similarly, serious developments emerged where the implication of the kind of truth 
that people told and their consequences for the overall agenda of the TRC was further 
elucidated in the following excerpt, 
 In the Freedom Front submission, General Constand Viljoen also 
reported on mistakes of the former government. Referring to the NP 
government, in which he was chief of the defence force, he testified: 
Forty years of governmental control made them power-drunk. 
Expediency, manipulation, propaganda … and in the end the ruthless 
tactics of an unconventional sort to retain power – all these things are 
not necessarily part and parcel of the original concept of 
differentiation that prevailed within Afrikaner political thinking. The 
original motivation of the Afrikaner was not to rule others.  He argued 
further that errors were made due to the arbitrary powers given to 
ministers and “even officials in the security forces” during the states 
of emergency… because of the absence of normal checks and 
balances that would avoid misuse of these powers … most cases of 
gross violations of human rights resulted from these practices and they 
had the serious additional effect of keeping the public in the dark on 
these activities and creating a sense of fear and bondage in general 
that was not conducive to free and responsible citizenship. 
(TRCR,1998: vol.5: 268) 
It is interesting how the foot soldiers and implementers of apartheid were rounded up 
to give an account of their stewardship while their masters who made the policies and 
handed down implementation instructions were untouchable while their implementing 
boys were put on the spot. Again, the underlying narrative was not absoluteness, but a 
relatively perspectival one. It was not justice; it was the truth. It was not all inclusive 
bios but some exclusive zoe. The same geometry of analysis as expressed by NFP 
members above viz a viz their leader’s role is being reiterated here. Again, a mockery 
of the phenomenon of truth was exhibited here. Truth is revealed, where is justice? It 
has been pushed into irrelevance and not allowed political expressions because it will 
become inimical to the overall goal of societal peace and stability as here, expressed;  
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The primacy of the political context as an explanation for violence 
was persuasively put by General Constand Viljoen in the submission 
of the Freedom Front to the Commission. Regarding accountability, 
General Viljoen said: I still maintain it is unfair that the operators be 
exposed as the chief perpetrators of atrocities and violence in general 
when the politicians and strategy managers hide behind their status 
and positions. The iniquity of our past was of a political nature first, 
and mainly in that way a moral problem on an individual level. Mr 
FW de Klerk also confirmed the primacy of the political in creating 
the overall climate for subsequent violence. In the NP’s submission 
statement to the Commission in May 1997, he said: Let me state 
clearly that the National Party and I accept full responsibility for all 
our policies, decisions and actions. We stand by our security forces 
who implemented such policies. We accept that our security 
legislation and the state of emergency created circumstances which 
were conducive to many of the abuses and transgressions against 
human rights … We acknowledge that our implementation of 
unconventional projects and strategies likewise created such an 
atmosphere.(TRCR,1998:.vol.5:277-278) 
Breaking down the phenomenon of truth without justice, in his analysis is Anglican 
Bishop David Beetge. He acknowledges that there were astonishing revelations, 
especially of official and professional misconducts of doctors and allied professionals 
that were startling, incomprehensible and unethical. Despite that, navigating between 
such revelations of bitter truths without justice, but not with the intention of injustice 
was affirmed after some of these violations were revealed. For instance, it was 
remarked that,  
In South Africa, the roots of violence were partly political, but were 
also exacerbated by demographic and socio-economic circumstances. 
Socio-political factors, such as the structural, economic, cultural and 
racial inequalities imposed by the former state, led to and exacerbated 
violence…The objective conditions of inequality make it clear that 
South Africa is a highly stratified society, characterised by intense 
structural and institutional injustice and violence.  (TRCR. 1998: 
vol.5:142-143)  
There was a long narration of these startling revelations of dangerous violations from 
unexpected quarters that alarmed the society in a manner that questions the narrative 
of peace. Demonstrating this in the report of the TRC includes facts that, 
Doctors were alleged to have given advice to police on lethal chemical 
formulas that were undetectable or difficult to trace, and on ways to 
disguise torture methods. In the case of Mr Siphiwe Mthimkulu, the 
victim became very ill after his release from detention. Upon further 
investigation, it was found that he had been poisoned with thallium, an 
odourless, tasteless poison whose effects are delayed after ingestion. 
Siphiwe Mthimkulu disappeared in the year after he was released from 
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prison. Many people believe that only a medical professional or 
chemical expert would have had the knowledge to advise the police to 
use such a poison. Mr Amos Dyantyi told the Commission that he was 
severely tortured on the day of his detention in 1985. He almost 
suffocated when his torturers put a tube over his head. He was 
electrocuted by having electrodes inserted into his anus and suffered 
excruciating pain when a mechanical piece of equipment (like a 
jackhammer) was forcefully pushed into his stomach. The police were 
so concerned about his condition that a part-time district surgeon was 
called in to see him. Before he was taken to the hospital, the doctor 
allegedly told the Security Branch police to force porridge into his nose 
so that it would look as if he had suffocated on the porridge.. It is also 
believed that doctors advised interrogators how to administer electric 
shock. Initially, it was administered through clips or wires. However, 
the clips left marks that were detectable under a microscope. Professor 
Simpson, who worked extensively with detainees, reported that, once it 
became widely known that detection of electric shock was possible, 
there was a change in the way in which detainees described the 
administration of electric shock. Torturers poured water over the victim 
and administered the current over a larger area of the body. Because the 
area through which the current penetrated was larger, this method left 
no marks. Again, it is believed that it was health professionals who 
advised torturers on this less detectable method of electric shock. 
Professor Simpson noted that, once it was discovered that electric shock 
could still be detected by a blood test, electric shock was used less 
frequently. Doctors were also used by the SADF to develop weapons 
such as letter bombs and silencers for guns. In a recent amnesty 
application, a perpetrator admitted to working for an SADF front 
company which, posing as a commercial chemical company, developed 
weapons such as letter bombs and special weapons that could deliver 
small amounts of lethal chemicals. This application named several 
medical doctors who were involved in this 
operation.(TRCR,1998.vol.4:127-  128) 
Furthermore, there is an exciting dimension in the following statement concerning 
truth without justice. Particularly when we consider the tremendous systemic human 
right violations revealed above, which seems to confirm that, “while successful 
amnesty applicants could not be punished, the impact of public acknowledgement 
should not be underestimated.” There is evidence to support the argument that while 
it was a narration of “ truth without justice” yet it is not the case of “truth with injustice” 
or truth with no justice especially as “Perpetrators were not able to take refuge in 
anonymity or hide behind national amnesia”. 
In the words of Anglican Bishop David Beetge at a post-hearing follow-up workshop, 
in Reiger Park, on the 19th of  April 1997:  he argues that;  
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The truth always goes hand in hand with justice. We do not tell our stories 
only to release the dammed up tears that have waited years to be shed. It 
is in order that truth should be uncovered and justice seen to be done. 
Even though it is not the work of the [Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission] to pass judgement or sentence on the oppressors, it has led 
many perpetrators of crimes to seek amnesty. That is good for them. The 
[Amnesty Committee] may speak sternly and, in some cases, refuse 
amnesty. That rightly demonstrates that truth can be tough. The refusal 
to grant amnesty is a sign that the [Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission] is not a body setting out simply to show leniency, but, more 
especially, that it requires justice before there can be reconciliation. 
Reconciliation is not taking the least line of resistance; reconciliation is 
profoundly costly. (TRCR,1998: vol.1: 120)  
Summarily, the pursuit of the deconstruction that fulfils societal stability, which in this 
case is  “truth without justice” requires that the narrative must be tailored sufficiently 
to achieve that since Truth with justice would contribute more to the disunity of SA. It 
became imperative to pursue “truth without justice”  but clearly, there were systematic 
structures put in place to actualise this objective, and these were carefully built into 
the operation of the TRC. First, the rhetoric must first redefine the phenomenon of 
justice and delineate its boundaries with sufficient justification for the choice of the 
ensuing narrative.  This is evident in the report of the TRC that states as follows;  
 First, if justice is seen merely as retribution, it becomes difficult to 
make the appropriate connections between amnesty and justice. While 
both the interim Constitution and the Commission expressed strong 
opposition to acts of revenge, it is necessary, nevertheless, to 
acknowledge that the desire for revenge is an understandable human 
response. Suppressed anger undermines 
reconciliation.(TRCR1998:Vol.1:117)…Nonetheless, the tendency to 
equate justice with retribution must be challenged and the concept of 
restorative justice considered as an alternative. This means that amnesty 
in return for public and full disclosure (as understood within the broader 
context of the Commission) suggests a restorative understanding of 
justice, focusing on the healing of victims and perpetrators and on 
communal restoration. ((TRCR,1998:vol.1:118) …Most people do not, 
of course, wish crimes merely to be condemned. For many people, 
justice means that perpetrators must be punished in proportion to the 
gravity of their crimes. If one accepts, however, that punishment is not 
a necessary prerequisite for the acknowledgement of accountability, it 
is possible to see that qualified amnesty does contain certain of the 
essential elements required by justice. Thus, individual perpetrators 
were identified and, where possible, the circumstances that gave rise to 
the gross violations of human rights they had committed were explained. 
(TRCR,1998:vol.1: 119)…Thus, although the Commission did not 
offer retributive justice, placing the amnesty process within a broader 
framework is likely to contribute to formal justice in the long term. 
Instead of trading justice for truth, amnesty might, in the end, prove to 
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have been a more profitable option than the stark choice between truth 
and trials. In societies in transition at least, truth must be viewed as an 
important element in restoring the rule of law.(TRCR,1998:vol.1:122) 
Interestingly, Desmond Tutu made a very important remark below. The implication of 
this remark, further affirms this narrative of “truth without justice” more solidly. 
According to him,  
the disqualification or removal from public office of people who have 
been implicated in violations of human rights. The Commission 
considered this question carefully and finally decided not to 
recommend that this step be pursued. It is  suggested, however, that 
when making appointments and  recommendations,  political parties 
and the state should take into consideration the disclosures  made in 
the course of the Commission’s work (TRCR,1998: vol.1:3) 
Here Desmond Tutu seems to be throwing up a significant discourse, which is the 
question of impunity and justice. If implicated people not granted amnesty cannot be 
removed from public office by the committee, it then calls to question, the fundamental 
issue of the true autonomy, independence and sovereign authority of the commission. 
What this simply implies is that the commission may not have been designed to deliver 
justice in the first place. It appears that all it was meant to do was just camouflage that 
and in fact, deliver compromise and reconciliation, founded on the de-politicisation of 
the concept of the dominant themes such as those of forgiveness, in the interest of 
nation-building and societal peace and stability much more than the pursuit of justice. 
It is apparent that what Tutu is saying is that the truth that has been exposed, but not 
for the purpose of justice at least in the retributive sense, instead it is there to operate 
at a moral level, which boils down to the derived narrative of truth without justice. 
This is like sweeping justice under the carpet to give the impression of a tidy 
environment. This may yield temporary peace but it is there under the carpet and as 
time goes on it is not unlikely that such unfinished business could rear its head in some 
shapes or forms depending on the prevailing dialectics that unfolds and how it is 
consciously managed. 
7.7 Summary of The Chapter on Truth without Justice 
In this chapter, the concept of truth is pitched against justice, when, in fact, they 
complement each other. The contemporary criminal justice system uses all means to 
arrive at the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth because it is the essential 
ingredient required for justice to be dispensed. Inability to arrive at the real truth, often 
lead to the miscarriage of justice. Interestingly in this chapter, the purpose of truth was 
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not to achieve justice. Under the criminal justice system, the truth was a means to 
justice, but in South Africa, the truth was an end in itself. The narrative that emerged 
showed over the celebration of truth at the expense of justice. In the couplet, Truth was 
the independent variable that could not be tampered with. It is the variable that needed 
to be part of the elements that was designed to return peace and stability to South 
Africa. Of course, one element that stands in contrast to it is justice, and this needed 
to be deconstructed in a manner that it would be less fatal to the truth. Hence 
Agamben’s philosophy. The narrative showed that the Society was primarily eager to 
know all the hitherto covered truths, confession did that. The consequence of 
volunteering the truth was amnesty but having known the truth, the dominant rhetoric 
was the call for justice, and justice in the retributive sense would derail the entire peace 
process. So all kinds of narratives were brought to bear in order to deconstruct justice 
until it was no longer a potent instrument for the disruption of the peace process. 
Justice was presented variously as immoral because it was founded on the principle of 
vengeance. (an eye for an eye). To some hard-core, justice-seeking South Africans, 
The call for justice was allowed. But not the retributive justice type but the restorative 
justice which was presented as a superior form of justice because it was not founded 
on the principle of vengeance but the moral principles involving the restoration of the 
dignity of the people. Hence justice had to be deconstructed to a point where it could 
not threaten societal peace and stability. 
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Chapter 8: Findings, Conclusions and Prescriptions 
8.0 Introduction to Chapter on Findings and Conclusions 
This chapter presents the findings of this research systematically by trying to align the 
findings with the initial objectives set out at the outset of this work. The objectives 
were three in number. The purpose of setting the findings against the initial objectives 
was to gauge the extent to which those objectives had been achieved in the course of 
the research. Hence there will be a set of findings for each objective after which a set 
of relevant conclusions benefit would be drawn from the findings.   Finally, 
recommendations would be made in forms of prescriptions to the relevant bodies, 
institutions, individual stakeholders such as scholars, bureaucrats, technocrats, 
mediators, conflict experts, leaders of states and governments, Democrats and to those 
to whom this work would be of great significance. 
Summary of Initial Objectives 
1. The first objective relates to identifying the elements,  themes, principles and 
rhetorics that underlie the narratives, negotiations and the workings of the TRC 
which accounted for the ultimate success of the peace and stability process in 
apartheid, South Africa. 
2. The second objective relates to demonstrating how Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) can help unpack the understanding of the explicit and implicit ideas that 
were at the base of the South African transition from apartheid to majority rule. 
3. The third objective relates to articulating how Agamben’s theory of exclusive 
inclusion of the Homo Sacer can be coherently applied to the understanding, 
and interpretation of the complementary and contradictory narratives that 
ultimately determined the success of the South African transition from being a  
warring to a peaceful society? 
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8.1 General Findings 
8.1.1 Findings 1: 
Our findings in this research as it relates to the first objective is that we found 
that one of the significant elements that underlie the success of the peace process 
in SA is what scholars called; 
Appropriateness and ripeness of time.  Bercovitch (2005) It is argued that no matter 
how long conflict may have existed if the dynamics and contradictions that were at the 
base of the conflict have not exhaustively outplayed themselves, all intervention is 
likely to be unsuccessful. Again, if interventions come too late when inconceivable 
and irretrievable damages have been done, then resolutions may equally be difficult. 
This means that there is a point of equilibrium when intervention could yield results. 
However, scholars were, clear in maintaining that this point is unpredictable and could 
be dictated only by the peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of the conflict in question. This 
explains, possibly, why the negotiations of 1994/95 in apartheid South Africa were 
successful. This means that the time was just ripe for the capitulation of the forty-eight 
years’ apartheid conflict that seemed to have run its course. Bercovitch and DeRouen: 
(2004: 154-155) 
Furthermore, findings from the review of literature also reveal that significance is the 
appropriateness of the method of resolution. If the wrong or faulty approach to any 
given conflict is applied, the chances of success are slim.   Hence, researchers in the 
analysis of this problem have employed some mixed methods, quantitative and 
qualitative approaches, and yet the solutions to intractable conflicts seem still far away. 
Bercovitch and Derouen (2004:166) are of the view that this could be due to using the 
wrong approaches which explains why they argue, “Internationalized ethnic conflicts 
are generally acknowledged as the most difficult and complex conflicts to manage. Yet 
these conflicts too can be de-escalated, or be made less violent, especially if the right 
form of conflict management is chosen.”  In other words, for 48 years, it was reasonable 
to infer that defective approaches may have been continuously applied to the South 
African conflict that was why it remained unsuccessful. The problematic bit here is in 
identifying what the right approach would be for any given conflict. Hence, it is 
suspected that the success of the South African conflict this time around may have 
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been connected with the fact that the right appropriate approach was eventually 
adopted.  
As evident, this could mean internally generated mediation without external 
involvement. It could also mean the choice of Truth Commissions over War Crime 
Tribunals; even though Lansing and King (1998:761) already argued that the option 
of a Truth Commission in South Africa as against Crime tribunals was not a choice 
that South Africans had in view of the balance of power still tilting in favour of the 
white minority because according to them, “even though,” Apartheid may have been 
defeated, but its minions still dominated the police, army, and civil service." Thus, 
"success in the constitutional negotiations depended, to a large degree, on making a 
deal with the previous regime, and Nuremberg-type trials were not an option if the 
country was to reach democratic elections without a coup or chaos." Lansing and 
King :(1998:761). There is also the choice of ethics and morality as guiding principles 
over strict legalism, the choice of all-inclusive democratic transparency in the selection 
of the participants and key players in the implementation and negotiation processes,  
as well as the over-celebrated principle of forgiveness and amnesty over that of 
retaliation and punishment. That is not all, buttressing this argument  Llewellyn and 
Howse (1999:356) suggest that “the possibility that this may be a first best solution, 
an ineffective bromide where criminal prosecutions are inadequate, politically risky, 
or undesirable. This alternative view directly challenges the conception of justice that 
underlies criminal trials. It implies a radical reassessment of the means by which 
justice is done and the respective merits and drawbacks of the various techniques of 
dealing with the past.”  
Another essential element that is said to possibly have contributed to the return of 
peace to SA after such a long time is in its entirety, the institution of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, which is considered a significant stride for success in 
SA. This assertion was corroborated by Gibson who argued that the return of peace 
and stability to South Africa is largely ascribable to the TRC because  “South Africa's 
democratic transition is widely hailed as one of the most successful transformations in 
the world today. At a simplistic level, the difficult transition from apartheid to 
democracy was made with minimal bloodshed and political instability, something 
many regards as nothing short of miraculous. What accounts for this miracle? Most 
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observers are willing to attribute at least some responsibility to the country's truth and 
reconciliation process, as institutionalised in the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC), and its leader, Archbishop Desmond Tutu.” Gibson (2005:341) 
Furthermore, our findings under this first objective, also reveal that another factor that 
could have been responsible for the South African success story is what we may call 
the collective and convergent world condemnation of the statuesque. The world at 
that time seems tired of politicising the South African apartheid conflict by reaching 
the general point of consensus that apartheid was a philosophy that had gone out of 
fashion in the same way that slavery, imperialism and colonialism went. Hence, there 
was a general world condemnation of apartheid and its policies. Corroborating this fact 
is Taylor (2002:69) who argues that it was not surprising that “in 1968, the United 
Nations had declared the apartheid system, “a crime against humanity” Later; the 
World Council of Churches was moved to describe apartheid as a sin against God and 
humanity. Also, in 1985, the Kairos’s Document labelled the apartheid state “satanic” 
There is no doubt that such international condemnations, were in the long run 
contributory to the eventual capitulation of apartheid. (Taylor, 2002:69) 
Furthermore, it is reasonable to posit that the return of peace to South Africa after 48 
years could not have been unconnected, with subsuming it in a rigorous, 
sophisticated theoretical narrative that thrives within the principles of unity of 
opposites. This was actualised in the emergence and harmonisation of the seven 
paradoxical couplets in which complex and opposing narratives were reconstructed 
based on the principle of deconstruction of the absolute. At the same time, morality 
took precedence over legality, pacifism over retaliation, genuine peace over artificial 
reconciliation, Truth and restorative justice over retributive justice, unification over 
harmony, healing over forgetting, tolerance over friendship, amnesty over forgiveness 
and confession over remorse.  
Further findings reveal that the South African success story was a complex and 
complicated one achieved on the strength of an expensive trade-off involving 
justice,  The result was an arrangement, whose future stability and transferability are 
suspect. This fact was confirmed by Lansing and King :(1998:782-783)  who affirm 
that,  
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Peace returned to South Africa but at a high cost of justice, which 
creates doubt if the structure was replicable elsewhere because in 
South Africa, traditional notions of justice, such as retribution and 
punishment, have been circumvented in order to promote national 
healing. While this may be a good precedent for dealing with the 
political violence committed during a civil war in South Africa, 
whether other countries may base future settlements on this model will 
depend on several factors. The situation in South Africa is unique, and 
the Truth Commission model may or may not transfer to another 
country's situation. On an individual level, it is likely very difficult to 
accept a loss of personal justice for the good of the nation. While 
national healing is important, the loss of justice is a high price to pay 
for the individual victims”. Lansing and King :(1998:782-783)  
Another major factor that accounted for peace in Apartheid South Africa was the 
determination of the parties themselves to embrace peace through compromise 
and trust. This was juxtaposed against the Angolan situation, where they maintain 
that unlike in SA, in the Angola, conflict,  
The conflicting parties came to the negotiating table for the wrong 
reasons hoping to continue to play the zerosum games they played out 
on the battlefield so destructively. In this way, compromise was 
anathema and trust was non-existent. It was a negotiation to be 
dictated by Washington, Moscow and Lisbon but had no relevance to 
the situation on the ground in Angola… In the South African case, 
while political parties came to the negotiating table with fixed position; 
they maintained a flexible posture to ensure that negotiations did not 
stalemate, although all parties played brinkmanship to the extreme. 
Besides the willingness to compromise, the other distinctive character 
about the South African case is that the willingness to talk peace came 
from local actors themselves and was not engineered by international 
brokers.” (Gounden and Solomon, 2001:12)  
Further findings reveal that another major factor that facilitated the peace process in 
South Africa was precipitated upon what scholars called “leadership quality and 
sacrificial compromise based on national interest”. Hence, it is argued that South 
Africa is endowed with leaders who are propelled by national interest over and above 
every other consideration. This was made abundantly clear in the address of  Nelson 
Mandela in 1990 to a mammoth crowd in Durban, shortly after his release from 27 
years of incarceration, where he appealed to ANC supporters to embrace reconciliation 
in the national interest.” By ending political violence. (Gounden and Solomon, 
2001:14) 
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A significant factor that restored peace to SA was one element built into the system 
and process; it is the phenomenon of compromise and politically inclusive 
settlement. This fundamental ingredient that helped to return peace to SA and lack of 
it was said to have accounted for the failure of the Angola peace accord. Hence  “ The 
levels of trust are so low in the Angolan case, and the history is so checkered by 
indications of complete control on the levers of power that the politics of fear is as 
dominant a theme as is the politics of power. One of the main failures of the Bicesse 
Accords was its inability to recognise this fact and prepare the ground for a politically 
inclusive settlement as opposed to a “winner takes all” outcome” (Gounden and 
Solomon, 2001:15) 
Another significant finding that brought about the success of the South African peace 
process includes the availability of the necessary resources, personnel, skills and 
goodwill in South Africa to facilitate the resolution of the conflict and to sustain 
such a peace effort even after the agreement was reached hence. Buttressing this 
argument, Gounden and Solomon, (2001:19-20) argues that South Africa was blessed 
with a pool of skilled, well trained and highly competent negotiators such as 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu himself, the IFP’s Frank Mdlalose and the ANC’s, Jacob 
Zuma were said to have  played important roles in brokering local peace in South 
Africa .Justifying this argument further, these scholars named other facilitators such 
as the current President, “Cyril Ramaphosa, a trade union leader who honed his 
negotiation skills over years of negotiations in the labour management arena. The 
National Party negotiation team was led by Roelf Meyer, a seasoned negotiator who 
had received formal negotiation training and who honed his skills in government over 
several years. This meant that there were the necessary resources, skills and goodwill 
in South Africa to facilitate the resolution of the conflict and to sustain such a peace 
effort even after the agreement was reached.” (Gounden and Solomon, 2001:19-20)  
Our findings reveal that one major factor that may have undoubtedly contributed to 
the success of the South African Peace process is the choice of truth commissions, 
which made it best suitable for the South African situation. Justifying this argument, 
Minow maintains that truth commissions help the goal of healing and facilitates 
reconciliation and confession much more than prosecutions largely because of its 
extensive therapeutic role. Hence Monow concluded that “When the societal goals 
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include restoring dignity to victims, offering a basis for individual healing, and also 
promoting reconciliation across a divided nation, a truth commission again may be as 
or more powerful than prosecutions. The commission can help set a tone and create 
public rituals to build a bridge from a terror-filled past to a collective, constructive 
future. Individuals do and must have their responses to atrocity, but the institutional 
framework created by society can either encourage desires for retribution or instead 
strengthen capacities for generosity and peace.” Minow, (1998:348) 
An equally important finding that may have contributed to the peace process in SA 
may not be unconnected with the rigorous theoretical underpinning upon which 
the process was hatched. There was evidence that the South African TRC goes 
beyond what it appears to be on the face value, It is a non-flexible phenomenon, 
theoretically manipulative and backed up at different stages by rigorous theoretical 
underpinnings that need unpacking. Hence, The whole machinery in motion according 
to Moon, is thoroughly sank into some sort of political theoretical narratives involving 
“construction of the objects, subjects and concepts of the discourse” where subject 
refers to victims and perpetrators, object- human right violations, while type of 
enunciation refers to confessions and types of testimonial while concepts refer to types 
of violations, truth and reconciliation. Minow further argued that the theoretical 
objective here, was to propel the emergence of a model of reconciliation that has within 
it the dominant elements at play within the reconciliation process but curtailed in some 
forms where  the “TRC did not make it possible, nor provide a language within which 
people could say ‘I am not reconciled’, or ‘I do not forgive you’, or ‘I want you to be 
punished’, or ‘I do not confess or apologize for what I did’, or ‘I do not recognize this 
process’. It did not recognize non-reconciled outcomes as possibilities” (Moon, 
2006:264) 
 Finally, we discovered that one major element that facilitated peace in South Africa 
was an eclectic combination of a myriad of elements and factors that have one common 
denominator that is based on one recurrent element called “compromise”. Scholars 
describe it as a system in which the phenomenon of compromise and reconciliation 
were underlying every sector of the process as reflected in the TRC report and 
buttressed by Moon when she argues that.  “The TRC’s history conveys the message 
that ‘violence has been the single most determining factor in South African political 
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history’, but that, and crucially, only a reconciliatory politics could provide the 
necessary moral and lasting closure of violence, the inauguration of which symbolized 
a new order of existence coinciding with transition to the new regime (TRC, 1998: 1 
(2) 68). To the ‘victims’ of human rights violations, this narrative of truth and 
reconciliation offers the hope of deliverance from their traumatic experiences, and to 
the ‘perpetrators’, the narrative is a warning that contains, even although it does not 
enact, the possibility of retribution.” (Moon, 2006:265)  
8.1.2 Findings 2: 
Some basic findings that emerged from the second objective, which involves 
demonstrating how Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) can help unpack the 
understanding of the South African transition from apartheid to majority rule. 
Beginning with  Fairclough, 
Our findings reveal that despite the eclectic application of CDA in this research, the 
most fundamental version of CDA that we found much more relevant is the dialectical-
relational approach of Norman Fairclough. In the body of this work, we have variously 
shown how we applied it to the South African situation and all we are doing in this 
section is to demonstrate prescriptively how it can be applied. 
This Norman Fairclough’s model of CDA consists of three inter-related processes of 
analysis which are further tied to three inter-related dimensions of discourse. Namely; 
1. The object of analysis (including verbal, visual or verbal and visual texts). 
2. The processes by means of which the object is produced and received 
(writing/speaking/designing and reading/listening/viewing) by human 
subjects. 
3. The socio-historical conditions which govern these processes.  
Furthermore, to Fairclough, each of these dimensions requires a different kind of 
analysis1 text analysis (description), 2 processing analysis (interpretation), 3 social 
analysis (explanation). Fairclough's ( 1995:98) Janks(1997:329). Structurally, our 
analysis is basically that of Fairclough. 
The primary aim here is to demonstrate not just how we applied it in this thesis, but 
also how other upcoming researchers should apply it. 
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Step one-  The first step is a textual analysis which is descriptive. The object of 
analysis could be visual, verbal or textual or even a combination of all or some of them. 
At this stage, the researcher should completely detach himself, gather all the 
information available including, audio and video materials and subject them to 
indiscriminate rigorous study and gain sufficient understanding of all the nuances 
involved and present them descriptively. This is precisely what we did to the seven 
volumes of the truth and reconciliation commission report. It was quite laborious 
because it was a huge document and this bit took about two years to achieve for a full 
grasp to be possible. 
Step two- The second step is the stage of processing and making rational links and 
connection between emerging facts and narratives. This is the stage of interpretations. 
It is at this stage that meaningfulness is made out of the emerging facts. The reading 
of the documents here needs to go beyond the surface to a broader dimension that 
transcends the text. it is a movement that goes from sight to insight. This is the stage 
where we found that there were dominant and minor themes that animates the nation-
building process in SA. This was the stage when we listed them all and began to 
eliminate some of them that could be subsumed under other broader ones. We 
eliminated inconsequential facts, we examined the diachronic and synchronic nature 
of these concepts, and we looked at the pattern of arguments and the dominant 
narratives and overall objectives of the process. Finally, after reducing the concepts to 
a concise number, we observed the pattern of alliances and merging of the concepts. 
We allowed the elements to throw up themselves freely without emasculating them. 
We did not suppress any fact but understood them in the light of the dominant 
narratives. We noticed the tension between the elements and the emergence of the 
paradoxes in couplets with the identification of the criteria justifying their fusing. We 
noticed the pattern of deconstruction in which absolutist principles were made to give 
way to relative ones in the formation of the paradoxes. It was then ready to move to 
the third stage of the research. 
Step three-  This is the point when researchers should build flesh around the emerging 
theoretical principles and paradoxes. It is the point where we needed to show that the 
principles were not arbitrary derived but inherently buried within the analysed 
documents. It is to show that there are empirical facts in the body of the original 
documents that demonstrates and justify the claims and assertions that emerged as 
theories and principles upon which the peace process was hinged. This is the stage that 
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Fairclough calls social analysis. It is where the socio-historical conditions which 
govern these processes are espoused. In this thesis, this was where we demonstrated 
for instance that there is evidence in the document which supports such claims as 
“healing without forgetting” by citing series of instances where confession had opened 
up wounds of the heart and people have declared that they can never forget. Yet they 
are urged to forgive in the interest of overall societal peace and stability. 
However, the above analysis is a demonstration of how the Fairclough’s model of 
CDA was applied and can be applied in practical terms. Other subsequent elements in 
this section are fragments of findings on how different elements of CDA contributes 
to the overall objective of the methodology of this research. 
Hence, CDA generally, provided a coherent theoretical framework for understanding 
conflict analysis in apartheid South Africa. This was comprehensively espoused in the 
chapter on methodology In this chapter, it was revealed that CDA aims at making 
transparent the connections between discourse practices, social practices, and social 
structures. These are the kind of connections that might be opaque to the layperson.  
Fairclough, (1993:135)  
Similarly, it was also revealed that the unapparent theoretical relationship between the 
underlying philosophical theories of Agamben and the emerging paradoxes as they 
reflect in the ensuing narrative was critical to the resolution of the South African 
apartheid conflict. Furthermore, it also emerged that though CDA is quite diverse yet 
dwells on some four major themes, which includes Discourse, Critique, Power and 
Ideology, which were all relevantly espoused in the South African situation in South 
Africa. 
Also, we found out that through CDA we were able to actualise the rigorous analysis 
of text and language that goes beyond explicit to implicit elements that give rise to 
interpretation and meaning that emerged from the reading and analysis of the original 
seven volumes of the TRC report. Some of the main themes that CDA addresses finds 
direct equivalences in the South African situation. This was carefully articulated in the 
section on the methodology, for instance, the theme of Social Problems manifest as 
racial segregation,  while that of power relations as being discursive, captures the 
tension between apartheid and anti-apartheid forces. Again, the theme of discourse as 
constituting society and culture captures the entire history of social relations in South 
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Africa. While seeing discourse as ideological, gave credence to theoretical analysis. 
However, classifying discourse as historical captures the idea of migration and 
settlement to the extent that it gave room for the tracing down of inequality to the 
historical antecedents that preceded the Boar war in South Africa and the relinquishing 
of political authorities to the Boars by the British. Finally, the emerging narratives 
confirm that the connection between society and text is mediated. Hence discourse 
analysis is interpretative and explanatory and at the same time; discourse is a form of 
social action whose practical relevance is activated in Apartheid South Africa. 
(Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 271-80) 
Moreover, our findings in the use of CDA, in this research, further affirms that within 
the purview of the two major opposing  kinds of knowledge; empirical knowledge 
(knowledge derived from experience) and logical knowledge (which is derived from 
logical analysis)”  Delanty (1997:29)   We were able to operate effectively at the level 
of logical analysis using CDA to gather the information that was required for this 
analysis. 
It was also found out that because  CDA deals with how meaning is constructed, and 
power functions in society” Willig (2008) we were able to identify the dominant 
narratives and construct the couplets that animate the mediation process in apartheid 
SA in a manner that captures meaningfulness and power relations between the 
apartheid and anti-apartheid forces on the basis on which interpretation was concretely 
made. 
It was equally discovered that because CDA is “concerned with studying and analysing 
written and spoken texts to reveal the discursive sources of power, dominance, 
inequality and bias, as well as examining how these discursive sources are maintained 
and reproduced within specific social, political and historical contexts”.  Dijk (1998a), 
We successfully applied this in the analysis of the written text in the seven volumes of 
the TRC of South Africa.  However, we were able to isolate the dominant themes and 
arrive at the discursive source of power that lies with the cruel apartheid system in 
actualising dominance, inequality and bias as well as how these discursive sources 
which appeared in couplets of paradoxes are actualised within the transition from 
minority rule to majority rule. 
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Our finding also revealed that through the objective of CDA at making transparent the 
connections between discourse practices, social practices, and social structures, 
Fairclough, (1993:135) we were able to show that the unapparent theoretical 
relationship between the underlying philosophical theories of Agamben and the 
emerging paradoxes as they reflect in the ensuing narrative that brought peace back to 
South Africa. 
We equally discovered how Wodak and Meyer ’s model of CDA provided a general 
structural pattern for this research as demonstrated in their diagram in which they 
clearly outlined the four major segments of CDA, starting from the Discourse text, 
which is where the primary text and documents are vigorously studied and dissected. 
The next stage is where they are subjected to rigorous hermeneutic interpretations and 
analysis. The next stage involves the building of theories, concepts, principles and 
paradoxical formations which are transported to the next stage of operationalisation 
where they are concretely applied. In the case of South Africa, the Text and videos 
analysed were the proceedings of the TRC as contained in the seven volumes report. 
The discourse produced dominant themes that were subjected to interpretations at the 
2nd stage, this produced some kind of theories or paradoxes at the third stage and the 
final stage of operationalisation is where we examined how in concrete terms these 
paradoxes manifest themselves in the process of returning peace to South Africa. 
Wodak, R. and Meyer, M.,( 2009:24). 
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 Diagram adapted from Wodak, R. and Meyer, M.,( 2009:24). Critical discourse 
analysis: History, agenda, theory and methodology. Na. 
 
We also found out that with the use of CDA, we were able to streamline and identify 
the main subject matter of this research among competing discourses of societal peace 
and stability through the identification, collation and preparation of the main 
documents, which is The seven volumes of the TRC reports for analysis. Hence we 
were able to choose a discourse plane that makes the work unique and outstanding 
making it different from previous researches and as such, demonstrating why it is 
worth researching. Wodak and Meyer (2009:52)   
8.1.3 Findings 3: 
Our findings in this research as it relates to the third objective which is to the 
effect that Agamben’s theory of exclusive inclusion of the Homo Sacer can be 
usefully applied to the rhetoric and narratives that ultimately provided a 
coherent explanation for the complementary and contradictory narratives that 
together account for the transition from apartheid to democracy in South Africa 
 includes the fact that; 
It should be expressly stated that our interest is not in Agamben’s Homo Sacer per se, 
but in its relevance and application to the ideas and concepts that emerge in the process 
of dismantling apartheid. We argued extensively in this thesis that some of the 
principles of Agamben, finds a parallel in these ideas and provides a plausible 
explanation for the turn of events that brought peace back to South Africa after about 
48years of fierce ethnic rivalry and animosity. The particulars are as follows; 
We found out that Agamben identified a societal conflict with an originary violence in 
which any given modern society as a catalyst for societal reformation, and 
sustainability. Just as it is violence that produced the ban placed on the citizen in the 
polis which subsequently led to the emergence of the Homo Sacer, in the same light, 
it is the violence of apartheid and its condemnation, that led to its transformational 
ideas that formed the bedrock upon which the South African peace process was based. 
We also found in Agamben, what Foucault calls “decisive abandonment of the 
traditional approach to the problem of power”( Peter,2014:327). Hence Agamben’s 
solutions to the originary violence were the “ban”  which is a none conventional 
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approach in which the full citizen who has the two elements of bios and zoe was 
stripped of one of them to give way to the emergence of the Homo Sacer. A similar 
fate befell the ideas at the base of the South African peace process. Hence, 
unconventional approach to societal conflict and above all, that of justice was adopted. 
It is called “Truth and Reconciliation Process”, The ideas underlying this process 
emerged in couplets as in bios and zoe. However, just as in Agamben, unconventional 
stripping of the ideas emerged from complete state to incomplete one as it was with 
“ truth with justice”  losing the justice bit and becoming just “truth without justice” in 
a realm equivalent to that of the Homo Sacer. 
We also discovered that in the relationship between the Sovereign and the subjects, is 
defined by the state of emergency, which involves the use of unconventional laws. It 
is a situation where conventional laws were abandoned for emergency laws in 
exceptional circumstance which is not normal but replaces the rules as if it is normal. 
This manifestation made it possible for the unorthodox, incomplete ideas that emerged 
in the South African situation to thrive. For instance, the convention would have been 
to have “peace on the basis of reconciliation”, but emergency rule turned this to “peace 
without reconciliation” and the same narrative happened with all the seven paradoxical 
ideas of peace in South Africa These new unconventional ideas carried on as if they 
were typical in the drive towards societal peace. 
The political relationship between the sovereign and the subject in an 
emergency/conflict situation dissolves into bare life which is the “originary political 
element which is at the threshold of articulation between nature and nurture, zoe ¯ and 
bios” Peter(2014:330). This fact as observed characterises the South African Peace 
process; the new narrative is characterised by “bare idea” which is ordinary, flexible 
idea that is incomplete and indecisive and not very consequential as it is with bare-life. 
It also marked the Threshold of articulation defined by some thin midway between the 
ideas that are neither of the two extremes. This manifests in South Africa for instance 
“truth without justice” falls within the realm that is strictly” not of justice, nor is it of 
injustice” because “truth without justice is not the same as truth with no justice at all,” 
the same narrative affects all the others in the bracket. Hence “healing without 
forgetting” is not the same as healing with complete remembrance” It only 
presupposed that there are those permitted to be remembered and those to forget. 
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We also found out that just as it is “not the city but rather the camp that is the 
fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West” (Peter,2014:330). So also it affirms 
that stable political structure does not have to be based on the macrocosm but on the 
microcosm, which is why conformed ideas could not yield peace, but deformed ones 
did in South Africa. Hence, the narratives show that the holistic idea such as 
“confession with remorse” is within the macrocosm while “confession without 
remorse” is within the microcosm and this is one of the resolution ideas in South Africa.   
Peter, (2014:331) says Affirms that ‘in the conclusion of Homo Sacer, that Only a 
politics that will have learned to take the fundamental biopolitical fracture of the West 
into account will be able to stop this oscillation and to put an end to the civil war that 
divides the peoples and the cities of the earth? (p. 180)  The same is true of South 
Africa. It is only a political principle or narrative that have learned to take the mid-
way compromising idea in which absolute ideas are fractured and fragmented to give 
way to relative and manipulative ideas that could capitulate apartheid and put an end 
to the endless uprising and tension that perpetually created disunity among South 
Africans. 
Similarly, we also discovered that Agamben (1998:47) maintained that “every 
interpretation of homo sacer is complicated by virtue of having to concentrate on traits 
that seem, at first glance, to be contradictory. This exactly is the same fate befalling 
the ideas at the base of the South African peace process. The ideas truly seem quite 
complicated by virtue of the fact that at first glance, the resolution ideas seem 
contradictory, until they are fully unpacked. For instance “amnesty without 
forgiveness” or “Unification without harmony” or “tolerance without friendship” 
“ peace without reconciliation” all seem to make no sense at first glance until espoused. 
We also discover that the major characteristic of the Homo Sacer also applies 
accurately to the ideas underlying peace in the RSA. For instance, Agamben (1995:46-
47 says, “The sacred man is the one whom the people have judged on account of a 
crime. It is not permitted to sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will not be 
condemned for homicide; in the first tribunitian law, in fact, it is noted that "if someone 
kills the one who is sacred according to the plebiscite, it will not be considered 
homicide." This is why it is customary for a bad or impure man to be called sacred. … 
since while it confirms the sacredness of a person, it authorizes (or, more precisely, 
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renders unpunishable) his killing … The contradiction is even more pronounced when 
one considers that the person whom anyone could kill with impunity was nevertheless 
not to be put to death according to ritual practices. In what, then, does the sacredness 
of the sacred man consist? And what does the expression sacer esto ("May he be 
sacred"), …if it implies at once the impune occidi ("being killed with impunity") and 
an exclusion from sacrifice? …I am not unaware that it appears strange [mirum videri] 
to some people that while it is forbidden to violate any sacred thing whatsoever, it is 
permitted to kill the sacred man." Whatever the value of the interpretation that 
Macrobius felt obliged to offer at this point, it is certain that sacredness appeared 
problematic enough to him to merit an explanation. 
In the same vein, The “sacred idea” in the case of the RSA are those seemingly 
incomplete and contradictory narratives that have been judged to be underlying 
peaceful resolution and societal stability in the RSA. They are the seven contradictory 
paradoxes of peace and conflict resolution that emerged in the course of trying to bring 
an end to apartheid. It is not permitted to validly refute or reject and denounce 
( sacrifice) these ideas on the basis of rational consistency and logicality. However, he 
who (kills) or refutes and denounce the ideas on the grounds of inconsistency or 
contradictions if taken just on face value would not be criticised or condemned for 
(homicide) intellectual bankruptcy of lack of criticality. Hence just as it is “customary 
for a bad or impure man to be called sacred” in the case of the RSA, it is the incomplete, 
adulterated, half-measure idea that is called “sacred”. Hence “ peace on the basis of 
reconciliation” is not “ “sacred”. The “sacred idea” is “peace without reconciliation” 
and the same applies to all the other six couplets. Just as with Agamben who “confirms 
the sacredness of a person, it authorises (or, more precisely, renders unpunishable) his 
killing”, the same way as it is with the sacredness of the ideas of resolution in the RSA, 
its rejection based on face value is not considered, heretic or intellectually dubious. 
Hence, The contradiction is even more pronounced when one considers that the “idea” 
whom anyone could reject (kill) unquestionably from mere appearance,  was 
nevertheless allowed to be rejected when subjected to rigorous analysis. (according to 
ritual practices)   
The most essential element to emanate from this analysis is the fact of “exclusion that 
presupposes inclusion” “the ban” that excludes the man in Agamben from the Polis 
took him outside the protection of the Sovereign, into some unwitting divine protection. 
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(includes him as a target for  political assassination, and by that token, unwittingly  
excluding him from divine, annihilation) Makes him vulnerable to attacks and puts 
him, or exposes him to the danger of being killed by anyone, legitimately, but at the 
same time, confers on him,  some forms of impurity that immunises or excludes him 
from divine sacrifice. We discovered that within the RSA, this translates into the fact 
that the exclusion that allows the resolution ideas to be rejected on the face value 
without contradictions disallows it from being rejected within the critical analysis. 
Also, the very ideas that were rejected in their perfect forms were by the same token 
included in their imperfect forms. For instance, a peace that excludes reconciliation, 
in order to achieve peace, has already within it, fragmented or modulated form or traits 
of reconciliation. Without which peace in its entirety would have been unattainable. 
The same geometry of analysis was discovered operating within all the emerging 
paradoxes. 
However, for clarity, we have evolved a couple of concepts that were active in the 
research and had parallels in Agamben, as well as the ideas that underlie the South 
African peace process as follows; 
The Application of Agamben’s Theory to the Ideas that were At the Base of The 
Peace Initiative in Apartheid South Africa At A Glance- The red and blue colour 
coding was to differentiate Agamben’s ideas from its application on to the ideas 
in South Africa. 
In  Agamben’s Polis (society)-  Here, the individual in the society under a sovereign 
ruler is purely a Homo Sapiens or a citizen. He is a combination of 2 traits-Bios (social 
aspect) and Zoe (biological aspect) With these two in him; he is a complete, perfect 
personality. He was stripped of his  
The basis of the Conflict resolution idea in South Africa- Here the binary fusion of 
the complementary ideas at the base of the  peace process in apartheid South Africa is 
a pure and perfect complete idea which we could just name “ Peaceful Idea” It is a 
combination of 2 perfectly such as “peace with reconciliation” or “truth with Justice.” 
The Zone of transition- The dialectics of tension and conflict in the polis led to a 
sovereign ban of the Homo-Sapiens, and he was sent into exile. Before then, He was 
stripped of his bios and left with just the zoe. Hence he becomes incomplete and 
imperfect. He is only zoe without bios. 
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The Zone of the transition of the ideas- The deconstruction and reductionist process 
led to the transformation in which one half of the couplet was stripped of its 
completeness and perfection  such that  “peace with reconciliation” became “peace 
without reconciliation” and “truth with justice” became truth without justice.” 
Outside the polis in exile-  The Homo- Sapiens now in exile became  Homo- Sacer- 
meaning the Sacred One- The Sacred one is one that can be killed with impunity but 
cannot be sacrificed in a religious circumstance. He is only zoe without bios. 
When the idea  has been deconstructed-  The Perfect peace idea having been 
deconstructed became Idea- Sacer- meaning the Sacred idea- The Sacred idea is one 
that can be killed or denied or jettisoned on a face value that is devoid of rigorous 
criticality but cannot be rejected or thrown overboard when subjected to rigorous 
theoretical analysis. Eg. Peace without reconciliation can be rejected as senseless and 
inconsistent when considered on the face value but would be seen as pregnant with 
meaning when further subjected to rigorous analysis. 
Features and implications of Agamben’s Philosophy-    
- Homo Sacer- is the Sacred man Life caught in the sovereign ban is regarded as 
sacred that is Homo Sacer can be killed but not sacrificed.  
- Bare-life is a worthless, incomplete and imperfect life of impurity and partiality 
such as a life with zoe only but without bios  
- The zone of indistinction between sacrifice and homicide- a death which is 
neither sacrifice nor homicide  
- Also, The original political relation is the ban (the state of exception as a zone 
of indistinction between sacrifice and homicide- a death which is neither 
sacrifice nor homicide  
- Also, The original political relation is the ban (the state of exception as a zone 
of indistinction between outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion). Excluded 
but inclusive 
Features and implications of the ideas- 
- Homo Sacer- “Sacred man” translates to “Idea –Sacer,” i.e. “Sacred idea.” 
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- Bare-life Translates to “Bare- ideas,” i.e. an imperfect idea such as peace 
without reconciliation is “bare-idea” as it is an impotent and incomplete idea 
that does not have the full capacity to obliterate any major upset 
- Excluded but inclusive The homo sacer ‘is in a continuous relationship with 
the power that banished him precisely insofar as he is at every instant is 
exposed to an unconditional threat of death’ which is why it is excluded but 
included in some altered fragmented form. 
- Life caught in the sovereign ban is regarded as sacred that is Homo Sacer can 
be killed but not sacrificed. Hence, in the same manner, the Idea Sacer can be 
killed but not sacrificed: For instance, how can you talk about peace without 
reconciliation when common sense has it that, there can never be peace without 
reconciliation because it is the peace that leads to reconciliation. Hence, the 
ideas can be attacked and killed for appearing incompatible with common 
sense at the layman’s level, but it cannot be jettisoned under rigorous 
theoretical analysis or intellectually ritualised thought system that is 
philosophically and analytically based. Hence, the sacredness of the idea 
means that the ideas cannot be sacrificed .jettisoned, repudiated or annihilated 
on a platter of the rigorous intellectually ritualised circuit for being illogical, 
irrational or inconsistent without one being guilty of intellectual bankruptcy 
and lack of criticality.  
- Whereas on the other hand, the “Idea Sacer” can be thrown out, repudiated and 
annihilated for being inconsistent and incongruence with common sense 
expectation and logicality. 
- The zone of indistinction between sacrifice and homicide – refers to death, 
which is neither sacrifice nor homicide. However, when related to ideas, it is 
the zone that falls midway in between the excluded extremes.  For instance 
truth without justice does not mean truth with injustice; it only means that it 
falls within the moderation line that is not full-scale justice neither is it outright 
injustice    
- Also, The original political relation is the ban (the state of exception as a zone 
of indistinction between outside and inside, This is the zone that lies between 
the complete and perfect idea and the imperfect idea such as Truth with justice 
and truth without justice 
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- Again, The zone of in-distinction between sacrifice and homicide Just as we 
shall have truth without justice lying between a zone that is neither of truth nor 
of falsehood and again, neither of justice nor of injustice  
8,2  Contribution to Knowledge   
• The peculiar use of CDA as an instrument of critical examination, to decipher,  
evaluate,  analyse, interpret and extrapolate information in such a systemic and 
systematic manner, that threw up all the crisscrossing rhetoric that  animates 
the peace and  nation-building mechanism, buried implicitly and explicitly 
between  and within the TRC report of SA,  is an original contribution to 
knowledge. 
• Emergence and identification of the dominant themes in line with the ensuing 
narratives that animate the mediation processes is an original contribution to 
knowledge. 
• Discovering of and how the seven paradoxes at the base of the peace process 
in South Africa emerged and fuses in couplets that ultimately de-fuses the 
South African apartheid conflict, is an original contribution to knowledge. 
• The identification of broad implication and uniformity in the way the seven 
paradoxes ultimately actualises itself in a consistent pattern where absolutist 
ideas, seemed to have been deconstructed to allow for relativism in the 
interpretation and implementation of every element that animates the nation-
building process is an original contribution to knowledge. 
• The interpretation, application and adaptation of  Agamben’s philosophy of 
exclusive inclusion of the homo sacer into the realm of ideas in interpreting the 
dynamics that took place in the founding of the political and nation-building in 
Apartheid South Africa is an original contribution to knowledge. 
• The discovery of the seven complementary couplets and their transition to 
paradoxes that were at the base of the successful transition from dictatorship to 
democracy as outlined in the accompanying diagram is an original contribution 
to knowledge. 
8.3  Conclusions of Thesis 
From the preceding, it is reasonable to conclude that the Transition of Apartheid South 
Africa from being a society deeply engulfed with an intractable racial conflict for about 
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48years to being a democratic society whose intractable conflict eventually and 
effectively ended in 2005 is a significant stride in international relations mainly 
because it was unexpected. 
Another major factor that could have contributed to the so-called South African 
Miracle may not be unconnected with the fact that the process was based on principles 
that were sophisticated and theoretically rigorousness. There were indications of 
influences of scholars such as Derrida, Foucault, Agamben, Habermas, Heidegger, or 
even some hybrid of German idealism or some postmodernists scholars.  
An extensive review of relevant literature reveals that this South African success story 
in 1994/1995 may not have been totally unrelated to what conflict experts call  “the 
ripeness theory” in international relations. It is a theory that suggests that the success 
of the intervention in age-long conflicts cannot be divorced from the fact that the time 
for peace was naturally ripe. It is often argued that if intervention comes too late or too 
early, peace will remain elusive. Bercovitch (2003,2004) 
There is sufficient evidence to suggest that the lack of direct external involvement in 
the mediation process, which was entirely home-grown could have significantly 
contributed to the success of the mediation process.  Prominent among such scholars 
who  made this claim includes, Guelke (2005) who maintained that “the absence of 
international involvement, in the negotiations that brought about peace to South 
Africa’s political settlement has been touted by some of the participants as one of the 
ingredients of the success of the process” (Guelke, 2005:188)   
Pieces of evidence from the rigorous study of the TRC report reveals that the emerging 
narratives seem to tie the success of the South African peace process to the quality and 
qualification of the personnel, as well as the openness, sincerity and all-inclusive 
democratic manner in which the members of the truth and reconciliation committee 
were selected. That accounted for the trust and confidence that the people reposed on 
the commission TRCR, (1998: vol.1) 
The articulation and emergence of the complementary and contradictory paradoxical 
couplets upon which the peace process was hatched, clearly undermines the principle 
of perfection but rather endorses the idea of incompleteness, defectiveness, 
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imperfection, compromise as the only authentic and realistic element that could lead 
to lasting peace in Apartheid South Africa. Hence peace could not be achieved until 
such relatively absolute ideas such as peace on the basis of complete, true and genuine 
reconciliation was deconstructed to produce such defective element as “peace without 
reconciliation” others are “healing without forgetting”, “tolerance without friendship”, 
unification without harmony”, confession without remorse”, Amnesty without 
forgiveness”, and “truth without justice”. 
There is evidence in this research to support the assertion that solutions to societal 
peace do not lie exclusively in complementarities and perfection. They could exist in 
mutually exclusive contradictory narratives, especially if they are deeply entrenched 
within a rigorous theoretical analysis. 
In the analysis of the above couplets, we discovered that the fundamental underlying 
narrative that consistently cut across these emerging narratives include the fact that 
ethics and morality took precedence over legality. Scholars  such as Gounden, V., & 
Solomon, H.: (2001), Avruch, K. and Vejarano, B 2001,.2002) including Desmond 
Tutu in TRCR: (1998) suggests that the very choice of Truth Commission over War 
Crime Tribunal, as was the case in Nuremberg was a choice between compromise and 
justice. Moreover, the peculiar case of South Africa dictated that it was the best option 
given the balance of powers at that time. Even the analysis of the emerging couplets 
such as that of “truth without justice”, “confession without remorse” and “amnesty 
without forgiveness” as they manifest in the ensuing narratives seem to give credence 
to this fact that ethics and morality are more potent instruments of nation-building and 
societal stability than strict legalism. 
There were also evidences to conclude that the principles of moderation, of 
compromises, of relativist ideas over and above absolute ideas, were substantial in the 
attainment of societal peace and nation-building in the RSA. 
It is interesting to note that what emerged from the complicated narratives involving 
the negation of absolutist principles only succeeded in producing an imperfect and 
uneasy peace. The result is that the sustainability of such peace in the nearest future 
would depend substantially on the delicate ability of the state and its apparatus to 
manage the unfinished businesses and unfolding contradictions that were either swept 
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under the carpets, ignored, suppressed or temporarily diffused in the interest of 
immediate societal peace and stability. 
 
The diagram below is a summation of how the different aporias give rise 
the fragile peace without genuine reconciliation even though that was 
what was feasibly possible if any iota of peace was going to be achieved. 
 
The original objective/goal of societal peace and nation-building in SA begins with; 
 
 
 
7. Fragile peace 
without genuine 
reconciliation
1. Confession to 
gross violation 
without remorse
2. State pardon or 
amnesty without 
individual pardon 
or forgiveness
3. Truth without 
justice
4. Healing without 
forgetting
5. Tolerance 
without friendship
6. Societal 
Unification 
without harmony
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8.4  Prescriptions based on Findings 
These prescriptions are for nation-builders, conflict resolution experts, scholars, 
researchers, governmental technocrats, diplomats, political leaders and stakeholders of 
states and societies torn apart by age-long intractable conflicts. 
These prescriptions are not ambitious to make outlandish claims of being blueprints 
that could turn the fortune of intractable conflicts around on the globe by making them 
tractable because of the limitation of the research. Although we initially set out in 
search of a new but most effective approach to intractable conflicts that could 
transcend the already existing not so effective third-party mediation.  Interestingly 
what we eventually found out were principles that were effective in Apartheid South 
Africa, which may not be generalizable given the socio-cultural and historical 
peculiarities of SA. 
This research also reveals that war crime tribunals based on the principles of retributive 
justice were becoming less fashionable and more ineffective than of Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions that are founded on the principles of morality and 
restorative justice.  
There is no doubt however that there are lessons to learn from the South African 
situation that could be contributory to the agenda of peace and nation building 
anywhere in the world as long as adaptation is made before adoption. Based on these, 
we, therefore, make the following recommendations for any society still under the 
yoke of intractable conflicts to borrow significantly from this South African 
experience as follows; 
It is suggested that even though no specific timing is possible to recommend as the 
appropriate ripe time for intervention in a conflict, it must be recognised that too early 
or too late in intervention in a conflict may not yield a positive result. However, 
conflicts in which both the aggressor and aggressed seem tired of sustaining the 
momentum and the dynamics of the conflict have already outplayed itself, would most 
probably succumb to intervention much more quickly. 
It is also recommended that ethical principles should supersede legal ones in the 
establishment of the mode of operation in conflict resolution, which is why truth 
commissions should be given priority over judicial tribunals. 
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The process of selecting participants and mediation personnel should be democratic 
and transparently inclusive with distinguished and accomplished individuals whose 
knowledge and charisma are highly saluted and accepted by the people. 
It is also recommended that the resolution process should not be shrouded in secrecy, 
insincerity, or obscurity but should be made open and transparently done in public 
glare covered by both manual and electronic media. Hence, There must be 
transparency, honesty and sincerity of purpose involved within the triad of the 
mediator, mediated and the mediation. 
It is also reasonable from this research to recommend that any such mediation process 
should be richly rigorous and theoretically based. Scholars and mediation experts must 
think outside the box in addressing the totality of the elements of the conflict to ensure 
there is a full understanding of even the unapparent and unexpressed as well as 
inexpressible tensions and elements of the conflict. This is why it is necessary to avoid 
stiffening full articulation of opposing elements and the willingness to accept both the 
complementary and contradictory narratives that may emerge in the process in order 
to achieve positive results.  
Hence, the principles of sacrifice, non-retaliation, of compromise, of the blend of 
equity and equality must be carefully harnessed and allowed to fester. 
Finally, it is prescribed that the following principles must be adopted and adapted 
where possible, and these are the principles of peace even if without reconciliation. 
Those of truth even if it is without justice, of amnesty even if it will be without 
forgiveness, of healing even though forgetting was difficult, of confession despite 
being unremorseful, of unification despite disharmony and finally of tolerance without 
friendship.  
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